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[1995] ZASCA 148
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Langeberg Voedsel Bpk. v Sarculum Boerdery Bpk. (64/94) [1995] ZASCA 148; 1996 (2) SA 565 (SCA); (28 November 1995)

SaakNo 64/94
IN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA
(APPèLAFDELING)
In die saak tussen :
LANGEBERG VOEDSEL BEPERK Appellant
vs
SARCULUM BOERDERY BEPERK Respondent
CORAM
: JOUBERT, HEFER, STEYN, MARAIS et
SCHUTZ ARR
AANGEHOOR
: 10 NOVEMBER 1995
GELEWER
: 28 NOVEMBER 1995
UITSPRAAK
HEFER AR
:
2
In die bevel waarteen geappelleer word, word die appellant gelas om
vergoeding aan die respondent te betaal vir skade wat laasgenoemde
gely het as
gevolg van die gedeeltelike mislukking van sy suikermielie-oes weens 'n verborge
gebrek in saad wat die appellant aan
hom verskaf het. Wat in geskil is, is of
die respondent voldoende getuienis voorgelê het om die appellant se
aanspreeklikheid
vir gevolgskade te grondves.
In die besonderhede van die respondent se vordering is die eis
gefundeer,
eerstens, op 'n bewering (in paragraaf 5) dat
die appellant die geskiktheid en
goeie gehalte van die saad uitdruklik of stilswyend gewaarborg het.
Tweedens
word in paragraaf 3(b) beweer dat die appellant :
"onder andere handel gedryf [het] as verskaffer van plantsaad, insluitende
suikermieliesaad...en openlik voorgegee dat dit ten opsigte
van die saad oor
eienskappe van bedrewenheid en deskundige kennis
beskik."
Hoewel die betrokke bewerings in die
verweerskrif ontken is en by die
3
verhoor steeds betwis was, het die verhoorhof bevind dat 'n waarborg
stilswyend verleen is en dat die bewerings in paragraaf 3(b)
bewys is. Die
respondent is gevolglik gelyk gegee op beide grondslae van sy eis.
In hierdie hof is namens die appellant aangevoer dat nóg die een
nóg die ander skuldoorsaak bewys is. Aangesien ek van
oordeel is dat die
eis tereg toegestaan is op grond van die bewerings in paragraaf 3(b) van die
besonderhede van vordering is dit
onnodig om die getuienis ten opsigte van die
bewerings in paragraaf 5 breedvoerig te bespreek. Gedagtig aan die vereistes
gestel
in sake
soos Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial
Administration 1974(3) SA 506 (A) op 532H-533C, Standard Bank of South
Africa
Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc and Others 1983(1) SA 276 (A) op 292B-C
en Delfs v Kuehne & Nagel (Pty) Ltd 1990(1)
SA 822 (A) op
827B-828B,
volstaan ek met die opmerking dat die verhoorhof se bevinding dat 'n
stilswyende waarborg bewys is nie ondersteun kan word nie.
4
Die bewerings in paragraaf 3(b) is geskoei op die lees van die
uitspraak
in Kroonstad Westelike Boere-Ko-operatiewe
Vereniging Bpk v Botha and
Another 1964(3) SA 561 (A) op 571G-572A
waar die reël neergelê is dat :
"liability for consequential damage caused by latent defect attaches to a
merchant seller, who was unaware of the defect, where he
publicly professes to
have attributes of skill and expert knowledge in relation to the kind of goods
sold...Whether a seller falls
within the category mentioned will be a question
of fact and degree, to be decided from all the circumstances of the case. Once
it
is established that he does fall within that category, the law irrebuttably
attaches to him the liability in question, save only
where he has expressly or
by implication contracted out of it."
Soos prof JC de
Wet aangedui het in 1964 Annual Survey of South
African Law 103 ev is die gedeelte van die reël wat ek gekursiveer
het, 'n
kwalifikasie wat hierdie hof toegevoeg het tot Pothier se uiteensetting
in Traité
du Contrat de Vente 214 van handelaars se aanspreeklikheid (naas
dié van
fabrikante) vir gevolgskade as gevolg van latente gebreke. Prof de Wet
het so
'n toevoeging ondersteun op grond van die verandering wat die handel
sedert
5
Pothier se dae ondergaan het. Inmiddels het meer as dertig jaar weer
verstryk waartydens nuwe handelsware en bemarkingstegnieke die
lig gesien het.
Van die uitgesproke verwagting in die Kroonstad Wes saak (op 572A-C) dat die
howe sou bydra tot die verdere ontwikkeling
van die reël of dat die
wetgewer sou ingryp, het egter niks gekom nie. (Vgl Holmdene Brinkworks (Pty)
Ltd v Roberts Construction
Co Ltd 1977(3) SA 670 (A) op 682fin-683C; Sentrachem
Bpk v Wenhold 1995(4) SA 312 (A).) Of die reël soos dit destyds geformuleer
is tans nog geregverdig kan word, is debatteerbaar (vgl Jean Davids se artikels
in
81 (1964) SALJ 419
en
83 (1966) SALJ 87).
In die onderhawige geval het beide
advokate egter die aangehaalde uiteensetting as 'n juiste weergawe van die
huidige stand van die
reg aanvaar. In die lig hiervan en van die getuienis
waarna aanstons verwys sal word, ag ek dit nie nodig om my verder oor die
onderwerp
uit te laat nie.
Die enigste vraag wat in die betoë geopper is, is of die appellant
bewese
6 'n handelaar is wat sigself as bedrewe ten opsigte van
suikermieliesaad teenoor
die publiek voorgehou het.
Die eerste grond waarop namens die appellant aangevoer word dat dit
nie
die geval is nie, is dat die appellant nie as 'n
saadhandelaar beskou kan word
nie. Hierdie submissie hou geen steek nie. Dit blyk uit die getuienis dat
die
appellant by uitstek 'n verwerker en inmaker van vrugte en groente is wat
in
onbewerkte vorm van kwekers aangekoop word. Ten einde die toevloei
van
voldoende voorrade onbewerkte produkte te verseker, word kontrakte
met
geselekteerde kwekers aangegaan vir die aankoop van bepaalde
hoeveelhede
produkte wat nog geproduseer moet word, en soms nog nie eens aangeplant
is
ten tye van die aangaan van die kontrak nie. In laasgenoemde gevalle
(waarvan
die onderhawige een van vele is) skryf die appellant self die kultivar
van die
besondere vrugte of groente en die soort saad voor en verskaf self die
saad wat
aangeplant moet word deur dit van erkende saadhandelaars te koop en weer
teen
7
'n wins aan kwekers te verkoop. Die blote feit dat sy saadhandel beperk
is tot die verkoop van saad aan kwekers en nie aan die algemene
publiek nie
ontneem die appellant klaarblyklik nie die status van 'n handelaar vir
doeleindes van die bepaling van sy aanspreeklikheid
vir gevolgskade
nie.
Die res van die betoog namens die appellant behels 'n aanval op
die verhoorhof se bevinding dat die appellant sig voorgehou het as
'n bedrewe
saadhandelaar. Ek is nie van voorneme om die gronde waarop die aanval geloods
word, volledig te bespreek nie. Die bevinding
berus hoofsaaklik op die manier
waarop die appellant jarelank teenoor sy kwekers opgetree het. Soos reeds
aangedui, was dit die appellant
wat voorgeskryf het watter kultivars geproduseer
moes word en watter soort saad gebruik moes word, en het die appellant inderdaad
self die saad verskaf. Op sigself getuig hierdie optrede natuurlik nie
noodwendig van 'n deskundige seleksie van kultivars en saad
nie; trouens, die
getuienis is tot die effek dat kwekers beperk is tot een voorgeskrewe
8
kultivar met die oog eenvoudig op 'n eenvormige eindproduk en dat 'n
bepaalde soort suikermieliesaad voorgeskryf is eenvoudig omdat
dit in die
verlede met groot sukses gebruik was. Van die werklike beweegredes het kwekers
egter nie geweet nie. Vanuit hulle oogpunt
gesien, was dit nie onredelik nie om
die appellant te beskou as 'n ondememer wat, weens sy jarelange ondervinding in
die bedryf,
oor deskundige kennis van kultivars en saad beskik het en daarom
presies geweet het wat om voor te skryf. Hierdie indruk was ongetwyfeld
versterk
en bevestig deur die feit dat appellant se veldbeamptes kwekers gereeld op hulle
plase besoek het waar hulle soms die grootte
van die grond wat 'n kweker moes
beplant bepaal het, behulpsaam was met die berekening van die hoeveelhede saad
wat benodig sou word
en die verwagte opbrengs daarvan, planttye vasgestel het,
die vordering van aanplantings dopgehou het en inligting aan kwekers verskaf
het
oor planttye, plantmetodes, bemesting en onkruid- en plaagbestryding. Optrede
van hierdie aard skep ongetwyfeld die indruk van
9
deskundigheid en kwekers sou kwalik kon raai dat sekere veldbeamptes
inligting aan hulle deurgegee het wat hulle (die beamptes) ook
maar van die
verskaffers van produkte soos onkruid- en insektedoders ontvang het. Myns
insiens het die verhoorhof tot die korrekte
gevolgtrekking gekom.
Die appêl word van die hand gewys met
koste.
J J F HEFER AR
STEM SAAM
:
JOUBERT AR STEYN AR MARAIS AR SCHUTZ AR
SCHUTZ JA
:
Whilst agreeing with the judgment of my brother Hefer, I
must
admit to having had difficulty in applying the test
in the
Kroonstad
case (above) to the facts: facts of a kind common in
modem commerce.
The appellant recommended, indeed required the use of a particular
cultivar, Commander. If that cultivar had been unsuitable there
would have been
little difficulty in concluding that the appellant had guaranteed suitability.
But there was nothing wrong with Commander
as such. The evidence is that it is a
good seed, fit for the use intended. The problem lay in the individual seeds in
the sealed
packets delivered to the appellant
3
and in turn by it to the respondent. For some reason they were defective,
and there is no evidence that the appellant had a practical
means of finding
that out; or had failed to buy its stock of Commander from a reputable seed
merchant. Quite how does one spell a
profession of expertise out of such a set
of facts?
On a date lost in the annals of the ancient Roman republic the curule
aediles imposed a new rule upon sellers of slaves in the markets
under their
control, a rule which is still the foundation of our law of liability for latent
defects. Sellers were to apprise purchasers
of any disease or defect in their
wares, as also of certain unbecoming propensities considered worthy of special
mention, such as
running away, loitering on errands and subjection to noxal
surrender: D 21.1.1.1
4
(Watson's translation). The purpose of the aediles' edict (as it was
called) was to check the wiles of vendors and to give relief
to purchasers
circumvented by them. However, the real innovation was that the seller was
liable even if he was ignorant of the defects
required to be declared (D
21.1.1.2). The justifications for the rule were expressed thus: "There is
nothing inequitable about this;
the vendor could have made himself conversant
with these matters; and in any case, it is no concern of the purchaser whether
his
deception derives from the ignorance or the sharp practice of his vendor"
(loc cit).
This is an instance of the imposition of a clear general rule of law, the
generality of which renders it unnecessary to enquire in
each instance whether
the considerations motivating the rule are present - in this case
5
fraud or carelessness on the seller's part. However the aediles may have
thought about the matter, today we would call their decision
one of
policy.
Although the grounds of liability were extended, the extent of liability
in money where latently defective goods were sold was limited
below the level
for ordinary breaches of contract - except in cases of fraud or consensual
warranty (ie warranty over and above that
now implied by law). By the time of
Voet the limitation had fallen away in the case of the artifex or craftsman
(Voet Commentarius
Ad Pandectas 21.1.10). He was liable also for consequential
loss. Today we commonly refer to this person as a manufacturer. This
usage tends
to conceal but also to reveal important changes in commerce, as will be
6
discussed later. Pothier, speaking for the France of his
day, in his Traité
du Contract de Vente 214, says that the artisan (Voets'
artifex or Gane's
craftsman) who sells goods of his own manufacture, by the
profession of
his art, spondet peritiam artis (guarantees his
skill). If he does not work
alone but employs workmen he should
employ none but good workmen.
Pothier goes further than Voet and
equates the tradesman who
makes a business of selling the products
of others to the artifex. By
professing his trade he renders himself
responsible for the goodness of
merchandise which he sells. Again
the basis of liability is his public
profession of his trade, and
the reason for it: "he ought to expose for sale
none but good
articles. He ought to have knowledge of his wares, and
ought to sell
none but good" (Gushing translation 132). As in the case
7
of the aediles' edict a clear rule of law is stated: he who deals in
particular goods warrants their quality: and again it is not
necessary to
enquire in each case whether the considerations motivating the rule are
present.
The effect of the
Kroonstad
decision was to limit the Pothier
rule, in my opinion, in a manner so as to elevate the reasons for the rule to
the rule itself.
I am not the first to have expressed this opinion. It was
advanced by Jean Davids in 1966 at p 88 of her article referred to in the
main
judgment. The result is that the rule requires the investigation of the presence
or absence of the reasons in each case.
By the time of the decision in 1964 conditions of manufacture and
marketing had changed, probably more since Pothier's time than they
had
8
changed from that of the aediles to his. The policy decision in the
Kroonstad
case, going beyond Voet or any other Roman Dutch authority, was
rendered possible by the fact that the "Pothier rule" had been applied
or
approved in a number of Southern African decisions, but with much difference as
to its exact content. As the scope of its application
was commercially
important, the certainty sought to be achieved was welcome. But in its search
this Court, in my respectful opinion,
rather overlooked that the reasons that
had made the rule appropriate to the mid eighteenth century were largely
anachronistic in
the mid twentieth century. With the passing of time they have
become more so. That is why I find that the rule in
Kroonstad
is
difficult to apply in present day conditions. It is not a simple rule: its
application must often involve
9
artificiality because its premises are not those of our
time.
Let us go back to the facts of this case. The appellant was
little more than an unwitting conduit. Breaching the seal would have vitiated
the guarantee of the seed merchant from which it had bought, little as that
guarantee was. Absent some manifest morbidity in the
content of the packets
there was little it could do to check effectively. But the rule is not concerned
with manifest defect but
with latent defect. The overall result is that it is
artificial to speak of a profession of skill in relation to the seeds themselves
- yet that is part of the factual enquiry envisaged by the rule in the
Kroonstad
case. It is true that the appellant could be careful in
choosing its supplier. But even such care would be no fast fortress. Reputations
are often based upon the marketing department and
10
not the manufacturing department. And even reputations once soundly based
may become undeserved due to secret capitulation to the
siren of market share.
Before these things eventually become exposed they may remain concealed, often
under near-impenetrable plastic
packing.
This is but one example of the way in which commerce has changed. The
merchant is denied the opportunity to see, to feel or to smell
the produce that
passes through his hands. He can as little examine the metal in the bearings as
the beans in the tin or the chip
in the computer.
There are many other examples of how commerce has changed. One of them is
touched upon by Schreiner JA in his dissenting judgment
in Hackett v G & G
Radio and Refrigerator Corporation 1949(3) SA
11
664(A) at 692-3 - the article that has passed through several different
hands, perhaps in different countries, in the course of manufacture.
The
"present day needs of the community" seemed to that learned judge to require the
recognition of the justice of the generalisation
that a seller who manufacturers
or deals in a kind of goods should be treated equally as having given the buyer
of such goods his
expert assurance that the goods are free of latent defects.
That was nearly 50 years ago. Even the notion of a trader dealing in
"a kind of
goods" comes from a bygone age. Today much is bought from unmanned acres of
trading floor on which are displayed for sale
goods of all kinds from all the
world.
It seems to me cumbrous, wasteful and uncertain of result, and therefore
unjust, to require a buyer to prove and a seller to resist
in case
12
after case the proposition that the latter publicly professes to have
attributes of skill and expert knowledge in relation to particular
goods.
The
Kroonstad
test can be criticised from both sides: as having
extended a dealer's liability unduly, which was the view of Prof de Wet (see the
main judgment in this case) : or as having restricted it unrealistically, a view
which I am not the first to express. The rule having
stood for such a long time
it is not surprising that both counsel accepted it as the final statement of the
law. But the passage
of time may have weakened rather than strengthened the
authority of the decision. If it ever be challenged in the future that will
be
the time to decide whether it may and should be altered.
13
It remains to add that it is not only in this small, if important, branch
of the law of purchase and sale, but in the much wider Geld
of product liability
generally that our law may be perceived to have lagged behind.
W P SCHUTZ
JUDGE OF APPEAL
JOUBERT JA)
HEFER JA) CONCUR
STEYN JA)
MARAIS JA)