THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case no: 2026-157870
In the matter between:
THE REGISTRAR OF LABOUR RELATIONS Applicant
and
SIPHO ERIC SONO N.O
(Administrator of the Chemical, Energy, Paper,
Printing, Wood and Allied Workers’ Union) First Respondent
CHEMICAL, ENERGY, PAPER,
PRINTING, WOOD AND ALLIED WORKERS’ UNION
(Under administration) Second Respondent
GERHARD VOSLOO Third Respondent
Heard: 14 July 2026
Delivered: 28 July 2026
JUDGMENT
PRINSLOO, J
Background
(1) Reportable Yes/No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised
TDM 28/07/2026
____________ ______________
Signature Date
2
[1] The Applicant (Registrar) approached this Court urgently, seeking an order
that the First Respondent (Mr Sono) be found guilty of contempt for failing to
comply with an order of the Labour Appeal Court (LAC), dated 6 May 2026,
and that he be ordered to comply with the LAC order by immediately vacating
the premises of the Second Respondent (the union or CEPPWAWU ) and
returning all the union’s property.
[2] The parties before Court have been embroiled in multiple applications, and it
seems that the end of the litigation is still not in sight. Resulting from the
various disputes, there are no less than 19 Orders and Judgments issued by
various Courts between June 2020 and July 2025, involving the Applicant and
Mr Sono, in one way or the other. The history of the litigation has been fully set
out in detail in two recent judgments 1, and I do not deem it necessary to
repeat that in any more detail than what is necessary to provide context to the
current application.
[3] Relevant for purposes of this judgment is that the union was placed under
administration, following an application by the Registrar in terms of section
103A(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act
2 (LRA). Such an order was granted on
4 June 2020, and Ms Thulisile Mashanda was appointed as the administrator.
[4] In December 2021, individual members of the u nion who were aggrieved with
Ms Mashanda’s administration brought an application before this Court, which
resulted in Ms Mashanda’s removal by agreement with the Registrar on 24
March 2022. Mr Sono was to assume the role of administrator on the same
terms as applicable to Ms Mashanda, and he was mandated, within
the interim period, to ensure the facilitation of a National Congress and
handing over to the elected leadership.
[5] On 21 May 2025, the Registrar filed an application seek ing inter alia, orders
that the administration of the Union be extended from 30 June 2025 until 30
September 2026; that Mr Sono be removed and replaced by the Third
September 2026; that Mr Sono be removed and replaced by the Third
Respondent ( Mr Vosloo) as the a dministrator until June 2026, or until Mr
Vosloo has finalised the following:
1 Registrar of Labour Relations v Sono (2025/075712) [2026] ZALCJHB 44; (2026) 47 ILJ 1375 (LC)
(28 January 2026), Registrar of Labour Relations v Sono N.O and Others (2026/111287) [2026]
ZALCJHB 179 (15 June 2026).
2 Act 66 of 1995, as amended.
3
5.1 all the outstanding audited financial statements (‘AFS’) of 2018 - 20 25
financial years;
5.2 convened a National Congress for the election of the Union national
leadership and;
5.3 handed over the Union to such elected leadership, whichever comes
first.
[6] The application was adjudicated by Tlhotlhalemaje J, and judgment was
handed down on 28 January 2026. The Court considered that the primary
objective of section 103A of the LRA, other than regulating the appointment of
an administrator of a union, is to enable it to regain its viability and the
fulfillment of the purpose for which it was established, and to further restore its
lawful and democratic functioning. In effect, the appointment of an
administrator is compared to that of a business rescue practitioner in the case
of an ailing company, with the
objective of placing a trade union that is in
financial distress on the road to a healthy recovery as the last step, before a
winding-up application or, in the case of a union, its deregistration by the
Registrar. The same grounds that are applicable under section 103A(2) when
a union is placed under administration, ought equally to apply where an
administrator’s removal is sought. This is so in that, at the core of those
statutory grounds, and where proven, is a state of dysfunctionality, coupled
with material failures to place the union in a position to run its own affairs
independently. The Court removed Mr Sono as administrator and appointed
Mr Vosloo as administrator with effect from 1 March 2026 to 30 December
2026, or until he has finalised and concluded all outstanding audited financial
statements, convened a national congress and handed over the union to such
elected leadership, whichever comes first.
[7] Notwithstanding the order of 28 January 2026, Mr Sono continued with
running the affairs of the union as administrator. On 10 February 2026, Mr
Sono launched an application for leave to appeal the order of 28 January
Sono launched an application for leave to appeal the order of 28 January
2026. The application for leave to appeal suspended the operation of the order
of 28 January 2026. The Registrar brought an urgent application on 16
4
February 2026, in terms of section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act 3 for the
interim enforcement of the said order, pending the application for leave to
appeal or any further appeal process.
[8] On 27 February 2026, an order was made in terms of section 18(3) for the
interim enforcement of the order of 28 January 2026, pending any appeal. The
order of 28 January 2026 was no longer suspended but was operative and
had to be complied with by Mr Sono.
[9] Also on 27 February 2026, Mr Sono noted an urgent automatic appeal in
terms of section 18(4)(a)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act to the Labour Appeal
Court (LAC), as the next highest Court from the Labour Court.
[10] Whilst this section 18(4)(a)(ii) appeal was pending, on 16 March 2026, Mr
Sono’s application for leave to appeal was dismissed by Tlhotlhalemaje J. In
response, Mr Sono filed a petition for leave to appeal to the LAC. The petition
was opposed by the Registrar and is currently still pending for determination
by the LAC. The said appeal is on the merits of the main case.
[11] In the section 18(4)(a)(ii) appeal, judgment was handed down on 6 May 2026.
The LAC dismissed Mr Sono’s appeal, with the effect that the interim
enforcement of the order of 28 January 2026 pending any appeal was no
longer suspended but was in full force and effect. In this instance, it is pending
the outcome of Mr Sono's petition for leave to appeal. The legal effect was that
full compliance with the order of 28 January 2026 by Mr Sono was required.
[12] On 6 May 2026, the Registrar’s attorneys sent a letter to Mr Sono, drawing his
attention to the LAC order and seeking his facilitation regarding when Mr
Vosloo should present himself to the union’s offices to take over the
administration of the union in terms of the order of 28 January 2026.
[13] Mr Sono once again reacted with a legal challenge , and on 7 May 2026, he
filed an application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court against the
filed an application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court against the
LAC’s order of 6 May 2026 . Mr Sono also responded to the letter of the
Registrar’s attorneys, stating that since he had filed an application for leave to
appeal to the Constitutional Court, the operation of the LAC o rder was
suspended.
3 Act 10 of 2013.
5
[14] The Registrar disagreed with the contention that the order of 27 February
2026 was suspended pending the application for leave to appeal to the
Constitutional Court and demanded that Mr Sono vacate the union’s premises
and return the union property by close of business on 11 May 2026. Mr
Sono’s attorneys indicat ed t hat Mr Sono did not contend for a further
automatic appeal under section 18(4), but his application for leave to appeal to
the Constitutional Court was pursued under that Court’s rules and jurisdiction,
and that the filing of that application engaged section 18(1) read with section
18(5), of the Superior Courts Act, and thus a suspension was in order. Mr
Sono sought specific relief concerning the stay and/or suspensive effect of the
orders. In short, his position is that he had filed an application for leave to
appeal the LAC order of 6 May 2026, which application is pending
determination, and that the said order was therefore suspended.
[15] The aforesaid impasse resulted in a contempt of Court application, which was
heard on 8 June 2026. The Registrar sought an order, inter alia, to find Mr
Sono in contempt of the LAC’s order of 6 May 2026 and to direct him to
comply with the LAC’s order by vacating the union’s premises and returning all
the union’s property to Mr Vosloo. The Registrar also sought an order to
declare the LAC order operative, notwithstanding the application for leave to
appeal to the Constitutional Court. Mr Sono contended that the interim
enforcement order of 27 February 2026, followed by the order of the LAC on 6
May 2026 dismissing his appeal against it, is suspended because of the filing
of his application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court.
[16] Judgment4 was handed down on 15 June 2026 and Snyman AJ considered
the principles applicable to section 18(3) and (4) of the Superior Courts Act
and contempt of Court applications. The Court in essence found that:
and contempt of Court applications. The Court in essence found that:
‘The order of 28 January 2026 remains operative and Sono remains obliged to
comply with the same and give effect thereto, despite his pending application
for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. This is because there exists no
competent appeal to any final determination made by the applicable appeal
Court under section 18(4). And even if such an appeal can be brought, an
order under section 18(3) is an interlocutory order that does not in any manner
4 Registrar of Labour Relations v Sono N.O and Others (2026/111287) [2026] ZALCJHB 179 at para
54.
6
determine the main appeal on the merits, and thus under section 18(2) the
operation of such order is not suspended, unless exceptional circumstances
are shown that it should be suspended, however Sono made out no such
case. Lastly, even if it can be argued that an application for leave to appeal to
the Constitutional Court under section 167(3)(b) per se, is competent, I do not
think it engages the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court because of the
clear consequence, effect and purpose of sections 18(3) and (4) and the fact
that it would be an appeal to the Constitutional Court concerning purely factual
determinations. In the end, all must finish once the LAC pronounced on the
issue under section 18(4).’
[17] Ultimately, on the issue of contempt, the Court found that:5
‘No matter how one may look at it, Sono’s adopted position was at least bona
fide, reasonably arguable, openly advanced at the outset when this issue
arose, and was arrived at based on legal advice. As such, it cannot be said
that the conduct of Sono was in wilful and mala fide non-compliance with the
order granted under sections 18(3) and (4).’
[18] An order was granted declaring that the LAC order of 6 May 2026 was not
suspended pending the final determination of any appeals pursued by Mr
Sono. He was directed to immediately comply with the order granted by
Tlhotlhalemaje J on 28 January 2026, and to vacate the union’s premises, and
return all the union’s property to Mr Vosloo. In the event of Mr Sono failing to
comply with the order within seven days of the date of the order, the Applicant
was given leave to immediately re- enrol, on an urgent basis, the contempt
application based on the same pleadings, with any supplementary affidavit
that may be necessary for establishing further non- compliance, for the
purposes of holding Mr Sono in contempt of court and implementing an
appropriate sanction.
[19] Also on 15 June 2026 , Mr Sono launched an application for leave to appeal
[19] Also on 15 June 2026 , Mr Sono launched an application for leave to appeal
against the judgment of Snyman AJ to the LAC, alternatively to the
Constitutional Court. Mr Sono filed an application for leave to appeal against
the declarator that the order of the LAC of 6 May 2026 is not suspended
pending the final determination of his appeals, the order that he be directed to
comply with the order of 28 January 2026 and the leave granted to the
5 Ibid at para 56.
7
Applicant to re-enroll the contempt application in the event of non-compliance.
[20] The gist of Mr Sono’s appeal is that the appeal does not target the factual
finding of exceptional circumstances, but rather raises a question of law,
namely whether the lodging of an application for leave to appeal to the
Constitutional Court engages section 18(1) and suspends an order made at
the conclusion of the section 18(4) process and the relationship between the
finality conferred by section 18(4) and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional
Court under section 167(3) of the Constitution. Mr Sono submitted that the
Court erred in finding that his application for leave to appeal to the
Constitutional Court is not competent and does not engage the jurisdiction of
the said C ourt and that the C ourt has effectively pronounced finally on a
question for the Constitutional Court and not for the Labour Court to decide.
According to him, on a proper construction of section 18(1) read with section
18(5) the lodging of the application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional
Court, suspended the operation and execution of the order.
[21] Mr Sono further submitted that the Court erred in granting the declaratory
relief, in that the operative status of the LAC order and whether it is suspended
pending the Constitutional Court process are the very issues pending before
the Constitutional Court. The declarator pre- empted the Constitutional Court’s
determination of the issue and its own jurisdiction.
[22] On 6 July 2026, the Applicant approached this Court for an order , inter alia, to
the effect that Mr Sono be found in contempt of Court for failing to comply with
the LAC order of 6 May 2026. The Registrar deposed to a supplementary
affidavit stating that Mr Sono is aware of the LAC order and that his non-
compliance is willful and mala fide, as Snyman AJ rejected the basis for his
non-compliance with the LAC order. Mr Sono can no longer hold the bona fide
non-compliance with the LAC order. Mr Sono can no longer hold the bona fide
belief that he can continue to disobey the order by refusing to relinquish the
administration of the union, vacate its premises , and return its property to Mr
Vosloo.
This application
[23] The Applicant’s case is that the single basis on which Mr Sono sought to resist
compliance, namely that his leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court has
8
suspended the orders, has been considered and rejected by the Court. Mr
Sono has no further justification for his non -compliance, which is willful and
mala fide.
[24] Mr Sono relies on his new application for leave to appeal the judgment of
Snyman AJ to resist compliance, contending that the said application
suspends the operation of the judgment, as contemplated in section 18(1) of
the Superior Courts Act.
[25] The Applicant submitted that Mr Sono’s contention is incorrect as Snyman
AJ’s order was just another order upholding an interlocutory order and
directing that it would not be suspended pending any appeals. Mr Sono’s
refusal to hand over the administration of the union is contemptuous and an
abuse of process , holding the union and its members hostage. He has
employed Stalingrad tactics to delay his inevitable departure.
[26] Mr Sono’s answer to the contempt application is that it is founded on what he
describes as an:
‘untenable proposition that the Snyman AJ order and the Labour Appeal Court
order of 15 June 2026 (sic) remain operative and executable notwithstanding.’
[27] In his application for leave to appeal to the Court, filed on 15 June 2026. He
submitted that he holds the bona fide view that his application for leave to
appeal has suspended the operation and execution of Snyman AJ’s order by
virtue of the operation of sections 18(1), read with sections 18(3) and 18(5) of
the Superior Courts Act.
[28] According to Mr Sono the contempt proceedings are premature as they are
tantamount to the implementation of the said court order, in contravention of
the provisions of section 18(1). The Applicant would effectively be granted the
relief envisaged in section 18(3), without having made such an application.
[29] Mr Sono disputed that his conduct is willful, mala fide, contemptuous or
calculated to undermine the authority of this Court or the LAC. As a result, the
Applicant has not established the requirements for contempt.
Applicant has not established the requirements for contempt.
[30] In argument, Mr Madima for the Applicant submitted that this application was
brought pursuant to the order of Snyman AJ, which did not address the issue
9
of contempt but merely confirmed the previous orders. He submitted that the
leave to appeal filed against the Snyman AJ judgment does not disturb the
enforcement of the order granted in terms of section 18(3), which order was
granted in respect of ‘any other appeal’. There would be no point in section
18(3) if any application for leave to appeal would have the effect of
suspending all previous orders. It is not necessary for the Applicant to bring
another section 18(3) application and contempt proceedings are the only
available remedy.
[31] Mr Madima argued that the aforesaid order is not suspended, and the Court
should grant the relief sought. He submitted that Mr Sono is surviving as
administrator on leave to appeal applications.
[32] Mr Mpofu for Mr Sono, on the other hand, submitted that the order by Snyman
AJ has nothing to do with the previous orders granted – it dealt with the issue
of contempt, and it is a new judgment, dealing with different issues and if the
Applicant seeks to enforce it pending the outcome of the leave to appeal, he
has to bring a new section 18(3) application.
[33] Mr Mpofu submitted that the order of Snyman AJ is suspended in view of the
application for leave to appeal. Mr Sono cannot be found to be in contempt of
Court as there is no operational Court order that he is in breach of, and he
truly believes that the operation of the order is suspended.
Analysis
[34] In Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Limited and Others;
Mkhonto and Others v Compensation Solutions (Pty) Limited (Matjhabeng) 6
the Constitutional Court confirmed the requisites for contempt of court as
follows:
‘I now determine whether the following requisites of contempt of court were
established in Matjhabeng: (a) the existence of the order; (b) the order must
be duly served on, or brought to the notice of, the alleged contemnor; (c) there
must be non- compliance with the order; and (d) the non- compliance must be
must be non- compliance with the order; and (d) the non- compliance must be
wilful and mala fide. It needs to be stressed at the outset that, because the
relief sought was committal, the criminal standard of proof − beyond
6 (CCT 217/15; CCT 99/16) [2017] ZACC 35 at para 73.; 2017 (11) BCLR 1408 (CC); 2018 (1) SA 1
(CC).
10
reasonable doubt − was applicable.’
[35] The Applicant must prove the aforesaid requisites beyond reasonable doubt.
[36] To establish non- compliance requires more than a failure to comply with the
order. In Matjhabeng,7 the Constitutional Court affirmed that contempt of court
does not consist of mere disobedience of a court order, but of ‘ contumacious
disrespect for judicial authority ’. The requirement of wilfulness and mala fides
means that contempt is committed not by a mere disregard of the court order,
but by the demonstration of a deliberate and intentional violation of the court’s
dignity, repute or authority.8
[37] Once the applicant has proved the order, service or notice, and non-
compliance, the respondent bears an evidential burden to adduce evidence to
rebut the inference that the non-compliance was not wilful and mala fide. If the
respondent fails to advance evidence that establishes a reasonable doubt as
to whether non-compliance was wilful and mala fide , contempt will have been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
9
[38] It is common cause that Mr Sono is aware of the LAC order of 6 May 2026 and
that he is not complying with the order by Thlothlomaje J in that he has not
vacated his position as administrator or the premises of the union, nor has he
returned the union’s property. The question is whether his non- compliance is
willful and mala fide, and whether it constitutes contempt of court.
[39] In casu Mr Sono filed an application for leave to appeal the judgment of 15
June 2026. He relies on the provisions of section 18(1) as a defence.
[40] Section 18(1) of the Superior Courts Act provides that:
‘18 Suspension of decision pending appeal
Subject to subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under exceptional
circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and execution of a decision
which is the subject of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, is
suspended pending the decision of the application or appeal.’
7 Ibid at para 65.
suspended pending the decision of the application or appeal.’
7 Ibid at para 65.
8 Dibakoane NO v Van den Bos and Others; Van den Bos and Others v Gugulethu and Others [2021]
ZAGPJHC 652 at para 29.5.
9 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd (653/04) [2006] ZASCA 52 at para 42.
11
[41] It is trite that the default position is that the operation and execution of a
decision (other than a decision not having the effect of a final judgment) is
suspended pending the outcome of an application for leave to appeal or an
appeal.
[42] Mr Sono did not comply with the court order, following the filing of his
application for leave to appeal. He believes that his non- compliance was not
willful or mala fide and does not constitute contempt because the Court order
finding that the order of 6 May 2026 was enforceable, is subject to appeal.
[43] The threshold to find Mr Sono in contempt of Court is high, and the onus to
prove it beyond reasonable doubt is on the Applicant.
[44] In the previous contempt application, Snyman AJ found that Mr Sono was not
in contempt of court as his adopted position was at least bona fide, reasonably
arguable, openly advanced at the outset when this issue arose, and was
arrived at based on legal advice. As such, it could not be said that the conduct
of Mr Sono was in wilful and mala fide non-compliance with the orders granted
under sections 18(3) and (4). Mr Sono’s position was that his application for
leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court suspended the operation of the
said orders.
[45] Snyman AJ considered the legal position and concluded that an application for
leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court did not suspend the operation of
the LAC order, issued in terms of section 18(4) of the Superior Courts Act.
[46] Mr Sono seeks leave to appeal the Snyman AJ judgment inter alia on the
ground that there is a question of law, namely whether the lodging of an
application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court engages section
18(1) and suspends an order made at the conclusion of the section 18(4)
process and the relationship between the finality conferred by section 18(4)
and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court under section 167(3) of the
Constitution.
and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court under section 167(3) of the
Constitution.
[47] It is not for this Court to make a final determination on the question whether
the order of 15 June 2026 has the effect of a final judgment, or whether it is
necessary for the Applicant to file another section 18(3) application. What this
Court must decide is whether Mr Sono is guilty of contempt of Court by failing
12
to comply with the order of the LAC, issued on 6 May 2026.
[48] In my view, the judgment of 15 June 2026 has some final effect, in that it
decided the question whether the lodging of an application for leave to appeal
to the Constitutional Court engages section 18(1) and suspends an order
made at the conclusion of the section 18(4) process. To the extent that the
judgment or order has final effect, the provisions of section 18(1) of the
Superior Courts Act are triggered when an application for leave to appeal is
filed.
[49] Non-compliance with a suspended Court order is not willful or mala fide and
does not constitute contempt. Mr Sono’s adopted position that he is not in
contempt, as he believed that the operation of the order has been suspended
when an application for leave to appeal was filed, was bona fide, reasonably
arguable, and was arrived at based on legal advice.
[50] The Applicant could not prove contempt beyond reasonable doubt and failed
to satisfy the requirements to prove that Mr Sono is in contempt of Court.
[51] As a result, this application has to fail.
Obiter
[52] The primary objective of section 103A of the LRA, other than regulating the
appointment of an administrator of a union, is to enable it to regain its viability
and the fulfillment of the purpose for which it was established, and to further
restore its lawful and democratic functioning. The administration of a trade
union is meant to be a temporary measure to restore proper governance and
ultimately facilitate democratic leadership through congress.
[53] CEPPWAWU has been under administration since 2020, with Mr Sono as the
administrator since 2022. The administration process, which has been ongoing
for six years, clearly failed to achieve any of the objectives alluded to supra.
[54] On 28 January 2026 the Court removed Mr Sono as administrator and
appointed Mr Vosloo instead, after finding that:10
‘The position the Union finds itself in cannot continue, nor is there justification
‘The position the Union finds itself in cannot continue, nor is there justification
10 Registrar of Labour Relations v Sono NO and others (2026) 47 ILJ 1375 (LC) at para 97.
13
for its administration to continue indefinitely, and in circumstances where such
as in this case, there is an obvious solution to this state of affairs, which Sono
has unreasonably rebuffed for over three years.’
[55] The Applicant has obtained an order removing Mr Sono as administrator
and appointing Mr Vosloo as administrator, with effect from 1 March 2026.
Mr Sono, however, refuses to let go and instead digs in to evade vacating
the position of administrator of CEPPWAWU. In fact, he clings to the
position by pursuing one appeal after the other.
[56] I agree with the sentiments expressed by Tlhotlhamaje J and Snyman AJ.
Tlhotlhamaje J held that:
11
‘One can only comment that the continuous litigation, which effectively
amounts to a war of attrition between the feuding parties in this matter, is
hardly to the benefit of the long-suffering members of the union. Since 2020,
the union members have remained helpless bystanders in countless legal
battles waged allegedly in their interests, and which battles in an ironic twist,
they have funded through their subscriptions. A point is reached where the
disputants in these legal battles, especially the administrator in this case, need
to take a step back, pause the charade and the bravado, and seriously reflect
on what is genuinely in the interests of the union and its members.’
[57] In the judgment of 15 June 2026 Snyman AJ remarked that12:
‘This all makes for quite distressing reading, considering that the very purpose
of placing CEPPWAWU under administration is to save it from going under,
which would leave its entire membership without the benefit of union
representation, which is one of the fundamentals under the LRA. It would
seem that this objective has been lost in the fight for earning fees from the
administration, rather than achieving the nursing of CEPPWAWU back to
health. As a general comment, if the first respondent could not restore
CEPPWAWU to being a healthy trade union in a period of about three years,
CEPPWAWU to being a healthy trade union in a period of about three years,
then surely, he should step aside and allow someone else to try.’
‘But even if exceptional circumstances are considered, the concept of the
interest of justice as part of such consideration would work squarely against
Sono. It has been decided by no less than three Courts that he must vacate
11 Ibid at para 111.
12 Id fn 4 at paras 3 and 53.
14
his position as administrator, and if he does not do so, there would be
irremediable prejudice to [the] very victim of all of this, being CEPPWAWU.
Sono’s right to challenge his removal as administrator on the merits is in the
first instance fully protected by his pending appeal to the LAC, which must still
be decided. But in the meantime, there can be no reason why the
dispensation as contemplated by the Court order of 28 January 2026 should
not find immediate application, as found to be the case by this Court, and the
LAC.’
[58] In Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of
State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of
State and Others13 the Constitutional Court said that: ‘Like all things in life, like
the best of times and the worst of times, litigation must, at some point, come to
an end.’
[59] The same applies in casu.
[60] This Court must express concern about the parties’ conduct and its effect on
the union. It is evident from the litigation history that Mr Sono has litigated at
his heart’s content and sought leave to appeal every order that was granted
against him. The ongoing litigation in the administration process has diverted
attention from the process's primary objectives and rendered the interests of
the union and its members insignificant.
[61] Applications for leave to appeal and/or appeals should not be pursued with the
intention of frustrating and tiring out an opponent or because it may be tactical.
This kind of approach was aptly identified in Zuma v Downer and Another
14 as
a fight from ‘burning house to burning house’, hoping for victory by attrition,
where the actual substance of the case is lost or is meritless. This approach
not only undermines the rule of law but also overburdens the courts' limited
resources to the detriment of everyone.
[62] The position CEPPWAWU and its members find themselves in cannot
continue, and it should not be prolonged by tactical applications for leave to
continue, and it should not be prolonged by tactical applications for leave to
appeal.
[63] The Applicant and the union’s frustration with the current situation is palpable.
13 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC).
14 2024 (2) SA 356 (SCA) at para 28.
15
It is a situation that cannot continue, but unfortunately for them, frustration and
allegations about abuse of process and resources do not establish contempt
of Court.
[64] Insofar as costs are concerned, this Court has a broad discretion in terms of
section 162 of the LRA to make orders for costs according to the requirements
of the law and fairness.
[65] Counsel for both parties argued that costs should be awarded. However, in my
view this is a case where the interest of justice will be best served by making
no order as to costs.
[66] In the premises, the following order is made:
Order
1. The application is dismissed;
2. There is no order as to costs.
_____________________
Connie Prinsloo
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Advocate T Madima SC
Instructed by: State Attorney, Pretoria
For the First Respondent: Advocate D C Mpofu SC
Instructed by: KMNS Inc Attorneys