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3. The Defendants are ordered to pay the Plaintiff’s costs on the attorney and
client scale taxed on the Magistrates’ Court tariff, including the costs of one
junior counsel on Scale A.
4. The Defendants are liable for the above amounts jointly and severally.
___________________________________________________________________
Judgment
___________________________________________________________________
J Mitchell AJ
[1] The Defendants, Luyanda Kopman and Sinazo Mooi, own a property in Murati
Place, a residential complex in Johannesburg.
[2] Under section 2(1) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of
2011, the Defendants became members of Murati Place’s body corporate, the
Plaintiff, when they bought their property. The Act requires the body corporate
to have rules, and the Act authorises the body corporate to levy contributions
on owners for the maintenance and running of the complex.
[3] The Defendants fell behind with their contributions. The body corporate sues.
The Defendants filed a special plea of lis pendens, pointing to another suit
between the body corporate and the Defendants in this Court under case
number 2024-089709, or the 2024 suit for short. The Defendants plead that
the 2024 suit is between the same parties, arises from the same cause of
action, and concerns substantially the same subject matter and relief. In their
special plea, the Defendants ask that these proceedings (or at least the
underlying action) be stayed pending the finalisation of the 2024 suit.
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[4] The Defendants plead over. In their main plea, they admit that they own
property in Murati Place but they deny the other allegations in the particulars
of claim. Aside from the special plea, the Defendants plead no substantive
defence to the body corporate’s claim.
[5] The 2024 suit is explained in more detail in the body corporate’s affidavit in
support of the application for summary judgment. In August 2024, the body
corporate sued the Defendants for arrear contributions amounting to
R10 968.07 as at the end of July 2024. A statement from the body corporate’s
managing agent shows that between July 2024 and August 2025, the
Defendants paid about R18 000. The body corporate argues that the lis
pendens objection is no good because those payments extinguished the debt
that the body corporate claims in the 2024 suit. The body corporate also
argues that, in any event, the claims are for different debts so the two suits
are not for the same cause of action and do not ask for the same relief.
[6] In these proceedings, the body corporate sues for ar rear contributions of
R47 897.40, which is calculated in a statement from the managing agent dated
13 October 2025. That is a liquidated amount in money because it is capable
of speedy and prompt ascertainment based on that statement and based on
the underlying budgets and resolutions that the body corporate passed. I am
also satisfied that the body corporate has complied w ith the other
requirements under rule 32.
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[7] In their heads of argument, the Defendants resist summary judgment on two
grounds. In my view, neither ground raises a defence that is bona fide and
good in law, and there is no reasonable possibility that either defence would
succeed at trial.
[8] First, the Defendants rely on their special plea of lis pendens. There are three
requirements for lis pendens: same parties, same cause of action, and same
relief, Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd v World of Marble & Granite 2000 CC 2013
(6) SA 499 (SCA) at para 12. The purpose of lis pendens is to “avoid a situation
where different courts pronounce on the same issue with the risk that they
may reach differing conclusions” , Caesarstone at para 2. Even if the three
requirements are met, a court has a discretion to refuse a stay, Caesarstone
at para 34.
[9] Lis pendens can, in principle, be a bona fide defence and enough to resist
summary judgment. But in my view, the Defendants misplace reliance on it on
these facts. Compared to the 2024 suit, the same parties are on either side of
the v, but the body corporate’s claim here is for a different cause of action and
for different relief. Each monthly invoice that the body corporate issues is a
separate cause of action, and each demand for payment on each monthly
invoice is separate relief. Moreover, there can be no risk of two courts reaching
different conclusions because the Defendants’ payments to the body
corporate between July 2024 and August 2025 extinguish the debt that is sued
on in the 2024 suit. For good measure, counsel for the body corporate quite
properly conceded that the body corporate cannot take any further steps in
the 2024 suit given its stance in these proceedings that the debt sued on there
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is extinguished. For those reasons, the special plea of lis pendens is, in my
view, neither bona fide nor good in law.
[10] The Defendants’ second ground for resisting summary judgment is their
argument that summary judgment is premature because of the pending
special plea. I am not aware of any cases that say a special plea precludes an
application for summary judgment. The architecture of rule 32 is against that
proposition. T he rule lets a plaintiff apply for summary judgment after a
defendant has delivered a plea. A special plea must be delivered as part of
the plea. So rule 32 necessarily envisages the possibility of an application for
summary judgment despite a special plea.
[11] The Defendants argue that they are entitled “as a matter of procedural
fairness, to have the Special Plea adjudicated first”. I do not see any basis for
an argument that the Defendants are entitled to have their special plea
determined first at some kind of summary judgment -proof trial. In any event,
courts routinely decide special pleas in applications for summary judgment:
see, for example, De Lange v De Lange 2023 JDR 2573 (GP) (rejecting a
special plea of lis pendens and granting summary judgment) and Summer
Brook Body Corporate v Masithela 2026 JDR 1225 (GJ) (rejecting a special
plea of lack of jurisdiction and granting summary judgment).
[12] At the hearing, counsel for the Defendants argued that they also dispute how
the body corporate went about allocating their payments, including for the debt
claimed in the 2024 suit. The Defendants do not plead a defence along those
lines, so they cannot r aise it as a reason against summary judgment: AHMR
Hospitality (Pty) Ltd v Da Silva 2024 (3) SA 100 (WCC) at para 14.
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[13] Murati Place’s conduct rules, which bind the Defendants under section 10(4)
of the Act, entitle the body corporate to charge interest at 24% per annum,
compounded monthly in arrears. The rules also entitle the body corporate to
recover legal costs on the attorney and client scale. But the amount of the
claim means that costs should be on the Magistrates’ Court tariff, not the High
Court tariff. The body corporate asks for costs to include “tracing fees and
collection commission”, but those are not, in my view, appropriate to include
in a costs order. As for the costs of counsel, the default Scale A will do.
[14] The body corporate’s application for summary judgment accordingly
succeeds, and I make this order:
1. The Defendants are ordered to pay the Plaintiff R47 897.40.
2. The Defendants are ordered to pay the Plaintiff interest on R47 897.40
at the rate of 24% per annum, compounded monthly in arrears from 2
December 2025 to date of payment.
3. The Defendants are ordered to pay the Plaintiff’s costs on the attorney
and client scale taxed on the Magistrates’ Court tariff, including the
costs of one junior counsel on Scale A.
4. The Defendants are liable for the above amounts jointly and severally.
_ ___
J Mitchell AJ
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Acting Judge of the Gauteng Division, Johannesburg
Date of hearing: 28 July 2026
Date of judgment: 30 July 2026
For the Applicant/Plaintiff: PJ Badenhorst instructed by
Heerschop Pienaar Attorneys
For the Respondents/Defendants: V Dumalisile of Dumalisile Attorneys