THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Reportable
Case no: 080/05
In the matter between:
INTERNATIONAL MARINE TRANSPORT SA APPELANT
and
M V ‘LE CONG” RESPONDENT
GUANGZHOU OCEAN SHIPPING COMPANY INTERVENING
RESPONDENT
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Coram : SCOTT, BRAND, JAFTA, PONNAN JJA et
COMBRI NCK AJA
Date of hearing : 2 November 2005
Date of delivery : 23 November 2005
Summary: Ships ow ned b y ‘state-owned enter prises’ established at
different levels of government in the People’s Republic of China not
‘associated’ ships within the meaning of s 3(6) of Act 105 of 1983
_______________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________
SCOTT JA/…
2
SCOTT JA:
[1] The appellant is a compan y registered and incorporated in
accordance with the laws of the R epublic of Panama. It is the owner
of the mv Gaz Progress. On 12 March 2002 it applied for, and was
granted ex parte, an order in the High Cour t, Durban, for the arrest of
the mv Le Cong which was then at berth in the port of Durban. The
arrest was sought in terms of s 5 ( 3) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction
Regulation Act 105 of 1983 (‘the Ac t’). Its purpose was to provide
security for a claim which the appellant intended to enforce by way of
arbitration proceedings in London against Shantou Sez Chemical
Industry and Petroleum Gaz General Company (‘Shantou Sez’). The
claim was for the payment of charte r hire in respect of two periods of
charter by Shantou Sez of the appellant’s vessel, the Gaz Progress.
In terms of the charterparty, disp utes were to be determined by
arbitration in London and in accordance with English law. The claim is
a maritime claim within the meaning of s 1(1)(j) of the Act.
[2] The Le Cong is owned by Guangzhou Ocean Shipping
Company (‘Guangzhou’). When the appellant’s claim arose Shantou
Sez was the charterer by demise of the Gaz Progress. By reason of
the provisions of s 3(7)(c) of t he Act, Shantou Sez is accordingly
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deemed to be the owner of the Gaz Progress for the purposes of the
associated ship provisions contained in s 3(6) of the Act. The basis
upon which the arrest of the Le Cong was sought and granted was
that both Shantou Sez and G uangzhou were ‘state-owned
enterprises’ of the People’s Republic of China and that the Le Cong
and the Gaz Progress were accordingly associated ships within the
meaning of s 3(6).
[3] Subsequently, on 20 March 2002, a letter of undertaking on
behalf of Guangzhou was furnished to the appellant and the Le Cong
was permitted to leave port. In terms of s 3(10)(a)(i), however, the
vessel was deemed to remain under arrest.
[4] The order granted on 12 Marc h 2002 made provision for an
application being made for the sett ing aside of the arrest after
security had been furnished. Th e letter of undertaking similarly
provided for such an application. It was launched on 4 July 2002 by
Guangzhou which sought leave to intervene and an order setting
aside the arrest. The merits of the appellant’s claim against Shantou
Sez were not placed in issue. Indeed, it appears that during the
proceedings the arbitration was held in London and a final award was
made in favour of the appellant for USD 3 831 233, together with
4
interest and costs. Ultimately, the sole question in issue was whether
in the circumstances the Le Cong was an ‘associated ship’ of the Gaz
Progress. The matter was heard by Hurt J who found for Guangzhou
and set aside the arrest with costs. The present appeal is with the
leave of the court a quo.
[5] It is necessary to quote ss 3 (6) and 3(7) of the Act in full –
‘3(6) Subject to the provisions of subsection (9), an action in rem, other than
such an action in respect of a mariti me claim contemplated in paragraph ( d) of
the definition of ‘maritime claim’, may be brought by the arrest of an associated
ship instead of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose.
(7)(a) For the purpose of subsection (6) an associated ship means a ship, other
than the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose –
(i) owned, at the time when the action is co mmenced, by the person
who was the owner of the ship concerned at the time when the
maritime claim arose;
or
(ii) owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a person
who controlled the company which owned the ship concerned when
the maritime claim arose;
or;
(iii) owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a company
which is controlled by a person who owned the ship concerned, or
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controlled the company which owned the ship concerned, when the
maritime claim arose.
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a) –
(i) ships shall be deemed to be ow ned by the same persons if the
majority in number of, or of voting rights in respect of, or the greater
part, in value, of, the shares in the ships are owned by the same
persons;
(ii) a person shall be de emed to control a company if he has power,
directly or indirectly, to control the company;
(iii) a company includes any other juristic person and any body of
persons, irrespective of whether or not any interest therein consists
of shares.
(c) If at any time a ship was the subject of a charter-party the charterer
or sub-charterer, as the case may be, sh all for the purposes of subsection (6)
and this subsection be deemed to be the owner of the ship concerned in respect
of any relevant maritime claim for which the charterer or the subcharterer, and
not the owner, is alleged to be liable.’
[6] It is common cause that bot h Guangzhou and Shantou Sez are
state-owned enterprises. Although not incorporated as companies
according to the law of the Peopl e’s Republic of China, they are
nonetheless juristic persons capable of owning property. As
previously stated, Guangzhou is the owner of the Le Cong , while
Shantou Sez is deemed to be the owner of the Gaz Progress. In the
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absence of a commonality in ownership the appellant was
accordingly obliged to rely on the pro visions of s 3(7)(a)(iii) of the Act
(read with s 3(7)(b)(iii)) to establish that the vessels were ‘associated
ships’ within the meaning of s 3(6). The enquiry is therefore whether
both state-owned enterprises are control led by the same person. The
appellant says that they are and that that person is the State of
China. Guangzhou says they are not. The issue involves a
consideration of the constitutional law of the Peoples Republic of
China. Both sides filed affidavits by experts on Chinese law. There
was a sharp dispute between them.
[7] The Act contains no definition of ‘power to control’. The nature
of the power to control contemplated in s 3(7) was, however,
considered in MV Heavy Metal: Belfry Marine Ltd v Palm Base
Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA). In that case the court
was concerned with a situation in wh ich the majority shareholder in
each of two ship-owning companies was the same person who was a
nominee holding the shares in eac h company for different persons.
Nothing like that arises in the pre sent case. What was common to all
three of the judgments delivered in the Heavy Metal w a s t h e
acceptance that it is not the power to control a company in the sense
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of managing its operations that is relevant, but the power to control its
‘direction and fate’. In this regard Smalberger JA, who delivered the
majority judgment, said in para 8 at 1105J – 1106A:
‘“Power” is not circumscribed in the Ac t. It can be the power to manage the
operations of the company or it can be the power to determine its direction and
fate. Where these two functions happen to ve st in different hands, it is the latter
which, in my view, the Legislature had in mind when referring to “power” and
hence to “control”.’
In the South African context, both would vest in the same person
where the majority shareholder of a company is also its director. But
the power to control the fate and di rection of a company is typically
the power which vests in the majority shareholder of a company or, in
the case of a subsidiary, the ma jority shareholder in its holding
company.
[8] Before turning to the evidence it is necessary to make two
further observations. The first is that although Guangzhou was the
applicant in the setting-aside proce edings, the appellant bore the
onus of establishing that its original application for the arrest of the Le
Cong was correctly granted. See eg Weissglass NO v Savonnerie
Establishment 1992 (3) SA 928 (A) at 936F-G. The second is that the
onus which the appellant bore of proving that the Le Cong was an
8
associated ship within the meaning of s 3(6), unlike proof of its claim
against Shantou Sez in respect of which a prima facie case was
sufficient, had to be discharged on a balance of probabilities. See
Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd 1994 (2) SA 563 (A) at
581B-D.
[9] The evidence of Guangzhou’s ex perts, which formed the basis
upon which it was sought to set aside the arrest order, was shortly
the following. While Guangzhou and Shantou Sez were described as
‘state-owned enterprises’ and said to be owned ‘by the whole people’,
the concept of ownership in this context in Chinese law is a complex
one, is largely abstract and does not correspond to the concept of
civil ownership in western legal systems. Of greater significance,
however, was the distinction betwe en the levels of government at
which the two enterprises were established and f unded. Guangzhou
was established and funded at the level of the central government;
Shantou Sez was established and funded at municipal level. In this
regard, (and this was common cause, or not in dispute) Guangzhou is
one of several ship-owning stat e-owned enterprises established by
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company, itself a state-owned
enterprise, which in turn was established and funded by the central
9
government. Shantou Sez, on the other hand, was established by an
enterprise called City Petroleum Chemical Industry Company (later
renamed Shantou Wuzhou (Group) Company) which in turn was
established and funded by the S hantou City Municipal Government.
Each level of government is elected by popularly elected bodies.
These are, in the case of t he central government, the National
People’s Congress and in the case of the lower tiers of government,
local people’s congresses. In accordance with its Budget law China
implements a system of central and local taxation with each level of
government having its own indepen dent financial status and being
vested with exclusive rights in relation to the capital funds within its
own particular budget. A state-owned enterprise established at a
particular level of government, eg at municipal level, would be
established with funds emanating fr om the budget at that level and
such an enterprise would be subject to the control of the government
at that level. Accordingly, in the present case, so the evidence went,
the power to control Shantou Sez ve sts in the Shantou City Municipal
Government and is exercised through Shantou Wuzhou (Group)
Company. The central government is in law precluded from
exercising control in respect of S hantou Sez or any of its assets. The
10
powers of the central government are limited to those which one
would expect to be vested in the central government of a largely
unitary state and would relate typically to the promulgation of
administrative rules of a general nature.
[10] The response of the appellant’s experts was to the effect that
the funding of the organs of state at different levels did not establish
independence between them; that there was no warrant for giving the
words ‘state-owned enterprise’ an ything other than their simple
express meaning and that the reality of the People’s Republic of
China was that the central governm ent controlled the provincial and
municipal arms of the government which enjoyed no independence
under the constitution.
[11] It appears from th e papers that the meaning given to ‘power to
control’ in Heavy Metal was brought to the attent ion of the experts on
both sides. Ultimately the essent ial difference between them related
to the seat of this power. The appellant’s experts (an associate
professor of law at the Universit y of Hong Kong a nd an assistant
professor of law at the City Univ ersity of Hong Kong) contended that
this power to control was vested in the central government and that in
the instant case the Shantou City Municipal Government exercised
11
no more than certain supervisory po wers over Shantou Sez whose
management attended to its day to day activities. Guangzhou’s
experts (a practising lawyer of Shenzhen in the Guangdong Province
and a professor of law at Beijing University) maintained that the
power of control in the above se nse vested in the Shantou City
Municipal Government. Professor Xing of Beijing University, in a
replying affidavit, expressed his view as follows:
‘I understand that reference to “control” in section 3(7) of the Act is a reference to
the power to ultimately determine the fa te and destiny of the legal person to
which the control relates. Such control would include, for exam ple, the ultimate
power to cause the legal person to be w ound up, to require that it merge with
some other entity or dispose of major a ssets and the like in much the same way
as the beneficial owner of the majority of shares or voting rights in a limited
liability company has ultimate control not withstanding the existence of a Board of
Directors.
It is that sense that I main tain that such ultimate c ontrol of SHANTOU SEZ vests
in the SHANTOU Municipal Governm ent (or the SHANTOU CITY PEOPLE’S
CONGRESS) and not the Central Govern ment or the NATIONAL PEOPLE’S
CONGRESS. Neither the Central Governm ent nor any of its Ministries or
Departments could exercise any of the powers of the nature referred to above
with regard to SHANTOU SEZ.’
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[12] The content and effect of foreign law is a question of fact and
like any other fact must be proved ( Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean
Commodities Inc 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) at 294G). Where the content
and effect of foreign law is in issu e in motion proceedings the rule in
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3)
SA 623 (A) must therefore be applied. In other words, regard must be
had in the first place to the averment s as to the foreign law contained
in the applicant’s affidavits (the respondent’s affidavits in proceedings
to set aside an arrest) which are admitted by the respondent (the
applicant in setting aside procee dings) together with the averments
as to the foreign law made by the respondent (the applicant in
setting-aside proceedings). Where, however, the foreign law is
statutory in nature a court will not si mply accept the allegations made
in the affidavits without question, especially if there is disagreement,
but will itself examine the statute in the light of those allegations and
as far as possible arrive at its own conclusion. See the Standard
Bank case, supra, at 294H. In this court counsel for the appellant
submitted that neither the constitu tion of the People’s Republic of
China (a copy of an English translation of which was included in the
papers) nor the statutory enactments quoted in the affidavits
13
supported the contentions advance d by Guandzhou’s experts. In
particular, he argued that merely bec ause the different tiers of
government may have been shown to be financially independent of
each other, did not mean that th ey were not ultimately under the
control of the central government. He accordingly submitted that even
applying the rule in Plascon-Evans, the appellant had succeeded in
discharging the burden of proving a commonality in control between
Shantou Sez and Guangzhou which rendered the Gaz Progress and
the Le Cong associated ships within the meaning of the Act.
[13] The extent to which a court will be dependent on the evidence
of experts when interpreting a statutory provision of a foreign country
will to a large extent depend upon th e system of law in question. The
statutory provision must, of course, be interpreted as it would by a
court of the country in wh ich it is enacted. The closer the system is to
ours the more readily a court will rely upon its ow n judgement when
faced with a problem of interpretatio n. In the present case, however,
the People’s Republic of China not only has a legal system different
from ours but its constitutional and social structures are vastly
different, as is its political philosophy and culture, and it is in this
context that its laws must be interpreted. Some examples will
14
illustrate the point. Article 1 of the constitution describes the People’s
Republic of China as a socialist state ‘under the people’s democratic
dictatorship’. Article 2 proclaims t hat ‘all power . . . belongs to the
people’ while article 6 speaks of ‘ownership by the whole people and
collective ownership of the working people’. These are all concepts
which are wholly foreign to our constitution and legal system.
[14] The above notwithstanding, the broad structure of the state as
outlined in the Chinese constitu tion can be stated with reasonable
certainty. The highest organ of state power is said in article 57 to be
the National People’s Congress. It is constituted through ‘democratic
elections’ as are a number of lo cal people’s congresses at various
levels of government. The latter, in terms of article 95, are
established ‘in provinces, municipal ities directly under the Central
Government, counties, cities, municipal districts, townships,
nationality townships, and towns’ . (The reference to ‘municipalities
directly under the Central Government ’ is a reference to particular
municipalities and is not a description of the power of the central
government.) The National People’s Congress has specified powers
and functions (one of which is the election of the president) as does
its standing committee. Provision is also made for a State Council
15
which is said in article 67 to be ‘the Central People’s Government’
and ‘the executive body of the highest organ of state power’. The
powers of this council are similarly specified.
[15] It is necessary to quote certain provisions of the Constitution
which, it would seem, have some bearing on the issue before this
court. In terms of article 89 the State Council has the power:
‘to exercise unified leadership over the work of local organs of state
administration at various levels thr oughout the country, and to formulate the
detailed division of func tions and powers between the Central Government and
the organs of state admin istration of provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities directly under the Central government.’
One of the powers conferred on the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress in terms of article 67 is the power:
‘to annul those local regulations or decis ions of the organs of state power of
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central
Government that contravene the Constitution, the law or the administrative rules
and regulations.’
Article 16 (as amended in 1993) deals specifically with ‘state
enterprises’. It provides:
‘State enterprises have decision-making power with regard to operation and
management within the limits prescribed by law, on condition that they submit to
unified leadership by the state and fulfill their obligations under the state plan.’
16
Both sides sought to rely on a sub-paragraph in article 3. It reads:
‘The division of functions and powers between the central and local state organs
is guided by the principle of giving full scope to the initiative and enthusiasm of
the local authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities.’
Counsel for the appellant emphasis ed the reference to the unified
leadership of the central authorit ies while counsel for Guangzhou
argued that this was consistent with what his experts had said and
emphasised the preceding words of the provision.
[16] It is also necessary to quot e from the Chinese Budget Law. The
provisions in question are some of those to which reference was
made by Guangzhou’s experts. Article 2 reads:
‘The State implements one level government, one level budget. Budget is divided
into five levels, ie the level of Cent ral Government; the level of Provinces,
autonomous regions or municipalities dire ctly under the Central Government; the
autonomous prefectures, the level of counties, autonomous counties, cities, cities
without districts or districts under cities; and the level of townships, national
townships or towns.’
Article 8 reads:
‘The State implements the separate system of central taxes and local taxes.’
This provision is explained in article 6 of the Rules for the
implementation of the Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China.
1995, which provides:
17
‘“The separate system of Central Taxes and Local Taxes” referred to in Art 8 of
the Budget Law means that the financial administration system determines the
extent of central and local expenditures on the basis of division of power between
the Central and Local Governments, and di vides the central budget income and
the local budget income by virtue of the different types of taxes.’
Finally it is necessary to quote article 23 of the Budget Law. It reads:
‘The Government in the Upper Tier shall not use the capital within the budget of
the Lower Tier. The Government in the Lower Tier shall not hold the capital
within the budget of the Upper Tier.’
[17] It will be apparent that no ne of the provisions quoted above
affords a decisive answer to the is sue in question, namely whether
the power to control Shantou Sez in the sense referre d to in para 7
above rests with the Shantou Munici pal City Government or whether,
as in the case of Guangzhou, the power rests with the central
government. Given the obvious difficulties facing a South African
court when attempting to interpret provisions of such a nature or
those of the Chinese Constitution generally, it has not been shown in
my view that they are inconsistent with or do not support the
statement of the law as set out in the affidavits of Guangzhou’s
experts. Indeed, there is much to be said for their exposition of the
law, especially when regard is had to the Budget Law. It follows that
18
as the appellant bore the onus of proof, Guangzhou’s version as to
the Chinese law had to be accepted as correct on the application of
the rule in Plascon-Evans.
[18] The appellant accordingly fa iled to establish that the Le Cong is
an ‘associated ship’ of the Gaz Progress within the meaning of the
Act and the appeal must fail.
[19] The appeal is dismissed with costs.
_____________
D G SCOTT
JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR
BRAND JA
JAFTA JA
PONNAN JA
COMBRINCK AJA