THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case number : 368/04
Reportable
In the matter between :
MEC FOR AGRICULTURE, CONSERVATION,
ENVIRONMENT & LAND AFFAIRS APPELLANT
and
SASOL OIL (PTY) LIMITED FIRST RESPONDENT
BRIGHT SUNS DEVELOPMENT CC SECOND RESPONDENT
CORAM : HOWIE P, CAMERON, MLAMBO JJA,
NKABINDE, CACHALIA AJJA
HEARD : 25 AUGUST 2005
DELIVERED : 16 SEPTEMBER 2005
Summary: Environmental law ─ Protection of the environment ─ Prohibition on
undertaking of environmentally detrimental activities without written authorisation of
competent authority as intended in s 22 of Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989
(ECA) ─ Scope of mandate of competent authority;
- the w ords ‘storag e’ and ‘handling’ facility for dangerous and hazardous
substances are broad enough to include a filling station.
- decision taken in terms of policy guidelines not irrational ─ a party seeking to impugn
rationality of decisio n must demonstrat e exceptiona l basis to succeed in review
application.
- section 36(2) of ECA read in context, together with s 35, does not constitute a time bar
to the institution of review proceedings after internal remedies have been exhausted.
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
CACHALIA AJA/
2
CACHALIA AJA:
[1] This appeal concerns the refusal of a provincial authority to authorise the
construction of a filling station in te rms of the Environment Conservation Act
73 of 1989 (‘the ECA’). It deals with whether:
1.1 The relevant authority had the pow er to refuse such authorisation,
1.2 the policy guidelines that it employe d in arriving at the decision are
ultra vires, and
1.3 the rationality of the decision.
[2] The first respondent, Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd (Sasol), is an oil company,
which wholesales and retails liquid fuel s and lubricants. Together with the
second respondent, Bright Sun Developm ents CC, Sasol identified a property
during 2000, considered suitable for th e construction of a filling station and
convenience store. The respondents then en tered into an agreement in terms of
which Sasol would supply petroleum produc ts to the second respondent for sale
to the public after the filling station and convenience store had been constructed.
[3] As is the practice in the indus try, the second respondent sought
authorisation for the construction in te rms of s 22(1) of the ECA from the
Gauteng Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land
Affairs (‘the Department’). The section requires that a ny activity that has been
3
identified in a notice by the Minister in the Gazette as potentially detrimental to
the environment in terms of s 21(1) of the ECA may not be undertaken without
the necessary authorisation of the Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism (‘the Minister’) or designated ‘competent authority’. The MEC for
Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs (‘the MEC’) is the
‘competent authority’ in the instant matter.1
[4] Section 22(2) of the ECA required the Department to consider reports
concerning the environmental impact of the proposed activity, the scope and
content of which has been prescribed by regulation. 2 Accordingly the
application was supported by a ‘scoping report’ that the second respondent
commissioned for this purpose, and further information that the Department
requested later from the second respondent.
[5] To assist the Department in th e evaluation of this and other such
applications it issued general guidelines 3 in terms of which prospective
applicants were advised that:
‘1. New Filling Stations will generally not be approved where they will be:
• Within 100m of residential properties, schools, or hospitals, unless it can be clearly
1 S 22(2) of the ECA read with Government Notice No. R670, 10 May 2002.
2 S 26 of the ECA.
3 Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) Administrative Guideline ─ Guideline For The Construction and
Upgrade Of Filling Stations and Associated Tank Installations, March 2002.
4
• demonstrated that no significant impacts will occur by reason of factors such as noise,
visual intrusion, safety considerations or fumes and smells;
• Within three (3) kilometres of an exis ting filling station in urban, built-up or
residential areas;
• Within twenty-five (25) kilometres driving distance of an existi ng filling station in
other instances (i.e. rural areas, and along highways and national roads), or
• Within a sensitive area…’
[6] In September 2002 the Department refused the application. From the
reasons furnished, it appears that the application was unsuccessful principally,
though not exclusively, because it failed to comply with the spatial stipulations
in the guidelines. 4 There were already two filling stations within three
4 This appears from the “Record of Decision” in which the main reasons for declining the authorisation fall into
three categories:
1. Incompatibility with the Guidelines.
• There are several filling stations within a 3km driving distance of the proposed sites, with the closest
being approximately 250m away from the proposed site.
• There are already two filling stations within 3km of the proposed site, the closest being 800m.
• The proposed site is within 100m of an existing and developing residential area.
2. Incompatibility in terms of the National Environment Management Act 107 of 1998. Not environmentally
and economically sustainable in terms of section 2(3).
• There already exist several filling stations in close proximity to the proposed site, two of which are
located on CR Swart Drive.
• Predicted volumes for the proposed service station do not comply with current trends within the area.
• Filling stations are considered to be point sources of pollution as petrol is considered to be a volatile
compound, which could potentially have significant impacts on residents where they are located close
to residential properties.
• The proposed filling station will significantly impact on the visual character of the surrounding
neighbourhood. It is located on a topographical incline and will therefore be highly noticeable to
surrounding residential areas.
• The proposed filling station will be located adjacent to a church, which is considered to be socially and
culturally sensitive.
3. Incompatibility in terms of the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995. The promotion of the optimum
use of existing resources relating to transport is compromised in terms of Section 3(c)(iv) of the Act.
• There are several filling stations within a 3km driving distance of the proposed site, the closest being
250m.
5
kilometres of the proposed development and it was located within a hundred
metres of an existing and developing resi dential area. Sasol appealed against
the Department’s decision to the MEC. She dismissed the appeal and confirmed
the Department’s decision and reasoning.5
[7] The respondents then sought an order in the Johannesburg High Court
declaring that the guidelines were ultra vires the ECA. In the alternative they
sought to review and set aside the deci sions of the Department and the MEC.
The court a quo (Willis J) refused the application for declaratory relief. It
nevertheless reviewed and set aside the decisions of the Department and the
MEC but ordered each party to pay its ow n costs. The MEC appeals against this
decision. The respondents in turn cross-appeal against the court a quo’s refusal
to grant them declaratory relief. The par ties approach this court with leave of
that court.6
[8] The principal finding of the court a quo was that the Department has the
• The proposed site is located within an established and developing residential area.
Additional Comments:
The department has the responsibility to adopt a risk-averse approach and places emphasis on point source
pollution, cumulative and social impacts.
5 The appeal was lodged in terms of Section 35(3) of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989. It provides
that any person who feels aggrieved at a decision may appeal to a competent authority.
6 The judgment of the court a quo is reported as Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd and Another v Metcalfe NO 2004 (5) SA 161
(W).
6
power only to regulate the environmental aspects of the storage and handling of
petroleum products on the premises of a filling station but not the environmental
aspects of filling stations per se. Flowing from this, the court a quo stated that
the guidelines issued by the Department were for the most part ‘totally
irrelevant and inappropriate’: the Department had purported to extend the remit
of the activity subject to potential prohibition in the erroneous belief that it had
the power to do so. Consequently the MEC’s refusal of authorisation for the
construction of the filling station, based on the guidelines, was declared invalid.
[9] The starting point is the Minister’s notice, which was issued in terms of s
21(1) of the ECA. Among the activities th at the Minister identified in item
1(c)(ii) of the notice as having a potentially detrimental effect on the
environment
7 are:
‘1. The construction, erection or upgrading of—
…
(c) with regard to any substance which is dangerous or hazardous and is controlled by
national legislation-
…
(ii) manufacturing, storage, handling, tr eatment or processing facilities for any such
7 This appears from GN No. R 670 of 10 May 2002. The Minister identified various activities in several
Gazettes as contemplated section 21(2) of ECA. These were initially set out in Schedule 1 of GN No. R 1182 of
5 September 1997. That schedule was amended by GN No. R1355 of 17 October 1997, GN No. R448 of 27
March 1998 and finally GN No. R 670 of 10 May 2002.
7
substance…’
[10] The parties agree that petroleu m products are ‘dangerous or hazardous’
substances, which are contro lled by national legislation. 8 The potentially
detrimental environmental aspects of th e management of such products are
therefore self-evident. What is in issue is whether a filling station is a ‘storage’
or ‘handling’ facility for petroleum products. If it is, the Department and MEC
had the power to refuse authorisation for its construction.
[11] The construction adopted by the court a quo is that these words describe
only specific aspects of the activity of a filling station viz. storage and handling
of petroleum products and not any ot her related activities within a filling
station.9 Adopting this construction the re spondents say that any commercial
activity that is associated with filling stations therefore falls outside of the ambit
of the Minister’s notice. The respondent s contend that if the Minister intended
to include filling stations he would have done so expressly.
[12] In my view this construction does not withstand scrutiny. The Minister
could certainly have been more explicit by including filling stations in the list of
activities that trigger environmental impact consequences. But his failure to do
8 This is apparent from the definition of a petroleum product in s 1 of the Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977
as ‘any petroleum fuel and any lubricant…’
9 See Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd and Another v Metcalfe NO 2004 (5) SA 161 (W) at [15].
8
so does not imply that he intended to exclude them.
[13] In order to construe item 1(c)(ii) properly, the construction must be
consistent with the purpose of the enactment giving rise to it, the environmental
clause in s 24 of the Constitution, as we ll as other relevant statutory enactments
which constitute the panoply of environmental law. 10 Of immediate relevance
are the ECA and the National Environm ental Management Act 107 of 1998
(NEMA).
[14] Section 24(a) of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental right of
everyone ‘to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being’.
To realise this right, s 24(b) imposes po sitive obligations on the state to protect
the environment ‘through reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent
10Discussed by Claassen J in BP SA (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land
Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at 140G-150A;
Jan Glazewski: Environmental Law in South Africa, Butterworths 2000 at 13 says that:
‘The bulk of environmental law is contained in a multiplicity of statutes and regulations. These are either
general in nature such as the ECA, which has been to some extent, but not completely, supplemented by the
NEMA, or those dealing with specific resources as the National Water Act 36 of 1998, or those dealing with
specific waste management or pollution control problems such as the Dumping at Sea Control Act 73 of 1980.
Apart from national statutes, cognisance must be taken of provincial laws and local authority by-laws. The focal
point for nature conservation legislation, for example, has historically always been the provincial rather than the
national level of government. The advent of nine provinces in the new South Africa as opposed to four in the
previous dispensation implies that there is an increasing plethora of legislative instruments of which the
environmental lawyer has to be aware.’
9
pollution…while promoting justifiable economic and social development’.11
[15] The first steps that were taken to protect the environment after the advent
of the Constitution were the promulgation of regulations under s 21(1) of the
ECA that listed the activities that are potentially detrimental to the environment
and set out the rules regarding the compilation of envi ronmental impact
assessments relating to such activities. 12 This was followed by the enactment of
NEMA, which gives effect to s 24 of th e Constitution. Of particular importance
is NEMA’s injunction that the interpre tation of any law concerned with the
protection and management of the e nvironment must be guided by its
principles.13 At the heart of these is the prin ciple of ‘sustainable development’,
which requires organs of state to evaluate the ‘social, economic and
environmental impacts of activities’.14 This is the broad context and framework
within which item 1(c)(ii) is to be construed.
11The relevant constitutional provision reads as follows:
‘ENVIRONMENT
24. Everyone has the right ─
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable
legislative and other measures that ─
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable
economic and social development.’
12 See fn 7 above.
13 S 2(1)(e) of NEMA.
14 S 2(3); s 2(4)(i).
10
[16] In essence a filling station consists of storage tanks where fuel is stored
and pumps through which fuel is pump ed. A pump is clearly a ‘handling’
facility for petroleum products within the meaning of item 1(c)(ii). Once this is
accepted, and I did not u nderstand the respondents to contend otherwise, the
fact that the fuel is sold from the sa me premises does not change the essential
features associated with filling stations . Nor does the fact that a convenience
store may be part of the proposed deve lopment. To attempt to separate the
commercial aspects of a filling station fro m its essential features is not only
impractical but makes little sense from an environmental perspective. It also
flies in the face of the principle of sust ainable development, which is referred to
above. The adoption of such a restricted and literal approach, as contended for
by the respondents would defeat the clea r purpose of the enactment. This was
explained succinctly, and in my view correctly, by Claassen J in BP SA (Pty)
Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservati on, Environment and Land Affairs ,15
decided in the same division after the present matter:
‘… To prove the point, one may merely ask the rhetorical question: Absent the storage and
handling of petroleum products in a filling station, what is then left of the “filling” station? In
my view, s 1(c) [ii] seeks to re gulate the entire construction of the facility and not merely the
construction of storage tanks and petrol pumps on the site. It seems to me artificial to say that
the department is only entitled to look at the storage and hand ling facilities of petroleum
15 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at 160A-E.
11
products as an activity distinct and separate from the rest of the activities normally associated
with a filling station. In any event, if it is accepted that the department has a say in the
construction of the fuel tanks and the petr ol pumps as constituting storage and handling
facilities of petroleum products, then, for envi ronmental purposes, it will remain a concern
where and for how long those fuel tanks and pe trol pumps will be operating. All the concerns
listed in the guideline, including the future econom ic life-span thereof, will still be relevant
and applicable to such fuel tanks and petrol pumps even though they may be regarded as
distinct and separate from the filling station. Ultimately, from an environmental point of
view, it makes little sense to draw a distin ction between, on the one hand, a filling station per
se and, on the other, its facilities which store and handle hazardous products.’
[17] It follows that the main issue in this appeal, whether the Department and
the MEC had the power to regulate the erection and construction of filling
stations per se must be decided in favour of the MEC. The respondents’
contention that the guidelines are ultra vires the ECA because they are based on
an erroneous belief on the part of the Department that it had the power to
regulate filling stations per se and not merely the ‘s torage’ and ‘handling’
facilities when formulating the guidelines is therefore similarly without merit.
[18] The respondents contend, in the alternative, that even if the guidelines are
not ultra vires , the review must still succeed because they were applied
mechanically, without due consideration of their applicability to the
respondents’ application. They contend, in other words, that the decisions were
12
not rational as contemplated by s 6(2)(f)(ii) 16 of PAJA since the decision-
makers fettered their discretion by applying the guidelines rigidly instead of
considering the specific environmental impact that the proposed development
would have.
[19] The adoption of policy guidelines by state organs to assist decision
makers in the exercise of their discretio nary powers has long been accepted as
legally permissible and eminently sensible . This is particularly so where the
decision is a complex one requiring the balancing of a range of competing
interests or considerations, as well as specific expertise on the part of a
decision-maker. As explained in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Environmental Affairs17, a court should in these circumstances give due weight
to the policy decisions and findings of f act of such a decision-maker. Once it is
established that the policy is compatible with the enabling legislation, as here,
the only limitation to its application in a particular case is that it must not be
16Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
‘6. Judicial review of administrative action─
(1) Any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial review of an administrative
action.
(2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if─
(a) …
(f) the action itself─
(ii) is not rationally connected to─
(aa) the purpose for which it was taken;
(bb) the purpose of the empowering provision;
(cc) the information before the administrator; or
(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator.’
17 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) [48].
13
applied rigidly and inflexibly, and that those affected by it should be aware of
it.18 An affected party would then have to demonstrate that there is something
exceptional in his or her case that warrants a departure from the policy.19
[20] The respondents’ complaint is that the decision to refuse the application
for the proposed development is irratio nal because the reasons given by the
Department and the MEC evince a rigid adherence to the distance stipulations in
the guidelines. This is, so it is contended, because no reference is made to any
possible environmental harm that may result from the proposed development.
The MEC however meets this criticism in her answering affidavit as follows:
‘…A distance stipulation… is… a rational basis for controlli ng an unnecessary and harmful
proliferation of filling stations. It allows the establishment of new filling stations where the
need therefore exists but has a justifiable bi as against allowing new filling stations where no
need exists. The purpose of the Gu ideline is not to play a role in economic regulation but to
regulate the consequences of uncontrolled prolif eration of filling stations for environmental
reasons… The distance stipulati ons… were the product of experience of, and research by, the
Department and consultation with various stakeholders, including SASOL… (We) do not
believe that (the Guidelines) should be applied inflexibly…The point I wish to stress is that
the Department (and I) are open-minded as to whether, in a particular situation, good grounds
may exist for permitting a filling station within less than 3km of an existing filling station.’
18 Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150 at 158; Computer Investors Group Inc v Minister of Finance 1979 (1) SA 879
(T) 898; British Oxygen Co. v Bd. of Trade (H.L.(E.)) [1971] AC 610 at 625D-E, Baxter Administrative Law
(1984) 415-419.
19 R v Port of London Authority, Ex Parte Kynoch Ltd [1919] 1 KB 176 at 184.
14
[21] In fact, the reasons given do not support the criticism that the guidelines
were applied rigidly and inflexibly, or that they impermissibly regulate
economic activity. They reveal that the proposed filling station would be located
diagonally opposite a church, which is c onsidered by the Department to be
culturally and socially sensitive. It is also adjacent to properties zoned for
residential development. Ev en without the distance stipulations, the proximity
of fourteen filling stations within five kilometres of the site would clearly have
some environmental impact. In additio n it was observed that the development
would have a significant impact on the scenic vista, degrade the existing visual
character or quality of the site and its surroundings, create a new source of
substantial light or glare, which would a dversely affect day or night time views
in the area or negatively impact on th e surrounding communities’ physiological
health, as well as increase ambient noise levels.
[22] In my view there is therefore no substance to the criticism that the
guidelines were applied in a manner that affected the rationality of the decision.
On the contrary, the reasons demonstrat e the opposite. But in any event, as
pointed out earlier, the respondents were thus required to demonstrate that there
was something exceptional in their appl ication that warranted a departure from
15
the usual application of the guidelines. 20 Filling stations bear a substantial
resemblance to each other. The res pondents advanced no argument that the
guidelines for filling stations should be inapplicable to theirs.
[23] A further issue raised in this appeal is whether the respondents had
instituted review proceedings in the High Court out of the time period
prescribed in the ECA, as contended by the MEC. If the MEC’s contention on
this point is correct, the respondents we re barred from pursuing their review in
the Johannesburg High Court.
[24] The relevant provisions of the EC A that bear on this question read as
follows:
’35. Appeal to Minister or competent authority ─
…
(3) … [A]ny person who feels aggrieved at a decision of an officer or employee
exercising any power delegated to him in terms of this Act or conferred upon him by
regulation, may appeal against su ch decision to the Minister or the competent authority
concerned, as the case may be, in the prescrib ed manner, within the prescribed period and
upon payment of the prescribed fee.
(4) The Minister, … or a competent authority, as the case may be, may, after considering
20 The word exceptional in this context denotes ‘something out of the ordinary and of unusual nature’. The
expression was used in this sense by Milne J in I A Essack Family Trust v Kathree 1974 (2) SA 300 (D) at
304B.
16
such an appeal, confirm, set aside or vary th e decision of the officer or employee or make
such order as he may deem fit, including an order that the prescribed fee paid by the applicant
or such part thereof as the Minister or co mpetent authority concer ned may determine be
refunded to that person.
36. Review by court ─ (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 35, any person
whose interests are affected by a decision of an administrative body under this Act, may
within 30 days after having become aware of su ch decision, request such body in writing to
furnish reasons for the decision within 30 days after receiving the request.
(2) Within 30 days after having been furnished with reasons in terms of subsection (1), or
after the expiration of the period within wh ich reasons had to be so furnished by the
administrative body, the person in question may apply to a division of the Supreme Court
having jurisdiction, to review the decision.’
[25] The Department made its decisi on not to authorise the respondents’
application on 2 September 2002 and furnished its reasons for so deciding to the
respondents. They appealed to the ME C. She made her decision on 28 April
2003. It was received by the res pondents on 5 May 2003. The review
proceedings were commenced on 31 July 20 03, almost three months later. It is
submitted on behalf of the MEC that because s 36 is peremptory in requiring
any review to be instituted within thirty days of the receipt of the decision and
furnishing of reasons, the review was no t brought within the prescribed time
period.
17
[26] Sections 35 and 36 must be r ead together. The words ‘notwithstanding
the provisions of section 35’ at the begi nning of s 36(1) make this clear. So
read, it is plain that an applicant who is aggrieved by a departmental decision,
may appeal to a 'competent authority' in terms of s 35(3), or instead, review the
decision without an appeal. If the latter option is chosen, the aggrieved party
may institute review proceedings in the High Court in terms of s 36(2) within
thirty days of having received the re asons. If however, an appeal is lodged
against a departmental decision, the tim e periods provided for in s 36 are not
applicable, as these relate only review proceedings where there is no appeal. But
such an appeal must be lodged within thirty days from the date on which the
record of the decision was issued.21
[27] The construction contended for by the MEC is not sustainable. This is
best illustrated by the facts of this matter. The Department’s decision was made,
and reasons furnished, on 2 September 2002. On 2 Oc tober 2002, before the
thirty day period prescribed had expired, the respondents lodged their appeal.
The MEC decided the appeal more than six months later, on 28 April 2003. If
the respondents had elected to review the Department’s decision in terms of s
36, without appealing to the MEC, they would have been required to do so
21 Regulation 7. Government Gazette 18261 GN R1183, 5 September 1997.
18
within thirty days of the Department ’s decision having been made on 2
September 2002, not within thirty days of having r eceived the MEC’s decision.
Mr Freund, who appeared for the MEC, dealt with the conundrum by suggesting
that an aggrieved party may be able to pursue both an appeal in terms of s 35,
and a review in terms of s 36 simultane ously, which is an absurdity. Apart from
the wastage of costs that su ch a dual procedure would entail, there is nothing in
the language that supports this construction.
[28] It follows that sections 36(1) and (2) must be read permissively, and not
as a time bar for the institution of review proceedings. The intention and
purpose of s 36 is to provide the option of a speedy review to an aggrieved party
without first having to exhaus t the internal appeal remedy. 22 If, however, the
party elects to by-pass the internal re medy, the thirty-day time bar must be
observed.
[29] The erroneous construction conte nded for by the MEC appears to have
22 It is a longstanding principle of our law that resort should not be had to the courts when there are other
remedies specifically provided to resolve an aggrieved parties grievances and where it may transpire, once those
remedies have been invoked, that it is unnecessary to approach the courts at all. Shames v South African
Railways and Harbours 1922 AD 228 at 233-4. See further Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 720-723. The
duty of a party to first exhaust internal remedies is now provided for in s 7(2) of PAJA:
The relevant subsections of PAJA read as follows:
‘(a) Subject to paragraph (c), no court or tribunal shall review an administrative action in terms of this Act
unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law has first been exhausted.
(b) Subject to paragraph (c), a court or tribunal must, if it is not satisfied that any internal remedy referred to in
paragraph (a) has been exhausted, direct that the person concerned must first exhaust such remedy before
instituting proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review in terms of this Act.
(c) A court or tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the person concerned, exempt
such person from the obligation to exhaust any internal remedy if the court or tribunal deems it in the interests
19
of justice.’
20
been accepted by the court a quo. It however found that the 180-day period
provided for in s 7(1) of PAJA 23 prevails over s 36 of the ECA because it is
‘universal legislation’, which derives its force from the Constitution. 24 The idea
that national legislation enacted as a constitutional requirement enjoys some
‘formal supremacy’ over any other Act of Parliament is novel, and has been the
subject of academic debate. 25 It is, however, not necessary to decide this
question.
[30] Even though the point on the time pe riods has no substance, the MEC has
been successful on the merits of this a ppeal. The appeal therefore succeeds with
costs and the cross-appeal is dismisse d with costs. The order of the court a quo
is replaced with the following:
‘The application is dismissed with costs.’
____________________
A CACHALIA
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL
Concur: Howie P
Cameron JA
Mlambo JA
Nkabinde AJA
23 7. Procedure of judicial review─ (1) Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1) must be
instituted without reasonable delay and not later than 180 days after the date…
24 Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd and Another v Metcalfe NO 2004 (5) SA 161 (W) at [7].
25 See G Devenish ‘The application of the generalia specialibus non derogant principle in the interpretation of
statutes’ (2005) 112, SALJ p 72 at 75.