REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Reportable
Case Number : 294 / 03
In the matter between
WESTERN PLATINUM LTD APPELLANT
and
THE COMMISSIONER FOR SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE SERVICE RESPONDENT
Coram
: SCOTT, MTHIYANE, CONRADIE, HEHER and VAN
HEERDEN JJA
Date of hearing
: 17 AUGUST 2004
Date of delivery : 27 SEPTEMBER 2004
SUMMARY
Income Tax - attributes of income from mining operations capable of being set off by
taxpayer against mining capital expenditure – wh en interest receipts qualify as mining
income.
___________________________________________________________________________
J U D G M E N T
___________________________________________________________________________
CONRADIE JA
2
[1] The fiscus favours miners and farmers. Mi ners are permitted to deduct
certain categories of capital expenditu re from income derived from mining
operations. Farmers are pe rmitted to deduct certain defined items of capital
expenditure from income derived fro m farming operations. These are class
privileges. In determining their extent, one adopts a strict construction of the
empowering legislation. That is the golden rule laid down in Ernst v
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1954 (1) SA 318 (A) at 323C-E and
approved in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v D & N Promotions (Pty) Ltd
1995 (2) SA 296 (A) at 305A-B.
[2] The appeal and cross appeal before us are from a decision of Cloete J
sitting in the Gauteng Income Tax Special Court. 1 They require us to decide in
what circumstances interest may be ch aracterized as ‘income derived by the
taxpayer from mining operations’. The fiscal importance of determining the
derivation of this kind of income lies in s 15( a) read with s 36(7C) of the
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’).
[3] Section 15( a) permits the deduction of capita l expenditure by a miner in
these terms:
‘There shall be allowed to be deducted from the income derived by the
taxpayer from mining operations –
1 Reported as Income Tax Case 1753 65 SATC 310 and as Case no 10678 2003 JTLR 117 (WSpCrt).
3
( a) an amount to be ascertained under the provisions of section 36,
in lieu of the allowances in section 11( e), (f), (gA) and (o).’
[4] Section 36(7C) supplements s 15(a) by providing that -
‘Subject to the provisions of subsections (7E), (7F) and (7G), the amounts to
be deducted under section 15(a) from income derived from the working of any
producing mine shall be the amount of capital expenditure incurred.’
Section 36(7E) limits the de duction to amounts of capita l expenditure that do
not exceed the taxable income ‘ ... deri ved by the taxpayer from mining ...’ but
permits any excess to be carried forward and to be deemed to be an amount of
capital expenditure incurred during the next succeeding year of assessment.
Section 36 (11) then sets out in detail what items of capital expenditure qualify
for deduction.
[5] Section 15( a) speaks of ‘mining operations’ and s 36(7E) simply of
‘mining’. In terms of s 1 of the Act, they mean the same:
‘Mining operations’ and ‘mining’ (unless the context otherwise indicates)
‘ ... include every method or process by which any mineral (including natural
oil) is won from the soil or from any substance or constituent thereof.’
The definition leaves scope for physic al operations outside the winning of
minerals from the soil to be regarded as mining; indeed, it was common cause
that the refining of excavated minerals is included in the concept.
4
[6] Mining operations by themselves ca nnot produce inco me. However, the
definition of ‘mining’ and ‘mining oper ations’, being context-dependent, is
capable of accommodating commercial transactions. Since there can be no
derivation of income without commercial activity we are entitled to read that
into the definition. 2 In the case of minerals or metals from a mine such an
income-producing transaction would commonly be a sale. One would therefore,
at least, have to interpose a sale (and the associated delivery and payment)
between the extraction of the minerals and the income, thus postulating a
business. I am nevertheless unable to acc ept the argument for the appellant that
the Act contemplates as the source of th e income the mining trade carried on by
the appellant. In order to derive income a taxpayer must generally carry on a
trade, but that is not to say that the trade, although it is a sine qua non of the
trading income, is its source. Cases such as Sekretaris van Binnelandse
Inkomste v Olifantsrivierse Koöperatiewe Wynkelders Bpk 1976 (3) SA 261 (A)
and Income Tax Case 1420 49 SATC 69 and Commissioner for Inland Revenue
v Zamoyski 1985 (3) SA 145 (C) which held that mining or farming is a trade
therefore do not advance the enquiry. Section 36(7C) of the Act speaks not of
‘mining’ or ‘mining operations’ but of ‘... income derived from the working of
any producing mine.’ 3 This expression (arguabl y more focused than the
2 Two decisions of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal espouse the approach that the operation of a mine is
an economic, not a metallurgical, concept: Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd v Minister of National Revenue 72
DTC 6337; Westar Mining Ltd v The Queen 92 DTC 6358.
3 The word ‘producing’ was inserted in section 36(7C) by s 29 of Act 113 of 1993 with effect from the years of
assessment ending on or after 1 January 1994.
5
expressions ‘mining’ and ‘mining operations’) leaves no doubt that to be mining
income its source must be minerals ta ken from the earth. This was the view
correctly taken by the full court in Commissioner for Inl and Revenue v BP
Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd 1997 (1) SA 375 (C) when it said that –
‘Properly construed, in the context of the Act and the Schedule, the phrase
“income derived from mining operations” means income derived from the
business of extracting minerals from the soil ...’ (at 379C-D).
The court used this formulation to point the difference between the derivation of
income from working a mine and the deri vation of deemed income that accrued
to the respondent from the sale of its interest in a mine.
[7] The appellant did not chal lenge the finding of the court a quo that in
order to qualify as mining income, the in come had to be dir ectly connected to
the mining source. ‘Directly connected’ is an expression from the judgment of
the lower court4 adopted by this Court in D & N Promotions (at 306C-D).
' " ... the income and the source from which the income arises, namely farming
operations, which of course embraces numerous agricultural activities, must
be directly connneted. An indirect connection or a remote one will not
suffice." '
It was held that interest on the price of sugar cane delivered by a farmer to a
miller was income directly derived fr om farming operations . The interest was
designed to compensate the fa rmer for the miller’s retention during the year of
4 The decision is reported as CIR v D&N Promotions (Pty) Ltd 1993 (3) SA 33 (N).
6
the difference between the final price a nd the provisional price paid for the
sugar cane: it was ‘part and parcel’ of th e final price, no more than additional
remuneration.
[8] On the other hand, interest on a pa yment received by the farmer from the
SA Sugar Association to compensate it for a newly imposed obligation to bear
the full costs of transport of cane to the mill, was held to fall ‘outside the
general ambit of the [farme r’s] income-earning operations from sugar farming’
(308H-I) in the same way as it would have done
‘[i]f the capital sum had been paid in one lump sum and such moneys invested
with or loaned to another institution…’ (at 308F-H).
The compensation paid by statutory au thority under the Sugar Agreement
promulgated in terms of the Sugar Act of 1978 was assessed in a lump sum but
paid in instalments. In a passage from the judgment of the special court5 quoted
with approval by Corbett CJ (at 308E-H) the following approach was adopted:
‘It is clear that the interest was derived from a capital sum due to the appellant
retained by the SA Sugar Association. It was interest accruing on either a
compulsory investment of a fixed amount by the appellant with the SA Sugar
Association or on a compulsory loan of this amount to the SA Sugar
Association. If the capital sum had been paid in one sump sum and such
moneys invested with or loaned to another institution, it is clear that such
interest would not have been regarded as being derived from farming
5 Reported in ITC 53 1505 SATC 406.
7
operations. In our view the position is not altered by the fact that such
investment or loan was not effected voluntarily but compulsorily.’
The line of reasoning is straightforward a nd, adapted to this case, leads to the
conclusion that income which is directly connected to a mi ning source qualifies
as mining income; an intermediate inv estment of such income, putting it to
work as capital, generally breaks the direct connection.6
[9] The appellant’s counsel suggested that any income flowing from the
trade of mining would be sufficiently closely connected to the mining
operations to qualify as mining income. Counsel for the respondent on the other
hand contended that only the proceeds of the sale of minerals would be
sufficiently closely connected to the mining operations (the extraction and
refinement of the minerals) to be properly characterised as mining income.
[10] The appellant’s approach is too generous; the res pondent’s on the other
hand is too narrow. Direct connection is a flexible concept. Its application does
not inexorably lead to the categorisation of any income item other than the price
itself as only indirectly or remotely connected with the mining source. A good
example of this is an insurance paym ent, which, replacing mining income, has
itself been held to be mining income. An insurance indemnity takes on the
character of the amount that would have been received had it not been for the
occurrence of the insured event (see Income Tax Case 597 14 SATC 264 and
6 Where a portion of a farm was put to use as an investment the rental was held not to be income from farming
operations: ITC 732 18 SATC 108.
8
the cases discussed therein). If the am ount lost is of a revenue nature an
insurance receipt is regarded as ‘filling the hole of income’ and is also revenue.
The question in Income Tax Case 1572 56 SATC 175 was whether this income,
when it replaced mining income (that w ould have been earned had it not been
for a machinery breakdown) was also mining income. The court held that the
connection of the insurance payment (an in come receipt) with the lost mining
income was sufficiently direct to qualify it as mining income.7
[11] The appellant maintains that certain interest items in its financial
statements formed part of its income derived from mining ope rations. Cloete J
analyzed the various sources of the inte rest income and concluded that some
items derived from mining operations whereas others did not. In conducting this
exercise he asked himself whether the in terest could be said to have been
derived directly from the mining operations or could mo re properly be said to
have been derived from the capital employed to produce it.
[12] Current bank accounts, of which there were several, were managed in
terms of a cash management system (CMS) operated by arrangement with the
appellant’s bankers and pr oducing over the tax years in question interest of
R1 776 187. The special court described the system thus:
7 ITC 65 1753 SATC 310. Interestingly, this was also the conclusion of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal
on a similarly worded provision in Westar Mining Ltd v The Queen 92 DTC 6358.
9
‘If the total amounts overdrawn on all the accounts managed by the
management company (those of the appellant and those of the other
companies in the group) exceeded the amounts in credit, the banks charged the
overdraft rate on the amounts in debit and paid interest at the overdraft rate on
the amounts in credit. The nett effect was therefore that the bank charged
interest at the overdraft rate on the nett amount in debit.
If the total of the debits exceeded the total of the credits, the position was
somewhat different. The bank paid overdraft interest on the total of the
amounts in credit, but only on an amount equal to the total of the amounts in
debit. On the nett excess credit the bank paid only the deposit interest rate,
which was lower than the overdraft rate. The nett effect to the bank was
therefore that it paid interest at the deposit rate to the companies on the total
nett amount in credit. However, to alleviate administrative difficulty, the
management company made up the shortfall between the overdraft and the
deposit rate on this total nett credit.’
[13] The management company’s comm itment to making up the interest
shortfall could, of course, impose a consid erable burden on it. It therefore tried
to eliminate credit balances as far as possible by investing any surplus overnight
in the money market. Interest receive d on overnight money lent to South
African banks in this manner came to R13 868 980. The special court was of the
view that the placing of money on over night call was an investment decision
that altered the character of the inter est from mining to investment income. I
agree. The interest was taken out of the mining income stream.
10
[14] The Commissioner challenges the sp ecial court finding that, since money
in an banking account would invariably attract interest, and the keeping of a
banking account was indispensable to the operation of the mine,
‘ ... the interest earned as a necessary concomitant of the operation of those
accounts is mining income.’
[15] If the current acc ounts had simply been repos itories of the proceeds of
metal sales and interest were earned on credit balances so that such interest was
the result of an (inevitable) disequilibr ium from time to time between outgoings
from that account and mining income paid into it, the connection between the
interest and the mining source would be direct. Interest so earned could
therefore be regarded as a necessary conc omitant of the mining operations. The
facts here do not, however, support su ch a conclusion. The accounts were
manipulated in the manner described by the judge a quo. The management of
the accounts of the whole group compri sing twenty-six companies (and the
intervention of the management compa ny) meant that the appellant received
from the banks, or from the banks subs idized by the manage ment company, the
overdraft rate of interest on its credit balances, a rate that it would not have
received had it not been for the CMS. The scheme was obviously conceived to
maximize the group’s inter est income. It was, in essence, an investment
scheme. The decision to manipulate the accounts br oke any direct connection
that the interest may have had with the mining source.
11
[16] Interest on money in foreign bank accounts for the tax years 1992 to 1997
came to R2 166 179. Proceeds of off-shor e mineral sales were paid into foreign
bank accounts conducted by the appellan t for the convenience of its overseas
customers. The evidence for the appellant was that this money was transferred
to South Africa with a brief delay either because it was not possible to transfer it
on the same day or because the appellant preferred to transfer rounded amounts
rather than specific deposits. In this way interest accrued on (short term) credit
balances in the accounts. That was the position up to the 1994 year of
assessment and the special court found th at the interest had until then been
earned in the ordinary course of marketing the appellant’s metals.
[17] The Commissioner contends that th e appellant failed to discharge the
onus of proving that the monies were no t allowed to remain overseas for the
purpose of earning income or deriving fo reign exchange benefits and in any
event argues that interest earned in this way was invest ment income, the fruit of
capital derived from the appellant’s metal sa les. It is not r eadily apparent why
in an era of electronic transfers money in the overseas acc ounts could not have
been transmitted as soon as it had been received. It might have had something to
do with different banking hours in this country and overseas or perhaps with
time zone differences but th at is speculation. The appellant laid no factual
foundation for its assertion that deposits c ould not be transferred on the same
day as they were received. The appellant ’s unexplained preference for receiving
12
rounded amounts is, on the evidence before us, too quirky to carry conviction;
in any event, a decision to wait for ro unded amounts to be made up (to leave
money in an account until the happening of a specified even t) is in itself a
conscious investment decision. In my view the appellant has not discharged the
burden of proving that this interest income was directly connected to the mining
operations.
[18] From September 1994 the appellant arranged with the overseas banks to
place sale proceeds on overnight call before transferring them to the appellant’s
head office account in South Africa. The delay in the transfer of the money was
no greater than before but the interest earned increased by one percent. This
interest was a fortiori not classifiable as income from mining operations.
[19] There were two overseas accounts exhibiting different features. They
were the so-called escrow accounts held at the Hypobank and the Bayerische
Vereinsbank in Germany. As part of th e security arrangements for long-term
loans to the appellant cu stomers were obliged to pay the price of metals
purchased from the appellant into these accounts so that the banks might lay
claim to the funds if the a ppellant failed to comply with its obligations to them.
Although the banks released funds on a daily basis monies inevitably remained
in the accounts for short periods where they earned interest totalling R239 501
at rates equivalent to that earned on the off-shore current accounts.
13
[20] The court a quo concluded that since this interest arose from receipts held
by the two foreign banks as part of the security for loans to enable the appellant
to mine there was a direct connectio n between the interest earned and the
operation of mining. I agre e. The interest was the unavoidable result of the
way in which the scheme for the rem uneration of the a ppellant had been
devised. It was not entitled to be pa id the price for its metals except in
accordance with its financing arrangement with the banks. The interest earned
on the escrow accounts is part and parcel of the appe llant’s mining operations;
it exhibits the direct conn ection with those operations that qualify it as mining
income.
[21] On four occasions during the ta x years in question the appellant lent
money on fixed deposit. Two of the loans were to Lonrho Management
Services: the interest totalled R2 686 478. Two further loans on which the
interest came to R3 073 389 were made to other institutions. The appellant’s
counsel submitted that the placing of money on short term fixed deposit could
not be regarded as an independent trade carried on by the appellant. I agree with
the submission, but it does not answer th e essential question of whether there
was a direct link between the interest derived from the investment and the
mining operations carried on by the appe llant. The question of how to treat the
investment of surplus income was settled in D & N Promotions. Whether funds
are invested over the short or the long term the interest is properly characterized
14
as investment income not directly conn ected to a mining in come source. The
Commissioner succeeds on this issue.
[22] The court a quo held that interest (amounting to R4 614 125) accruing by
virtue of an agreement under which a cust omer undertook to pay interest if it
paid late was derived from the appellant’s mining operations. Mitsubishi, one of
the appellant’s principal customers, was by agreement charged a favourable rate
of interest for a short period if it failed to pay for metal sold to it on due date;
thereafter it was charged ordinary intere st. The Commissioner contends that the
interest so received was not income derived from mining operations. The
appellant should, he says, have adjusted the price to take account of the
extended period for paymen t: had it done that, the income would have been
mining income. In making this submissi on the Commissioner sees the income
stream from mining operations too narrowly. The interest was part and parcel of
the income stream; under the prescribed circumstances it augmented the income
stream in exactly the same way as an increase in th e purchase price would have
done but it did so in a more flexible and commercially sensible way. I do not
consider that the directness of the deri vation of this income from the mining
source can be doubted.
[23] In terms of the General Export Ince ntive Scheme in fo rce at the time the
appellant became entitled to incentives on the export of two base metals, nickel
sulphate and copper cathodes. The export incentives were calculated according
15
to a formula Z = U x (M plus or minus E) x P in which Z w as the value of the
benefit payable under the scheme, U was the export sales valu e of the exported
product, M the manufacturing level factor, E the exchange rate factor and P the
local content factor. Larger incentives were paid by the Department of Trade
and Industry by way of promissory not es on which interest became due. It is
common cause that for the tax years in question (1992 and 1993) the incentives
were tax exempt under the now repealed s 10(1)(zA) of the Act but that the
interest was not. The only dispute is whether the inter est, amounting to
R421 163, is mining or non-mining income.
[24] It is not necessary to know preci sely how the formula worked. The point
is that it was devised to augment an exporter’s income. The promissory notes
were issued for varying periods dependi ng on the department’s budget and its
ability to pay the notes. The interest was intended to compensate exporters for
deferred payment, very like the intere st paid by Mitshubishi for late payment,
and incontestably part and parcel of the purchase price. I agree with the special
court that there was a direct connec tion between the mining source and the
export incentive interest.
[25] The final three items in dispute are all concerned with refunds by the
Commissioner of tax or mining rental on which he was in terms of s 88(1) of the
Act obliged to pay interest. The simila rity between the second situation dealt
with in the D & N Promotions case and these three item s of interest is that
16
money due to the taxpayer was retained by government action and later repaid
with interest. For the purpose of determ ining the derivation of the interest there
is no difference in principle between the retention of money by the Sugar
Association and the rete ntion of money by the fiscus. In either case the
retention of the money can be equated with a compulso ry loan, the interest on
which, as explained in para [8], is not derived from a farming or mining source.
[26] For the 1989 year of assessment the appellant clai med a deduction of
R23 758 447 in respect of capital expenditure and paid its provisional tax on the
footing that the deduction would be allowed. When the deduction was
disallowed8 the appellant had to pa y more provisional tax and also, in terms of
s 89quat(2) of the Act, had to pay intere st on the difference between the
provisional payment and the tax as assessed.
[27] An appeal against the disallowan ce of the appellant’s objection to the
assessment was later con ceded by the Commissioner w ho during the 1994 year
of assessment refunded to the appellan t R10 697 186,64 plus the interest of
R2 559 318,15 that it had been obliged to pay on that amount; moreover, in
terms of s 88(1) of the Act the Commissioner paid the appellant interest of
R7 044 140,62 on these overpayments – interest that the appellant claims is part
of its mining income.
8 A small portion of the expenditure was allowed in a later year of assessment.
17
[28] Apart from the considerations referred to in para [8], a tax is an impost on
income; it has none of the attributes of revenue. By virtue of the statutory
intervention that allows the imposition of the tax it is already one level removed
from the mining income on which it is im posed. The refund of the tax occurred
after procedures to secure th at result had been adopted by the appellant so that
the refund was two levels removed from the mining income. The interest that
the Commissioner was statutorily obliged to pay on that refund is another level
away. Its connection with the mining in come is tenuous. It did not flow from
the appellant’s mining operations: it wo uld have been payable whatever the
source of the income on which tax had unjustifiably been imposed.
[29] The court a quo was correct in finding that ‘ ... the fact that the earning of
the mining income was a sine qua non for the payment of the tax which was
paid, does not provide a sufficiently direct causal link between the interest paid
on the refund of the tax and the actual mining operation.’
[30] The downward revision of the appe llant’s tax liability following on the
allowance of the capital expenditure meant not only that it owed the
Commissioner of Inland Reve nue less in tax but also that it owed the
Commissioner of Mines less in rental.
[31] The appellant mined precious minerals under a mining lease in terms of
the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967 (now la rgely replaced by the Minerals Act 50
18
of 1991). The rental under the lease wa s calculated on the appellant’s annual
profit in the same manner as its taxabl e income from mining operations was
determined under the Income Tax Act. When the Commissioner disallowed the
deduction claimed by the appellant its ta xable income increased and so in
consequence did the rental on its mining lease, from R8 712 270 to
R12 134 512. The appellant was required to pay the difference of R3 422 242 to
the Commissioner pending the resolution of its dispute with the Revenue.9 Since
the rental was paid later than the appoin ted day the appellant paid interest of
R1 107 623,52 for the period of the delay. As a result of the revised assessment,
these amounts were repaid to the appellant together with R2 323 620 in interest.
[32] The direct cause of the payment of the interest was the reversal by the
Commissioner of an earlier decision not to allow certain capital expenditure as a
deduction. The interest was paid as compensation for the Commissioner’s
wrongful detention of these amounts. The repayment has much more to do with
the complexities of the tax regime und er which the appellant carries on its
mining trade than with the extraction of minerals from the soil. For these
reasons and for the reasons stated in para [8] the interest cannot be characterized
as mining income.
9 The Commissioner had in terms of the lease and s 26(7) of the Mining Rights Act, 1967 the same power to
exact payment of rental and interest thereon as he had to exact payment of income tax and interest thereon in
terms of the Act.
19
[33] In 1990 the appellant through a sh are issue to Impala Platinum Holdings
acquired the Karee Mine owned by one of the latter’s s ubsidiaries. This was a
developing mine situated on land adjoining the Western Platinum mine. Capital
expended by the appellant on the development of the Kar ee mine could not be
set off against mining income earned fr om the Western Platinum mine since
s 36(7F) of the Act prohibited such a set-off unless the Minister of Finance
permitted it.
[34] Between the acquisition of the new mine in 1990 and the grant of
permission by the Minister in 1992, the appellant had paid provisional tax on
the basis of the then ex isting separate taxation re gime. The appellant’s 1992
assessment, based on the joint taxation of the two mines, entitled it for the 1990
tax year to a refund of R43 000 700 of provisional tax togeth er with interest
This interest, payable by the Commissioner in terms of s 88(1) of the Act, came
to R4 827 353. The appellant contends th at the interest should be classified as
mining income.
[35] The tax refund flowed from a deci sion of the government to adjust the
law relating to the ring fencing of the two mines in such a way that the appellant
was able to deduct from its mining income greater capital expenditure than it
was formerly permitted to do. This resu lted in a reduction of its mining income
and led to the tax re fund together with interest. For the reasons stated above,
20
the interest on the tax refund was only remotely connected with the mining
source of the income. I agree with the judge a quo in this regard.
[36] The special court did not issue an or der in respect of ea ch of the items of
interest. It simply referred the matter back to the Commissioner to issue revised
assessments in terms of its findings. Th e special court's order therefore stands
but revised assessments will of course have to be issued in accordance with the
findings as adjusted on appeal. It is n ecessary to identify the findings on which
each of the parties has been successful in order to arrive at a just costs order.
1 The Commissioner has succeeded in having the following findings
of the income tax special court overturned-
(a) that interest earned by the appella nt by virtue of its participation
in the cash management scheme is mining income;
(b) that interest earned on fore ign current banking accounts is
mining income;
(c) that interest on the refund of mining lease rentals is mining
income.
2 The Commissioner has succeeded in having the following findings
of the income tax special court upheld –
(a) that interest earned on mone y placed on overnight call is not
mining income;
(b) that interest on fixed de posits is not mining income;
21
(c) that interest on tax ref unds is not mining income;
3 The Commissioner has failed in hi s attempt to have the following
findings of the income tax special court overturned –
(a) that interest on late payments by a customer of the appellant is
mining income;
(b) that interest on escrow accounts is mining income;
(c) that interest on export incentives is mining income.
The overall result is that none of the ap pellant’s attacks on the findings of the
special court has succeeded. The Commissioner on th e other hand has
successfully attacked the findings of the special court mentioned in 1(a) – (c). It
seems to me that this subs tantial success merits an aw ard of costs in this Court
which is to include the costs of two counsel.
1 The appeal is dismissed.
2 The cross-appeal succeeds to th e extent set out in para [36]
1(a) – (c) above.
3 The appellant is to pay the respond ent’s costs of the appeal and the
cross-appeal which include the costs of two counsel.
J H CONRADIE
JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCURRING:
SCOTT JA
MTHIYANE JA
HEHER JA
VAN HEERDEN AJA