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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION HELD AT PRETORIA
CASE NO : CC26/2025
DATE : 27.05.2026
In the matter between
THE STATE
and
NTHABISENG TLALI AND LI NEO RALIT SA
SENTENCE
MATLAPENG , AJ: Ms Nthabiseng Tlali and Lin eo Ralit sa,
here inafter accused 1 and accused 2 respectively, appeared
before me on a charge of murder read with the provisions of
section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997.
[2] It is necessary to canvass the, circumstances that
led to the murder of the deceased as described in section
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE : YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES : YES / NO
(3) REVISED
......................................... ...........
SIGNATURE
DATE: .............................
112(2) statement of the plea of guilty. Accused 1 statement
is marked EXHIBIT A, accused 2's is marked EXHIBIT B.
The statements contain a detailed explanation of how and
why the offence was committed. I am going to deal with the
sentence on the basis that the murder of the deceased was
planned or premeditated and apply t he provisions of section
51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1977 part
1 of schedule 2 of the Act.
[3] I must now consider what an appropriate sentence
is and in the assessment of what an appropriate sentence
is, the Court must have regard to and pay attention the triad
mentioned in S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) that is the
accused personal circumstances, the offence of which they
have been convicted and the interest of the community and
none of the tri ad mentioned in Zinn should be over
emphasised at the expense of and to the exclusion of
others.
[4] In the case of S v Rabi e 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) it
was held that punishment should fit the criminal as well as
the crime, be fair to society and be blended with a measure
of mercy according to the circumstances.
[5] A brief synops is of the facts that led to the
conviction of the two accused is essential. May I interpose
to state that the accused were made aware by their legal
representative before the y pleaded of their Constitutional
rights contained in section 35 of the Constitution. Amongst
others, the right to remain silent and not to incriminate
oneself a s well as the provision of section 51(1) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act colloquially referred to as the
minimum sentence Act. The Court also apprise d the
accused of the provision of section 51(1) of the Minimum
Sentence Act.
[6] Accused 1 is a 42 year old female who was
married to the deceased in this matter and she has a child
by the deceased. Accused 1 had moved out of the ir home
when the deceased was killed.
[7] Accused 2 is a 39 year old Lesotho national. She
is also married with a child. Accused 1 is her acquaintance.
[8] Some months before the deceased was killed,
accused 1 informed accused 2 that the deceased was
abusing her and that accused 2 should organise a hit man
to kill him. Accused 2 acceded to the request. She
contacted her ex -boyfriend and the latter organised two
Lesotho nationals to kill the deceased.
[9] Accused 1 and accused 2 had several telephonic
conversations with the two hit m en and even met them
between June and 12 August 2024 the day on which the
deceased was killed.
[10] The two assassins spent a night at the
accused 2' place of residence. Whilst they were there,
accused 1 phoned accused 2 to say that the deceased was
on his way to his place of abode. Accused 2 communicated
this message to the hit men who then proceeded to the
deceased's place of abode.
[11] The deceased was accosted at the gate of his
home by the two hit men who, where he was shot with a
firearm.
[12] According to post mortem report, the deceased
died of a gunshot wound to the head. Both accused admit
the correctness of the post mortem report.
[13] Accused 1 paid the two hit men a sum of R60 000
to kill the deceased.
[14] Both accused admit that they were aware that
their actions of planning the death of the deceased was
wr ong and punishable by law.
[15] The proper approach where minimum sentence is
applicable was established by the Supreme Court of Appeal
in the pat h finding and se minal judgment of S v Malgas
2001 SACR 469 (SCA ), 2001 (2) SA 1222 (2001) 3 All SA
22 . The summary of the approach is set out at
paragraph 25 of the judgment:
The effect of which is that the prescribed
sentence should ordinarily and in the
absence of weighty considerations be
imposed
In paragraph 1 of the summary it is stated that:
"The Court may impose a lesser sentence
if on consideration of circumstances of a
particular case, it is satisfied that they
render the prescribed sentence unjust in
that it would be disproportionate to the
crime, the criminal and the needs of
society so that an injustice would be
done by imposing the sentence."
[16] The approach established in the case of S v
Malgas Supra was approved by the Constitutional Court in
the case of S v Dodo 2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC) as
undoubtedly correct and the summary referred to above as
having laid down a determinative test as to when the
prescribed sentence may be departed from.
[17] Whether the prescribed sentence is proportionate
and capable of being imposed, is a matter to be determined
upon a consideration of the circumstances of a particular
case.
[18] The approach established in the case of Malgas
supra has been followed in a long line of cases. It sets out
how the coll oquially known as the minimum sentence s Act
should be approached and in particular how the enquiry into
substantial and compelling circumstances should be
conducted by a Court.
[19] It is not irrelevant to bear in mind that life
imprisonment is the heaviest sentence that a person can be
legally obliged to serve in our sentencing juris prudence . It
was remarked in Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions
2003 (1) SACR 200 (SCA) 18 that:
"Where section 51(1) of the Act applies
an accused must not be subjected to the
risk that substantial and compelling
circumstances are on inadequate reasons
held to be absent. At the same time, the
communities are entitled to expect that
an accused will not escape the
prescribed sentence of life imprisonment
simply, because such circumstances are
unwarrantedly held to be present. "
[20] Every human being has the inherent right to life
and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her right to
life. Section 11 of the Constitution of the republic of South
Africa at 108 of 1996 provides that:
"Everyone has the right to life."
[21] Closely akin to the protection of the right to life
in the Constitution is the protection of ones right to freedom
and security of the person. Section 12(1) of the
Constitution provides that:
"Everyone has the right to freedom and
security of the person which includes the
right a, not to be deprived of freedom,
arbitrarily or without just cause. C, to be
free from all forms of violence from either
party of private sources. D, not to be
tortured in any way."
[22] In terms of section 36 of the Constitution, the
rights in the Bill of rights may be limited in exception of the
right to life, which is an absolute right. The fundamental
right to life of the deceased was infringed by the two
accused in this matter. I convicted them of murder on
20 February 2026. The deceased was killed on
12 August 2024.
[23] The Constitutional Court in the case of S v
Ma kwanyana and another CCT3/94 (1995) ZACC 3, 1995 (6)
BCLR 665, 1995 (3) SA 391, 195 (2) SACR 1 Judgment
delivered on 6 June 1995 held as follows at paragraph 115
that:
"The need for a strong deterrent to
violent crime is an end, the validity of
which is not open to question. It is of a
fundamental importance to the future of
our country that respect for the law
should be restored and that dangerous
criminals should be apprehended and
dealt with firmly."
[24] In the case of S v Ncgobo 2018 ZACSA judgment
delivered on 25 February 2018 the Court when dealing with
the period spent in custody awaiting trial stated as follows:
"The test was not whether on its own that
period of detention constituted
substantial and compelling
circumstances, but whether the effective
sentence proposed was proportionate to
the crime committed. Whether the
sentence in all the circumstances
including the period spent in detention,
prior to conviction was a just one.
Furthermore the period in detention
presentence is but one of the factors that
should be taken into account in
determining whether the effective period
of imprisonment to be imposed is
justified."
See also S v Vilakazi 2012 (6) SA 353 (SCA).
[25] In the case of Vilakazi 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA)
the following was stated:
"In cases of serious crimes the personal
circumstances of the offender by
themselves will recede into the
background. Whilst it becomes clear that
the crime is deserving a substantial
period of imprisonment, the question
whether the accused is married or single,
whether he has two children or three,
whether or not he is in employment are in
themselves largely immaterial to what the
period should be and those seems to be
flimsy grounds that Malgas said should
be avoided. A material consideration is
whether the accused can be expected to
offend again."
[26] Mr Kgagara for accused 1 presented a pre -
sentence report and also called the social worker Mas ego
Nkoane . The social worker testified to the effect that the
deceased and accused were not staying together when the
deceased was killed and that accused 1 informed her that
the deceased promised t o kill her should she institute
divorce proceedings. The social worker also testified to the
effect that accused 1 only told her about two insurance
policies. She testified further that she will ensure that her
department take care of the needs of accused 1's child.
[27] Accused 1 also testified in mitigation of sentence
and her evidence , in a nutshell is that she confirms the
social worker's testimony that she was no more staying with
the deceased when the deceased was killed. She had
moved out of their home, because the deceased was
abusing her. It is accused 1's testimony further that the
deceased was in possession of a n un licensed firearm and
ammunition and police uniform and that the deceased at
time s sen t the child to go and fetch this firearm from inside
a vehicle and bring it to him in the house and that the
deceased would also forcefully enter accused 1's workplace
and demanded to see her, but that she did not lay a
protection order against the deceased. She also did not lay
any charge against the deceased, because she was afraid
of him.
[28] It emerged during cross -examination by
Adv Masilo for the state that accused 1 had about five
insurance policies and that they did pay out after the death
of the deceased.
[29] It was argued by Mr Kgagara for accused 1 that
the following factors cumulatively taken into account should
be found to constitute substantial and compelling
circumstances justifying this c ourt to deviate from imposing
the prescribed sentence of life imprisonment , that the
accused pleaded guilty, which in itself shows a sign of
remorse on her part , that she did not waste the Court's
time , t hat she is a first offender that she is a primary
caregiver that she spent a year and 6 months in custody
awaiting trial. That she was employed and maintaining the
deceased and their child. That she is suffering from
depression, stress and insomnia and that she is a first
offender.
[30] Accused 2 did not testify in mitigation of
sentence. Adv Simpson called a probation officer and
addressed the Court from the bar. Adv Simpson submitted
that the Court should consider what follows to be
substantial and compelling factors entitling the Court to
deviate from imposing the prescribed term of life
imprisonment. That accused 2 pleaded guilty to this charge
and took responsibility for the crime and she was
remorseful. That she is candidate for rehabilitation. That
she is a first offender at the age of 39 years and that she
has been in custody for a period of a year and 6 months
awaiting trial. That the accused's role was of assisting in
the logistics of the crime, but she did not benefit from the
crime. It is submitted that a sentence of 15 and 20 years
imprisonment will be an appropriate one under the
circumstances. Adv Simpson further referred the Court to
the case of S v Prinsloo CC10/2024 (2025 ZAGPP 8 C 33)
judgment deliver on 24 March 2025, mention need t o be
made that the facts in Prinsloo's case are distinguishable
from the facts of this case as it will appear later in the
judgment.
[31] The state in aggravati on of s entence called two
witnesses, t he investigating officer and the deceased's
sister to with M mal efu Molo i. The investigating officer
Mr Radebe informed the court that after the death of the
deceased he approached accused 1 on two different
occasions with a view to enquiring if she does not know the
people responsible for the death of the deceased and that
on both these instances accused 1 denied any knowledge of
the people who killed the deceased, the investigating officer
Mr Radebe, should be applauded. His evidence is further
that he took statements from accused 1 on both these
instances when she denied knowledge of the people who
killed the deceased.
[3 1] The investigating officer, Mr Radebe, testified further the accused 1 went to the University of Vaal, Vaal University Radio Station and there she requested members of the community to help with information that c ould lead
to the arrest of the people who killed her husband .
[3 2] It was put to investigating officer by
Adv Simpson, that the person who went to the radio station
is accused 1's friend. Mention need to be made that even if
it can be a ccepted for a moment that it was accused 1's
friend who went to the radio station and requested members
of the public to assist with information that can help the
police to trace the perpetrators, the friend could not have
gone to the radio station without the knowledge or
permission of accused 1.
[3 3] Whether it was accused 1 or her friend who went
to the radio station and pleaded with members of the
community to help the police with the information that w ould
lead to arrest of the hit men who killed the deceased, does
not make a difference. The question that forcefully come to
the fore is, why did accused 1 go to the radio station or
cause her friend to go to the radio station and requested for
assistance when accused 1 knew very well that she and
accused 2 planned the death of the deceased. The IO Mr
Radebe, was at accused 1's place on two occasions, why
did she not tell Mr Radebe I killed the deceased. I was with
accused 2.
[3 4] The evidence of the deceased's sister to wit
Mmal efu Moloi is that she is staying in Kroonstad and that
accused 1, the deceased and their child used to visit her in
Kroonstad and that accused 1 never informed her that the
deceased was abusing her.
[35] M mal efu Moloi testified further that accused 1
did not inform her and her family, about the death of the
deceased. She testified further that the mother of the
deceased was well before this incident, but that she fell ill
after the death of the deceased, which means that the
deceased's death affected her.
[36] It is common cause that the deceased was killed
on 12 August 2024. The investigating officer Mr Radebe
informed the Court that, the accused were arrested on 24
November 2024. That is 2 months and 13 days after the
death of the deceased.
[37] Accused 1 and accused 2 started to plan the
murder of the deceased in June 2024 and the deceased was
killed on `12 August 2024. The insurance policies paid
accused 1, she paid the killers R60 000 in October 2024.
[38] Accused 1 is insinuating that she killed the
deceased, because the latter was abusing her. She
testified further that she was afraid of the deceased, more
especially, because the deceased had an unlicensed firearm
and ammunition, but she did not lay charges against him.
[39] If accused 1 killed the deceased, because the
latter was abusing her and she was afraid of him, one would
have expected her to report him at t he first available
opportunity. The investigating officer approached her on
two instances to enquire about who could have killed the
deceased. She did not disclose this to the investigating
officer. M malefu Moloi 's evidence which was uncontested,
is that at the funeral accused 1 said she does not know the
people who killed the deceased. Accused 2 also kept quiet
like a rock. She never came forward and say myself and
accused 1 killed the deceased up to and until she was
arrested in November , t hese are not the actions of people
who show remorse or who are remorseful.
[41] Genuine remorse is a significant mitigating
factor, particularly when an accused person takes full
responsibility of his or her actions. In the present case,
accused 1 and accused 2 have done nothing that
demonstrates accountability. In the case of S v Prinsloo
CC10/2024 (2025 ZAGPP C327) judgment delivered on
24 March 20 17, it was said that the accused demonstrated
accountability by expressing intent to make financial
contributions for his estate to the child R[...] [spelt] (who
had lost her mother). The Court found this aspect to be
demonstrating genuine concern for the plight of the child.
[42] It is argued that accused 1 and 2 spent a year
and 6 months in custody awaiting trial. In the case of the
Director of Public Prosecutions Gauteng Pretoria v Gcwale
2014 (2) SACR 337 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal said
the following on the period spent in custody at paragraph 80
and paragraph 90:
"The question has already been
answered. Not only in relation to cases
where minimum sentences are being
prescribed by the legislation, but in all
cases where a Court is considering the
justness of the sentence to be imposed.
The sentencing Court should consider in
all cases whether the period of
imprisonment proposed is proportionate
to the crime committed taking into
account for that purpose the period spent
in custody."
The Court concluded that :
"T he period spent in custody awaiting
trial by an accused, is a factor to be
taken into account in determining
whether substantial and compelling
circumstances exist such that a
prescribes minimum sentence may be
departed from. Each case must be
decided having regard to all the
circumstances that justify a lesser
sentence ."
[43] In the case of Ngcobo 2018 ZASCA a judgment
delivered on 23 February 2018 the Court when dealing with
time spent in custody awaiting trial stated as follows:
"The test was not whether on its own that
period of detention constituted
substantial and compelling
circumstances, but whether the effective
sentence proposed was proportionate to
the …[indistinct]. Whether the sentence
in all the circumstances, including the
period spent in custody prior to
conviction was a just one. Furthermore,
the period in detention pre -sentencing is
but one of the factors that should be
taken into account in determining
whether the effective period of
imprisonment to be imposed is justified."
[44] It was stated in the case of S v D i B lasi 1996 (1)
SACR (A) at paragraph 10 (f -g) that:
"The requirements of society demand that
a premeditated callous murder such as
the present, should not be punished too
lightly. Less the administration of justice
be brought into disrepute. The
punishment should not only inflict a
shock and indignation of interested
persons and of the community at large
and so serves as a just retribution for the
crime , but should also deter others from
similar conduct."
[45] It is so that accused 1 and accused 2 pleaded
guilty to the charge preferred against them, which is a sign
of remorse on their part. According to their legal
representatives but the mere fact that both accused pleaded
guilty to a charge, did not necessarily support the
conclusion that they are remorseful. As the plea of guilty
could have been motivated by various factors. For
example, they might have noticed that the evidence against
them is overwhelming and that it would have been futile to
plead not guilty to the charge.
[46] An accused person might well regret his or her
conduct, but that does not without more translat e to genuine
remorse. The case in point is S v Mokoena 2009 (2) SACR
309 (SCA) at paragraph 9 where it was said that:
"Genuine contrition can only arise from
an appreciation and acknowledgement of
the extent of ones' error."
[47] Whether an accused person is sincerely
remorseful for his or her actions, not simply feeling sorry for
having been apprehended, is a factual question. An
accused's actions should be considered in order to
determine if he or she is remorseful and not his statement
in court.
[48] The above exposition demonstrates that accused
1 and 2 ’s actions do not translate into genuine remorse
[49] If it can be a ccepted for a moment that the
deceased was killed, because he was abusing accused 1,
one would have expected accused 1 to go to the law
enforcement officers after the murder of the deceased and
informed them that myself and accused 2 arranged that the
deceased be killed, because I was afraid of him, he was
promis ing to kill me. I was afraid of him. That is why I
killed him. Both of them, accused 1 and accused 2, were as
quiet as a rock. They were arrested, because of the
investigating officer Mr Radebe's investigations.
[50] Accused 2 is a Lesotho national. She decided to
organise hit men from another country, Lesotho. It goes
without saying that she did that to avoid detection. That is
why the killers are still at large 2 years after the deceased
was murdered and it is clear that, the two accused, planned
the death of the deceased m etic ulou sly and with precision.
[51] It was contended that the accused are good
candidates for rehabilitation. No facts has been placed
before me to demonstrate any probability of rehabilitation.
[52 ] It appears that accused 1 had informers or
people who were monitoring the movements of the
deceased. I am saying so, because late at night on the
night the deceased was killed, accused 1 phoned accused 2
who was with the assassins at her residential place.
Accused 1 informed accused 2 that the deceased is on his
way to his place of abode. Accused 2 communicated these
messages to the hit men who were armed to their teeth.
They immediately went to the accused's place and accosted
the accused at his gate, shot and killed him.
[53 ] The murder of ones' spouse, is an extremely
serious offence and rife in the country. This type of
offences , necessitate a deterrent approach.
[54] Now of late, we hear on radio stations, print
media, we see on television that South African citizens are
up in arms against undocumented foreigners who come here
and commit serious crimes. Accused 1 and accused 2's
case substantiate the assertion of these South Africans. I
am saying so, because accused 2 a Lesotho national at the
request of accused 1, employed the services of hit men
from Lesotho and they did kill the deceased and 2 years
after the murder of the deceased they are still at large.
[55] The fact that an accused person is a first
offender does not justify the imposition of a lesser
sentence. Mitigating factors must be assessed
cumulatively.
[56] It is said that accused 1 is suffering from
amongst others, depression. This factor must be
considered together with other factors.
[60 ] It is said the accused spent a year and 6 months
in custody awaiting trial. This factor must also be
considered in conjunction with other circumstances. It is
said that accused 1 is 42 years of age and accused 2, 39
and their ages should be taken into consideration. In the
case of S v JA 2017 (2) SACR 147(MCK) the appellant was
59 years of age. He was convicted of having raped his 12
year old daughter and the Court found that his relatively
advanced age did not warrant deviation from the prescribed
sentence of life imprisonment.
[62] It came to light during cross -examination as I
had indicated earlier, during cross -examination by
Adv Masilo, that accused 1 benefited from the insurance
policies after the death of the deceased and he paid the hit
men R60 000, it is not known how much accused 2
benefitted for having organised the hit men. It is also not
known how much accused 2's ex -boyfriend received for
having organised the hit men.
[63 ] Accused 1 and accused 2 brought this tragedy on
themselves. Whatever accused 1's distress was, the
deceased did not deserve to die. The two accused had no
justification to kill the deceased, but it appears from the
facts of this matter that accused 1 killed the deceased for
financial gain so that he should benefit from the insurance
policies. That is why she kept her quiet from August after
the deceased was killed, until November when he was
arrested.
[6 4] Accused persons convicted of the same offence
should receive equal punishment, unless there are
circumstances that justify disparity in their sentences. It
was argued by Adv Simpson on behalf of accused 2 that the
accused's role was just of assisting in logistics of the crime,
I disagree. She organised the Lesotho nationals, they slept
at her place. She and accused 1 met the assassins and
made several calls to them between August and the August
when the deceased was killed and the assassins, spent a
night at accused 2's place. I therefore see no reason that
justify a disparity in the sentences of the accused.
[65] The assassins are still at large. The accused 1
and 2 planned the death of the deceased more than 2
months before he was assassinated. The above expositions
negate any basis for finding the existence of substantial
and compelling circumstances. The crime of murder is a
stubborn scourge and prevalent in this division and not only
in this division, but all over the country. Prevalence of an
offence in an area must be taken into account in the
assessment of what an appropriate sentence is.
[67] After having considered all the relevant factors,
the one against the other in an attempt to strike a balanced
and or a just sentence, it is my considered view that there
are no substantial and compelling circumstances. The
aggravating factors in this case far outweigh mitigating
factors. You may stand up.
[68] In conclusion, it is my considered view that the
sentence that is going to be pronounced shortly is a just
one under the circumstances. In the result I sentence
accused as follows. Count 1, accused 1 premeditated
murder, life imprisonment. Accused 2, premeditated
murder, life imprisonment. Accused 1 is declared unfit to
possess a firearm. Accused 2 is also declared unfit to
possess a firearm.
…………………………..
MATLAPENG , AJ
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
DATE : 27/ 05/2026
TRANSCRIBER’S CERTIFICATE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that so far as it is audible to
me, the aforegoing is a true and correct transcript of the
proceedings recorded by means of a digital recorder in the matter
between:
THE STATE // NTHABISENG TLALI AND NEO VALITA
CASE NUMBER : CC26/2025
RECORDED AT : PRETORIA
DATE HELD : 27.05.2026
NUMBER OF PAGES : 23
DATE COMPLETED : 06.06.2026
TRANSCRIBER : Liesellotte Renate Halse
PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED WITH RECORDING
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