JUDGMENT 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2026- 105823
DATE: 03.06.2026
10
In the matter between:
LARMUTH, MAUREEN ROBIN First Applicant
LARMUTH, ROBIN Second Applicant
LARMUTH, NICHOLAS Third Applicant
and
SAMODIEN, RIAZ First Respondent
20
THE CITY OF JOHANNESBURG Second Respondent
J U D G M E N T
MOULTRIE , J: This is an application for an urgent
temporary eviction in terms of section 5(1) of the Prevention
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act , 19 of 1998 (the PIE Act). The circumstances under 30
SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE : YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES : YES / NO
(3) REVISED
SIGNATURE: ..............................................
DATE: 09.06.2026
JUDGMENT 2
which the eviction are sought are tragic but are in my view
deserving, and in fact requiring, of the order that I will be
giving.
The first respondent , Mr Samodien alleges that he is
currently in a relationship with and engaged to be married
to the third applicant, who is the adult son of the first and
second applicants. The applicants’ allegations with regard
to the requirements of section 5( 1) of the PIE Act, and
particularly regard to the question of an imminent danger of
substantial injury to any person, are based on a series of 10
alleged altercations and events that have, in the words of
the representative of the applicant who appeared before
me, have resulted in a deterioration of the conditions of the
parties’ home life. Certainly, it seems to me that there has
been an increase in tension and that an increasingly
untenable situation has developed in the house.
It appears that the first respondent initially came to
live at the home of the first and second applicant at the
instance and special request of the third applicant.
However, on the admission of the first respondent himself , 20
the relationship has been stormy . H e ascribes the
difficulties in the relationship to what he considers to be the
interference of the first applicant, the mother of his fiancée.
The disputes that have been raised by the first
applicant as to the veracity of the allegations in the
JUDGMENT 3
founding papers regarding the alleged instances of violence
and altercations are bald and unsubstantiated in
comparison to the detailed information set out in the
founding affidavit s. Although there is authority suggesting
that the Plascon- Evans rule does not apply in view of the
nature of the relief sought ( cf .
SWDC Holdings (Pty)
Limited v Sibu 2018 JDR 1207 (GJ) paras 14 and 22; but
contra: Shanike Inv No 85 (Pty) Ltd v Ndima 2015 (2) SA
610 (GJ) para 93) even assuming that it does, the vague
and bald denials that are set out in the answering papers 10
militate against a finding that the deponent to the founding
affidavit , being the first applicant , is lying with regard to the
detailed contents of that affidavit , the veracity of which
could readily be determined by reference to the video to
which the first applicant refers.
It appears to me in view of the submissions advanced
by the first respondent that he has , at least until recently,
been labouring under a delusional understanding of the
nature of his relationship with the third applicant and the
circumstances under which his presence in the house has 20
been tolerated. It is clear to me that the relationship has
broken down to such a significant level that everybody
involved in this matter (including the first respondent
himself) is facing the risk and imminent danger of
substantial harm by the mere fact of the first respondent’s
JUDGMENT 4
continued residence in the home . My understanding of the
first respondent’s submissions to the court is that that he
himself acknowledge s this .
In my view, it is not necessary for the purposes of the
first requirement in section 5( 1)(a ) of the PIE Act for an
applicant to establish to the satisfaction of the Court that
any person will suffer substantial physical harm and I am
satisfied that emotional harm (including harm of a lesser
degree than of a “ recognised psychiatric injury ” as
contemplated in our law of delict ( cf . Bester v Commercial 10
Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk 1973 (1) SA
769 (A)
)), would be sufficient to establish that requirement .
I consider that the first requirement has in fact been met ,
not only in relation to the applicants but also in respect of
the first respondent.
Turning to the second requirement of the PIE Act , I do
not believe that either party will significantly benefit (other
than from the avoidance of the harm that I have referred to)
should the temporary eviction order be granted. To the
contrary, I consider that it is likely that parties on both 20
sides of this case will suffer at least some hardship, either
if the first respondent is ordered to leave, or not . However,
on the strict wording of the relevant legislation, I am of the
view that the likely hardship to the applicants (who are all
“affected persons ” at the very least ) if an order for eviction
JUDGMENT 5
is not granted, would indeed exceed the likely hardship to
the first respondent if such an order (temporary as it is ), is
granted.
I am cognisant of the fact that Mr Samodien alleges
that he does not have an alternative place to stay . However,
I found his responses to my questions in this regard to be
unsatisfactory and lacking in detail . Ultimately , I am of the
view , even accept ing that he does not have any specific
place to reside immediately upon the interim eviction being
executed, that that would not necessarily be decisive of the 10
question before me. I am simply unable to draw any
significant conclusions in that regard, other than to say
that , on balance, I consider that the likely hardship to the
applicants of not granting the order will be greater than the
likely hardship to the first respondent of granting it.
I am also persuaded that there is indeed no other
effective remedy available in these circumstances. Ms
Kropman submitted that the remedies available in terms of
the Domestic Violence Act or the Harassment Act would not
avail the applicants as they would be ineffective and 20
unwieldy. However, my concern is the opposite: if protection
orders were to be granted against the first respondent in
favour of any of the applicants in this matter, it seems to me
that they would be too easy to enforce the consequences of
non- compliance with any such protection order, with the
JUDGMENT 6
result that the first respondent would be jailed immediately
upon the submission of an affidavit to the police. The
circumstances under which he would then be released are
difficult to speculate on, and I consider that the
consequences for everybody involved, would be
undesirable, not only for the applicants but for the first
respondent too. As such I do not consider that a protection
order under these acts could constitute an effective
alternative remedy in the circumstances.
In conclusion. I am satisfied that a case has been 10
made out for the interim eviction sought .
I canvass ed the timing of the eviction with the
parties . Although t he applicants ’ representative proposed a
relatively long period, it does not appear to me that a long
period would be appropriate in view of the findings that I
have made regarding the domestic circumstances of the
parties. If indeed the respondent is correct that any aspect
of his relationship with the third applicant is capable of
being salvaged, of which he apparently holds out some
hope, it would appear to me that that interest is best served 20
by a clean and speedy break. In the circumstances, I am of
the view that the first respondent should be given sufficient
time to pack his belongings and to leave the home . I intend
to allow a number of days, including two days of a weekend,
over which that can be done.
JUDGMENT 7
In the circumstances, I grant an order in terms of the
draft that has been handed up and which I have amended in
manuscript .
ORDER:
1. Part A of the application is heard as a matter of urgency
in terms of section 5 of the Prevention of Illegal
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19
of 1998 ("PIE") and Uniform Rule 6(12), and the time
periods are accordingly dispensed with. 10
2. Pending the outcome of Part B (an eviction application
brought in terms of section 4 of PIE), the First
Respondent is ordered to vacate the property with his
belongings, situated at [… ] J[… ] P[… ], Northcliff Ext 22,
2[… ], Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa, by no later
than 16h00 on Monday, 8 June 2026 in terms of section
5(1) of PIE.
3. Should the First Respondent fail to vacate the property 20
as ordered in paragraph 2 (above), the Sheriff and/or
his or her lawfully appointed deputy, is authorised and
directed to execute the eviction order contained in
paragraph 2 by removing the First Respondent and his
belongings from the property.
JUDGMENT 8
4. The Registrar is authorised to allocate a hearing date
for Part B.
5. The Applicants are granted leave to supplement their
founding papers for Part B of this application.
6. Costs are costs in the cause.
10
MOULTRIE J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Date heard and decided: Wednesday, 3 June 2026
For the Applicants: Ms K Kropman
For the 1 ST Respon dent: In person
For the 2 nd Respond ent: No appearance