REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 125708/2026
In the matter between:
GRANT LEE-OR GONEN Applicant
and
MARC SCHULMAN First Respondent
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, JOHANNESBURG Second Respondent
______________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED.
…………..…………............. ……………………
SIGNATURE DATE
Page 2
LEECH, AJ:
1 This judgment pertains to an urgent application concerning the care and wellbeing of an
elderly man who, it is common cause, is no longer capable of caring for himself.
2 The Patient, as I shall refer to him, suffers from Parkinson’s disease and Lewy Body
Dementia— both of which are progressive and neither of which can be arrested or
reversed. At best, he has occasional moments of lucidity, but even this is disputed; he is
otherwise incapable of managing his affairs or seeing to his day-to-day care and needs.
3 The Patient’s adult son, who I will refer to by his first name Grant so as to avoid any
possible confusion arising in future between him, other family members, and the Patient,
is the applicant in the urgent application before me . He claims to enjoy the support of
other of the Patient’s adult children.
4 The second respondent in the application is the Master of the High Court, Johannesburg
(Master), cited in his capacity as such and having an indirect interest by virtue of the
relief claimed. The Master has elected to abide by its outcome.
5 The application is, however, opposed by the first respondent , Mr Schulman, who also
contests its urgency.
5.1 Mr Schulman is the Patient’s husband, married to him out of community of
property.
5.2 Mr Schulman accepts that the Patient is no longer capable of looking after his
affairs. This is a position that he has maintained since at least March 2026, when
he applied to the Master under section 60 of the Mental Health Care Act, 17 of
Page 3
2002 (Mental Health Act) for his appointment in terms of section 59 of the Act as
an administrator to care for and administer the property of the Patient. Section 59
permits of the appointment of an administrator —in the prescribed
circumstances—in respect of a mentally ill person or person with severe or
profound intellectual disability.
5.3 On 24 April 2026 the Master appointed Mr Schulman as an interim administrator
of the Patient’s estate, in accordance with section 60(4) of the Mental Health Act.
Mr Schulman says that since his appointment he has been act ing in terms of that
appointment. This interim appointment expires on 24 June 2026.
5.4 Mr Schulman also holds and has relied on a general power of attorney authorising
him to act on behalf of the Patient. It would appear as though Mr Schulman may
have continued to act ostensibly in terms of this general power of attorney, even
though his authority to do so may have lapsed with the Patient’s apparent loss of
contractual capacity.
6 The principal relief Grant claims in his Notice of Motion is for an order appointing a
curator ad litem to the Patient. The curator will be authorised and directed to conduct a
number of investigations and inquiries and provide a report setting out any findings made.
Amongst other aspects , the curator ad litem will be asked to report on whether or not a
curator bonis or curator ad personam should be appointed. The full powers and duties of
the curator ad litem are reflected in the order below and I need not dwell on t hem further
in this aspect of my judgment.
Page 4
7 As I understand the primary basis for his opposition to this aspect of the relief claimed,
Mr Schulman says that there is already an interim administrator appointed by the Master
under the Mental Health Act (himself) and an investigation is underway, initiated by the
Master in terms of the Mental Health Act, to determine if a permanent administrator
should be appointed. Furthermore, as the Patient’s spouse, he is more than capable of
fulfilling the roles of curator bonis and curator ad personam . There is therefore is no
need for a curator ad litem to be appointed or for any investigation to be undertaken.
Indeed, it was argued before me that I should not countenance a dual process —one under
the Mental Health Act, the other at the hands of the curator ad litem.
8 According to Mr Schulman, this also disposed of any urgency in the matter, because the
Patient’s proprietary and other needs were already being adequately catered for by him.
9 As I made clear in my debate with Mr Schulman’s attorney in court, I am of the view that
this argument is misplaced.
9.1 First, there is the question of whether or not an appointment under the Mental
Health Act is competent at all, given that the value of the Patient’s estate and his
annual income both exceed by significant margins the prescribed monetary limits
set under the Mental Health Act. There is no dispute that the value of the Patient’s
estate is measured in tens of millions of Rands and the validity of the appointment
of Mr Schulman as interim administrator is therefore subject to some doubt.
1
1 For present purposes it exists as a fact unless and until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction (MEC for
Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 2014 (3) SA 481 (CC) at [64] ff
approving and endorsing Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA)). That is not
relief that is sought before me.
Page 5
9.2 Mr Schulman’s appointment as interim administrator is in any event shortly to
lapse and, on my understanding of the Act, cannot be made permanent.
9.3 What then? Mr Schulman cannot continue to manage the financial and proprietary
affairs of the Patient as though they are his own or on the basis that he has a right
in law to do so. He has no such right. Nor can anyone else do so, with the result
that the Patient’s sizeable estate and financial affairs will be left unattended. This
is surely not a state of affairs that is in the interests of the Patient or, for that
matter, any of the Parties affected by this litigation, including Mr Schulman.
9.4 There is an urgent need, after 24 June 2026, for this unsatisfactory position to be
regularised. Mr Schulman’s arguments to the contrary —both as to the merits and
in respect of urgency
2—don’t appear to me to sensible, reasonable, or rational.
9.5 His argument that the existing process and appointment under the Mental Health
Act is sufficient is, in my view, not correct.
9.6 The appointment of an administrator under the Mental Health Act fulfils an
entirely different purpose to the appointment of any one or a combination of a
curator ad litem , curator bonis, and curator ad personam . The administrator (as
well as an interim administrator) is appointed to care for and administer the
property of the person in respect of whom he is appointed. This is made clear in
both section 59(1) and the definition. Pregnant within that definition is a constraint
on the extent of the administrator’s powers.
2 Mr Schulman has plainly not been prejudiced by the time afforded him to answer the application: he has managed
in the time available to him to file a 180 page answering affidavit. His opposition to the application being entertained
under Rule 6(12) smacks of being obstructive.
Page 6
9.7 A curator bonis’ powers and duties go much further than simply the care for or
administration of property. 3 (The curator ad personam fulfils an even more
markedly different role .4) The curator ad litem is the person through whom a
court inquires into the need for the appointment of either a curator bonis or
curator ad personam . He fulfils a role as an officer of the court and is not
concerned with the administration of the Mental Health Act.
9.8 An investigation undertaken in terms of the Mental Health Act is limited to
questions regarding inter alia the suitability of the appointment of a permanent
administrator. It is a far more circumscribed investigation than one that a curator
ad litem ordinarily undertakes on behalf of a court appointing him and for an
entirely different purpose.
9.9 The fact that the Master has authorised an investigation under the Mental Health
Act therefore does not substitute for an inquiry to be undertaken by the curator ad
litem to be appointed by me pursuant to this judgment and the Order appearing
below. Even if it were competent, nor would the appointment of a permanent
administrator by the Master under the Mental Health Act substitute for the
appointment of someone as a curator bonis.
9.10 Whilst I make no finding on this, Mr Schulman’s actions —including apparently
holding himself out in correspondence as being the Patient and negotiating for the
sale of the Patient’s principal assets —appear to me prima facie at least to exceed
3 Ex parte Du Toit: In re Curatorship Estate Schwab 1968 1 SA 33 (T); Ex parte Hulett 1968 (4) SA 172 (D).
4 Clarke v Hurst NO and Others 1992 (4) SA 630 (D).
Page 7
the bounds of his lawful authority as interim administrator under the Mental
Health Act. That too is a concern and, I would have thought, should also be a
concern for Mr Schulman himself : he cannot continue in that vein. T he situation
cries out for the appointment of a curator bonis if only to allow Mr Schulman , if
he is appointed as such, to lawfully administer the Patient’s financial affairs and
deal with his assets in full.
9.11 The appointment of a curator bonis can only be made by a court and, in terms of
the Rules, this follows on the prior process of the appointment of a curator ad
litem. It should be abundantly clear to all concerned that a t very least an order
effecting the appointment of a curator bonis is required in relation to the Patient
and, it would seem, this needs to be done on an urgent basis. The sole gateway to
this outcome is via an application of the type brought by Grant.
9.12 In the circumstances, I do not understand why Mr Schulman i s opposing that
outcome or this application. H is opposition strikes me as being at best for him
misconceived and at worst mala fide.
5
9.13 I would add, in this regard, that t he curator ad litem might ultimately conclude
and recommend that Mr Schulman be appointed the curator bonis . That th is
outcome may eventuate makes Mr Schulman’s present opposition to the urgent
application all the more puzzling.
5 Grant attributes mala fides to Mr Schulman. I don’t need to make a finding in that regard—it is something that a
future court can determine, including in relation to costs.
Page 8
9.14 I appreciate that the position in relation to the appointment of a curator ad
personam might stand in a different position. Mr Schulman no doubt wishes to
preserve his role , in the capacity of spouse, as the Patient’s next of kin, entitled
thereby to make decisions about his husband, including the prospect of some time
in the future having to make difficult decisions about the Patient’s medical care.6
9.15 But the appointment of someone else as curator ad personam is also not a
foregone conclusion. Whatever that outcome is will follow upon the curator ad
litem’s investigations and report.
9.16 I am not going to preempt that outcome by making precipitous findings in urgent
court regarding Mr Schulman’s alleged conduct in relation to the Patient. But,
once again, I am concerned that Mr Schulman’s opposition to this application is
not justifiable on the basis of his seeking to prevent the appointment of a curator
ad personam—whoever that curator ad personam might be—in the event that this
is what the curator ad litem ultimately recommends.
10 It follows that the application must be enrolled as one of urgency and that the primary
relief must be granted.
11 In his Notice of Motion Grant applied for the appointment of Mr Doron Block, an
advocate of the High Court, to be appointed as the curator ad litem . Mr Block has
confirmed his availability and willingness to act.
6 Cf Clarke v Hurst NO and Others 1992 (4) SA 630 (D).
Page 9
11.1 This proposal was opposed from the Bar on behalf of Mr Schulman, solely on the
basis that Mr Block had been proposed by Grant. Mr Schulman did not propose an
alternative, but instead I was asked to appoint someone else.
11.2 I made inquiries and engaged the Parties in relation to an alternate person to be
appointed instead of Mr Block. Neither Party objected to the appointment I
proposed, although on behalf of the applicant the position was maintained that Mr
Block was and remained a suitable candidate and that the objection to his
appointment lacked any proper basis.
11.3 I agree that Mr Schulman’s objection to Mr Block is baseless —he is an officer of
the court, experienced in these matters, and there is no reason to question his
partiality or independence. On review, the objection seems obstructive and
unhelpful, especially in the absence of a putting forward an alternative.
11.4 That said, the issue has become largely academic as the person I was considering
as an alternative to Mr Block is unable to complete the investigation and compile a
report within the urgent constraints that this matter requires.
11.5 In the circumstances and there being no proper objection raised to Mr Block’s
appointment, his appointment is confirmed in the Order below.
12 Grant also sought interdictory relief aimed at the appointment of Mr Schulman as interim
administrator and potentially as the administrator under the Mental Health Act.
7
7 That relief was set out in prayer 4 of the Notice of Motion as follows:
Pending the finalisation of this application and/or any further proceedings flowing therefrom:
Page 10
12.1 As I debated with his counsel and as presaged by my reference to Kirland and
Oudekraal above, it is not clear to me that I can grant the relief in prayer 4.2 or,
for that matter, prayer 4.3 . Mr Schulman has been appointed and his appointment
can only be set aside by a court on review. Equally, once appointed, it is not clear
to me on what basis I can interdict him from carrying out that appointment.
12.2 I accordingly decline to grant this relief.
12.3 The relief sought in prayer 4.1 is, however, a different matter. I am satisfied that a
proper case has been made out for this relief, including having regard to the proper
interpretation and application of the Mental Health Act set out above , and so I
include relief to that effect in the Order below.
13 Prayer 5 is a matter that has also proved to be contentious and, I am once again of the
view, unnecessarily so.
13.1 By way of background, in his founding a ffidavit Grant raised concerns about Mr
Schulman’s conduct in relation to the healthcare of the Patient, who has
undergone a number of apparently inexplicable emergency medical admissions in
the past months.
13.2 Grant sought an order as follows:
4.1 the second respondent is interdicted and restrained from finally appointing the first respondent as
administrator of the below patient’s estate;
4.2 the first respondent’s appointment as interim administrator of the below patient’s estate is terminated; and
4.3 the first respondent is interdicted and restrained from accessing, withdrawing or transacting on any bank
accounts or investment accounts owned or held by the below mentioned patient pending the finalisation
of these proceedings
Page 11
The patient is to remain placed in Intercare Sandton or a suitable alternative
facility to ensure the patient is cared for and maintained pending the curator ad
litem’s report and the recommendations therein.
13.3 It is not necessary for me to make a finding on the allegati ons Grant directs at Mr
Schulman in relation to the care of the Patient or whether Mr Schulman is unsuited
to continue to care for him. That too is something that should be investigated by
the curator ad litem untrammelled by anything I say in my judgment.
13.4 On a conspectus of all of the evidence before me, however, it is clear that the
collective wisdom of the healthcare professionals attending to the Patient is that he
should be discharged to Intercare or a like facility. This was confirmed in
argument before me on behalf of both Parties.
13.5 In these circumstances, I am of the view that the applicant has succeeded in
making out a prima facie right justifying the interim relief sought, having regard
to the balance of convenience, the risk of irreparable harm, and the absence of any
alternative remedy.
13.6 The curator ad litem has been expressly afforded the power, in the Order, to return
to Court —including on the strength of an interim report —should there be a
requirement for a variation of this or any other aspec t of the Order granted below.
This will no doubt cater for a situation where the medical advice or other
circumstances change.
14 The remaining aspects of the Notice of Motion in respect of which relief was sought
appear from the Order. They are not contentious and are otherwise self-explanatory.
Page 12
15 Finally, as to costs. Grant sought a punitive costs order against Mr Schulman. There is
merit in this claim, but that would require me to make findings of fact on issues that I
have indicated would best be investiga ted by the curator ad litem and by the Court
hearing Part B with the benefit of both the report and more time. Ordinarily, costs are not
urgent and especially where punitive costs are sought where disputes of fact are at stake.
In these circumstances, I am of the view that costs should best be reserved.
16 I accordingly make the following order:
1 The application is enrolled as one of urgency under Rule 6(12).
2 Doron Block, an advocate of this Court, is hereby appointed as curator ad
litem to the patient, MEIR GONEN, with Identity Number: 570427 5258
087, with the powers as set out below, together with such incidental
powers as are necessary properly to perform the said powers.
3 The curator ad litem is authorised and directed to:
a. attend on and interview the patient, as well as all professionals that
have provided reports supporting the application for the appointment
of the curator ad litem, all family members and friends of the patient
that may be able to provide information relative to the report to be
provided by the curator ad litem to the court as set out below and
investigate the identity of the person or persons to be nominated for
appointment as the curator bonis and / or curator ad personam and
make recommendations in respect of their powers;
b. subject the patient to further medical evaluation to establish his ability
to manage his affairs should he deem it necessary to do so; and
Page 13
c. prepare and submit to the second respondent and to this Honourable
Court within six weeks of this appointment of the curator ad litem , a
report of what the curator ad litem has done, in accordance with the
requirements of this order.
4 The curator ad litem is also expressly afforded the power, should it prove
to be necessary, to approach this Court on the strength of an interim
report to seek a variation to or supplementation of this Order.
5 The final report of the curator ad litem must deal fully and appropriately
with the following aspects:
a. the age and general health of the patient, including the patient’s ability
to appreciate financial aspects generally and specifically to make
decisions involving the patient’s own money, resources and
investments;
b. the assets and liabilities of the patient, including the short-, medium -,
and long term financial needs of the patient and the ability of the
patient’s current and fixed assets to provide in those needs;
c. the current home and care provision that has been made for the short,
medium- and long term personal needs of the patient;
d. the identity and general disposition of the patient’s immediate family
and friends and their interaction with the patient;
e. the curator ad litem’s opinion as to whether the patient is of unsound
mind and should be declared of unsound mind and as such incapable
of managing his own affairs and, in particular whether a curator for the
person and/or the property of the patient should be appointed with
specific reference to the question whether the assets of the patient
would be sufficient to afford such appointment, and whether the
Page 14
appointment should be in respect of all the patients affairs or only
some of them and if so, which of them;
f. whether or not any curator appointed for the patient should be
required to furnish security to the second respondent for the
performance of his/her duties;
g. a proposed order to be issued by the court, including provision for
appropriate powers to be conferred upon any curator so appointed,
and provision for the payment of the fees and costs of the curator ad
litem from the resources of the patient; and
h. any other matter which in the opinion of the curator ad litem should be
brought to the attention of the court.
6 Pending the finalisation of this application and/or any further proceedings
flowing therefrom , the second respondent is interdicted and restrained
from finally appointing the first respondent as an administrator of the
Patient’s estate under Chapter VIII of the Mental Health Care Act, 17 of
2002.
7 Upon his discharge from hospital, the patient is to remain placed in
Intercare Sandton or a suitable alternative facility to ensure the patient is
cared for and maintained pending the curator ad litem’s report or interim
report and the recommendations therein.
8 The applicant is granted leave to file his supplementary founding affidavit
dated 10 June 2026.
9 The applicant and opposing parties, are permitted to supplement their
papers, as they may deem necessary upon receipt of the curator ad
litem’s report, with the applicant to supplement within 10 days of receipt of
Page 15
the report and those respondents who oppose to supplement 10 days
thereafter
10 The costs of this Part A are reserved for determination in Part B.
______________________________
B.E. LEECH
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
For the applicant: Ms S Meyer
Instructed by: Saul Ginsberg Attorneys
For the 1
st respondent: Ms N Kinstler
Instructed by: Kinstler Attorneys Inc.
Date of hearing: 19 June 2026
Date of judgment: 23 June 2026