THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2026-025277
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED
,,. ::r """ ,..,. 6 ::;i
DATE ~
In the matter between:
DIMITRI CAVALEROS
VANA MAGDALENA CAVALEROS
and
THE MINISTER OF POLICE
THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
MAJOR GENERAL KHUMALO
BRIGADIER GOPANE
WARRANT OFFICER MOEKETSI RAMAKA TSA
First Applicant
Second Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Respondent
Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties'
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter
2
on CaseLines. The date and time for hand -down is deemed to be 14h00 on 12 June
2026.
Flynote: Police — Unlawful conduct — Investigation of crime — Powers of police in
obtaining a warning statement from a suspect — Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977,
sections 26 and 27 — Police entering private residential premises without a warrant
or consent to obtain a warning statement — No prior audible demand for admission or
notification of purpose made — Conduct held to be unlawful and a severe infringement
of the constitutional right to privacy under section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996
JUDGMENT
PG LOUW, AJ
Introduction
[1] This matter concerns unlawful conduct of members of the South African Police
Service (“SAPS”) and the violation of fundamental rights in the course of a
police investigation. Central to the determination of this matter is the extent of
the powers of the members of the SAPS in obtaining a warning statement.
[2] The matter came before me in the urgent court on 25 February 2026 . The
applicants sought injunctive relief against the respondents on an urgent basis.
The matter was argued on 25 February 2026. I reserved judgment . On 13
March 2026, the parties submitted supplementary heads of argument upon my
request. The supplementary heads of argument on behalf of the respondents
only came to my attention on 16 March 2026. I granted the following order on
17 March 2026:
“1. The matter is urgent and the forms, service and time periods provided
for in the Uniform Rules of Court are dispensed with in terms of Rule 6(12).
2. The fifth respondent is interdicted and restrained from harassing and/or
intimidating the first and/or second applicants and the immediate family of
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the applicants, in any manner whatsoever, whether at the applicants’
private residence or elsewhere.
3. The South African Police Service in the Gauteng area, acting under the
direction and control of the first to fifth respondents, is interdicted and
restrained from harassing and/or intimidating the first and/or second
applicants and the immediate family of t he applicants, in any manner
whatsoever, whether at the applicants’ private residence or elsewhere.
4. The first to fifth respondents are directed to take all reasonable steps
within their power to prevent any member of the South African Police
Service in the Gauteng area from harassing and/or intimidating the first
and/or second applicants and the immediate family of the applicants, in any
manner whatsoever, whether at the applicants’ private residence or
elsewhere.
5. To the extent that the fifth respondent continues with the investigation
under Sandringham CAS 222/9/2025, the fifth respondent is directed to do
so in a manner that is lawful, reasonable and objective, and cognisant of
the applicants’ constitutional right s, including that the fifth respondent is
directed:
5.1 To provide the applicants through their legal representative with
a clear written explanation of any and all complaints and
allegations against them which are under investigation, with
sufficient particularity to enable the applicants, if so advised, to
provide the warning statements required by the fifth respondent,
if any, within a reasonable period and to allow the applicants to
prepare warning statements, if any, in the presence of their legal
representative and in circumstances where such statements are
made freely, voluntarily and without undue coercion or
intimidation.
6. The costs of this application shall be paid by the respondents, jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, on Scale C.”
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[3] My reasons for granting the order are set out in this judgment.
The facts
[4] The first applicant, which I will refer to for the sake of convenience as “Dimitri
Cavaleros”, is a businessman and the son of the second applicant, who are for
the sake of convenience referred to herein as “Vana Cavaleros”. She is an 83-
year-old widow. Vana Cavaleros is also the mother of Dimitri Cavaleros’
brother, who I refer to herein for the sake of convenience as “Pero Cavaleros”.
[5] The first respondent is the Minister of Police, cited in his official capacity as the
Minister responsible for the Department of Police which Department is
responsible for law-enforcement services and oversees the execution of duties
by the SAPS.
[6] The second respondent is the National Commissioner of the SAPS, cited in his
official capacity as the official responsible for the day -to-day management of
the SAPS, including personnel within the police force and ensuring an efficient,
honest and lawful police force.
[7] The third respondent is Major General Khumalo, cited in his official capacity as
the official responsible for the conduct of the Gauteng SAPS Organised Crime
Department, of which the fifth respondent is part.
[8] The fourth respondent is Brigadier Go pane, cited in her capacity as the unit
commander of the Provincial Organised Crime Unit in Gauteng.
[9] The fifth respondent is Warrant Officer Moeketsi Ramakatsa, referred to herein
for the sake convenience as “Warrant Officer Ramakats a”, a member of the
SAPS and part of the Provincial Organised Crime Unit in Gauteng.
[10] The first to fourth respondents are cited in their official capacities on account of
them having jurisdiction and control over Warrant Office r Ramakatsa and his
team in the Johannesburg area and/or are the responsible officials in whose
area of jurisdiction the alleged harassment and intimidation occurred and/or on
account of their joint responsibility for those persons acting within their
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departments to exercise their duties lawfully and in accordance with the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (“the Constitution”).
[11] Pero Cavaleros laid a complaint against the applicants with the SAPS. The
exact nature of the complaint was not known t he applicants until disclosed in
the respondents’ answering affidavit deposed to on 17 February 2026, from
which it appears that Pero Cavaleros laid complaint against during April 2025.
[12] The complaint is premised on an allegation that “theft alternatively defrauding
of GB P 500 000.00 (five hundred thousand Great British Pound) from the
Dirona Family Trust have been perpetrated by the Applicants”. It is further
alleged in the answering affidavit that , according to Pero Cavaleros he was
entitled to this amount due to an agreement and that the applicants, through
their legal representatives,
“had unlawfully and intentionally made misrepresentations which caused
prejudice to [Pero Cavaleros] alternatively; utilising their legal representatives
unlawfully and intentional [sic] had obtained corporeal property belonging to
[Pero Cavaleros] with or without the consent of [Pero Cavaleros], and if with
the consent of [Pero Cavaleros], such consent being given as a result of a
misrepresentation by either [the applicants] or their legal representatives, and
appropriated the corpor eal property; alternatively [ h]ad unlawfully and
intentionally appropriated mov eable, corporeal property belonging to [Pero
Cavaleros]”.
[13] Pero Cavaleros and the applicants are engaged in civil litigation in the form of
an action instituted by Pero Cavaleros in August 2025 in this court under case
number 2025-127781 (“the 2025 action”). In the 2 025 action, Pero Cavaleros
claims payment of GPB 500,000 from Vana Cavaleros. This allegation is denied
by the respondents on the basis that they have no knowledge thereof. However,
the respondents allege that Pero Cavaleros is “involved [in] a protracted family
the respondents allege that Pero Cavaleros is “involved [in] a protracted family
dispute concerning various family legal disputes between [Pero Cavaleros] and
the Applicants that have been ongoing for many years”.
[14] The applicants rely on inter alia three separate events in support of their case.
6
[15] The applicants allege that on 2 September 2025, three white vehicles bearing
no markings of the SAPS arrived at the private residential complex where Vana
Cavaleros resides. They say that the driver of the first vehicle approached the
security guard at the gate and insisted that the security guard allow him access
to the complex. The driver introduced himself as a police officer (a member of
the SAPS) and stated that he wished to urgently speak to Vana Cavaleros, who
was said to be a “suspect in a criminal investigation involving money
laundering”. The security guard (who has asked to remain anonymous as she
fears retaliation if she is identified) informed the member of the SAPS that Vana
Cavaleros was not at home. The member of the SAPS left a note, wh ich
recorded his name and mobile number. The note also recorded “G.P.S. …
ENQUIRY 2/03/2025 SST RAMAKAT SA”. The member of the SAPS was
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa.
[16] Vana Cavaleros immediately instructed her attorney ( “Mr Small -Smith”). Mr
Small-Smith, who knows Warrant Officer Ramakatsa, called the latter on the
same day. According to the applicants, Warrant Officer Ramakatsa told Mr
Small-Smith inter alia that he would prepare questions and forward them to Mr
Small-Smith to discuss with Vana Cavaleros.
[17] Warrant officer Ramakatsa confirms that he went to Vana Cavaleros’ residential
address on 2 September 2025 to obtain a waring statement but was informed
that Vana Cavaleros was not at her residence and he left a written note with the
security guard informing Vana Cavaleros to contact him.
[18] The second incident occurred on 20 January 2026, when Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa again went to Vana Cavaleros’ house unannounced. Vana was not
home, and Warrant Officer Ramakatsa left a note with her house-keeper for her
to call him. The note stated, “SANDRINGHAM CAS … THEFT WARRANT
OFFICER RAMAKATSA [with his cell number ] LOOKING FOR STATEMENT
OFFICER RAMAKATSA [with his cell number ] LOOKING FOR STATEMENT
ON THIS CASE.” According to the applicants, Warrant Officer Ramakatsa told
the house-keeper that next time Warrant Officer Ramakatsa came to the house,
it would be “with force”. The house-keeper confirmed this under oath. On the
same day Mr Small -Smith phoned Warrant Officer Ramakatsa after Vana
Cavaleros informed Mr Small -Smith of this visit. Warrant Officer Ramakatsa
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said that he had gone to Vana Cavaleros’ home because he needed to take a
statement from both the applicants.
[19] In the answering affidavit, the respondents failed to deal with the allegation that
the next time Warrant Officer Ramakatsa came to Vana Cavaleros’ house, it
would be “with force” , save for baldly denying the allegation and stating that
they have no knowledge thereof.
[20] Mr Small-Smith met with Warrant Officer Ramakatsa on 22 January 2026 and
inter alia advised the latter that he also represented Dimitri Cavaleros. This
allegation is not dealt with in the answering affidavit, save for a bare denial.
[21] The third incident relied upon by the applicants occurred on 27 January 2026.
The applicants’ version of what transpired on this day is set out as follows in
the founding affidavit:
“71 Despite Mr Small -Smith’s meeting with Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa where he reiterated that Vana and I are represented by him
(and happy to cooperate in the preparation of a warning statement), a few
days later, on 27 January 2026, at about 15h00, three vehicles arrived at
my residence whilst my wife and I were at home. The first was unmarked
and driven by a person in civilian clothes, accompanied by another man
in civilian clothing. The second and third vehicles were police vehi cles,
each containing at least two policemen, tw o of which appeared to be in
tactical gear. I subsequently learnt that the person in the first vehicle was
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa.
72 I stay in a gated neighbourhood. My house is at the end of a
long and deep panhandle, which panhandle is shared with one of my
immediate neighbours. The panhandle is owned by this neighbour. If one
were to arrive at the street gate to the panhandle, there would be no way
of knowing where my house is in relation to that gate. Somehow,
however, the police knew precisely which was my house and proceeded
to access it by jumping over one of my other neighbour’s wal ls, before
to access it by jumping over one of my other neighbour’s wal ls, before
jumping back again into the panh andle. From the panhandle, they
accessed my property by climbing over another gate at the border of my
8
property. Once access had been gained (unlawfully) to my property,
instead of simply knocking on the front door, the policemen proceeded to
the side of the house, after pushing through yet another gate. They then
proceeded to bang on windows and outside doors (some of which were
glass) as they circled the house. There was also an open window, which
they also attempted to access and, in so doing , messed up the wooden
blinds in an attempt to open the lower, more accessible window from the
inside (which they managed to do). As described, during the course of
this raid, the policemen trespassed on three properties.
73 This was observed on security cameras and heard by my wife
and me. We were concerned that these persons were not there on
legitimate police business. Their conduct, together with the fact that Mr
Small-Smith had specifically advised Vana and I during our consultation
with Webber Wentzel that the police had no right to unlawfully force their
way into our premises, made me fearful of a confrontation with t actically
armed (and seemingly, aggressive) police officers. Further, Mr Small -
Smith had advised tha t we could not be forced to make a warning
statement without legal represent ation. This knowledge, combined with
the fact that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa had previously agreed with Mr
Small-Smith to liaise with us through our legal representatives, led me to
be fearful about the true motive of this raid on my personal residence.
74 My wife and I were confused and terrified. When we noticed men
climbing over the walls and gates, we thought it best to hide.
75 Whilst we were hiding, my wife then got a call from an unknown
number on her mobile phone. We later discovered that this was Warrant
Officer Ramakatsa. We do not know how he obtained her mobile number,
and I consider this attempt to contact her – in circumstances where she
is not alleged to have been implicated in my complaint – to be a further
act of intimidation.
act of intimidation.
76 We feared the uncertainty of what these men may do to us .
Despite two of the vehicles being police vehicles (which I could see from
the camaras), these men were not acting a calm rational manner that I
would expect of policemen who were lawfully executing their duties. I was
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extremely fearful that based on their aggressive behav iour they would
force us to go with them and unlawfully detain us and, even worse,
physically harm us. This was especially so considering that my wife was
with me.
77 The conduct of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and his cohorts, as
descried in this affidavit, have instilled an ongoing fear in me, my wife and
my mother that another ‘raid’ or other acts of intimidation is imminent.
78 We contacted Mr Small -Smith as soon as we could to tell him
what was happening at our home. He immediately put through a call to
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa , who did not answer. Mr Small -Smith then
made a call to a mutual acquaintance of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa, and
through this intervention, he was able to get through to Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa. I cannot be certain, but this appeared to cause the raid to be
called off. We remained hidden for some time thereafter until we were
certain that everyone had permanently left the property.”
[22] The respondents’ recordal of the events on 27 January 2026 is the following:
“45.1.17 Warrant Officer Ramakatsa went to the residential
address of the First Applicant, situated at … The First Applicant was
seen to be present in the home.
45.1.18 On arrival at the gate of the residence, access was
denied by the First Respondent, in that refused (sic) to allow access to
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and members of the SAPS who
accompanied him.
45.1.19 Warrant Officer Ramakatsa then received a telephone
call from Mr. Ian Smith, whereby he was informed that he was
‘harassing’ the First Applicant, and that he must ‘stop’.
45.1.20 Warrant Officer Rama katsa then communicated
WhatsApp to Mr. Ian Smith enquiring on the status of the warning
statements from the Applicant (a copy of which is hereto attached as
annexure ‘SH-45’). The communication stated the following:
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‘Mr Smith…How are you doing … checking how far with the
statements’ ”;
and further:
“80 Save to admit 28 January 2026 at the residential address of the
First Applicant, in an attempt to obtain a warning statement from the
First Applicant, the Fifth Respondent went to the residence of the First
Applicant and was later denied entry to the property nor able to obtain
the warning statement from the First Applicant, the Respondents have
no knowledge (sic) the allegations contained herein and are therefore
accordingly denied.”1 [My underlining.]
[23] The following day, on 28 January 2026, Mr Small -Smith addressed a letter to
Major General Denise Beukes, Head of Legal Support & Resources, Legal
Services of the SAPS (“Head of Lega l Services”) wherein he set out the
applicants’ version of events and requested a written undertaking to be
provided that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and/or other members of the SAPS
would not attend at the applicants’ residences and would not approach the
applicants at any other location until the applicants have been provided with a
summary of the complaint and list of questions for them to respond to. The
written undertaking was sought by no later than 30 January 2026, failing which
the applicants would approach this court for appropriate urgent relief. The
respondents baldly deny this allegation in the answering affidavit.
[24] On 30 January 2026, Mr Small-Smith was copied in email correspondence from
the Head of Legal Services to Major General Hendricks and Major General
Peters stating that she had referred the complaint to the office of Major General
Khumalo (the third respondent) but understood he was on leave.
1 The reference to 28 January 2026 is a reference to the incident that took place on 27 January 2026
according to the applicants. Nothing turns on this. The parties agree that the incident occurred.
11
[25] On 2 February 2026, Mr Small -Smith sent Warrant Officer Ramakatsa a
WhatsApp asking him to:
“[P]lease assist so that we do not have to launch an application. Firstly just help
me understand if the allegations that I have put in my first message to you is
accurate? And secondly just promise that you will not harass or go to my clients’
houses for a period of two weeks so that could we could prepare warning
statements”.
[26] Warrant Officer Ramakatsa responded by stating that the “rule of warning
statement it has to be completed by a police officer if the suspect has a legal
[representative] whom he wanted to be present during the completion of his
statement, it is the suspect rights and any further explanation can be attached
as annexures to the statement.”
[27] When Mr Small -Smith sought to obtain clarity about the allegation, Warrant
Officer Ramakatsa did not respond. No undertaking was given as requested by
Mr Small-Smith. Similarly, these allegations are met with a b ald denial by the
respondents in their answering affidavit.
[28] The application was launched three days later on 5 February 2026.
The Law
[29] The requirements to obtain a final interdict are trite. The applicant must show a
clear right, an injury actually committed or reasonabl y apprehended, and the
lack of an adequate alternative remedy.2
[30] In Residents,3 the Constitutional Court held that a case had been made out for
a final interdict restraining certain officials where they had been conducting riots
and searches without any legal authorisation to do so, from unlawfully
interfering with the applicants and their homes, except on the authority of an
2 Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) at para 8, with reference
to the established test set out in Setlogolo v Setlogolo 1914 AD 221 at 227.
3 Residents, Industry House v Minister of Police 2023 (3) SA 329 (CC).
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order of court or a warrant granted in terms of any applicable law or in terms of
section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (“CPA”).4
[31] Relevant for current purposes are section 25, section 26 and section 27 of the
CPA.
[32] Section 25 of the CPA provides as follows:
“(1) If it appears to a magistrate or justice from information on oath that there
are reasonable grounds for believing-
(a) that the internal security of the Republic or the maintenance of law
and order is likely to be endangered by or in consequence of any
meeting which is being held or is to be held in or upon any premises
within his area of jurisdiction; or
(b) that an offence has been or is being or is likely to be committed or
that preparations or arrangements for the commission of any offence
are being or are likely to be made in or upon any premises within his
area of jurisdiction,
he may issue a warrant authorizing a police official to enter the premises in
question at any reasonable time for the purpose-
(i) of carrying out such investigations and of taking such steps as such
police official may consider necessary for the preservation of the
internal security of the Republic or for the maintenance of law and
order or for the prevention of any office;
(ii) of searching the premises or any person in or upon the premises for
any article referred to in section 20 which such police official on
reasonable grounds suspects to be in or upon or at the premises or
upon such person; and
(iii) of seizing any such article.
(1A) …
(2) …
(3) A police official may without warrant act under subparagraphs (i), (ii) and
(iii) of subsection (1) if he on reasonable grounds believes-
(a) that a warrant will be issued to him under paragraph (a) or (b) of
subsection (1) if he applies for such warrant; and
4 Residents at para 88.
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(b) that the delay in obtaining such warrant would defeat the object
thereof.” [My underlining.]
[33] Section 26 of the CPA deals with entering of premises for purposes of obtaining
evidence. It provides that:
“Where a police official in an investigation of an offence or alleged offence
reasonably suspects that a person who may furnish information with reference to
any such offence is on any premises, such police official may without warrant enter
such premises for the purpose of interrogating such person and obtaining a
statement from him: Provided that such police official shall not enter any private
dwelling without the consent of the occupier thereof”. [My underlining.]
[34] Section 27 of the CPA deals with resistance against entry and search. It
provides that:
“(1) A police official who may lawfully search any person or any premises
or who may enter any premises under s 26, may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to overcome any resistance against such search or
against entry of the premises, including the breaking of any door, or window
of such premises: Provided that such a police official shall first audibly
demand admission to the premises and notify the purpose for which he
seeks to enter such premises.
(2) The proviso to subsection (1) shall not apply where the police official
concerned is on reasonable grounds of the opinion that any article which is
the subject of the search may be destroyed or disposed of if the provisions
of the proviso are first complied with.” [My underlining.]
[35] Section 205(3) of the Constitution provides that the objects of the SAPS are to
prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and
secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and
enforce the law. In Monareng,5 Opperman J stated with reference to Botha and
5 Monareng v Minister of Police 2025 (2) SACR 499 (FB) at para 6.
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Visser,6 that “[t]his is no easy task, as South Africa boasts with some of the
gravest crime statistics in the world”.
[36] In carrying out their duty to investigate acts of criminality, members of the SAPS
are called to perform their duty with due regard to their powers, duties and
functions. They must act in a manner that is reasonable. Where SAPS
members are required to use force, such force must be the minimum force
which is reasonable in the circumstances.7
The warning statement
[37] The respondents explained that a warning statement is a document utilised by
the SAPS in a specified form (SAPS 3M(m): Statement Regarding Interviews
with Suspects) to firstly advise a suspect of their rights in terms of section 35 of
the Constitution, and secondly, to provide suspects with an opportunity to
record their version of events in respect of the alleged crime they are suspected
to have perpetrated , in a manner that gives “their side of the story” to the
investigation officer, in a formal document. A warning statement is an important
document in the investigation of crimes, which document may only be
composed by a member of the SAPS, primarily through the investigation officer.
[38] The respondents contend that no other unofficial form or manner ought to be
utilised by members of the SAPS in the compiling of warning statements
because this may impact the fairness of any proceeding trial in the criminal
court.
[39] A warning statement is obtained during the initial interviews of suspects, and
concentrates on “the all -important question of the constitutional rights and of
the fact that allegations are made at that stage against a suspect”. 8 A suspect
is given a chance to respond to the complaints against him or her, so that such
response can be included in the docket that is presented to a prosecutor for a
decision on the complaints. Included in the constitutional rights about which the
decision on the complaints. Included in the constitutional rights about which the
6 R Botha and J Visser ‘Forceful arrests: an overview of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 and its recent amendments’ (2012) PER 26 at para 1.
7 Section 13 of the South African Police Service Act, 68 of 1995.
8 S v Zimele (CC16/2020) [2022] ZAECMHC 55 (24 March 2022) at para 20.
15
suspect is “warned” is the right to remain silent, to not self -incriminate, and to
legal representation.9 A suspect can choose whether or not to give a warning
statement – that choice cannot be forced on him or her, but it “goes without
saying that an election cannot be a choice unless it is made with proper
appreciation of what it entails. It is particularly important in this co untry to
remember that an uninformed choice is indeed no choice”.10
The injunctive relief
[40] I have set out the three main incidents upon which the applicants place reliance
for the relief sought. I turn to deal with the requirements of the injunctive relief
sought by the applicants.
[41] A person’s home is a person’s “inner sanctum, central to their right to privacy”.11
A home is supposed to be “a place of comfort , safety and the keystone of a
functional society”.12 Raiding a person’s home is a “substantial interference by
the state in one’s private life”.13 The applicants contend that raiding a person’s
home constitutes an infringement of the right to privacy in terms of s ection 14
of the Constitution.
[42] In Mistry,14 the Constitutional Court held that:
“The existence of safeguards to regulate the way in which State officials may enter
the private domains of ordinary citizens is one of the features that distinguishes a
constitutional democracy from a police state.”
[43] A typical safeguard is a warrant. Warrants guarantee that the state has, prior to
an intrusion, justified such intrusion before a judicial officer.15
9 See S v Majola (98/2013) [2014] ZAGPJHC 421 (30 October 2014) which summarised the SAPS
3M(m) Form at para 7.
10 S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 SA (CC), concurring judgment at para 87.
11 Residents, Industry House v Minister of Police 2023 (3) SA 329 (CC) at para 49.
12 Residents at para 1.
13 Residents at para 49.
14 Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at para 25; Minister
of Police and Others v Kunjana 2016 (2) SACR 473 (CC) at para 18.
15 Residents at para 57.
16
[44] It is not the respondents’ case that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and his team
had a warrant when they raided Dimitri Cavaleros’ home on 27 January 2026.
The applicants contend that, w hilst s ection 26 and s ection 27 of the CPA ,
respectively, provide for the entering of premises for the purposes of an
investigation without a warrant, under certain circumstances , no such
circumstances were present in this matter. Firstly, neither Dimitri Cavaleros nor
his wife consented to the SAPS entering their private dwelling. Secondly, there
is no evidence that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa or any member of his team first
audibly demanded admission to the premises and notified the purpose for which
they sought to enter the premises.
[45] Thirdly, the purpose of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and his team’s raid on Dimitri
Cavaleros’ home on 27 January 2026 was, on the respondents’ version, to
obtain a warning statement . The raid was therefore also not justified under
section 25 of the CPA which provides that a police officer can enter without a
warrant if such officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant will be
issued but that delay would defeat the object of obtaining the warrant.
[46] The applicants contend that they have a clear right, inter alia , not to be
subjected to intimidatory or unlawful conduct by members of the SAPS, to not
have their right to priva cy infringed by unlawful entry to their residential
premises, and to have any criminal investigation into them conducted in a
lawful, rational and procedurally fair manner, free of ulterior motives or abuse
of power.
[47] The applicants state that they have suffered harm as a result of the unlawful
conduct of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa, including an unjustified infringement of
Dimitri Cavaleros’ right to privacy in terms of section 14 of the Constitution, and
hold a reasonable apprehension that this unlawful conduct will continue and
escalate unless the court intervenes. Dimitri Cavaleros has been left
escalate unless the court intervenes. Dimitri Cavaleros has been left
traumatised by the unlawful raid on his home and is fearful that Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa will act unlawfully again. The surprise visits to Vana Cavaleros
traumatised her and embarrassed her in front of her neighbours and staff. Vana
Cavaleros is terrified that members of the SAPS will return and illegally detain
17
her or force her to go away with them. This fear is strengthened by Warrant
Officer Ramakatsa’s threat that next time he would be “with force”. The
applicants requested an undertaking from the SAPS that the intimidatory
conduct will cease, without success.
[48] According to the applicants they therefore had no choice but to approach this
court to urgently interdict the continuing unlawful conduct. In this regard, t he
applicants also rely on Residents.16
[49] Insofar as the mandatory injunctive relief sought by the applicants is concerned,
they contend that they are entitled to the following procedural safeguards, as
suspects in a criminal investigation, namely:
a. To have their request for legal representation respected and not bypassed
or undermined.
b. To be informed of the complaints against them with sufficient clarity and
particularity before being required to provide a warning statement.
c. Generally, for the investigation to be conducted in a manner that is lawful,
reasonable and fair.
[50] The applicants contend further that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa’s conduct in
arriving at the homes of the applicants for the purpose of obtaining warning
statements in the absence of Mr Small -Smith directly undermined the
applicants’ right to legal representation. They reasonabl y apprehend that this
will happen again, unless this court grants an order that any warning statement
is to be given in the presence of the applicants’ legal representative.
[51] The applicants contend that part of the right to a fair trial in terms of section 35
of the Constitution is for an accused to be informed of a charge against him or
her with sufficient detail to answer it.17
[52] The applicants say that they have been seeking particularity of the complaints
for purposes of the warning statement for a number of months and that none of
16 Residents at para 86.
17 S v Molimi 2008 (3) SA 608 (CC) at para 54.
18
these requests have been responded to. Instead, the applicants have been left
with confusing, contrary and second -hand versions of the complaints
concerned “money laundering”, “theft” or “fraud”. The respondents have for the
first time in the answering affidavit set out the alleged complaints which concern
alleged theft, alternatively fraud, by the applicants of GBP 500,000 from the
Dirona Trust, an offshore independently -run trust, alternatively
misrepresentations by the applicants that prejudiced Pero Cavaleros or induced
him to consent to the applicants’ appropriation of Pero Cavaleros’ property,
alternatively direct misappropriation of Pero Cavaleros’ property.
[53] According to the applicants, this description of the complaints remains highly
confusing, vague and contradictory.
[54] The applicants contend that the respondents have advanced no basis for the
court to refuse the relief sought , namely that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa is to
provide the applicants or their legal representative with a clear explanation of
any and all complaints against them which are under investigation, with
sufficient particularity to enable the applicants to provide the warning statement
to Warrant Officer Ramakatsa.
[55] The applicants contend further that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa is making use
of his investigating powers not for the purpose of actually advancing the
investigation, but to intimidate and harass the applicants. In this regard the
applicants rely on the following conduct of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa, which
is not seriously disputed in the answering affidavit:
a. Arriving at Vana Cavaleros’ home for a warning statement even before a
CAS docket has been opened and even before the enquiry had been
transferred to Warrant Officer Ramakatsa’s unit or he had been ordered to
investigate the enquiry.
b. Arriving at Vana Cavaleros’, an 83-year-old, home in three vehicles, with at
least three armed men.
c. Ignoring the requests to provide particularity about the complaints.
c. Ignoring the requests to provide particularity about the complaints.
d. Further unannounced visits to Vana Cavaleros, despite the arrangement
with her legal representative, and threatening to return with force.
19
e. Failing to respond to Mr Small -Smith’s attempts to summarise the
complaints.
f. Arriving at Dimitri Cavaleros’ home with six armed men in tactical ge ar,
scaling walls and gates and banging on doors and windows.
g. Failing to agree to cease any unlawful conduct upon requests by Mr Small-
Smith in this regard.
[56] The applicants simply seek for the investigation to be run properly, fairly, without
an improper purpose or ulterior motive, and with due regard to the applicants’
rights, including to legal representation.
The respondents’ case
[57] The respondents contend that the application is not urgent , alternatively that
any urgency is self-created, and that the applicants have not established the
absence of substantial redress in the ordinary course.
[58] The respondents further contend that the application constitutes an abuse of
process and that the applicants:
“have acted in a manner that is severally (sic) prejudicial to Warrant
Officer Ramakatsa in hindering his role and duties as the investigating
officer. Since the lodging of this application, all efforts to ascertain a
warning statement from the Applicants have halted, as well as further
information gathering in respect of the complaint laid by [Pero
Cavaleros]”.
[59] The respondents also state that the applicants and Mr Small -Smith have used
“resisting and delaying tactics in their refusal to co-operate with Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa”.
[60] The conduct of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and the other members of the SAPS
is said to have been done in accordance with section 205(3) of the Constitution
read with section 13 of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (“SAPS
20
Act”) and “in attempting to obtain a warning statement from each Applicant in
respect of the criminal investigations under Cas Number …”.
[61] The upshot of the respondents’ opposition to the application on the merits is
that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa attempted to obtain warning statements from
the applicants on various occasions between September 2025 to February
2026 and “on each occasion was met with resistance alternatively refusal by
[the applicants] to furnish the warning statements ”. The respondents rely on a
summary of events as listed in the investigation diary of Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa to demonstrate “the difficulties experienced by [ Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa] in obtaining the warning statements from the Applicants and the
obstructive conduct perpetrated by [Mr Small -Smith] in frustrating the criminal
investigations”. The diary entries relied upon, are set out as follows:
a. On 2 September 2025 , Warrant Officer Ramakatsa went to the resident ial
address of Vana Cavaleros. Warrant Officer Ramakatsa was informed that
Vana Cavaleros was not at her residence and he subsequently left a written
note with the security guard for Vana Cavaleros to contact him.
b. On 24 October 2025 , Mr Small -Smith sent a letter to Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa’s superior, Brigadier Gobane (the fourth respondent) and Senior
Prosecutor Bezuidenhout wherein he confirmed that he is aware that
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa is seeking warning statements from the
applicants. According to the respondents, no attempt was made to facilitate
a time and date to compile the warning statements, but instead Mr Small -
Smith “opts to usurp the role and duties of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa as
the investigating officer and seek rather to liaise with [Senior Prosecutor
Bezuidenhout].”
c. On 20 November 2025, Mr Smalll -Smith contacted Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa, and informed him that he represented the applicants and
sought information contained in the docket. Warrant Officer Ramakatsa
sought information contained in the docket. Warrant Officer Ramakatsa
informed Mr Small -Smith that he required a warning statement from the
applicants and attempted to ascertain a suitable date and time to meet with
the applicants and Mr Small-Smith. No date and time was agreed upon.
21
d. On 25 December 2025, Senior Prosecutor Bezuidenhout contacted Warrant
Officer Ramakatsa and enquired whether he had succeeded in obtaining the
warning statements from the applicants. Warrant Officer Ramakatsa
informed Senior Prosecutor Bezuidenhout that he was encountering
difficulties in obtaining the warning statement as he was being “blocked” by
Mr Small-Smith.
e. On 20 January 2026, Warrant Officer Ramakatsa went to the home of Vana
Cavaleros in an attempt to obtain a warning statement from Vana Cavaleros.
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa was informed that Vana Cavaleros had gone
shopping and received WhatsApp communications from Mr Small-Smith. In
this message, Mr Small-Smith states that:
“Hey I see you are still in the habit of going to old ladies houses and
leaving notes without calling their lawyers. We are happy to give
you a statement but would first like to meet you to understand the
allegations. Let me know when you will be able to meet with the old
lady and I at my office please. I don’t want to take her to [your]
offices if you don’t mind. I have also been informed by the Senior
Prosecutor Johannesburg that she has been trying to reach you
about this matter … let me understand if you want to make a normal
statement nor a warning statement.”
f. On 22 January 2026, Mr Small -Smith went to the office of Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa without the applicants, accompanied by “bodyguards”. Mr
Small-Smith wanted to “check the allegations” against Vana Cavaleros and
endeavoured to bring her back to the police station to write down her
warning statement within the following two weeks.
g. On 28 January 2026, Warrant Officer Ramak atsa went to the residential
address of Dimitri Cavaleros. I have dealt with Warrant Officer Ramakatsa’s
version in this regard above.
h. On 30 January 2026, Mr Small-Smith sent further correspondence to Major
General Beukes. In his email Mr Small-Smith stated that he had received a
General Beukes. In his email Mr Small-Smith stated that he had received a
WhatsApp message from the investigating officer asking hi m when the
22
warning statements will be handed to him. Mr Small -Smith stated further
that:
“… He has not been informed by his superiors of the
communications that has been exchanged in this matter by our
office and yours. If he had been notified and consulted by his
superior he would have understood that he had to 1st comply with
the reasonable request that I had addressed to him last week to
confirm allegations.
I have forwarded the communication and will screenshot and share
his response.
We have no options but to approach the High Court for the relief in
our previous letter. This could have been avoided by the police
simply behaving reasonably.”
i. The application was issued on 5 February 2026 and on 6 February 2026,
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa received WhatsApp communication from Mr
Small-Smith in this regard. According to Warrant Officer Ramakatsa, the
application “sought to prohibit Warrant Officer Ramakatsa from continuing
with investigating the crime as stated in the Police Docket under C AS
Number …, and further sought to prohibit Warrant Officer Ramakatsa from
duly exercising his role and duties as a member of the SAPS and the
investigating officer as prescribed in s 205(3) of the Constitution read with
section 13(3) of the [SAPS Act]”.
[62] The respondents contend that it is apparent from the conduct of the applicants
and Mr Small-Smith that the applicants “sought to interfere in the investigations”
and to “dictate” and “control” the manner and method in which they were to
furnish Warrant Officer Ramakatsa with their warning statements.
[63] The respondents state that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa, in seeking to obtain a
warning statement from the applicants, was acting in accordance with s ection
205(3) of the Constitution read with s ection 13 of the SAPS Act, as well as in
23
accordance with the South African Police Service Code of Conduct (“SAPS
Code of Conduct”).
[64] As of 2 February 2026, Warrant Officer Ramakatsa has been unable to continue
with the investigation of the criminal complaint nor continue his role and duties
as the investigating officer in the criminal investigations against the applicants.
It is stated in the answering affidavit that the applicants “have effectively ‘bullied’
the SAPS from investigating”. According to the respondents, since the lodging
of the application, “all efforts to ascertain a warning statement from the
Applicants have halted , as w ell as further information gathering in respect of
the complaint laid by [Pero Cavaleros]”.
[65] Insofar as the requirements for a final interdict is concerned, the high watermark
of the respondents’ case is the following:
a. The applicants complain of “embarrassment” and “discomfort” in being
investigated. This cannot be construed as a violation of their constitutional
rights to dignity, freedom and not to be treated or punish ed in a cruel and
inhumane or degrading m anner. They state further that “any discomfort
experienced by the Applicant (sic) stems from the discourse within the family
which discourse cannot be laid at the feet of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa”.
The respondents therefore contend that t hey have not established a clear
right.
b. Warrant Officer Ramakatsa’s conduct in carrying out his role and duties as
an investigating officer, in an attempt to obtain a warning statement, cannot
be construed as constituting “injury” for the purposes of a final interdict. The
investigation is at a “Information Gathering Stage . … This information and
evidence is required to provide all necessary information to the public
prosecutor to determine whether the Applicants will be prosecuted in the
criminal courts”.
c. The applicants have an alternative remedy in that they can simply provide
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa with their warning statements. In addition, the
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa with their warning statements. In addition, the
applicants complain that they have been harassed and intimidated by
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa, however they failed to seek a protection order
24
in terms of the Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 (“Harassment
Act”).
[66] According to the respondents, the purpose of the application is not to interdict
Warrant Office Ramakatsa from perpetrating any alleged harassment or
intimidation, but to “actually interfere with the investigation into the alleged theft
and fraud …”.
Analysis
[67] Warrant Officer Ramakatsa was involved in two visits to each of the applicant’s
homes in quick succession at the end of January 2026 . On the first occasion,
on 20 January 2026, Warrant Officer Ramakatsa threatened Vana Cavaleros’
housekeeper that the next visit would be “with force” . As I have stated above
the respondents failed to deal with this allegation in the answering affidavit.
[68] On the second occasion, on 27 January 2026, Warrant Officer Ramakatsa
arrived at Dimitri Cavaleros’ home, together with other members of the SAPS
in three vehicles. After climbing over one of Dimitri Cavaleros’ neighbour’s walls
and over another gate at the border of Dimitri Cavaleros’ property to gain
access to Dimitri Cavaleros’ property, the members of the SAPS circled Dimitri
Cavaleros’ house and banged on windows and outside doors. The applicants
set out in great detail in the founding affidavit what transpired on this occasion.
Dimitri Cavaleros and his wife were “terrified”. When they noticed men climbing
over the walls and gates, they thought it best to hide. Dimitri Cavaleros was
“extremely fearful” based on the “aggressive behaviour” of the members of the
SAPS.
[69] These serious allegations are dealt with scantly by the respondents in the
answering affidavit. The high watermark of the respondents’ version regarding
what occurred on this occasion is that in an attempt to obtain a warning
statement from Dimitri Cavaleros, Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and other
members of the SAPS who accompanied him, were refused access by Dimitri
Cavaleros. No particulars are provided regarding, for instance, how, if at all,
25
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa announced the reason for his visit to Dimitri
Cavaleros’ residence; what exactly was communicated to Dimitri Cavaleros by
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa in this regard (if anything); and, significantly, the
respondents proffer no version in respect of the serious allegations of having
trespassed on different properties in order to gain access to Dimitri Cavaleros’
residence and their apparent intimidatory and harassing conduct at Dimitri
Cavaleros’ residence.
[70] The escalating conduct, coupled with the refusal of the respondents to provide
any undertaking that it would cease, in my view, warranted the applicants
approaching this court on an urgent basis.
[71] In my view, there is no merit in the contention that the urgency was self-created.
The last incident occurred on 27 January 2026. The next day, Mr Small -Smith
had written to the SAPS legal department and Warrant Officer Ramakatsa ’s
superiors seeking an undertaking that the harassment would cease, with a
deadline of 30 January 2026. No undertaking was provided by the deadline. On
2 February 2026, Mr Small-Smith made a final attempt to obtain an undertaking
directly from Warrant Officer Ramakatsa . This, too, failed.18 The application
was launched three days later, on 5 February 2026.
[72] I am also not convinced that an application in the ordinary course will afford the
applicants substantial redress .19 There is force in the submission made on
behalf of the applicants that where a police officer is acting outside the bounds
of his lawful duties, abusing his powers in a manner that causes fear and
infringes upon constitutional rights, such conduct must be stopped as quickly
as possible. Waiting months for a hearing in the ordinary course, during which
such conduct may intensify, does not provide substantial redress.
[73] In the answering affidavit, the respondents allege that, since the launch of the
application, all efforts to obtain a warning statement from the applicants have
application, all efforts to obtain a warning statement from the applicants have
come to a halt. In other words, Warrant Officer Ramakatsa only ceased the
18 See East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others
(11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) at para 5 to 9 in this regard.
19 Ibid.
26
conduct complained of by the applicant s when the applicants brought this
application. To my mind, this in itself is telling.
[74] The urgency of this matter is self-evident.
[75] I now turn to deal with the requirements of the prohibitory injunctive relief sought
by the applicants.
[76] I did not understand the respondents to dispute that the applicants have a right
not to be subjected to intimidatory or unlawful conduct by members of the
SAPS, not to have their right to privacy infringed by unlawful entry to their
residential premises, and to have a criminal investigation into their conduct
conducted in a lawful, rational and procedurally fair manner , free from ulterior
motives or abuse of power.
[77] The respondents contend that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and the other
members of the SAPS conducted themselves in accordance with their duties
and obligations in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the SAPS
Act and the SAPS Code of Conduct. It was also argued on behalf of the
respondents that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and the other members of the
SAPS involved acted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the CPA.
[78] The matter therefore turns on the lawfulness or otherwise of the conduct of
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and the other members of the SAPS in the course
of the investigation of the applicants. Having regard, for current purposes, only
to the incident on 27 January 2026, this court would be hard pressed not to find
the conduct of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa unlawful.
[79] I can do no better than to refer to the oft quoted paragraph of Heher JA in
Wightman,20 where the following is said in relation to disputes of fact:21
“A real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the court is
satisfied that the party who purports to raise the dispute has in his affidavit
seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed. There will
seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed. There will
20 Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA).
21 Wightman at para 13.
27
of course be instances where a bare denial meets the requirement because
there is no other way open to the disputing party and nothing more can
therefore be expected of him. But even that may not be sufficient if the fact
averred lies purely within the knowledge of the ave rring party and no basis is
laid for disputing the veracity or accuracy of the averment. When the facts
averred are such that the disputing party must necessarily posses knowledge
of them and be able to provide an answer (or countervailing evidence) if they
be not true or accurate but, instead of doing so, rests his case on a bare or
ambiguous denial the court will generally have difficulty in finding that the test
is satisfied. I say ‘generally’ because factual averments seldom stand apart
from a broader matrix of circumstances all of which needs to be borne in mind
when arriving at a decision. A litigant may not necessarily recognise or
understand the nuances of a bare or general denial as against a real attempt
to grapple with all relevan t factual allegations made by the other party. But
when he signs the answering affidavit, he commits himself to its contents,
inadequate as they may be, and will only in exceptional circumstances be
permitted to disavow them. There is thus a serious duty imposed upon a legal
adviser who settles an answering affidavit to ascertain and engage with facts
which his client disputes and to reflect such disputes fully and accurately in the
answering affidavit. If that does not happen it should come as no surprise that
the court takes a robust view of the matter.” [My underlining.]
[80] I find the respondents’ version of what had transpired at Dimitri Cavaleros’
residence on 27 January 2026 unsatisfactory. I alluded to this above. The
comprehensive and detailed version of Dimitri Cavaleros of what had transpired
on the day is met by, what is essentially, a bare denial by the respondents, save
for the version that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa was denied access by Dimitri
for the version that Warrant Officer Ramakatsa was denied access by Dimitri
Cavaleros, which as I have stated above, is so lacking in particularity that I
reject the version outright.22
[81] According to the respondents, the reason for entering Dimitri Cavaleros’
residence was to obtain a warning statement. In terms of section 26 of the CPA,
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and the other members of the SAPS who assisted
him was not entitled to enter Dimitri Cavaleros residence without his consent.
22 See South African Veterinary Council and Another v Szymans ki 2003 (4) SA 42 (SCA) at paras 23
to 24.
28
The respondents proffered no evidence of having first audibly demanded
admission to Dimitri Cavaleros’ residence and of notifying of the purpose for
which they sought to enter Dimitri Cavaleros’ premises so as to justify their
conduct under section 27 of the CPA.
[82] That then puts paid to the second requirement, namely that some act has
actually been done constituting interference with the applicants’ rights, or a well-
grounded apprehension that acts of the kind will be committed by the
respondents.23
[83] This requirement has also been met in respect of Vana Cavaleros who has been
traumatised by the unannounced visits to her premises which left her terrified
by the express threat of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa that the next time he would
be “with force”.
[84] The respondents’ glaring failure to deal with this very specific allegation is
significant and the respondents’ bare denial in this regard is rejected outright.24
[85] Much of the debate before me and, in respect of which I requested further
written submissions by the parties, turned on the availability of an alternative
remedy.
[86] At the outset, it needs to be emphasi sed that the test is not merely the lack of
an alternative remedy, but the lack of a satisfactory remedy.25
[87] Because a final interdict is a drastic remedy the court will not grant an interdict
when the applicant can obtain adequate redress in some other form of ordinary
relief.26
23 See Semi Conductor Services Export Division (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd (unreported, GJ case no
2023-109603 dated 24 October 2025) ; (2023-109603) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1072 (24 October 2025) at
para 78 and 79 where reference is made to Van Loggerenberg, Erasmus: Superior Court Practice, RS
28, 2025, D6-20.
24 Szymanski at paras 23 to 24.
25 V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) Ltd and
Others 2006 (1) SA 252 (SCA) at para 23 ; Van Loggerenberg, Erasmus: Superior Court Practice , RS
28, 2025, D6-21.
28, 2025, D6-21.
26 Van Loggerenberg, Erasmus: Superior Court Practice, RS 28, 2025, D6-21 to D6-22.
29
[88] In Winne,27 the court referred to Reserve Bank,28 where an interdict was refused
where it was held that there was “an equally effective, if not more effective,
remedy available” to the applicant to obtain “the same result” as would be
achieved by the granting of an interdict.
[89] The respondents contend that the applicants have not met this requirement for
a final interdict to issue.
[90] Firstly, the respondents contend that the applicants can simply provide the
warning statements. I agree with the applicants that this contention misses the
point entirely. The purpose of the application is not to avoid providing the
warning statements but rather to ensure that the applicants are not harassed
and intimidated in the process, and that the investigation is conducted lawfully.
[91] The other ground relied upon by the respondents for contending that the
applicants have an adequate or satisfactory alternative remedy at their disposal
requires more consideration. It is in this regard that I required the parties to
deliver supplementary written submissions.
[92] The respondents contend that the applicants complained that they have been
harassed and intimidated but failed to seek a protection order in terms of the
Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 (“Harassment Act”). The
Harassment Act makes provision for a complainant to apply to a Magistrate’s
Court for a protection order against harassment (as defined in the Harassment
Act). The process is relatively straightforward, and it is structured in a manner
that an individual can easily and inexpensively approach a Magistrate’s Court
for protection.
[93] Section 2 of the Harassment Act which provides as follows:
“(1) A complainant may in the prescribed manner apply to the court for a
protection order against harassment.
(2) If the complainant or a person referred to in subsection (3) is not
27 Winne & Godlonton NNO v Mutual & Another NNO 1973 (1) SA 283 (E) at 295G.
27 Winne & Godlonton NNO v Mutual & Another NNO 1973 (1) SA 283 (E) at 295G.
28 Reserve Bank of Rhodesia v Rhodesia Railways 1966 (3) SA 656 (SA).
30
represented by a legal representative, the clerk of the court must inform the
complainant or person, in the prescribed manner, of –
(a) the relief available in terms of this Act; and
(b) the right to also lodge a criminal complaint against the respondent of
crimen injuria, assault, trespass, extortion or any other offence which has
a bearing on the persona or property of the complainant or related person.
(3) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the application for a
protection order may, subject to paragraph (b), be brought on behalf of the
complainant by another person who has a material interest in the well -
being of the complainant or related person. …”
[94] I was further referred to the preamble and s ection 3(2) of the Harassment Act.
The preamble provides as follows:
“SINCE the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, enshrines the rights of all people in the Republic of South Africa,
including the right to equality, the right to privacy, the right to dignity, the right
to freedom and security of the person, which incorporates the right to be free
from all forms of violence from either public or private sources, and the rights
of children to have their best interests considered to be of paramount
importance;
AND IN ORDER to —
(a) afford victims of harassment an effective remedy against such behaviour;
and
(b) introduce measures which seek to enable the relevant organs of state to
give full effect to the provisions of this Act, ...”
[95] Section 3(2) of the Harassment Act provides for a Magistrate’s Court to issue
what is known as a protection order, which is an interdict (both interim and final)
against persons found to be engaging or having engaged in harassment.
31
[96] Harassment is defined in section 1 of the Harassment Act as:
“‘harassment’ means directly or indirectly engaging in conduct that the
respondent knows or ought to know-
(a) causes harm or inspires the reasonable belief that harm may be caused
to the complainant or a related person by unreasonably-
(i) following, watching, pursuing or accosting of the complainant or a
related person , or loitering outside of or near the building or place
where the complainant or a related person resides, work, carries on
business, studies or happens to be;
(ii) engaging in verbal, electronic or any other communication aimed at
the complainant or a related person, by any means, whether or not
conversation ensures; or
(iii) sending, delivering or causing the delivery of letters, telegrams,
packages, facsimiles, electronic mail or other objects to the
complainant or a related person or leaving them where they will be
found by, given to, or brought to the attention of, the complainant or a
related person;
…”.
[97] If the Magistrate’s Court is satisfied that the requirements are met, first an
interim and then a final protection order will be issued against the respondent.
In the protection order, the court can order that the respondent be prohibited
from engaging in harassment, enlisting the help of another to do so, or
committing another act as specified in the protection order.29
[98] When a protection order is issued, the court will also make an order authorising
the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the respondent, although such warrant
will be suspended subject to compliance with the protection order.30
[99] The purpose of this is so that, if the respondent continues to act towards the
complainant in a manner contrary to the protection order, the complainant can
29 Section 10(1).
30 Section 11(1).
32
hand the warrant of arrest to any member of the SAPS, who will consider the
conduct and can immediately arrest the respondent.31
[100] According to the respondents, the conduct complained about by the applicants
fall squarely under the definition of “harassment” in the Harassment Act. As
such, the respondents contend that the alleged harassment by Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa can be adjudicated upon in and curtailed by the Magistrate’s Court.
In other words, so it is contended, an application for a protection order, in terms
of s ection 2 read with s ection 9 of the Harassment Act is an adequate and
satisfactory remedy in relation to the relief sought in prayers 2 and 3 of the
applicants’ notice of motion.32
[101] The applicants contend that the Harassment Act is not an alternative remedy
which precludes the granting of the injunctive relief sought for, inter alia, the
following reasons.
[102] Firstly, harassment, as it is defined in the Harassment Act, is closely linked to
unreasonable conduct such as stalking, unsolicited and unwanted conduct,
communication or advances that cause harm. Whilst Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa’s conduct was unreasonable conduct causing harm, only some of
the conduct falls within this definition. According to the applicants, the conduct
of Warrant Officer Ramakatsa and the other members of the SAPS involved in
this matter is better characterised as the unlawful exercise of statutory power ,
including, inter alia:
a. Unlawfully accessing a private dwelling;
b. Abusing their powers by using their position as members of the SAPS to
intimidate and threaten the applicants;
c. Directly undermining the applicants’ right to legal representation in the
obtaining of their warning statements; and
31 Section 11(4).
32 Which includes the relief granted in prayers 2 and 3 of my order of 17 March 2026.
33
d. Failing to provide the applicants with the details of the complaints against
them with sufficient particularity to enable the applicants to provide the
warning statements.
[103] The conduct complained of is more akin to an unlawful search, seizure and
entry to property than it is to the type of harassment listed in the Harassment
Act. Further, it also encompasses intimidatory conduct , which does not fall
within the definition of “harassment” in the Harassment Act.
[104] Secondly, the applicants contend that the Harassment Act provides for a
protection order to be issued against a respondent, prohibiting him or her from
engaging in the harassment. The relief sought by the applicants includes
injunctive relief against Warrant Officer Ramakatsa , members of the SAPS in
Gauteng, under the direction of the first to fifth respondents, and other relief
against the first to fifth respondents. At most, a protection order directed at
Warrant Officer Ramakatsa individually would, in principle, have provided some
measure of protection. But, the remaining prayers would simply not have been
accounted for had the applicants approached the Magistrate’s Court under the
Harassment Act instead of this court for an interdict. The type of relief sought
by the applicants, in total, falls exclusi vely within the jurisdiction of the High
Court.
[105] Thirdly, the applicants contend that the Harassment Act is designed to address
interpersonal conduct such as stalking, sexual harassment and cyberbullying
between private persons. It is not designed to restrain the unlawful exercise of
public power by an organ of state. In contrast, the applicants’ complaint is not
that they are victims of interpersonal harassment in the ordinary sense
contemplated by the Ha rassment Act. Their complaint is that members of the
SAPS are exercising police powers unlawfully to intimidate them in connection
with a criminal investigation.
with a criminal investigation.
[106] Fourthly, the applicants contend that the Harassment Act does not oust the High
Court’s jurisdiction for injunctive relief in circumstances like the present.
34
[107] In JR,33 in the context of interpersonal harassment, this court dismissed the
contention that there was an alternative remedy in terms of the Harassment
Act. The court noted that the Harassment Act was promulgated to provide for
the issuing of protection orders against harassment and to afford victims of
harassment an effective remedy against such behaviour but then held that the
Harassment Act would not provide a remedy for all the unlawful conduct
perpetrated by the respondents, nor did the Harassment Act cater for the extent
of relief sought. Thus, the court held that, in the circumstances of that case, the
only ordinary and more effective remedy which provided t he necessary
protection was an interdict.34
[108] Where, as in this instance a number of constitutional rights are at stake unless
a court intervenes, the appropriate form of relief is, as the Constitutional Court
recently held in relation to unlawful searches, to “approach a court on an urgent
basis for an interdict”.35
[109] A similar approach was recently taken by this court in Mamiane,36 where threats
were made by a lieutenant colonel to the applicants in that matter and the court
held that: “there can be no effective legal remedy other than an interdict, to
restrain her from carrying then out”.
[110] There is force in the applicants’ submission that, whilst the injunctive relief
sought herein and a protection order under the Harassment Act issued by a
Magistrate’s Court constitute interdicts, the effectiveness of the enforcement
mechanism of the Harassment Act is not functionally equivalent to the
enforcement of a High Court interdict against an organ of state. The
Harassment Act provides for a warrant of arrest when a protection order is
breached.37 This mechanism is a powerful tool in the hands of a complainant
who can then approach a police station and ask for the warrant to be acted
upon. But , so it is contended on behalf of the applicants, such enforcement
upon. But , so it is contended on behalf of the applicants, such enforcement
33 JR v TR (2021/21609) [2022] ZAGPJHC 392 (13 June 2022) at para 86 to 91.
34 JR at paras 86 to 91.
35 Residents at para 84 and 88.
36 Mamiane v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2025 JDR 1476 (GJ) at para 16.
37 Section 11 of the Harassment Act.
35
mechanism is ill -suited to restraining institutional conduct of the SAPS in the
Gauteng area. The applicants ask the rhetorical question that, in the current
circumstances, to whom would the applicants turn to enforce their protection
order – the very persons whose conduct they seek to restrain? Whilst a
protection order from a Magistrate’s Court is enforceable by warrant of arrest
against an individual, it cannot restrain institutional conduct complained of in
this matter. By contrast, a High Court interdi ct is enforceable by contempt
proceedings against the responsible officials and carries with it the supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court over organs of state. I agree with the applicants
that the latter provides for materially different and more effective protection in
the circumstances of this case.
[111] This brings me to the mandatory injunctive relief sought by the applicants. In
this regard, the following relief was sought by the applicants:
“5. The fifth respondent be directed to continue with the investigation under CAS
vide Sandringham CAS … in a manner that is lawful, reasonable and objective,
and cognisant of the applicants’ constitutional rights, including that the fifth
respondent be directed:
a. to provide the applicants or their legal representatives, within 5 days of this
Court’s order, with a clear explanation of any and all the charges,
complaints and allegations against them which are under investigation;
with sufficient particularity to enable the applicants to prov ide the warning
statement the fifth respondent requires.
b. to provide the applicants or their legal representative, within 5 days of
Court’s order, in writing, the questions that the fifth respondent and/or the
investigating team require the applicants to answer as part of the warning
statement; and
c. to allow the applicants a reasonable period to respond to such questions
and prepare warning statements in the presence of their legal
and prepare warning statements in the presence of their legal
representative and in circumstances where such statements are made
freely, voluntarily and without undue coercion or intimidation.”
[112] The respondents contend that it is not necessary to direct Warrant Officer
Ramakatsa to continue with his investigation of the applicants in a lawful,
reasonable and objective manner, because Warrant Officer Ramakatsa has a
legal duty to do so in terms of section 205(3) of the Constitution and section
13(3)(a) and (b) of the SAPS Act.
[113] I granted some of the relief sought by the applicants under prayer 5 and 5(a) of
the notice of motion, but amended it to the extent I viewed it necessary. I
declined to grant the relief sought in prayers 5(b) and 5(c) of the notice of
motion. My reasons for amending the relief sought in prayers 5 and S(a) of the
notice of motion and declining the relief sought in prayer 5(b) and 5(c) of the
notice of motion are, essentially, that I agree with the submissions made on
behalf of the respondents that to grant such relief would, constitute prescribing
to the SAPS when and in which manner it should conduct the investigation. If I
granted such relief, the court would, in my view, commit a judicial overreach.
This court cannot prescribe to the SAPS how it should conduct its
investigations, other than to ensure that it does so in a lawful manner.
[114] Insofar as the issue of costs is concerned, the applicants were substantially
successful and therefore the normal rule that costs should follow the event finds
application . In the notice of motion, the applicants sought costs against the
respondents, jointly and severally, on scale C. Although the cost of two counsel
was sought in the applicants' heads of argument dated 23 February 2026, in
the draft order submitted to my secretary subsequently, the order of costs
sought aligns with the costs order sought in the notice of motion. If the request
for cost of two counsel had been persisted with, I would have seriously
considered granting such an order. The scale of costs (scale C) is justified by,
at least, the importance of the matter to all parties concerned and the
complexity of some of the issues raised.
LOUW
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
36
37
Date of hearing: 25 February 2026
Date of further written submissions: 13 and 16 March 2026
Date of judgment: 12 June 2026
38
Appearances
Counsel for Applicants: L N Harris SC with E A van Heerden
Instructed by: Webber Wentzel
Counsel for respondents: S Mamoepa
Instructed by: State Attorney