Brief Summary

Vexatious litigant — Mental health assessment order — Applicant seeking leave to appeal against High Court orders declaring him a vexatious litigant and requiring a mental health assessment before instituting further legal proceedings — Court finding that the orders do not infringe the applicant's constitutional rights to dignity, freedom, and access to courts — Appeal and cross-appeal upheld in part, with specific conditions imposed on the applicant's ability to litigate.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment

1. Introduction

This matter concerned an application for leave to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court, together with a conditional cross-appeal, arising from a series of orders granted by the High Court of South Africa, Eastern Circuit Local Division, Thembalethu. The High Court had (i) declared the applicant effectively subject to a vexatious litigant restriction, and (ii) issued interim and final orders requiring him to undergo a mental health assessment as a precondition to pursuing further litigation in the High Court or other courts of similar or inferior status.

The parties were Thabang Motjamela (the applicant in the Constitutional Court proceedings), an indigent and self-represented litigant, and the George Local Municipality (the respondent), which had sought protective relief in the High Court in response to repeated litigation and alleged defamatory statements.

The procedural history was extensive and spanned multiple fora. It originated in employment-related disputes arising from the applicant’s temporary contracts under the Expanded Public Works Programme. Those disputes proceeded through statutory labour dispute processes and reviews in the Labour Court, the Labour Appeal Court, and unsuccessful attempts to obtain relief from the Constitutional Court. Following further litigation and public accusations, the Local Municipality approached the High Court for relief, which resulted in orders limiting the applicant’s future litigation and later requiring a mental health assessment before certain applications would be entertained.

The general subject-matter of the dispute before the Constitutional Court was the lawfulness and constitutional compatibility of the High Court’s orders restricting litigation (on vexatious proceedings grounds) and compelling a mental health assessment in civil proceedings, as well as the Constitutional Court’s own power to protect its processes against ongoing abusive litigation connected to the same underlying employment dispute.

2. Material Facts

Mr Motjamela was employed by the George Local Municipality in 2018 under two fixed-term contracts of approximately five months each under the Expanded Public Works Programme, with the second contract expiring in December 2018. It was common cause that the contracts were temporary and that the applicant sought permanent employment through subsequent dispute processes.

After the expiry of his contracts, Mr Motjamela and other employees lodged a dispute at the South African Local Government Bargaining Council seeking a ruling that the Local Municipality should employ them permanently. That claim was dismissed in November 2019 on the basis that the contracts were temporary. Mr Motjamela then pursued a similar outcome through the CCMA, where a commissioner found the matter to be without merit and took the view that the referral was vexatious.

Mr Motjamela pursued review proceedings in the Labour Court in respect of both the Bargaining Council and CCMA outcomes. His CCMA review was found to have lapsed due to his failure over an extended period (2021 to 2024) to provide transcripts. The Bargaining Council review was dismissed on 13 December 2023, and subsequent attempts to obtain leave to appeal and to petition the Labour Appeal Court were unsuccessful (dismissed on 12 February 2024 and 2 April 2024 respectively). A first application to the Constitutional Court was dismissed on 16 July 2024 for lack of prospects of success.

Thereafter, Mr Motjamela attempted to pursue criminal fraud allegations against the Local Municipality (first in the High Court and then through the South African Police Service), but the National Prosecuting Authority declined to prosecute due to insufficient evidence. He launched further labour-related proceedings seeking reinstatement of lapsed review proceedings and suspension of transcript requirements; this was dismissed on 28 November 2024. He also brought an urgent High Court application for reinstatement, compensation and damages which was dismissed on 2 May 2025. An attempt to petition the Supreme Court of Appeal did not proceed due to non-compliance with that Court’s filing rules.

Against this backdrop, the Local Municipality approached the High Court seeking a vexatious litigant order and an interdict against allegedly defamatory public allegations. On 20 October 2025, the High Court granted an order barring Mr Motjamela from instituting legal proceedings against any person in any court or inferior court without leave, and it included language permitting the Local Municipality to seek further relief should defamatory statements continue, including potentially a court-ordered inquiry into mental health.

Mr Motjamela then filed applications for leave to appeal and for recusal of the presiding judge. On 3 November 2025, the High Court suspended those applications pending Mr Motjamela submitting to a mental health assessment within 10 days, recording that it appeared he was, by reason of mental illness or intellectual disability, not capable of understanding the proceedings and making a proper case. Mr Motjamela did not undergo the assessment. On 20 January 2026, the High Court dismissed the suspended applications and barred him from filing new applications or re-enrolling the dismissed applications unless accompanied by a mental health report. The dismissal of the leave to appeal application had the effect that the vexatious litigant order came into operation.

Before the Constitutional Court, it was undisputed that Mr Motjamela had repeatedly filed proceedings connected to the Expanded Public Works Programme contracts and subsequent hiring disputes, including additional applications in the Constitutional Court itself, and that this pattern continued even after the Court’s prior dismissals for lack of prospects.

3. Legal Issues

The central legal questions the Court was required to determine were whether the High Court’s orders (i) restricting litigation and (ii) compelling a mental health assessment were lawful and constitutionally compliant, and what remedial orders were appropriate in light of the applicant’s litigation history.

The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal principles to a largely common-cause litigation history, alongside questions of law regarding the scope of permissible vexatious proceedings orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 and the limits of a court’s inherent jurisdiction under section 173 of the Constitution. It also raised questions involving value judgments and discretion, particularly in relation to tailoring restrictive orders to the evidentiary record and assessing whether judicial intervention was necessary to protect court processes and other litigants.

Within that framework, the Court had to address the applicant’s contention that the High Court’s vexatious litigant order was barred by res judicata due to a prior High Court decision declining similar relief in different litigation, and had to determine whether the High Court’s mental health assessment order impermissibly infringed the applicant’s constitutional rights to dignity, freedom and security of the person (including psychological integrity), and privacy, and whether it was authorised by statute, rules of court, or permissible common-law development.

A further issue was whether the Constitutional Court itself could, without an application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act (which does not apply to the Constitutional Court), regulate its own processes by directing its Registrar not to accept further filings from the applicant relating to the same subject matter.

4. Court’s Reasoning

The Court held that its constitutional jurisdiction was engaged. The High Court’s unsolicited mental health assessment order implicated the applicant’s rights under sections 10, 12 and 14 of the Constitution, and the vexatious litigant order affected the applicant’s section 34 right of access to courts. These were sufficient to establish a constitutional issue.

On res judicata, the Court applied the established requirements as stated in Ascendis Animal Health (Pty) Ltd v Merck Sharp Dohme Corporation. It found that the applicant had not demonstrated that earlier litigation involving the Garden Route District Municipality rendered the present matter res judicata. Although the earlier matter formed part of a broader pattern of disputes about employment-related litigation, the parties were different, and so were the causes of action and the specific subject-matter. The essential elements for res judicata were therefore not satisfied.

On the vexatious litigant order, the Court accepted the principle that courts may grant such orders where the interests of justice require, in order to protect the effective functioning of courts and to protect parties from harassment and the costs of meritless litigation. It reiterated that courts may consider the litigation history of the matter and, where properly placed before them, related matters involving the same litigant. The Court emphasised, however, that persistence must not be conflated with vexatiousness, and that prolific but bona fide unsuccessful litigation is not necessarily abusive. The focus must be on indications that litigation is being used abusively to secure outcomes through persistence rather than merit, thereby manipulating court processes.

The Court noted that the High Court’s vexatious litigant order mirrored the broad language of section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956, which contemplates an order restricting proceedings “against any person”. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed that, in Beinash v Ernst & Young, it had upheld both the constitutionality of the statute and the general proposition that a vexatious litigant order regulates, rather than necessarily denies, access to courts in a manner consistent with section 34.

Nevertheless, the Court held that the High Court’s order in this case was not properly supported by the evidence to the extent of its breadth. While the litigation record supported restricting further proceedings relating to the Expanded Public Works Programme contracts and the applicant’s efforts to obtain permanent employment from the Local Municipality, the High Court order covered any proceedings against any person, irrespective of subject matter. The Court reasoned that it did not appear that evidence of abusive litigation unrelated to the public works contracts had been placed before the High Court. It further noted that the Local Municipality itself had sought relief limited to employment-related litigation against it, which was consistent with the scope of its cross-appeal.

In addressing appellate deference to discretionary orders, the Court relied on the principle in Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd that appellate interference is generally limited where a lower court exercised a true discretion judicially. Here, however, the Court found that the High Court’s order went beyond both the relief sought and what was supported by the record. The High Court’s vexatious litigant order was therefore set aside and substituted with a narrower order tailored to the employment-related dispute.

On the mental health assessment order, the Court considered the seriousness of a judicially initiated challenge to a litigant’s mental health and legal capacity. It stressed the constitutional protection of physical and psychological integrity under section 12(2) and the link between mental health stigmatisation and the right to dignity under section 10, referencing the Court’s prior recognition of these concerns. It further relied on the presumption that adults are mentally competent and capable to litigate until the contrary is proven, and observed that any rebuttal of this presumption must be approached with principled safeguards.

The Court acknowledged that, in criminal proceedings, there are specific statutory mechanisms under sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 for enquiries into an accused’s fitness to stand trial and criminal responsibility, designed to prevent injustice. It also noted that civil proceedings provide established mechanisms such as the appointment of a curator ad litem, including under rule 57 of the Uniform Rules of Court, and that courts may in some circumstances act under inherent jurisdiction to appoint a curator to prevent injustice, but within the framework of established safeguards and evidentiary requirements.

The High Court had invoked section 173 of the Constitution to develop the common law by importing criminal-procedure-like mechanisms into civil proceedings in circumstances it perceived as a regulatory vacuum. The Constitutional Court found this approach unsustainable. It reasoned that the High Court did not engage with the existing statutory framework in the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 and the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, nor with the MHCA’s limits on when mental health care services may be provided and how involuntary care is regulated. The Court highlighted that the MHCA contemplates applications by specified persons (such as a spouse, next of kin, partner, associate, parent or guardian), and that neither the MHCA nor rule 57 authorises a court, on its own initiative and without a detailed evidentiary basis, to order a mental health assessment of a civil litigant as a precondition to litigation.

The Court also found that the basis for the High Court’s remark that the applicant appeared incapable of understanding proceedings due to mental illness or intellectual disability was not apparent from the record. The order was not sought by the Local Municipality and was not supported by expert evidence. The Court considered that the issue was raised for the first time in the High Court judgment and was grounded essentially in the presiding judge’s observations of the applicant’s conduct and communications. In the Constitutional Court’s view, the High Court did not conduct the principled enquiry required for lawful common-law development under section 173 read with section 39(2) of the Constitution, and did not evaluate the rationale for established procedural safeguards requiring an evidentiary basis.

Drawing on Niekus v Niekus, the Court stressed that before interfering with an adult’s right to control their own affairs, there must be a proper inquiry into mental condition and typically the assistance of a neutral representative such as a curator ad litem. It noted that the applicant had sought variation to align the process with rule 57, indicating that established civil procedures were available. The Court concluded that the High Court’s departure from MHCA and rule 57 procedures could not be sustained, and that the matter should instead have been disposed of through the operation of an appropriately tailored vexatious litigant order. The mental health assessment orders were therefore set aside.

Finally, the Court addressed the continued pattern of meritless litigation in the Constitutional Court itself. It recorded multiple additional applications by Mr Motjamela relating to the same constellation of issues about the Expanded Public Works Programme contracts, hiring disputes, and related litigation. The Court noted that the Vexatious Proceedings Act does not apply to the Constitutional Court, and there was no application before it seeking a restraint order under that Act. However, the Court held that it could not allow disproportionate depletion of its resources by a single litigant without good cause. It considered the perverse incentive created by the suspension of lower-court orders pending appeal, which may encourage serial litigants to inundate the Court with unmeritorious applications, undermining finality and prejudicing meritorious litigants.

Relying on section 173 of the Constitution and authority recognising the Court’s inherent power to protect and regulate its own processes, the Court held it was within its inherent jurisdiction to direct its Registrar not to accept further applications from Mr Motjamela relating to his employment under the Expanded Public Works Programme contracts, and matters arising from the order, where rescission, direct access or leave to pursue a direct appeal was sought.

On costs, the Court balanced the Local Municipality’s argument about the expenditure of public funds against the applicant’s indigence and self-representation, and also took into account that the Local Municipality had supported the unlawful mental health assessment order in its submissions. Given the applicant’s partial success and the overall circumstances, the Court concluded that each party should bear its own costs.

5. Outcome and Relief

The Constitutional Court granted leave to appeal directly and leave to cross-appeal directly against parts of the High Court’s order in George Local Municipality v Motjamela (267/25) [2025] ZAWCHC 473. The appeal and cross-appeal were each upheld in part.

The Court set aside paragraphs (a) to (c) of the High Court’s order and substituted them with an order that restricted Mr Motjamela from instituting proceedings against the Local Municipality (not “any person”), and only in relation to his terminated Expanded Public Works Programme employment contracts, without leave of the relevant court. The substituted order also directed transmission to the Labour Court and publication in the Government Gazette, with publication costs borne by the Local Municipality subject to a possible partial recovery from Mr Motjamela if the Local Municipality elected. It further gave the Local Municipality leave to approach the High Court on the same papers, supplemented, for appropriate relief should the applicant continue publishing disparaging or defamatory statements about the Municipality, its employees, court administrative staff, or judicial officers.

In addition, the Court directed the Registrar of the Constitutional Court not to accept further applications from Mr Motjamela relating to his Expanded Public Works Programme employment contracts and matters arising from the order, where rescission, direct access or leave to pursue a direct appeal was sought.

The Court ordered that each party bear its own costs.

Cases Cited

Ascendis Animal Health (Pty) Ltd v Merck Sharp Dohme Corporation [2019] ZACC 41; 2020 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2020 (1) SA 327 (CC).

AB v Minister of Social Development [2016] ZACC 43; 2017 (3) BCLR 267 (CC); 2017 (3) SA 570 (CC).

Beinash v Ernst & Young [1998] ZACC 19; 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC); 1999 (2) BCLR 125 (CC).

Beinash v Wixley [1997] ZASCA 32; [1997] 2 All SA 241 (A); 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA).

De Vos N.O. v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development [2015] ZACC 21; 2015 (2) SACR 217 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1026 (CC).

George Local Municipality v Motjamela (267/25) [2025] ZAWCHC 473.

Motjamela v George Local Municipality [2025] ZAWCHC 510.

Motjamela v George Local Municipality [2026] ZAWCHC 9.

Garden Route District Municipality v Motjamela, unreported decision of the Western Cape High Court, Thembalethu, Case No 529/24 (11 December 2024).

Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria [2007] ZACC 9; 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC); 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC); 2007 (8) BCLR 827 (CC).

Niekus v Niekus 1947 (1) SA 309 (C).

S v Pennington [1997] ZACC 10; 1997 (4) SA 1076 (CC); 1997 (10) BCLR 1413 (CC).

S v SM [2021] ZAWCHC 260; 2022 (1) SACR 313 (WCC).

Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd [2015] ZACC 22; 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC); 2015 (10) BCLR 1199 (CC).

Legislation Cited

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (sections 9, 10, 12, 14, 34, 39(2), 173).

Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 (section 2(1)(b)).

Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (sections 77, 78, 79).

Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 (sections 9, 26, 27).

Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013.

Rules of Court Cited

Uniform Rules of Court (Rule 57).

Held

The Court held that constitutional jurisdiction was engaged because the High Court’s mental health assessment order implicated the applicant’s constitutional rights to dignity, freedom and security of the person (including psychological integrity), and privacy, and because the vexatious litigant order affected the applicant’s right of access to courts.

The Court held that the applicant’s reliance on res judicata failed because the prior litigation relied upon was not between the same parties and did not involve the same cause of action and subject-matter as required by the doctrine.

The Court held that while a vexatious litigant order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act is constitutionally permissible and does not in itself violate section 34, the High Court’s order in this matter was impermissibly broad on the record because it restricted litigation against “any person” without evidence of abusive litigation beyond the employment-related disputes. The order was set aside and replaced with a tailored restriction limited to proceedings against the Local Municipality relating to the terminated Expanded Public Works Programme contracts.

The Court held that the High Court’s mental health assessment orders were not supported by an application, were not grounded in an evident evidentiary basis on the record, and were inconsistent with existing statutory and procedural mechanisms regulating mental health interventions in non-criminal contexts, including the MHCA and rule 57. The High Court’s attempt to develop the common law by importing criminal-procedure mechanisms into civil proceedings was not sustained.

The Court held that, under section 173 of the Constitution, it was entitled to protect its own processes by directing its Registrar not to accept further applications from the applicant relating to the same subject matter where rescission, direct access or leave to pursue a direct appeal was sought.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A party alleging res judicata must establish a prior judgment by a competent court between the same parties, based on the same cause of action, and in respect of the same subject-matter; matters within a similar “constellation of issues” do not satisfy the doctrine absent those requirements.

A court may grant a vexatious litigant order where the interests of justice require, including to protect court functioning and innocent parties from harassment and costs caused by meritless litigation. In assessing vexatiousness, a court may consider the litigant’s history in the matter and related matters properly before it, but must not equate persistence with lack of merit; the central inquiry is whether litigation is being used abusively for purposes other than those for which courts exist.

Although section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 permits broadly framed restrictions, courts retain a true discretion in crafting appropriate orders, and such orders must be supported by the evidentiary record and be proportionate to the abuse demonstrated.

Judicially initiated challenges to a civil litigant’s mental health and capacity implicate constitutional rights to dignity, psychological integrity, and privacy, and must be approached with principled safeguards. Existing frameworks such as the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 and Uniform Rule 57 require structured procedures and an evidentiary basis; absent statutory or rule-based authority, a court may not compel a mental health assessment of a party in civil proceedings merely on judicial observation.

Under section 173 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has inherent power to protect and regulate its own processes and may take measures to prevent ongoing abuse of its procedures where repeated meritless applications threaten the Court’s finite resources and prejudice other litigants’ access to timely adjudication.

Motjamela v George Local Municipality (CCT 34/26) [2026] ZACC 31 (7 July 2026)