SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 37874/2019
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
DATE
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
MASHADI MARTHA MALATSI Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Defendant
Summary: Industrial psychologists, when expressing an opinion on the Plaintiff’s
uninjured career path, are duty-bound to meaningfully and purposefully consider the
likely uninjured retirement age of the Plaintiff, and accepting the retirement age of 60
or 65 uncritically is untenable. The court considers personal circumstances , not
statistics, when making an award. Factors to consider the uninjured retirement age
include: (a) Uninjured physical and mental abilities. (b) Pre -accident work
accommodations, availability of assistive devices, or assistance. ( c) The sector in
which the Plaintiff operated. ( d) The physical requirements of the uninjured work. ( e)
Retirement planning and financial position of the Plaintiff. ( f) Applicable labour
legislation, contractual terms and bargaining council agreements. ( g) The Plaintiff’s
2
uninjured career plans. ( h) Life expectancy of the Plaintiff. (i) Modern tendency and
general practice. Retirement age of 77½ accepted.
JUDGMENT
KEHRHAHN AJ
Introduction
[1] The Plaintiff, Ms. Mashadi Matha Malatsi, was injured in a motor vehicle
collision on 28 July 2017. The Plaintiff was born on 19 May 1946. She was about 71
years of age at the time of the accident and about 79 years of age when the matter
proceeded before me.
[2] On 30 September 2025, when I was seized with the matter, only the quantum
remained in dispute. Justice Lubbe AJ , on 11 April 2024, ordered the Defendant to
pay 100% of the Plaintiff’s proven or agreed damages. The Defendant had not yet
decided on the seriousness of the Plaintiff’s injuries , and as a result, I postponed the
general damages for later determination. The loss of income and past medical
expenses remained to be adjudicated. I granted the rule 38(2) application and
admitted the evidence of the Plaintiff’s witnesses, including the Plaintiff’s expert
witnesses, by affidavit.
[3] After having regard to the evidence presented by the Plaintiff, I ordered the
Defendant to pay the Plaintiff an amount of R 115 514.40 (one hundred and fifteen
thousand, five hundred and fourteen Rand and forty cents ). I directed that the
reasons would follow.
[4] I raised the issue of the retirement age with counsel for the Plaintiff. To this
end, Dr. Pretorius, the Plaintiff’s industrial psychologist, opined that , but for the
accident, the Plaintiff would have retired at age 77½ . Given my concern with the
retirement age, the Plaintiff opted to present the evidence of Dr. Pretorius, who is
well-known to this court and a respected industrial psychologist, viva voce.
3
The Plaintiff’s evidence
[5] The Plaintiff provided evidence from numerous of her clients, who mostly
confirmed that the Plaintiff took care of their minor children in her capacity as an
informal daycare owner and could not continue to do so as a direct result of the
accident. This includes evidence from Morongwa Annah Serepa, Sekhumbulane
Leah Ledwaba, Renolda Busisiwe Letwaba, Bertha Mpuku Morulane, Dimakatso
Margaret Mothiba and Khutjo Fubke Maleka. They all confirmed that they have paid
the Plaintiff R400/m to take care of their children.
[6] The undisputed evidence is that the Plaintiff was earning an income at the
time of the accident, at a time when she was already 71 years old.
[7] The industrial psychologist, Dr. Pretorius, testified that the Plaintiff had been
forced to work , owing to her dismal socio-economic circumstances. She has an
indigent background and thus relied on the Social Security Agency's old -age grants
to survive, but the Plaintiff was compelled to supplement her SASSA pension to
make ends meet. She had an adult daughter and two grandchildren , all of whom
were financially dependent on the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was financially motivated to
work as long as she could , owing to financial hardships. Dr. Pretorius also opined
that, given the current economic climate, many individuals, especially those with a
low level of education, including the Plaintiff, are compelled to work as long as
possible.
[8] According to Dr. Pretorius (industrial psychologist), “retirement is becoming a
heated discussion within the labor (sic) market. The reality (while not always
acknowledged) is that the majority of the South African labor (sic) market are not
sufficiently prepared for retirement ”. Dr. Pretorius also alludes to the fact that “ the
growth in technology, and knowledge in health science results in people living
healthier and longer than before”.
[9] The Plaintiff’s evidence is that she had no limitations to perform the work of an
[9] The Plaintiff’s evidence is that she had no limitations to perform the work of an
informal caregiver. If such problems were to develop later, owing to her advanced
age, she would have the assistance of her adult daughter and two grandchildren,
who could help her with the work of an informal caregiver. Dr. Pretorius relied on the
4
academic literature of Michelle Reyers , published in the Journal of Financial
Counseling and Planning. This scholar notes that “potentially two-thirds of all South
Africans may not have a funded pension benefit at retirement and will need to rely on
social grants after retirement”.1
[10] Dr. Pretorius, drawing from the Retirement Reality Report (RRR),2 suggests
that only 6% of South African s can afford to retire comfortably. Abo ut two-thirds of
South Africans are not saving for retirement, as many simply cannot afford to do so
because they have no money left at the end of the month. Dr. Pretorius also notes
that, in recent times, the share of the RRR survey respondents who cannot afford to
retire has increased from 65% to 70%.
[11] Dr. Pretorius also alluded to the fact that in the past, the post-retirement
lifespan of an individual who retired at age 65 may have been about 20 years, where
such a person may live up to age 85 (for healthy individuals) . The post-retirement
lifespan of an individual retiring at age 65 has recently increased to 35-40 years.
Living longer and having a longer retirement expectancy require people to work
longer and maintain some employment post-retirement.
Assessment
[12] During the week of 29 September to 3 October 2025, I dealt with numerous
default judgment applications against the Road Accident Fund, up to seventeen
matters a day. In almost all of these actions, in which the Plaintiffs claimed loss of
income and/or loss of earning capacity, the Plaintiffs presented expert opinion
evidence, including evidence from industrial psychologists. In almost none of these
cases did the industrial psychologists conduct an in -depth assessment of the
Plaintiffs’ likely pre -accident retirement age. For the most part, the industrial
psychologists uncritically accepted without more that the ‘normal retirement age’ was
between 60 and 65 years. This is an untenable situation, given that when quantifying
between 60 and 65 years. This is an untenable situation, given that when quantifying
a personal injury claim, one must have regard to the Plaintiff’s personal
1 Reyers “Perceptions of retirement adequacy: Evidence from South Africa ” (2018) 29(2) Journal of Financial
Counseling and Planning Education 343 at 344.
2 The 10X Retirement Reality Report had been published annually since 2018 and is based on a comprehensive
survey b y Brand Atlas , aimed at providing insight into the financial knowledge and behaviour of the RSA
consumers.
5
circumstances and not to statistics or averages. 3 The Appellate Division in Griffiths v
Mutual & Federal Insurance , held that the earning s of other members of the Cape
Bar, or their average or mean earnings , are not helpful in determining the probable
potential earnings of the Plaintiff in that case, as skills, fees and earnings vary from
one individual to another.4
[13] In LD v Road Accident Fund,5 the court, this time in the context of remarriage
contingencies, was mindful of outdated marriage statistics being used in deducting
contingencies, which was to the detriment of the litigants, and accepted that the
court should obviate such injustices. 6 The same can be said about the generic, one-
size-fits-all, outdated use of the fixed retirement ages of 60 -65 years. An industrial
psychologist would be remiss in their duty to the court 7 if they omit to conduct an
individual, fact -specific assessment of the Plaintiff’s likely pre -accident retirement
age.
[14] By its very nature, owing to the “once-and-for-all” and “lumpsum” rules,8
claims for loss of income are speculative, and one aspect that must be determined,
as best a court possibly can, is the pre -morbid retirement age of the Plaintiff . In
Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey N.O,9 the court held that an enquiry into
loss of earning capacity “involves a prediction as to the future, without the benefits of
crystal balls, soothsayers, augers or oracles. ”10 Some cases will be easier to
adjudicate than others, but where the Plaintiff presents the best evidence available,
the Plaintiff may not be non -suited, and the court is duty -bound to do the best it c an
with the evidence at hand.11
3 Griffiths v Mutual & Federal Insurance Company Ltd 1994 (1) SA 535 (A) at 546 and Mathamelo v Road
Accident Fund [2023] ZAGPPHC 1150 at para 75.
4 Griffiths above n 3 at 546.
5 [2018] ZAGPPHC 181.
6 Id at paras 34-36.
4 Griffiths above n 3 at 546.
5 [2018] ZAGPPHC 181.
6 Id at paras 34-36.
7 An expert owes a duty to the court to provide independent assistance by way of objective, unbiased opinion
relating to matters within his/her expertise , see Schneider N.O and Others v A A 2010 (5) SA 203 (WCC) at 211 -
212.
8 Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) 835 and Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd v Katz N.O
1979 (4) SA 961 (A) 974.
9 1984 (1) SA 98 (A).
10 Id at 113. Also see Dyssel N.O v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1982 (3) SA 1084 (C) at 1085-1086 and Goodall v
President Insurance Co Ltd 1978 (1) SA 389 (W) at 392-393.
11 Esso Standard SA (Pty) Ltd v Katz 1981 (1) SA 964 (A) at 969; Mkwanzi v Van der Merwe 1970 (1) SA 609 (A)
at 632 and Hersman v Shapiro & Co 1926 TPD 367 at 379.
6
[15] It must not be lost out of sight that the R oad Accident Fund Act12 abolishes
the delictual common law claim against the guilty driver .13 The Act replaces the old
common law delictual claim against the guilty driver with a statutory claim against the
Road Accident Fund, without changing the substantive basis for liability.14
[16] As for what this common law and retained “substantive basis for liability ”
entails, the Constitutional Court in Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund held that:15
“The Act does not define ‘damages’ or ‘damages for patrimonial loss ’. Its meaning
must be garnered from the common law. The notion of damages is best understood
not by its nature but by its purpose. Damages are ‘a monetary equivalent ’ of loss
‘awarded to a person with the object of eliminating as fully as possible [her or] his
past as well as future damage. 16 The primary purpose of awarding damages is to
place, to the fullest possible extent, the injured party in the same position she or he
would have been in, but for the wrongful conduct.”
[17] If the Plaintiff is to be placed, to the fullest extent possible, back in the position
that she would have been in, but for the accident, it is essential that the uninjured
retirement age be meaningfully considered . The uncritical and generic adoption of a
“normal age of retirement” would leave the Plaintiff with no claim at all, as she had
long passed what industrial psychologists generally accept as the “normal”
retirement age of 60-65. The question that I must thus establish is this: What was the
Plaintiff’s most likely uninjured retirement age, based on her individual
circumstances?
[18] Upon a thorough and proper assessment of the uninjured expected retirement
age, the court may conclude that the uninjured expected retirement age is higher or
even lower than what is generally perceived as the “normal” retirement age, that is ,
the generically accepted age of 60-65 years.
12 Section 21 of Act 56 of 1996.
the generically accepted age of 60-65 years.
12 Section 21 of Act 56 of 1996.
13 Law Society of SA v Minister for Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) at para 26.
14 Road Accident Fund v Abrahams 2018 (5) SA 169 (SCA) at para 13.
15 2006 (4) SA 230 (CC) at para 37.
16 Visser et al Visser en Potgieter’s Law of Damages 2nd ed (Juta & Co Ltd, Lansdowne 2003) at 19.
7
[19] Although by no means a numerus clausus , and listed here in no particular
order, I turn next to the objective facts and circumstances that informed my findings
on the likely uninjured retirement age of the Plaintiff.
[20] The first factor to consider is the Plaintiff’s pre-accident physical and mental
abilities.17 It follows that any pre -existing medical, physical , or psychological
conditions that may have an adverse effect on the mental and physical capacity of
the Plaintiff, would have an adverse impact on the uninjured expected retirement
age. The Plaintiff in casu had no chronic diseases and pre-accident, she was never
in a serious accident or sustained serious injuries. She had no psychological or
cognitive problems before the accident.
[21] The second factor is the uninjured workplace accommodations, the availability
of assistive devices and other assistance that would accommodate an older person
in the workplace . If the Plaintiff had been able to work for longer in the uninjured
scenario, despite the normal and expected consequences of ageing, owing to being
accommodated at work or being able to rely on assistive devices or the help of
others to perform the work, then it follows that a higher uninjured retirement age may
be justified. In casu, the Plaintiff was the owner of an informal daycare and had the
assistance of her adult daughter to assist her with the physical requirements of the
work.
[22] The third factor that I considered was the sector in which the Plaintiff
functioned in the uninjured scenario. The question is whether the Plaintiff was
functioning in the formal or informal or in the corporate or non -corporate labour
markets. Dr. Pretorius (the Plaintiff’s industrial psychologist) testified that the Plaintiff
in casu operated in the non -corporate informal sector. Given the Plaintiff’s work
history and level of education, her profile limited her to physically demanding work ,
history and level of education, her profile limited her to physically demanding work ,
specifically as a self-employed daycare operator. In Dr. Pretorius's opinion, people in
the informal, non -corporate sector are more likely to retire later than those in the
corporate or formal labour markets.
17 See Mbambo v RAF [2025] ZAFSHC 178 at para 36.
8
[23] In Mahlo v Road Accident Fund (Mahlo),18 Chesiwe J held that it was not
unreasonable to accept that the Plaintiff would have worked beyond age 65 and took
cognisance of the fact that a self -employed vendor was financially dependent on
income generated from the sale of goods. 19 The court went on to find that the
retirement age of 70 years was appropriate. 20 The court held that it is a reality
that people work into their later years, depending on their health.21
[24] The fourth factor was the physical requirements of the pre -accident work that
the Plaintiff did or was likely to do . It follows logically that as people get older, they
become less capable of performing heavy work. In casu, the Plaintiff’s work was of a
physical nature, as she worked with young children. She had to be able to pick up
and carry the children and to stand and walk for long periods of the day.
[25] The fifth factor was whether the Plaintiff could afford retirement pre-accident.22
The affordability of retirement may be informed by the actual earnings of the Plaintiff
and the actual or prospective retirement savings of the Plaintiff. In casu, the Plaintiff
earned a profit of R1450 /m or R17 400/a. She used this profit to supplement her
SASSA income, to make ends meet. She had not contributed to a retirement fund or
annuity. If she did not work, she had no other stream of income to rely on. She
obviously has no surplus funds to save towards her retirement, which supports the
notion that she would have retired later rather than sooner.
[26] The sixth factor is the dictates of the existing l abour legislation, contractual
obligations, pension fund rules and collective bargaining agreements. The age of
retirement may be fixed by a contractual agreement, a collective bargaining
agreement, pension fund rules or some other binding arrangement.
[27] To this end, it is important to consider the consequences of an employer
[27] To this end, it is important to consider the consequences of an employer
permitting an employee to work longer than the contractually agreed retirement age.
18 [2022] ZAFSHC 194 at para 25.
19 Id at para 15.
20 Id at paras 30 & 37.
21 Id at para 36. Also see Mogale v Road Accident Fund [2014] ZAGPJHC 263 at para 47.
22 See Mbambo above n 17.
9
[28] In terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the LRA”), a dismissal of an
employee shall be automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is based on,
inter alia, age,23 however section 187(2)(b) of the LRA provides that, notwithstanding
this section, when an employee is dismissed based on a ge, such a dismissal shall
be fair if the employee reached the normal or agreed retirement age.
[29] In Rubin Sportswear v SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union, 24 Zondo JP
(as he then was) considered the meaning of “normal or agreed retirement age ” and
held that:25
“The word is not defined in the Act. It, accordingly, must be given its ordinary
meaning. Chambers – Mcmillan’s South African Student’s Dictionary describes
the word “norm” thus: “You say that something is the norm if it is what
people normally or traditionally do.” It further says: - “Norms are usual or
accepted ways of behaving.” It describes the adjective “normal” as
meaning “usual, typical or expected.” The word “normality” is described
as “the state or condition in which things are as they usually are.” The New
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary describes the word “norm” as meaning,
among others “a standard, a type; what is expected or regarded as normal;
customary behavior, appearance.” As to the adjective “ normal”, one meaning
that the latter dictionary gives is “constituting or conforming to a standard;
regular, usual, typical, ordinary, conventional.” (Emphasis in original.)
[30] With this meaning of “normal or agreed retirement age ” in mind, what is then
the position if an employee works past the normal or agreed retirement age and is
not dismissed by the employer ? The law , per the dicta of Schweitzer v Waco
Distributors (A Division of Voltex Pry) Ltd (Waco),26 has always been that termination
of employment, after the normal or agreed retirement age , is automatically fair, even
if dismissed long after reaching the agreed or normal retirement age.27
if dismissed long after reaching the agreed or normal retirement age.27
23 Section 187(1)(f). Also see sections 9 and 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and section 6
of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.
24 [2004] ZALAC 8.
25 Id at para 13. Also see Motor Industry Staff Association v Great South Autobody CC t/a Great South
Panelbeaters; Solidarity obo Strydom v State Information Technology Agency SOC Limited 2025 (3) BCLR 312
(CC) at para 52.
26 Schweitzer v Waco Distributors (A Division of Voltex Pry) Ltd [1999] BLLR 188 (LC).
27 Id at p ara 16, followed in Bos v Eon Consulting (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZALCJHB 305 at paras 46 -47; Kutuma v
Limpopo Legislature [2014] ZALCJHB 357 at paras 33-38; and Rubenstein v Price’s Daelite (Pty) Ltd (2002) 5 ILJ
(LC) at paras 20-24.
10
[31] This position is no longer clear. In Motor Industry Staff Association v Great
South Autobody CC t/a Great South Panelbeaters ; Solidarity obo Strydom v State
Information Technology Agency SOC Limited ,28 the apex court could not reach a
majority decision on the interpretation of section 187(2)(b) of the LRA and handed
down the following three judgments:29
(a) The first was penned by Justice Zondo CJ (as he then was) with
Chaskalson AJ, Ma thopo J and Schippers AJ (as he then was)
concurring. The first judgment held that Waco was wrongly decided and
that an employer must terminate the employment of an employee at the
date upon which the employee attains the “normal or agreed retirement
age”. A termination at a later date would be unfair.30
(b) The second judgment, penned by Van Zyl AJ, held that the employer
has an election to retain or terminate the employment relationship when
the employee reaches the normal or agreed retirement age , which
election can be exercised later, but must be exercised within a
reasonable time.
(c) The third judgment was penned by Justice Rodgers J with Dodson AJ
(as he then was), Kollapen J and Tshiqi J concurring. This judgment
upheld the position as set out in Waco,31 i.e., the status quo.
[32] Each of the various judgments of the apex court raised concerns with the
practical implications of the other judgments.32 How the labour industry responds to
this uncertainty in the labour market is best left for the experts, but it is no doubt a
factor that ought to be considered by industrial psychologists when expressing an
opinion on the appropriate pre-accident retirement age.
28 Motor Industry Staff Association above n 25.
29 Motor Industry Staff Association above n 25 at paras 2-4.
30 Motor Industry Staff Association above n 25 at para 2.
31 Waco above n 26.
32 For example, see Motor Industry Staff Association above n 25 at paras 52-54, 56, 60, 62, 63, 66-67.
11
[33] It is also important to consider whether an employment agreement , pension
fund rules, or a collective bargaining agreement33 dictates a retirement age. Formal
and corporate employers often opt for fixed retirement ages.
[34] In Mahlo, Justice Chesiwe J held that there are “many instances where
employees in the formal employment market are allowed to work until the age of 70
(seventy) years and beyond, such as is the case for professionals, Attorneys and
Ministers”.34
[35] In Mbambo, the court applied an uninjured retirement age of 68 years, finding
that the Plaintiff was a deputy sheriff and no fixed retirement age applied to him.35
[36] In Mogale, the court held that the Plaintiff would have retired at age 70, 36
because the Plaintiff’s employer had no fixed-term retirement policy and the
employees worked for the company as long as they were able to perform the work to
the satisfaction of the employer. 37 The court held that “persons who retire at 65 in
today’s economic climate, also do so at considerable financial disadvantage, and
that people today are healthier and continue to work after the age of 65.”38
[37] In casu , the Plaintiff was self -employed in the informal sector. There is no
compulsory retirement age applicable to the Plaintiff.
[38] The seventh factor to consider is Plaintiff’s uninjured retirement plan. Was it
the intention of the Plaintiff to work up to a given age? Obviously, this is a subjective
factor and depending on the circumstances and other objective facts that corroborate
or support the Plaintiff’s uninjured retirement plans, the court will decide what weight
may be attached to this consideration. I t remains a factor to consider. G iven the
financial realities for many South Africans, it must be accepted that a great deal of
the population plans on working beyond the age of 65. The intention of the litigant is
33 Motor Industry Staff Association above n 25 at paras 55-56.
34 Mahlo above n 18.
35 Mbambo above n 17 at para 36.
34 Mahlo above n 18.
35 Mbambo above n 17 at para 36.
36 Mogale above n 21 at para 47.
37 Mogale above n 21 at para 11.4.
38 Mogale above n 21 at para 47.1.
12
not something that can be ignored by the court merely because it is a subjective
factor. In this case, the Plaintiff’s evidence is that she and her family depended on
her income, and she would have worked for as long as reasonably possible.
[39] Of course , the mere wishes and intentions of an injured victim, although
relevant, should not be the only decisive factor, and much will depend on the facts of
each case and other objective collateral information regarding the prospects of
employment and instead, the question should turn on the probabilities of an injured
victim obtaining and sustaining further work to an advanced age.39
[40] If an employee works for an employer where a compulsory retirement age
applies, the court must consider whether that employee planned on finding an
additional source of income after the compulsory retirement age, such as consulting ,
performing part -time work, or embarking on self -employment, and what were the
uninjured prospects of the Plaintiff securing post-retirement work.
[41] The eighth factor, is the general uninjured life expectancy of the Plaintiff. The
lifespan of an individual who retires at age 65 have gone up as people live longer in
modern times. But they do not live forever and for this reason, it is important to
consider the life expectancy on a case-to-case basis.
[42] The ninth and final factor to consider is the modern tendency and general
practice. In Huxtable v Road Accident Fund ,40 Ally AJ accepted a retirement age of
67 ½. The court held that:41
“Now the Policy of the Company, DRA, that he is presently employed by, has a
retirement age of 63 years. The Industrial Psychologist submitted an addendum
report wherein the retirement age of 67.5 is confirmed. The author of the report refers
to research having been conducted in South (sic) wherein it is shown that the age of
65 is no longer regarded as being a retirement age. One of the reasons for this, is
65 is no longer regarded as being a retirement age. One of the reasons for this, is
that people are unlikely to sustain the same livelihood today if they retired at age 65
39 In this context, the court in Walton v Road Accident Fund 2016 JDR 0471 (GJ ) at para 28, was not satisfied
with the evidence presented.
40 2023 JDR 1284 (GP).
41 Id at para 6. Also see Mogale above n 21 at para 47.1.
13
and hence the inclination to work as long as possible taking into consideration the
specific circumstances of the individual”.
Conclusion
[43] I find that the Plaintiff would have worked to the age of 77½ had the accident
not occurred. I accept the opinion of Dr. Pretorius (industrial psychologist) in this
regard. I also accept the opinion that the accident had rendered the Plaintiff
unemployable.
[44] The past loss of income to age 77½ was calculated by the actuary in the
amount of R135 800. Mr. Marais, who appeared for the Plaintiff, conceded that the
proposed contingency of 5% was conservative given the uncertainty of the uninjured
retirement age. The higher the postulated uninjured retirement age , the higher the
contingency should be. I directed that the contingency deduction should be 1 5%.
The amount that I awarded for the past loss of income is R115 430.
[45] There is no claim for future loss of income. This claim was rightfully
abandoned.
[46] The Plaintiff’s claim for past medical expenses amounts to R84.40. Dr.
Engelbrecht confirmed that these vouchers are accident -related and fair and
reasonable.
ORDER
[47] The total award is R115 514.40 as set out in the order that I made on 30
September 2025. I repeat the order that I made:
1. The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff by way of delictual damages within
180 calendar days, calculated from 30 September 2025, the amount of R115
514,40 (One Hundred and Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred and Fourteen Rand
and Forty Cents) in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim for payment of loss of
earnings and past medical expenses.
14
2. If the defendant does not pay the judgment amount or any portion thereof within
the time period as set out in 1 supra, interest shall be paid on the capital amount
a tempore morae, after 14 days of the judgment date to the date of final payment.
3. The defendant is ordered to within 4 months from date of this order furnish the
claimant with an unlimited undertaking in terms of the provisions of Section
17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act, Act 56 of 1996 for 100% (one hundred
percent) of the costs stipulated in terms of the said Section arising out of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the motor vehicle collision that is the subject
of the claim instituted under the abovementioned case number. It is ordered that
any expenses as envisaged in Section 17(4(a) that are incurred after this order is
made will resort and, be claimable under the undertaking.
4. 4 The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff s and plaintiffs reasonable taxed or
agreed party and party costs of suit on the High Court-scale which costs are to be
taxed in the discretion of the taxing master and will include, but not necessarily
be limited to the following:
4.1. The fees of plaintiff's counsel to include counsel's day fees in respect of trial
(30 September 2025) and counsel's fee incurred in preparing heads of
argument and draft order for trial - High Court Scale - B.
4.2. The costs and fees incurred in the drafting of all affidavits for the Plaintiff and
the Plaintiff’s experts and the costs and fees in procuring the affidavits from
them for purpose of trial.
4.3. The costs of the plaintiffs Rule 38(2) application.
4.4. In respect of the plaintiff's experts the following reasonable taxable costs,
fees, disbursements and expenses: (a) the reasonable taxable preparation
and reservation and day fees of A. Dr Willie Pretorius for trial; (b) the costs of
and incurred by the plaintiff to procure all expert reports and assessments,
and incurred by the plaintiff to procure all expert reports and assessments,
including any follow up and addendum reports and assessments ; (c) the
costs of obtaining all actuarial calculations and reports thereon (d) The costs
and fees incurred in the drafting of all affidavits for the plaintiff's experts.
15
4.5. The costs and fees incurred in the drafting the affidavit(s) of Dr Engelbrecht
including his fee for considering the past medical and hospital expense
vouchers at hand and the costs incurred in preparing an affidavit for him
dealing with said issue.
4.6. The plaintiff's attorney is not entitled to recover under the cost order fees for
any Filing Notices containing indexes and screenshots evidencing that these
notices were uploaded to caselines.
5. It is recorded that evidence was led by affidavit.
6. All payments of the plaintiff's capital and legal costs are to be made by paying the
amount(s) and taxed or agreed costs to the credit of the Trust account of Salomé
Le Roux Attorneys, the details of which are as follows:
SALOME LE ROUX ATTORNEYS
BANK: THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA
BRANCH CODE: 0[...]
ACCOUNT NUMBER: 0[...]
ACCOUNT HOLDER: SALOMÉ LE ROUX TRUST ACCOUNT TYPE OF
ACCOUNT: TRUST CHEQUE ACCOUNT
REF: M1418 VENDOR NR: 5[...]
7. 7 It is noted and recorded that the plaintiff's claims are not subject to a
contingency fee agreement.
8. The issue of general damages are separated in terms of 33 (4) and postponed
sine die.
________________________________
FHH KEHRHAHN
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Date of hearing: 30 September 2025
Judgment delivered: 11 June 2026
16
Appearances:
Counsel for the plaintiff: Adv H Marais
Instructed by: Salome le Roux Attorneys
Counsel for the defendant: No appearance