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[2026] ZAGPJHC 708
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FirstRand Bank Limited t/a Nissan Finance Division of WesBank v Multipoint Logistics CC and Another (2018/24520) [2026] ZAGPJHC 708 (14 May 2026)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 2018/24520
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
14
May 2026
In the matter between:
FIRSTRAND
BANK LIMITED T/A NISSAN FINANCE, A DIVISION OF
WESBANK
Applicant/Plaintiff
and
MULTIPOINT
LOGISTICS CC
First Respondent/Defendant
NTLANTLA
GEORGE GULE
Second Respondent/Defendant
JUDGMENT
CRUTCHFIELD J
[1]
The applicant, Firstrand Bank Limited t/a
Nissan Finance, a Division of Wesbank, brings a second application
for summary judgment
for the payment of the full outstanding balance
under an instalment sale agreement (“the agreement”), in
the amount
of R517 708.54, interest thereon and costs on the
attorney and client scale.
[2]
The respondents, Multipoint Logistics CC
and Ntlantla George Gule, the first and second respondents
respectively, oppose the application.
The first respondent is the
lessee in terms of the agreement and the second is the surety.
[3]
The respondents opposes the summary
judgment application on the basis that the applicant undertook a
bifurcated process to reach
this point and that the applicant was not
entitled to bring this application pursuant to an amendment to the
particulars of claim
that the respondents allege was incompetent.
[4]
Furthermore, the respondents allege that
the applicant may not claim the full outstanding balance given that
the initial particulars
of claim claimed damages, and that the
applicant should be held to its claim for damages in terms of those
initial particulars
of claim. This because the respondents allege
that the applicant’s amendment to the particulars of claim was
irregular because
an order for repossession of the vehicle had
already been granted in terms of the first summary judgment
proceedings, resulting
in the action and the
lis
between the parties being complete.
[5]
Furthermore, that the applicant’s
election to cancel the agreement and seek repossession of the vehicle
resulted in the applicant
being disentitled from claiming the full
outstanding balance pursuant to the applicant’s failure or
inability to repossess
the vehicle. The respondents allege that the
applicant’s claim is limited to the value of the vehicle that
the applicant
sought initially to repossess.
[6]
In effect, the only issue is whether the
applicant is entitled to return to this court in terms of the second
summary judgment application,
for an order for payment of the full
outstanding balance under the agreement.
[7]
The procedural history of this matter holds
some relevance in the light of the respondents’ objections.
[8]
The applicant issued summons in which it
claimed cancellation of the agreement, repossession of the vehicle
that is the subject
of the agreement, damages, (being the difference
between the value of the vehicle upon repossession and the balance
outstanding
under the agreement due by the respondents), and costs on
the scale as between attorney and client.
[9]
The respondents defended the action. The
applicant issued the first application for summary judgment for
repossession of the vehicle.
The respondents opposed the first
summary judgment application. Notwithstanding, the court dealing with
that first summary judgment
application granted an order for delivery
or repossession of the vehicle to or by the applicant.
[10]
The applicant was unable to take delivery
of the vehicle. The respondents allege that the applicant made no
attempt to do so whilst
the applicant alleges that the respondents
withheld the vehicle. It is irrelevant why or how the applicant was
unable or unwilling
to take delivery of the vehicle. Subsequently,
the applicant amended its particulars of claim substituting the claim
for damages
with a claim for payment of the outstanding balance under
the agreement by the respondents.
[11]
The respondents submitted that the
amendment was invalid in that the respondents delivered a notice
opposing the amendment pursuant
to which the amendment failed. The
applicant’s amendment lapsed subsequent to the respondents’
notice of objection.
[12]
Thereafter, however, the applicant
delivered a second notice of intention to amend. The respondents did
not object to the second
notice of intention to amend and effect was
duly given to that second amendment by delivery of the amended pages
to the applicant’s
particulars of claim.
[13]
Furthermore, the respondents contended that
the second amendment was incompetent because the
lis
between the applicant and the
respondents was complete pursuant to the order for repossession of
the vehicle granted by the court
seized with the first summary
judgment application.
[14]
The respondents argued that the applicant
could not amend the particulars of claim in respect of which judgment
had already been
granted in terms of the first summary judgment
application. That order for summary judgment entitling the applicant
to repossess
the vehicle, however, served to finalise the first
summary judgment application only. The order did not finalise the
action proceedings
in that the claims in the action for damages and
costs of the action, remained extant. Those claims were not dealt
with or finalised
in terms of the summary judgment application.
[15]
Accordingly, the judgment in the summary
judgment application for repossession of the vehicle did not serve to
finalise the
lis
raised
in the action proceedings. The claim for damages remained alive. In
those circumstances, it was open to the applicant to
amend the claim
for damages in the particulars of claim and to replace that claim
with a claim for payment of the full outstanding
balance under the
agreement. The applicant duly did so.
[16]
The
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Edwards
v Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank
[1]
was amenable to an amendment to the summons being effected subsequent
to an order granted in summary judgment proceedings for certain
of
the relief claimed in the summons.
[17]
Furthermore,
a similar procedure whereby an amendment to the summons was effected
subsequent to an order for repossession of a vehicle,
was accepted by
the court in
Nedbank
v Nkosi.
[2]
In the circumstances, the respondents’ opposition to the second
summary judgment application on this ground, must fail.
[18]
The applicant, pursuant to amending the
particulars of claim, issued the second application for summary
judgment. The respondents
argued that the applicant was not entitled
to do so. There is no dispute that the claim by the applicant for the
outstanding balance
in the amount above-mentioned, is liquidated and
the applicant delivered a certificate of balance for that amount.
[19]
In
effect, a party may seek judgment on one or more claims capable of
sustaining summary judgment whilst the remaining claims proceed
to
trial by operation of law.
[3]
[20]
There
is precedent in terms of
Nedbank
v Nkosi
above,
for an amendment in the circumstances before me, from damages to a
claim for repayment of the full outstanding amount as
the applicant
claims before me. The respondents cannot claim that they are deprived
of an opportunity for a reduction equivalent
to the value of the
vehicle given that the applicant has not been able to repossess the
vehicle as it was entitled to do.
[4]
[21]
There is no opposition raised by the
respondents in these proceedings to the amount outstanding under the
agreement. Furthermore,
there is no dispute that the amount claimed
by the applicant is liquidated and capable of sustaining an
application and order for
summary judgment.
[22]
In the circumstances, the respondents have
not demonstrated a
bona fide
defence
to this second application for summary judgment. The respondents have
not raised a triable issue and the applicant is entitled
to summary
judgment as claimed.
[23]
In the circumstances, I grant summary
judgment in favour of the applicant against the first and second
respondents jointly and severally,
the one paying the other to be
absolved, as follows:
1.
Payment to the plaintiff in the amount of
R517 708.54;
2.
Interest on the aforementioned amount at
the rate of 13.25% per annum with effect from 7 June 2024 to
date of final payment;
3.
Costs of suit on the scale as between
attorney and client.
I hand down the judgment.
CRUTCHFIELD J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For the
Applicant:
Adv KM Boshomane instructed by Rossouws INC
For
the Respondent:
Adv Mureriwa instructed by Gary Segal Attorneys
Date of the
hearing:
12 May 2026
Date of the
judgment:
14 May 2026
[1]
Edwards
v Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank
2017 (1) SA 316
(SCA) at para 6.
[2]
Nedbank
v Nkosi
[2018] ZAGPPHC 796 (26 October 2018).
[3]
Spilhaus
& Co Ltd v Coreejees
1966
(1) SA 525 (C).
[4]
Marques
v Unibank Ltd
2001 (1) SA 145
(W) at 148C.