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[2026] ZAGPJHC 707
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Mercedes-Benz Financial Services SA (Pty) Ltd v Mabunda (2024/140651) [2026] ZAGPJHC 707 (14 May 2026)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 2024/140651
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
14 May 2026
In
the matter between:
MERCEDES-BENZ
FINANCIAL SERVICES (SA) (PTY) LTD
Applicant/Plaintiff
and
SMIKE
DUMISANI MABUNDA
Respondent/Defendant
JUDGMENT
CRUTCHFIELD J
[1]
The applicant, Mercedes-Benz Financial
Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd, claims summary judgment in the following
terms:
a.
Condonation for the late delivery of the
summary judgment application;
b.
Confirmation of the cancellation of the
instalment sale agreement;
c.
Authorisation of the repossession of a
Mercedes-Benz GLE300D 4Matic together with costs and leave to
reapproach the court for damages
subsequent to the repossession.
[2]
The respondent, Mr Smike Dumisani Mabunda,
opposes the application and represents himself in person at the
hearing.
[3]
The plaintiff claims condonation for the
late delivery of the application for summary judgment. Condonation is
an indulgence granted
by a court on good cause shown in terms of
rule 27(3). Condonation is not for the mere asking. The
application for summary
judgment was due for delivery on 4 March
2026. It was, however, delivered by the plaintiff some three weeks
late, on 25 March
2026.
[4]
As is apparent, these are summary judgment
proceedings. Whilst the applicant delivered the summary judgment
application three weeks
late, some would say a mere three weeks late,
summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy, only to be granted in
the clearest of
circumstances, where no doubt in respect of the
plaintiff’s case exists. This is because final relief may be
ordered in circumstances
where a defendant or respondent does not
have the benefit of a trial. Accordingly, a plaintiff’s claim
is required to be
impeccable. Furthermore, a court has a discretion
to refuse summary judgment even when a
bona
fide
defence is not disclosed by a
defendant.
[5]
It
is well-established that condonation is not a mere formality. An
applicant is required to explain the facts and circumstances
that led
to the delay in sufficient detail so as to allow a Court to
understand truly how the delay occurred and why it would be
in the
interests of justice to condone the failure to comply with the Rules.
See in this regard
Firstrand
Bank Ltd v Mpho David Baloyi NO & Others
[1]
.
[6]
An applicant for condonation must explain
the entire period of the delay. The application provided by the
applicant and the explanation
therein is vague, bald and lacking in
such detail as to afford the alleged explanation credibility. Counsel
for the applicant submitted
at the hearing that the applicant fully
explained the delay. I cannot agree with that submission.
[7]
The application for condonation, in effect,
tells me nothing about what occurred to cause the delay or how the
delay occurred. The
deponent fails to furnish any dates as to when
the plaintiff’s attorneys advised the plaintiff of the issues
raised by the
defendant or when it received instructions from the
plaintiff to proceed with an application for summary judgment.
[8]
Nor am I told when the applicant’s
attorney proceeded to prepare the application for summary judgment or
when he/she instructed
counsel to prepare the supporting affidavit or
when that affidavit was received back from counsel ready for
signature on behalf
of the plaintiff. Nor am I told when the
supporting affidavit was sent to the plaintiff’s head office
for signature.
[9]
The plaintiff refers to “the
unavailability and unforeseen circumstances at the time when the
affidavit was being prepared
by counsel”. It is impossible for
me to understand what is intended by the alleged “unavailability
and unforeseen circumstances”
relied on by the plaintiff. The
allegations by the plaintiff are vague and meaningless.
[10]
Furthermore, the plaintiff refers to the
unavailability and unforeseen circumstances at the time when the
affidavit had to be signed
and commissioned by the plaintiff. There
is no explanation as to what is meant in respect of the alleged
“unavailability”
or alleged “unforeseen
circumstances” referred to by the plaintiff in respect of the
signatory to the supporting affidavit.
The so-called unforeseen
circumstances referred to by the plaintiff are not explained and I am
left with no inkling of what the
alleged circumstances were or how
they caused or contributed to the delay in delivering the application
for summary judgment.
[11]
In short, the plaintiff’s explanation
of the delay is meaningless. It smacks of a sense of entitlement on
the part of the
plaintiff to condonation being granted in the
plaintiff’s favour. The plaintiff is a large organisation,
assisted by well-resourced
legal representatives. It is not a lay
person unequipped with knowledge of the rules and requirements of
this court.
[12]
The condonation application does not show
good cause and does not meet the required standard of such an
application. In the circumstances,
it would not facilitate the
administration of justice if I were to grant condonation in the face
of this application that does
not take the requirements for
condonation seriously.
[13]
Accordingly, the application for
condonation for the late delivery of the summary judgment application
stands to be dismissed with
costs on the scale as between attorney
and client. Whilst the defendant appeared before me in person, the
papers reflect that historically
he was represented at a stage during
these proceedings and the defendant is entitled to recover such legal
costs as were incurred
by him. The application for summary judgment
is not properly before me and stands to be struck of the roll with
costs on the scale
as between attorney and client.
[14]
Accordingly, I grant the following order:
1.
The application for condonation for the
late delivery of the application for summary judgment is dismissed
with costs on the scale
as between attorney and client.
2.
The application for summary judgment is
struck off the roll with costs on the scale as between attorney and
client.
I hand down the judgment.
CRUTCHFIELD J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For the
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Adv Mpho Rasivhetshele
instructed by Macrobert
Incorporated.
For
the Respondent/Defendant:
Self-represented
in person.
Date of the
hearing:
11 May 2026.
Date of the
judgment:
14 May 2026.
[1]
Firstrand
Bank Ltd v Mpho David Baloyi NO & Others
[2014] ZAGPPHC 995 (13 November 2014).