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IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE NO: 093093-2026
JERMAINE PRIM APPLICANT
And
THE MINISTER OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 1ST RESPONDENT
THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 2ND RESPONDENT
THE HEAD OF C-MAX KGOSI MAMPURU II
CORRECTIONAL CENTRE 3RD RESPONDENT
THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER OF
GAUTENG REGION 4TH RESPONDENT
(1) REPORTABLE: NO / YES
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO/YES
(3) REVISED.
(4) SIGNATURE DATE
Electronically delivered 05 June 2026
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THE HEAD OF JOHANNESBURG CORRECTIONAL
CENTRE 5TH RESPONDENT
‘This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ representatives by email.
The date and time of hand-down is deemed to be 05 June 2026.
JUDGMENT (URGENCY)
___________________________________________________________________________
N V KHUMALO J
[1] The A pplicant, an inmate at the Kgosi Mampuru , brought an urgent review
Application in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”)
in accordance with Rule 6 (12) of the Uniform Rules of Court , seeking as a matter of
urgency an order:
[1.1] Exempting him to an extent necessary from the obligation to exhaust
internal remedies, if any are found to exist.
[1.2] That the decision of the 1 st, 2nd 4th and 5th Respondents to transfer him
from the Johannesburg Correctional Center Medium C to Kgosi Mampuru
Correctional Centre C Max prison be reviewed and set aside;
[1.3] That the decision by the Respondents to detain the Applicant in C Max
in segregation for a period exceeding 7 days be reviewed and set aside,
[1.4] That the decision by the Respondent s to continuously detain the
Applicant in C-max in segregation or solitary confinement be reviewed and set
aside
[1.5] That the decision of the Respondents to find the Applicant guilty of the
Disciplinary charges and to impose a sanct ion of 42 days restriction of
amenities be reviewed and set aside.
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[1,6] The 1 st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th are ordered to transfer the Applicant back to
Johannesburg Correctional Centre Medium C within 24 hours of date of service
of this order;
[1.7] That the Respondent pay the costs of the Application including the costs
of Counsel on High Court Scale B
[2] The test for urgency was eloquently stated in the dictum of the judgment in East
Rock Trading Counsel on High Court Scale B ag 7 (PTY) Ltd and Another vs Eagle
Valley Granite and Another’s1 that:
[5] The issue of whether a matter should be enrolled and heard as an urgent
application is governed by the provisions of 6(12) of the Uniform Rules. The
aforesaid sub rule allows the court or a Judge in urgent applications to dispense
with the forms and se rvice provided for in the rules and dispose of the matter
at such time and place in such manner and in accordance with such procedure
as to it seems meet. It further provides that in the affidavit in support of an
urgent application the applicant “… shall set forth explicitly the circumstances
which he avers render the matter urgent and the reasons why he claims that
he could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.”
[6] The import thereof is that the procedure set out in rule 6(12) is not there for
taking. An applicant has to set forth explicitly the circumstances which he avers
render the matter urgent. More importantly, the Applicant must state the
reasons why he claims that he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a
hearing in due course. The question of whether a matter is sufficiently urge nt
to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application is underpinned by the issue
of absence of substantial redress in an application in due course. The rules
allow the court to come to the assistance of a litigant because if the latter were
1 (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011)
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to wait for the normal course laid down by the rules it will not obtain substantial
redress.
[9] It means that if there is some delay in instituting the proceedings an
Applicant has to explain the reasons for the delay and why despite the delay
he claims that he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due
course. I must also mention that the fact the Applicant wants to have the matter
resolved urgently does not render the matter urgent. The correct and the crucial
test is whether, if the matter were to follow its normal course as laid down by
the rules, an Applicant will be afforded substantial redress. If he cannot be
afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course then the matter qualifies
to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application. If however despite the
anxiety of an Applicant he can be afforded a substantial redress in an
application in due course the application does not qualify to be enrolled and
heard as an urgent application. (my emphasis)
[3] The court distinguished between self -created urgency, where a litigant delays
and then invokes urgency to fast -track relief and real urgency (such as imminent
harm).2 The reason for the urgency is not to be subjective, self-created therefore a
subjectively orientated urgency .3 In cases where the urgency relied upon was
subjective, clearly self -created, the courts have consistently refused the urgent
applications, unless the Applicant can show that it within reasonable conditions and
time constraints , attempted to settle to avoid having to approach the court
inconveniently on an urgent basis.
[4] The Application was set down for hearing on 12 May 2026. It was served on
the 2nd and 5th Respondent on 24 April 2026 and on the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents
between 13h16 and 14h29 on 29 April 2026 . The Respondents were required to
furnish the Applicant with the record and such reasons as it would be required by law
furnish the Applicant with the record and such reasons as it would be required by law
to be dispatched on the same day some of the Respondents received the Application,
that is, on or before 29 April 2026 . The Respondents were called upon to file their
2 Luna Meubel Vervaardigers v Makin and Another 1977 (4) SA 135 (W)
3 DLC 56 Group (Pty) Ltd & Another v Mohlawe Technology (Pty) Ltd and Others (005443-2025) 2025 ZAGPPHC
290 (14 March 2025) (5) /2025/260 [2]
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Notice to Oppose within 1 day after receipt of the Application, that is by 25 and 30 April
2026. In the mean while, the Applicant was to file its Supplementary Affidavit on or
before 29 April 2026. The Respondents were required to file their Answering Affidavit
on or before 5 May 2026.
[5] The tr uncated time frames within which the Respondents were required to
respond were laborious and the whole notice confusing since service on some of the
Respondents was 5 days after issuing of the Application, and given the nature of the
application and the relief sought by the Applicant . It is common cause that the
Applicant is in such an instance required not only to make a case why he alleges that
he will not get substantial redress if the matter is to be heard in due course but also to
explain his urgency that justifies bypassing the internal remedies that are expediently
available and applying the truncated timeframes.
[6] He must set forth the life-threatening circumstances that renders the matter so
urgent to justify not only the truncated time periods but also the stringent demands,
that has resulted in parties filing post the official set out time for all the affidavits to be
before court. According to the Respondent t he reason for putting everybody under
such extremely truncated time frames is primarily because he will not get substantial
redress in due course if the normal court processes , procedures and timeframes
prescribed by the rules under urgent applications were to be observed.
[7] The Applicant is a convicted detainee, seeking on an urgent basis to invoke the
Rule 53 review application, to set aside, inter alia, a decision instigated by the 5 th
Respondent, that is the head of the Johannesburg Correctional Centre, to transfer him
from a Johannesburg Medium Prison to a Maximum C Section at Kgosi Mampuru
Correctional Centre, a high security facility in Pretoria. The transfer occurred on 28
March 2026 following a transgression the Applicant committed, alleged to have
breached the security at the Medium Prison hence he was moved to the Maximum C
prison.
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[8] The Minister and the National Commissioner of Correctional Services, the Head
of C Max Kgosi Mampuru Correctional Centre and the Regional Commissioner,
Gauteng are cited respectively in their official capacities as the 1st , 2nd 3rd and the 4th
Respondents.
[9] On 27 March 2026, the Applicant conducted an interview with the press through
the prison landline that is alleged to have been without permission from the prison
authorities and under the disguise that he was phoning a friend. According to the
Applicant he disclosed to one Mr Kwinda who escorted him to the phones, that he was
going to do the interview and had also noted that in the Register. He alleges that the
prison officials were aware . The allegation is denied by the Respondents and
contradicted by the register he signed. It is therefore clear that there is a dispute of
facts. Furthermore, the Applicant disputes that the offence is within the ambit of s 234
of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (CSA).
[10] The Applicant ’s further allegations are that at C Max he has been illegally
subjected to prolonged solitary incarceration under inhumane conditions that far
exceeds the 7 day statutory maximum for segregation prescribed by s 30 (4) 5 of the
(CSA). As a result his constitutional rights are being violated as the incarceration also
constitutes prolonged solitary confinement within the meaning of Rule 44 of the UN
Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, causing him severe deprivation
and irreparable psychological and physical harm.
5 Section 30 (4) reads:
(4) Segregation in terms of subsection (1)(c) to (f) may only be enforced for the minimum period that
is necessary and this period may not, subject to the provisions of subsection (5), exceed seven days.
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[11] He furthermore alleges that he is confined into a small cell, that is 2 meters by
2,5 meters for 23 hrs, without a watch or calendar and allowed only 1 hour of exercise
and 2 minutes shower in a cage. He is only taken out side to exercise and sho wer.
Food is given to him through a small latch in the cell door. He is allowed 2 phone calls
per month and 3 visits that extend to 30 minutes each. He submits that his
incarceration is a clear abuse of power by the officials, severely infringing his
constitutional rights and as a result urgent and immediate intervention has become
more critical.
[12] On 29 March 2026, a day after he was transferred to Kgosi Mampuru, he was
furnished with a Notice for a Disciplinary hearing that was to take place on 9 April
2026. According to the Applicant he informed his attorneys who consulted with him on
2 April 2026. They advised him to await the outcome of the Disciplinary Hearing and
his sentencing on 13 April 2026 . The Applicant was prepared to wait and endure
another 11 days of the alleged inhumane circumstances of his incarceration, which he
alleged were causing him severe depression, irreparable mental and physical harm,
that necessitates an immediate release in strenuously truncated proceedings. This
was also despite having earlier sent a complaint and demand to the Commissioner for
an immediate release on 3 1 March 2026 , threatening to proceed with an urgent
application by 2nd April 2026.
[13] The Applicant, in the Commissioner’s letter which was sent in terms of s 21 of
CSA was also alleged to be held in solitary confinement, severely assaulted and as a
result to have sustained serious injuries. He claimed not to have been afforded any
medical treatment or fed since his transfer, hence the threat to approach the court on
an urgent basis by 2 April 2026. Despite the alleged dire situation, conspicuously not
repeated on affidavit, the Applicant and his attorneys were prepared to wait , only
repeated on affidavit, the Applicant and his attorneys were prepared to wait , only
approaching the court, short of a month after his transfer and 24 days after the letter.
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[14] Furthermore, the Disciplinary Hearing was heard and finalised on 9 April 2026.
The A pplicant was found guilty and a sanction of 43 days restriction of amenities
imposed, which might include further segregated incarceration. He e ven after that
outcome that exposes him to further segregated incarceration and alleged inhumane
and perilous conditions was prepared to delay until 13 April 2026.
[15] He alleges that after he was not sentenced on 13 April 2026, he was unable to
consult with his attorneys until 23 April 202 . He was, a result only able to launch his
application thereafter. Contrary to his allegations, h is attorn eys were in constant
contact and consultation with him advising him, from the time he w as transferred to
Kgosi Mampuru C Max prison, issued with a Notice for the Disciplinary Hearing ,
representing him at the Disciplinary Hearing until 13 April 2026. The excuse that he
was delayed due to the attorneys not being able to consult with him therefore cannot
hold.
[16] He, even though he was already duly represented, and alleging the conditions
of his incarceration to be dire, also overlooked the internal or institutional remedies
that were immediately and readily available to him after the Disciplinary Hearing
outcome. This is without a doubt self - created urgency. There is no reason why the
court has to urgently deal with a final relief where clearly there are serious dispute of
facts and the Applicant did not deem the situation to be so dire to invoke the urgency
proceedings at the opportune time.
[17] He furthermore states that if he had set the matter down in the normal roll , it
was going to be delayed as the Respondents will oppose it. Approaching the court on
truncated times, in order to avoid or stifle your opponents’ opposition or constructive
participation is un fair and absurd. It not only disregards the sacrosanctity of the
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principle of the audi alteram partem rule in the South African legal system, 6 but also
lacks the mandatory professional courtesy and responsibility expected of a legal
practitioner who conforms to such an intention.
6 Section 30 reads: Segregation
(1) Segregation of an inmate for a period of time, which may be for part of or the whole day and which may
include detention in a single cell, other than normal accommodation in a single cell as contemplated in
section 7(2)(e), is permissible
(a) …
(b) to give effect to the penalty of the restriction of amenities imposed in terms of section 24(3)(c),
5(c) or 5(d) to the extent necessary to achieve this objective;
(c), (d), (e) …
(f) if at the request of the South African Police Service, the Head of the Correctional Centre considers
that it is in the interests of the administration of justice
[S 30(1)(f) amended by s 16 of Act 32 of 2001.]
3) A request for segregation in terms of subsection (1)(a) may be withdrawn at any time.
(4) Segregation in terms of subsection (1)(c) to (f) may only be enforced for the minimum period that is
necessary and this period may not, subject to the provisions of subsection (5), exceed seven days.
(5) If the Head of the Correctional Centre believes that it is necessary to extend the period of segregation in
terms of subsection (1)(c) to (f) and if the correctional medical practitioner or psychologist certifies that
such an extension would not be harmful to the health of the inmate, he or she may, with the permission
of the National Commissioner, extend the period of segregation for a period not exceeding 30 days.
(6) All instances of segregation and extended segregation must be reported immediately by the Head of the
Correctional Centre to the National Commissioner and to the Inspecting Judge
(7) (a) An inmate who is subjected to segregation must be informed of the right to appeal and may refer
the matter to the Inspecting Judge who must decide thereon within 72 hours after receipt thereof.
(b) The Head of the Correctional Centre or the Head of the Remand Detention Facility must, upon
request, provide all relevant information relating to the matter contemplated in paragraph (a) to the
Inspecting Judge within 24 hours of receiving the request.
[S 30(7) substituted by s 24 of Act 25 of 2008; s 2 of Act 14 of 2023 with effect from 1 December 2024.]
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[18] He alleges to have exhausted all internal remedies available to him, since his
attorneys sent the s 21 letter to the Head of Prison o n 31 March 2026 and to the
Inspecting Judge on 6 April 2026 , which he agrees are not a remedy contemplated
under PAJA. He complains that remedies available are ineffective and incapable of
affording him timely relief and requests to be exempted from the obligation to exhaust
such remedies. However, those remedies under s 24 (5) to (7) (b)7 were devised to
facilitate and accelerate a proper and speedy resolution of administrative disputes.
(8) Segregation must be for the minimum period, and place the minimum restrictions on the inmate,
compatible with the purpose for which the inmate is being segregated.
(9) Except in so far as it may be necessary in terms of subsection (1)(b) segregation may never be ordered as
a form of punishment or disciplinary measure.
7 Section 24 (5) to (9 ) reads:
(5) Where the hearing takes place before a disciplinary official, the following penalties may be imposed
severally or in the alternative:
(a) a reprimand;
(b) a loss of gratuity for a period not exceeding two months;
(c)
(d) restriction of amenities not exceeding 42 days; in the case of serious or repeated infringements,
segregation in order to undergo specific programmes aimed at correcting his or her behaviour, with a
loss of gratuity and restriction of amenities as contemplated in paragraphs (b) and (c).
[Para. (d) substituted by s. 18 (c) of Act No. 25 of 2008.] Wording of Sections
(6) The penalties referred to in subsections (3) and (5) may be suspended for such period and on such conditions
as the presiding official deems fit.
(7) (a) At the request of the inmate proceedings resulting in any penalty other than a penalty contemplated in
subsection 5 (d) must be referred for review to the National Commissioner.
subsection 5 (d) must be referred for review to the National Commissioner.
(b) The National Commissioner may confirm or set aside the penalty and substitute an appropriate order for
it. [Sub-s. (7) substituted by s. 18 (d) of Act No. 25 of 2008.]
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On behalf of Applicant: R A BIRTZ
Instructed by: Brandon, Swanepoel Attorneys
Email Natasha@brandonswanepoel.com
On behalf of Respondents: Z Mokatsane
Instructed by: State Attorney
Email: TNetshitungulu@justice.gov.za
Ref: 4306/2023/Z90