1
SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 2024-106824
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED.
SIGNATURE
DATE 25 May 2026
In the matter of:
TRANSEC 5 (RF) LIMITED Plaintiff
And
MANTABOGE TALANE Defendant
Delivered: This judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the Par-
ties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading to Caselines. The date of
hand-down is deemed to be 25 May 2026
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
LUKHAIMANE AJ
2
[1] The plaintiff applies for summary judgment against the defendant. The plain-
tiff’s cause of action is founded upon an instalment sale agreement concluded
between the defendant and Potpale Investments (RF) on 24 November 20201,
which agreement was later ceded to the plaintiff. However, nothing turns on
the cession. In terms of the agreement, the plaintiff financed the purchase of
the defendant’s motor vehicle. For the sake of convenience, the parties are
referred to as in the main action.
[2] In terms of the agreement the plaintiff sold a 2020 TOYOTA QUANTUM / HI-
ACE 2.7 SESFIKILE 16S to the defendant, with engine number 2[...] and
chassis number A[...] (the vehicle).
[3] In its particulars of claim, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had breached
the agreement by failing to make the monthly instalments to it and was in ar-
rears in the amount of R101 394.64 as at September 20242. After giving no-
tice to the defendant in terms of the National Credit Act 3 (NCA) the defendant
remained in breach of the agreement which entitled the plaintiff to cancel the
agreement, which it duly did.
[4] The plaintiff then instituted action against the defendant seeking judgment for
orders confirming cancellation of the agreement, the return of the vehicle to
the plaintiff and costs. The plaintiff does not seek any monetary relief and
asks that the damages component of its claim be postponed sine die.
[5] On 9 December 2024, following the defendant’s plea which was served and
filed on 20 November 2024, the plaintiff delivered notice of intention to amend
the particulars of claim and, on 6 January 2025, effected the amendment by
1 Annexure B to POC; CaseLines 002-14 to 21
2 POC CaseLines 002-65
3 34 of 2005
3
delivering the amended page on the particulars of claim. The plaintiff brought
the application on 21 January 2025. The plaintiff took the view that the de-
fendant’s plea did not appear to be bona fide, had been delivered to delay the
plaintiff’s claim and applied for summary judgment for the relief set out above.
The plea was essentially that his vehicle was stolen and replaced by h is in-
surer. However, this replacement vehicle broke down a lot and since demand-
ing that the insurer rectifies the issue on 16 May 2024, the insurer has failed
to do so. Despite stating that he intend ed to join the insurer to the claim, as at
the date of the application, the defendant had not yet done so.
[6] The defendant opposes the application for summary judgment and raises
points in limine without dealing with the merits of the claim, i.e no defence to
the claim is advanced except a bald denial4.
[7] The defendant contends that summary judgment cannot be granted as there
is non-compliance with Rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court and the relief
sought in the application is not competent in a summary judgment application .
The defendant contends that the plaintiff is not entitled to cancellation of the
agreement, return of the vehicle and postponement of the claim for damages.
[8] The defendant further states that the application was brought 21 (twenty -one)
days late on 21 January 2025 instead of 11 December 2024 , if regard is had
to when she filed her plea. The defendant further argued that the plaintiff’s no-
tice of motion is procedurally flawed and ought to be dismissed as it is tanta-
mount to an application brought under Uniform Rule 6, initiating new proceed-
ings altogether.
[9] The plaintiff contends that the defendant did not raise the issue of the liquid
document in her pleadings and should not be allowed to do so in argument.
4 Defendant’s plea CaseLines 002-80
4
The plaintiff further contends that the defendant’s plea does not raise any tria-
ble issues let alone a defence and the summary judgment application should
be granted.
[10] The principles governing summary judgment are provided for in Rule 32 of
the Uniform Rules of Court and have become trite. Rule 32 provides as fol-
lows:
“(1) The plaintiff may, after the defendant has delivered a plea, apply to court for
summary judgment on each of such claims in the summons as is only -
(a) on a liquid document;
(b) for a liquidated amount in money;
(c) for delivery of specified movable property; or
(d) for ejectment,
together with any claim for interest and costs.
(2)
(a) Within 15 days after the date of delivery of the plea, the plaintiff shall
deliver a notice of application for summary judgment, together with an
affidavit made by the plaintiff or by any other person who can swear
positively to the facts.
(b) The plaintiff shall, in the affidavit referred to in subrule (2)(a) verify the
cause of action and the amount, if any, claimed, and identify any point
of law relied upon and the facts upon which the plaintiff’s claim is
based, and explain briefly why the defence as pleaded does not raise
any issue for trial.
(c) If the claim is founded on a liquid document a copy of the document
shall be annexed to such affidavit and the notice of application for
summary judgment shall state that the application will be set down for
hearing on a stated day not being less than 15 days from the date of
delivery thereof. “
5
[11] Rule 30A of the Uniform Rules of Court provides for non -compliance with rules
and court orders and states as follows:
“(1) Where a party fails to comply with these Rules or with a request made or no-
tice given pursuant thereto, or with an order or direction made by a court or in
a judicial case management process referred to in Rule 37A, any other party
may notify the defaulting party that he or she intends, after the lapse of 10
days from the date of delivery of such notification, to apply for an order –
(a) that such rule, notice, request, order or direction be complied with; or
(b) that the claim or defence be struck out.
(2) ……………”
[12] It is true that after becoming aware of the fact that the plaintiff had filed its ap-
plication for summary judgment 21 days late, the defendant had 10 days with-
in which to give notice thereof to the plaintiff, who in turn would have had 15
days to cure the irregular step. Both parties failed to act on the irregular step .
The plaintiff further failed to file a substantive condonation application for the
court to condone the non-compliance, instead raising such from the bar during
argument. More importantly though, the defendant is precluded from raising
the issue of the non-compliance at this juncture. It took a further step in the lit-
igation, thereby condoning the plaintiff’s non -compliance. In addition, the de-
fendant has failed to show any prejudice that he has suffered or stands to suf-
fer. Therefore, the court finds that the parties are properly before court for the
consideration of the matter.
[13] For a defendant to succeed in resisting an application for summary judgment,
it must be shown that there is a bona fide defence to the applicant’s claim
which raises a triable issue5. The defendant must fully disclose the nature and
grounds of the defence, and the material facts relied upon therefor. In
5 Rule 32(3)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court
6
Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk 6, the court held that bald, vague and
sketchy defences should not be tolerated.
[14] The plaintiff accepts that the application must be accompanied by an affidavit
from a person who can swear positively to the facts and verify the cause of
action in the particulars of claim. The facts alleged must be in the deponent’s
personal knowledge. Firsthand knowledge of every fact is not required. If the
applicant is a corporate entity, the deponent may rely on records in the com-
pany’s possession7.
[15] The applicant’s deponent is a legal operations manager who has control and
possession of the applicant’s records, accounts and other documents for this
claim8. In any case, the defendant does not raise this as a bone of contention
in its papers.
[16] It is the plaintiff’s case that the defendant is required to demonstrate that it
has a bona fide defence that if proved at trial, would be a complete defence to
the plaintiff’s claim9. It must fully disclose the nature, grounds and the material
facts relied on for the defence 10. Such disclosure must be of sufficient particu-
larity and completeness to enable the court to decide whether a bona fide de-
fence has indeed been disclosed.
[17] In his plea, the defendant did not dispute that as of September 2024, he was
in arrears for R101 394.64, plus interest as per the affidavit of the plaintiff’s
legal operations manager and evidenced by a certificate of balance. As indi-
cated above, the defendant’s plea was mostly about the dispute with the in-
6 1976 (2) SA 226 (T) at 229F-H
7 Dean Gillian Rees v Investec Bank Limited 2014(4) SA (SCA) at paragraph 12
8 Heads of Argument CaseLines 014-71
9 Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) at 426 B-C
10 Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk 1976 (2) SA 226 (T)
7
surer and not a denial that he owes the plaintiff money for the vehicle. Be-
sides, the exact quantification of the defendant’s indebtedness is not an issue
at present. The plaintiff only seeks cancellation of the agreement and return of
the vehicle to it. It is the indebtedness and not the actual quantum that entitles
the plaintiff to the relief that it seeks.
[18] In Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joints Venture 11,
the court held that:
“[31] So too in South Africa, the summary judgement procedure was not intended
to ‘shut (a defendant) out from defending’, unless it was very clear indeed that
he had no case in the action. It was intended to prevent sham defences from
defeating the rights of parties by delay, and at the same time causing great
loss to plaintiffs who were endeavoring to enforce their rights.
[32] The rationale for summary judgement proceedings is impeccable. The proce-
dure is not intended to deprive a defendant with a triable issue or a sustaina-
ble defence of her/his day in court. After almost a century of successful appli-
cation in our courts, summary judgment applications can hardly continue to
be described as extraordinary. Our Courts, both of first instance and at appel-
late level, have during that time rightly been trusted to ensure that a defend-
ant with a triable issue is not shut out. In the Maharaj v Barclays National
Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) case at 425G – 426E, Corbett JA, was keen to
ensure first, an examination of whether there has been sufficient disclosures
by a defendant of the nature and grounds of his defence and the facts upon
which it is founded. The second consideration is that the defence so dis-
closed must be both bona fide and good in law. A court which is satisfied that
this threshold has been crossed is then bound to refuse summary judgment.
Corbett JA also warned against requiring of a defendant the precision appo-
site to pleadings. However, the learned judge was equally astute to ensure
site to pleadings. However, the learned judge was equally astute to ensure
that recalcitrant debtors pay what is due to a creditor.
11 (161/08) [2009] ZASCA 23; 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA); [2009] All SA 407 (SCA) (27 March 2009)
8
[33] Having regard to its purpose and its proper application, summary judgment
proceedings only hold terrors and are ‘drastic’ for a defendant who has no de-
fence. Perhaps the time has come to discard these labels and to concentrate
rather on the proper application of the rule, as set out with customary clarity
and elegance by Corbett JA in the Maharaj case at 425G – 426E,”
[19] In the matter of NPGS Protection and Security Services CC and Another v
FirstRand Bank Ltd 12, the court held as follows in relation to denials in plead-
ings:
“Rule 32(3) of the Uniform Rules requires an opposing affidavit to disclose ful-
ly the nature and grounds of the defense, and the material facts relied upon
therefor. To stave off summary judgment, a defendant cannot content him or
herself with bald denials, for example, that it is not clear how the amount
claimed was made up. Something more is required. If a defendant disputes
the amount claimed, he or she should say so and set out a factual basis for
such denial. This could be done by giving examples of payments made by
them which have not been credited to their account”
[20] The defendant has failed to profer a defence to the claim. The defendant’s dif-
ficulty is that in seeking to stave off summary judgment, she does not disclose
a defence to the plaintiff’s claim for cancellation of the agreement and repos-
session of the vehicle. The plaintiff’s right to cancel the agreement accrued
once the defendant was in breach and had failed to remedy her breach after
notice thereof had been given to the defendant pursuant to the terms of the
agreement and sections 129 and 130 of the NCA. There is thus no response
by the defendant to the fact that she failed to comply with the instalment obli-
gations under the agreement nor is there one as to the plaintiff’s entitlement to
cancel the agreement and return of the vehicle. The defendant received the
cancel the agreement and return of the vehicle. The defendant received the
12 (314/2018) [2019] ZASCA 94; [2019] 3 All SA 391 (SCA); 2020 (1) SA 494 (SCA) (6 June 2019) at
paragraph 11
9
s129 and 130 notices as they were not only confirmed to have been delivered
to the post office, which delivery she received notice of; they were also at-
tached to the summons.
[21] A defendant may not refuse to plead over. He must raise all his defences at
the first opportunity to plead 13. If a defendant fails to admit, deny o r confess
and avoid all the material facts alleged, he is deemed to admit the allegations.
The defendant’s argument is that because he holds the application to be non -
compliant with the rules, he is exempt from providing a defence to the claim,
which belief is erroneous in law. The defendant progressed the litigation and
failed to raise the non -compliance; further failing to advance a defence to the
claim.
[22] I am of the view that the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for summary
judgment, and the defendant has not provided a defence to the claim . The
plaintiff was entitled to cancel the agreement, which it did. As far as the non -
compliance is concerned, the balance of prejudice favours the plaintiff.
[23] As far as costs are concerned, these are awarded on attorney and client scale
as provided for in the instalment sale agreement.
[24] Under the circumstances I make the following order:
1. The cancellation of the instalment sale agreement is confirmed;
2. The defendant is directed to restore to the plaintiff possession of the
vehicle, being a 2020 TOYOTA QUANTUM / HIACE 2.7 SESFIKILE
16S with Chassis Number: A[...] and Engine Number: 2[...];
13 Thyssen v Cape St Francis Township (Pty) Ltd 1966 (2) SA 115 (E)
10
3. The plaintiff is entitled to retain all monies paid to it by the defendant
pursuant to the instalment sale agreement;
4. The damages component of the plaintiff’s claim is postponed sine die.
5. Costs of suit on attorney and client scale.
_____________________
LUKHAIMANE AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearances
Counsel for Applicant : Adv E Mann
Instructed by : MVR Attorneys Inc
For the Respondents : T Morotolo (T Morotolo Attorneys)
Date of hearing : 22 April 2026
Date of Judgment : 25 May 2026