IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case number: 2023•048601
Date of hearing: 12 May 2026
Date delivered: 4 June 2026
DELETE WHICH EV.ER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/Ne-""
{2) OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: YESfNCJ
(3) R~
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DATE SIGNATURE
In the ex parte application of:
LEONARD FRANCOIS BEZUIDENHOUT
and
PRETORIA SOCIETY OF ADVOCATES
JUDGMENT
SWANEPOEL J (MBONGWE J CONCURRING):
Applicant
Intervening Party
1
[1] How is one to measure a man's character? How does one
determine whether a person is inherently dishonest, or whether he or she
has real remorse for prior actions? This question is at the heart of an
enquiry into the fitness of a person to be readmitted as a legal practitioner.
Good character is of immense importance, as the Court held in Legal
Practice Council v Mkhize: 1
"Advocates are required to be of complete honesty, reliability and
integrity. The need for absolute honesty and integrity applies both in
relation to the duties owed to their clients as well as to the courts. The
profession has strict ethical rules to prevent malfeasance. This is for
good reason. As officers of the court, advocates serve a necessary rote
in the proper administration of justice. Given the unique position that they
occupy, the profession has strict ethical rules."
[2] This application, for the applicant's readmission as an advocate,
was brought on an ex parte basis, after he had been struck from the roll
of advocates on 29 September 2011. The Intervening Party ("the PSA")
was the party at whose instance the applicant's name was struck from the
roll in the first place. It sought to intervene in this application, and to
oppose the relief sought by the applicant. The applicant should, in my
view, have cited the PSA as a respondent from the outset, as it must have
been obvious that it has an interest in the matter. Ultimately the applicant
did not oppose the intervention application. It is appropriate that the PSA
be heard in the matter, and that it be joined as a respondent. The
applicant conceded that as far as the intervention application is
2
concerned, he should pay the costs on an unopposed basis, and we shall
make such an order.
[3] A further preliminary issue is that a postponement application was
brought by the applicant at the hearing of the matter. On 11 May 2026 a
letter was addressed on behalf of the applicant to my brother Mbongwe
J, as the senior judge, in which an objection was noted against Reid J
sitting in the matter, on the grounds that the learned Judge had been a
member of the PSA's ethics committee when the decision was taken to
apply for the applicant's striking-off.
[4] In the letter the applicant recorded that, in his view, a
postponement was inevitable. On the same date Mbongwe J advised the
applicant that the matter would proceed, and that writer had replaced Reid
J. At the hearing of the matter the applicant appeared in person. He
placed on record that he had been unable to obtain the services of an
appropriate counsel, and for that reason he applied for a postponement.
The application was brought from the bar, without any explanation by the
applicant as to the steps that he had taken to obtain representation.
[5} It is by now trite that a postponement is an indulgence that is not
merely for the taking. The party seeking a postponement must explain
precisely what circumstances have resulted in the application for a
postponement. Save for the applicant asserting that he had been unable
to obtain representation, there is no material explanation of the
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circumstances that led to the applicant being unrepresented. The
applicant made out no case whatsoever for a postponement.
[6] Furthermore, in light of the fact that the applicant had practiced as
counsel for some 25 years before he was struck off, we took the view that
he was entirely capable of conducting the matter himself. For those
reasons the postponement was refused.
(7] The applicant's striking-off was the result of an investigation by the
PSA in 2009 relating to the practice of double charging in (mostly) Road
Accident Fund trials. A practice had emerged amongst counsel
specializing in such cases, whereby they accepted multiple instructions
in trial matters for the same date, subsequently billing for each matter as
if a trial had been conducted, whereas most were settled between the
parties. This practice continued despite a circular having been issued by
the PSA on 1 November 2006, in which members were warned that
acceptance of more than one trial matter per day amounted to double
briefing and was seen in a serious light.
[81 When investigations commenced against the applicant, and a
disciplinary enquiry was convened in which the applicant faced 819
charges of misconduct, the applicant, unlike a number of his erstwhile
colleagues, took a hardline approach. The Full Court described his
conduct as follows in its judgment in the striking-off application2:
"2. The present application was not preceded by a disciplinary
hearing in terms of the rules of the applicant. Such a hearing is, however,
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not a precondition for an application of this nature. Throughout the
proceedings Bezuidenhout was obstructive. His view is that the relevant
rules are 'antiquated', it's no longer what happens in day to day life. He
did not willingly participate in the disciplinary process. He did not produce
his books when requested to do so and ultimately together with MCC de
Klerk, T Pillay, PG Leopeng and CG Jordaan threatened the deponent
to the founding affidavit with s 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa. On 24 May 2010 he requested a postponement of the
proceedings of the Vester committee, which request was granted. When
eventually he appeared before the committee he requested the
committee to recuse itself alleging that it was biased having in the interim
found against Botha and De Klerk. The committee refused the
application for recusal and Bezuidenhout withdrew from the proceedings.
He threatened a review application. The bar council initially elected to
rather convene a third disciplinary committee to deal with the case
against him but subsequently decided to bring the present application.
During this application he twice sought a postponement on grounds
without merit. His attitude during argument was that his actions were
morally justified, as they would be permissible under the Johannesburg
Bar rules. We have shown that that is wholly incorrect. He has shown no
remorse."
[9] Significantly, the Full Court held that the applicant had not only
shown no remorse, but also that he had committed perjury in answering
to a charge brought by Adv. JT Roos. The Full Court also found that the
applicant had continued with his misconduct until at least June 2011. The
Full Court held that the applicant had received R 5 992 400 in "ill-gotten
5
gains" during the period February 2009 to November 2009. The Full Court
had some difficulty in calculating the applicant's precise earnings as he
refused to testify under oath to answer that question. There is no dispute
that the applicant in fact double charged for some time after November
2009, and it is likely that he received much more in 'ill-gotten gains'. As I
will discuss hereunder, the true extent of the applicant's scheme was
never disclosed.
[1 O] On appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeal, similar sentiments
were expressed to those of the Full Court:3
"{81} Turning to the appeal of Bezuidenhout, unlike the seven advocates
I have dealt with, he was uncooperative, even obstructive in dealing with
the allegations against him. He denied the evidence of Ellis SC that at first
he 'flatly refused' to produce his records but that denial can be summarily
dismissed. He was one of those who claimed their right to privacy when
they became aware that the Bar Council was once more in search of their
books, which is hardly consistent with an intention to disclose his books.
Moreover, the court below recorded that he failed to comply with a request
by the Bar Council to place certain of his records before the court. When
he was compelled to do so by the court they reflected that his
transgressions were continuing, obliging the court to order his suspension
until the outcome of the application."
[11] It is thus clear that in the striking out proceedings, and in the
subsequent appeal, the applicant persisted in arguing that he had done
nothing wrong. Some thirteen years have passed since the applicant's
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appeal was dismissed, and the question is now whether the applicant has
gained any insight into his conduct. The applicant states in no uncertain
terms that he is remorseful for his conduct, and he apologizes profusely
in the founding affidavit to various persons and organizations that he
admits having prejudiced . The applicant says that he is a reformed person
and that the "defect of character or attitude that led to my transgressions
no longer exist".
[12] Words are, however, just words, and a person's character can only
be measured by his or her conduct. In the founding affidavit the applicant
attempted to distinguish his conduct from other counsel who had also
been implicated in double-briefing. He says the following:
"I humbly submit that I have no alternative but to, in this application ,
make a comparison and differentiate myself and some of the other
advocates involved as respondents in the application a quo and
the subsequent appeal, in that it was never alleged nor found that
I:
23.1.1 charged fees for hours that I did not work, and/or fees for
overlapping hours."
[13] This statement is astounding in its disingenuity. Whilst it is so that
the applicant never charged for preparation for trial or for other additional
work, he charged multiple trial fees in cases that were on the roll on the
same day. In eleven instances, the applicant charged for ten or more trials
on one day. Overall, the applicant charged for trials that did not proceed
7
on 615 occasions. The applicant knew in advance that those trials would
not proceed. When he prepared his fee notes, he knew that he had not
conducted trials in those matters, notwithstanding which he charged a
trial fee. On each of those occasions the applicant was guilty of
dishonesty. The Full Court held that4:
"The [applicant} acted in an unprofessional, unworthy and dishonourable
way. By debiting and accepting more than one trial fee per day the
respondent was acting dishonestly. He is guilty of overreaching on a
consistent basis over a considerable period of time."
[14) In answer to the allegation by the PSA in these papers that he had
been guilty of dishonest conduct, instead of conceding the point, the best
answer that the applicant could muster in reply was that he understood
the "reasoning that led to a finding of dishonesty in those circumstances".
He denied, however, that he had been dishonest intentionally. He could
not bring himself to admit that he had been guilty of dishonest conduct
over an extended period of time and on multiple occasions.
[15] The applicant persisted in his heads of argument to say that his
intention was never to be dishonest, and to argue that these multiple
infringements did not lead to a conclusion that he had a propensity to
dishonesty. It was only in argument that the applicant admitted, for the
first time, that he had been dishonest. That is not the conduct of a man
who has an understanding of the egregious nature of his conduct, nor of
someone who has changed. A full admission of wrongdoing is, after all,
the first step to redemption. In my view the applicant's conduct displayed
8
a propensity to dishonesty, and nothing suggests that he has changed his
ways.
[16) A further aspect of importance is that, where an applicant applies
to be re-admitted he should disclose fully the nature and extent of his
transgressions. It is only then that a Court is able to weigh up his conduct
against the standards expected of legal practitioners. I have pointed out
above that the applicant continued to double charge after the enquiry into
his conduct had already commenced, and he did so until June 2011,
shortly before the Full Court heard the matter. The Full Court felt it
necessary to suspend the applicant pending its judgment, in order to
prevent further misconduct. If one accepts that he received some R 5.9
million in overcharges in a relatively brief period, namely from February
to November 2009, it is highly likely that he received significant amounts
in the period between November 2009 and June 2011.
[17) When I enquired from the applicant why he had not disclosed the
true extent of his ill-gotten gains, he said that it had not occurred to him
to do so. In my view, if an applicant does not fully and truthfully disclose
the full extent of his misconduct, it is an indication that he has not truly
reformed.
[18) Finally, although the applicant was not obliged by court order to
repay the monies, the Supreme Court of Appeal having held that the Full
Court was not empowered to make such an order, he at least had a moral
obligation as a legal practitioner to make restitution. The applicant wishes
9
to demonstrate his reformation, but he is satisfied to retain the ill-gotten
gains. That is, to my mind, disqualifying to a candidate who applies for re
admission on the basis that he has grasped the nature of his
transgression and has undergone a character change.
[19] Where an applicant applies for readmission after having been
previously struck off on the grounds that he was not a fit and proper
person to continue in practice:
" .. . the onus is on him to convince the court on a balance of probabilities
that there has been a genuine, complete and permanent reformation on
his part; that the defect of character or attitude which led to him being
adjudicated not fit and proper no longer exists; and that, if he is
readmitted, he will in future conduct himself as an honourable member
of the profession and will be someone who can be trusted to carry out
the duties of an attorney in a satisfactory way as far as members of the
public are concerned .... "5
[20] The Court must have regard to:
" ... the nature and degree of the conduct which occasioned applicant's
removal from the roll, to the explanation, if any, afforded by him for such
conduct which might, inter alia, mitigate or even perhaps aggravate the
heinousness of his offence, to his actions in regard to an enquiry into his
conduct and proceedings consequent thereon to secure his removal, to
the lapse of time between his removal and his application for
reinstatement, to his activities subsequent to removal, to the expression
10
of contrition by him and its genuiness, and to his efforts at repairing harm
which his conduct may have occasioned to others."6
[21] In Johannesburg Society of Advocates v Nthai (supra) the
Supreme Court of Appeal held7:
"Where, as here, an applicant for readmission has demonstrated a
propensity for inherent dishonesty, 'his prospects of being readmitted to
what after all is an honourable profession, will be very slim indeed. Only
in the most exceptional of circumstances, where he has worked to
expiate the results of his conduct and to satisfy the court that he has
changed completely, will a court consider readmission at all."
[22] The applicant has not even made the submission that there are
exceptional circumstances that justify his readmission, nor can we find
any. It gives no pleasure to come to such a finding with regard to a legal
practitioner, more especially as one is acutely aware of the impact of the
judgment on the applicant's life and livelihood. It must, however, be
emphasized that these proceedings are not aimed at punishment, but at
"maintaining the integrity, dignity and respect the public must have for
officers of court."8
[23] The application must be dismissed. In my view, the circumstances
of the matter justify a costs order on the attorney/client scale.
[24] I make the following order:
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[24.1) The Pretoria Society of Advocates ("PSAu} is granted
leave to intervene in the matter as a respondent.
[24.2] The applicant shall pay the costs of the PSA in
respect of the intervention application on an unopposed basis
on Scale C.
(24.3] The application for readmissi-on is dismissed with
costs on the attorney/client scale , including the costs of two
counse l where so employ-ed.
I agree, and it is so ordered :
SWANEPOELJ
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVJSION PRETORIA
MBONGWE J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION PRETORIA
1 Legal Practice Council v Mkhize 2024 (1) SA 189 {GP) at para {?OJ
2 Pretoria Society of Advocates and Another v Geach and Others 2011 (S) SA 441
(GNP)
3 General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Geach and Others 2013 (2) SA 52
(SCA) ,
4 At para 20
5 Law Society . Transvaal v Behrman 1981 ( 4) SA 538 tA) at 557 B--C
6 Kudu v Cape Law Socia y 1972 (4) SA 342 {C). as quoted with approval in
Johannesburg Society of Advocates and Another v Nthai and Others 2021 (2) SA 343
(SCA)
12