WIB Intellitech (Pty) Ltd v South African National Roads Agency SOC Limited and Others (2026-095093) [2026] ZAGPPHC 575 (3 June 2026)

40 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Administrative Law — Tender Review — Urgent interim interdict — Applicant seeking to interdict the implementation of a tender awarded to the second respondent pending a review — Court finding that the applicant lacked locus standi as it was part of a joint venture and did not have the authority to act alone — No prima facie right established and irreparable harm not proven — Application dismissed.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA


Case Number: 2026-095093
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
DATE 2026-06-03
SIGNATURE

In the matter between:

WIB INTELLITECH (PTY) LTD Applicant
(Registration number: 2014/101572/07)

and

THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL ROADS AGENCY
SOC LIMITED First Respondent
(Registration number: 1998/009584/30)

ZIMELE ERP IT SERVICES (PTY) LTD Second Respondent
(Registration number: 2009/015825/07)
PROCEED GROUP AFRICA (PTY) LTD Third
Respondent
(Registration number: 2019/294050/07)

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This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected
and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for handing down is deemed to be 3 June 2026.



JUDGMENT

POTTERILL J


Introduction
[1] The applicant, WIB Intellitech (Pty) Ltd [WIB] brought an urgent interim
interdict to interdict and restrain the First Respondent, The South African National
Roads Agency SOC Limited [SANRAL] and the Second Respondent, Zimele ERP IT
Services (Pty) Ltd [Zimele] from continuing to implement and render services in terms
of the contract awarded as RFP NO; NRA 2[...] [the Tender] to Zimele. This interim
interdict is to be grant ed pending WIB’s application to review the award of this
Tender.
[2] The Third Respondent, Proceed Group Africa (Pty) Ltd [Proceed] is the South
African entity of the Proceed Group with its holding company in the UK. WIB joined
Proceed as an interested party “by virtue of its role as the consortium member in
WIB’s bid for this Tender.” I find it necessary to quote what WIB stated under oath
pertaining to Proceed:
“11. The Third Respondent [Proceed] has indicated that it does not wish to
actively participate as an Applicant in these proceedings. However, as
the outcome of this application may affect the Third Respondent’s direct
and substantial interest, and therefore, that it has a direct and
substantial interest in these proceedings, it is joined as a Respondent to
ensure that it is afforded the opportunity to be heard, should it so wish.”

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[3] Both SANRAL and Zimel e oppose the application. Counsel for Proceed
attended to Court on a watching brief, pursuant to placing on record that it
abandoned any participation in the hearing. It thus also abandoned its mis -joinder
application.
[4] I found the matter to be urgent.
Point in limine – WIB has no locus standi
[5] On behalf of Zimele the point was raised that WIB did not have locus standi.
SANRAL raised that WIB is non -suited because the bid was that of a joint venture
and the joint venture is not before Court.
[6] It was argued that it is common cause that WIB’s bid was with Proceed as a
consortium with the vehicle used that of a joint venture . Proceed, with its rights to
challenge the award of the Tender , had not elected to afford WIB its right to
challenge the award. In fact, Proceed had abandoned its right.
[7] It was further submitted that this abandonment constituted a clear waiver by
means of conduct. WIB did not aver in the founding papers that it was authorised to
represent Proceed Africa.
[8] As the bid by WIB was a joint venture , WIB on its own is non -suited. A joint
venture is to be treated as a partnership.1 This is so because WIB and Proceed both
bring something to the partnership whether it be money, skill or labour. The
consortium tendered for the joint benefit of the partners with the object to make a
profit.
[9] Accordingly, Proceed declared that it did not wish to actively participate in the
litigation and wanted its name removed from the court records. Proceed could not
assign its right to the tender bid without the consent of SANRAL. It was not averred
that SANRAL had consented.
[10] In WIB’s replying affidavit it addresse d the point in limine by attaching the
Consortium Agreement referring to Clause 12.6 of this agreement that provides for
the Assignment of Rights.

1 Bester v Van Niekerk 1960 (2) SA 779 (AD) at 784

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[11] Furthermore, on 13 May 2026, after the issuing of the application and the
answering affidavits were filed, Proceed and WIB executed a resolution. This
resolution provided that Proceed had assigned, transferred and made over to WIB all
rights on title to litigate on any causes of action arising from the Tender. It
authorised WIB to litigate as sole applicant in its own name in respect of the
consortium. It expressly ratified and confirmed all legal actions already taken by WIB
pertaining to this matter.
Finding on locus standi
[12] WIB does not distinguish between locus standi and the requirement for an
interim interdict; locus standi is not a prima facie right though open to some doubt.
Locus standi is the standing to institute proceedings.
[13] It is common cause that the consortium flows from a joint venture. It was not
denied that a joint venture equates to a partnership. Both partners are not before the
Court as applicants; as a respondent the one partner is not instituting proceedings.
In fact , Proceed had abandoned its right to institute proceedings and wanted its
name removed from the papers.
[14] In Sandton Civic Precinct (Pty) Ltd v City of Johannesburg and Another
(458/2007) [2008] ZASCA 104 (22 September 2008) the Supreme Court of Appeal
found as follows:
“While the question of legal standing is in a sense procedural, it also bears on
substance. It concerns the sufficiency and directness of a litigant’s interest in
proceedings which warrants his or her title to prosecute the claim asserted.
This case illustrates the point. The applicant must establish the legal lineage
between itself and the rights -acquiring entity the resolution mentions. That it
has not done. While in a sense this is technical, and procedural, it also goes
to the substance of the applicant’s entitlement to come to court.”2
And

2 Par [19]

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“WIB must thus show that it is the rights -bearing entity, or is acting on the
authority of the entity, or has acquired its right.”3
[15] The question is what rights, if any arose from the resolution. The resolution, to
facilitate the effective prosecution of the litigation “assigned all of its rights and title in
respect of the ability to litigate on any causes of action or claims whatsoever arising
from the Bid to its consortium partner, WIB Intellitech (Pty) Ltd in the interests of the
consortium.” Moreover, the resolution authorised WIB to litigate in its own name; as
the sole Applicant, for the purposes of challenging and setting aside the award made
by SANRAL …”
[16] The resolution also ratified and confirmed all actions already taken by WIB in
relation to this litigation relating to the Consortium’s interests in the bid.
[17] This resolution did authorise WIB to institute these proceedings and does give
it legal standing. It also ratified the proceedings. I am satisfied that WIB has locus
standi.
WIB’s contentions on the interim interdict
The prima facie right
[18] In the founding affidavit WIB set out that it has a “prima facie right case” in
terms of bringing a review. It then relie d on the fact that the decisions of SANRAL
amounted to administrative action and that its action adversely affected the rights of
WIB, because the decisions were procedurally unfair, unreasonable,
unconstitutional, unlawful and/or irrational.
The irreparable harm
[19] The irreparable harm raised by WIB is that SANRAL has allowed Zimele to
commence work in terms of the contract despite the award not having been made
viewable on the website of SANRAL.

3 Par [19]

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[20] Zimele is on site and whittling away the budget of the Tender. Should the
review ultimately succeed, WIB will have a “hollow victory” because it would have
exhausted the project’s financial allocation.
[21] The implementation of the contract was awarded contrary to cost
effectiveness requirements with SANRAL to pay a premium of over R337 million
above WIB’s price while a review is pending; a waste of public resources that could
not be recovered.
[22] In the founding affidavit the main ground for review was that awarding a
contract for R438,264,2 36.11. “When a proven service provider with institutional
knowledge tendered R101,233,535.62 for the same scope is a prima facie violation
of the cost-effective requirement.” This likely constituted wasteful expenditure.
SANRAL’S submissions
[23] SANRAL in answer set out that the publication of the award was on
SANRAL’s website and attached a copy of the publication.
[24] It set out that WIB did not submit a transition plan, a mandatory document,
before a bidder can execute its contractual obligations in terms of the award letter.
In reply, WIB denied that it did not submit a transition plan.
[25] SANRAL acknowledged that WIB’s price was the lowest, but that clause 1.7
(section 2) informed the bidder that SANRAL reserved the right not to award to the
lowest bidder. But, in any event, WIB was disqualified before price came into
question.
Zimele’s argument
[26] On behalf of Zimele it was submitted that f rom WIB’s own affidavit it was
relying on incorrect bid specifications when submitting its bid or had made vast
errors in calculating the costs. It set out that WIB did not attach Addendum No 1
which altered the scope and affected the price upwards.
[27] Zimele has been performing the work required under the tender since 17
November 2025 successfully. This is a period of 6 months.

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Balance of convenience
[28] It was argued by WIB that the balance of convenience favoured it because
WIB will suffer damages which will be unquantifiable or difficult to quantify.
Conversely allowing Zimele to continue at an exorbitant cost to the public fiscus far
outweighs any temporary inconvenience caused by a pause in operations.
[29] The unanswered request for internal remedies tilted the balance of
convenience due to SANRAL’s deliberate lack of transparency.
[30] There will be no disruption of services because WIB was already familiar with
the environment and was performing the service as a sub -contractor to Tech
Mahindra. In reply it admitted that Afrocentric IP was on sit e before Zimele was
awarded the tender.
[31] Both SANRAL and Zimele argued that the balance of convenience did not
favour WIB because Zimele was on site and has rendered services for 6 months.
No other satisfactory remedy
[32] WIB argued it had not other satisfactory remedy whereas SANRAL and
Zimele both agreed WIB could still proceed with a review without the interdict being
granted.
Reasons for decision
Does WIB have a prima facie right
[33] It is trite that WIB has to establish it has a prima facie right warranting interim
relief pending the review of the tender award. Furthermore, a well -grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not granted, where the
balance of convenience lies, the absence of any other satisfactory remedy and the
separation of powers harm.
[34] Everybody’s right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative
action is entrenched in our Constitution. 4 But, to invoke this right by means of an
interim interdict, something more is required, this right can only be prima facie if

4 Section 33

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irreparable harm would follow if this right is not pro tected.5 WIB has no prima facie
right because it has a “prima facie case” as a bidder to review. Its two submissions
that because of a right in terms of PAJA and its prima facie right as a bidder is
sustaining a prima facie right is simply bad in law.
[35] WIB has not shown that it will suffer irreparable harm if the interdict is not
granted. It was a sub-contractor, not on site, supported by the fact that from another
source it ascertained that Zimele was on site . It is in any event common cause that
Afrocentric IP was on site , prior to Zimele being on sit e, pursuant to being awarded
the Tender. Zimele has been on site for 6 months and it is not denied that
Afrocentric IP was absorbed by Zimele. It is also common cause that SANRAL and
Zimele had signed the service level agreement [SLA] and Zimele commenced with
its contractual obligations on 7 November 2025.
[36] WIB set out its irreparable harm as that the tender was not published on the
website. This is not irreparable harm flowing from the interdict not being granted and
to say the least, is non -sensical. It relates to procedure; when it could have and
should have known of the award of the tender and time-frames relevant thereto.
[37] Furthermore it raised that Zimele would whittle away the budget and should
the review succeed WIB would have a hollow victory. WIB has no right to any
monies until it is declared to be the successful bidder, alternatively it could claim loss
of profit if it should be the successful bidder. The monies now paid to Zimele is in
terms of the Tender award, it is not whittled away under a different procedure. But,
in any event, it is a 5 year contract and a review will most certainly be heard within a
year, there is no irreparable harm to WIB if the interdict is not granted. WIB has not
proven a prima facie right, even open to some doubt.
[38] The court can take note of the prospects of success on review without

[38] The court can take note of the prospects of success on review without
deciding the merits thereof. In applying Plascon-Evans6 the Court would have to
accept that there was publication of the Tender and that Addendum A did affect the
costs of the project.

5 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA
223 (CC) par [50]
6 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A); National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA)

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[39] This urgent application was brought on mere speculation pertaining to the
reviewability of the award. WIB blamed SANRAL for not answering their letters for
this, yet it had a remedy provided for in the Tender, to ask for reasons why it was not
a successful bidder. It did not utilise this. In reply it state d that it did provide a
transition plan, although called by another name. This prejudiced the respondents
because at urgent court further affidavits from the respondents to react thereto
cannot be deli vered, except by leave of the Court. This is not the function of an
urgent court; to initiate proceedings on “should the reasons evidence, when
received, that the award of the contract to ZIMELE is challengeable, then the
Applicant shall launch an application to review and set aside the decision of
SANRAL” and then proceed to litigate by means of instalment.
[40] Even if this Court should find that there are prospects of success, which it
prima facie does not, the lack of a prima facie right has only one outcome; the
dismissal of the interim interdict.
[41] The balance of convenience does not favour WIB. It has no right to review; it
was not on site prior to the award, while Zimele has been doing the work for six
months. Granting the interdict will prevent Zimele from continuing and leaving the
project unattended to. No Court will appoint WIB to take over pending the review, as
it avers, it has no vested right. The Court will have to resort to the remedy of
appointing a service provider pending review. This could only be Zimele leaving the
status quo as it is. The difficulty of quantifying the damages does not outweigh the
prejudice SANRAL and Zimele will suffer.
[42] WIB has the alternative remedy to pursue a review, if it so wishes.
Costs
[43] I can see no reason why the costs should not follow the result.
[44] The following order is made:
The application is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the first and second respondents’ costs , including

The applicant is to pay the first and second respondents’ costs , including
costs of two counsel each on Scale C.

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___________________________
S. POTTERILL
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

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CASE NO: 2026-095093

HEARD ON: 21 May 2026

FOR THE APPLICANT: ADV. B.D. STEVENS
INSTRUCTED BY: Morgan Law

FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: ADV. E. MOKUTU SC
ADV. L. MNQANDI
INSTRUCTED BY: Gildenhuys Malatji Inc.

FOR THE 2nd RESPONDENT: ADV. N.A. CASSIM SC
ADV. S. FREESE
INSTRUCTED BY: LM Attorneys

FOR THE THIRD RESPONDENT (WATCHING BRIEF): ADV. P. LEBEA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 3 June 2026