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[2002] ZASCA 148
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Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund (391/01) [2002] ZASCA 148; [2003] 1 All SA 40 (SCA); 2003 (2) SA 715 (SCA); (2003) 24 ILJ 338 (SCA); [2003] 5 BLLR 439 (SCA) (28 November 2002)
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF
SOUTH AFRICA
REPORTABLE
Case number : 391/2001
In
the matter between :
CEDRIC MEYER APPELLANT
and
ISCOR PENSION FUND
RESPONDENT
CORAM
: HARMS,
CAMERON, NAVSA, BRAND JJA and JONES AJA
HEARD :
7
NOVEMBER 2001
DELIVERED
: 28
NOVEMBER 2002
Chapter
V A of Pension Fund Act 24 of 1956 - complaint to Adjudicator -
amendment to Pension Fund Rules - conferring additional benefits
on
existing members - whether unfair discrimination against former
members - legitimate expectation of substantive results as opposed
to
fair procedure - whether enforceable.
JUDGMENT
BRAND JA
/
BRAND JA
:
[1] This appeal arises
from a successful application to set aside a determination by the
Adjudicator appointed under s 30C of the
Pension Fund Act 24 of 1956
(âthe Actâ). The underlying dispute to the appeal has already
wound its costly way through four
tribunals over a period of nearly
a decade. The respondent (âthe Fundâ) is a Pension Fund
registered under the provisions
of the Act. It is a company fund in
the sense that all its members are employed by companies in the
Iscor group, consisting of
a large (former parastatal) company,
Iscor Limited, its subsidiaries and affiliates (âIscorâ). The
appellant (âMeyerâ)
was employed by Iscor for over 33 years
until he took early retirement at the end of July 1993. He did so
because he was informed
that he was about to be retrenched.
Throughout his employment with Iscor, Meyer was a member of the
Fund. Upon retirement his
pension benefits were calculated in
accordance with the then applicable rules of the Fund. More
particularly, rule 6.2 was applied.
This rule provided that if a
member took retirement before reaching the normal retirement age of
63,
âthe pension that is payable on such
retirement shall be ⦠reduced by 0,4% in respect of each month by
which his retirement
precedes his normal retirement age [of 63]
â.
Since Meyer was only 51 when he took retirement, his pension
benefits were substantially reduced by the application of rule
6.2.
[2] On 20 September
1993, less than two months after Meyerâs retirement, the trustees
of the Fund resolved to amend rule 6.2.
The amendment was expressly
formulated as a temporary measure and was clearly calculated to
advance the personnel reduction programme
embarked upon by Iscor at
the time, by encouraging employees of Iscor (and members of the
Fund) who have reached the age of 50
to take early retirement. To
this end the amended rule 6.2 stipulated that the pension of
employees who (a) attained the age of
50 prior to 31 December 1993
and (b) elected between 1 October and 31 December 1993 (c) to retire
during the first quarter of 1994,
would not be subject to the 0,4%
per month reduction. The amended rule also provided that in
calculating the pensionable service
of these qualifying members
would be extended by one month for each year of actual service.
[3] Calculated
on the basis of rule 6.2 in its original form, Meyerâs pension
benefits amounted to a lump sum award of R152 019,61
and a
monthly pension of R1 669,94. By contrast, if Meyer had been
allowed to take earlier retirement under the amended rule
6.2, he
would have received a lump sum payment of R342 612,90 and a
monthly pension of R3 939,11. Quite understandably
Meyer felt
aggrieved by his exclusion from the enhanced benefits of the amended
rule 6.2.
[4] He
first sought relief against his erstwhile employer, Iscor, in the
Industrial Court, pursuant to s 46(9) of the Industrial
Relations
Act 28 of 1956. The Industrial Court held in his favour, finding,
in essence, that the amendment discriminated against
him; that
Iscor was partly responsible for the amendment; and that it could
therefore be held answerable to Meyer for the loss
that he suffered
because of the discrimination. In determining the amount of
Meyerâs resulting loss, the Industrial Court relied
on an
actuarial calculation of the difference between the pension benefits
Meyer actually received and those that he would have
received under
the amended rule 6.2. Based on these calculations the Court gave
judgment for Meyer against Iscor in the sum of
R450 000. On
appeal by Iscor to the Labour Appeal Court the Industrial Courtâs
judgment was, however, set aside, substantially
on the basis that
the Fund was an entity separate from Iscor and that Iscor could not
be held responsible for a loss occasioned
by an amendment to its
rules by this separate entity. The judgment of the Labour Appeal
Court has subsequently been reported
sub nom
Yskor v Meyer
[1995] 7 BLLR 28
(LAC).
[5] Meyer thereupon
redirected his pursuit for compensation. This time, he availed
himself of the statutory complaints procedure
created by Chapter V A
(ss 30A-30X) of the Act by lodging a complaint against the Fund in
terms of s 30A. On a basis to which
I shall presently return, the
Adjudicator determined the dispute between the parties in favour of
Meyer. He thereupon made an
order which
inter alia
provided
that:
â
(a) The decision of
the [Fund] not to grant enhanced early retirement benefits to
[Meyer] similar to those granted to other former
members of [the
Fund], in terms of the amendment to rule 6.2 on 20 September 1993,
is declared to be unfair discrimination and
thus maladministration
of the fund by the fund as contemplated in paragraph (b) of the
definition of a complaint in section 1 of
the Pension Funds Act of
1956.
(b) The [Fund] is
ordered to remove the effects of such discrimination by placing
[Meyer] in the position in which he would have
been had he not been
the victim of the discrimination.â
The rest of the order
was aimed at facilitating an agreement between the parties on the
amount of Meyerâs compensation and, failing
such agreement, at
providing a mechanism for the determination of this amount by the
Adjudicator. However, instead of implementing
the latter part of
the order, the Fund brought an application in the Transvaal
Provincial Division in terms of s 30P of the Act
for the setting
aside of paras (a) and (b) of the order. The Court
a quo
granted the application and set the Adjudicatorâs order aside, but
afforded Meyer leave to appeal to this Court.
THE STATUTORY SETTING
[6] The Adjudicatorâs
powers to interfere with the Fundâs management of its own affairs
as well as the jurisdiction of the High
Court to confirm the
Adjudicatorâs determination or to set it aside are governed by the
provisions of Chapter V A of the Act.
This Chapter was introduced
by the Pension Fund Amendment Act 22 of 1996. Although the latter
Act only came into operation on
19 April 1996, that is, as far as
this matter is concerned, long after the event, Chapter V A was
expressly given retrospective
effect by s 30H.
[7] At the risk of
stating the obvious, it must be borne in mind that, since the office
of the Adjudicator is a creature of statute,
the Adjudicator has no
inherent jurisdiction. His powers and functions are confined to
those conferred upon him by the provisions
of Chapter V A. For
present purposes, he is enjoined by these provisions to determine
âcomplaintsâ as defined in s 1 of
the Act. The relevant part of
the definition reads:
ââ
complaintâ means
a complaint of a complainant [which includes a member or former
member of a fund] to the administration of a
fund, the investment of
its funds or the interpretation and application of its rules, and
alleging -
(a) that a decision of
the fund ⦠purportedly taken in terms of the rules [of the fund]
was in excess of the powers of that fund
⦠or an improper exercise
of its powers;
(b) that the complainant
has sustained or may sustain prejudice in consequence of the
maladministration of the fund â¦, whether
by act or omission; â¦â
[8] The
High Courtâs jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against a
determination by the Adjudicator is governed by the provisions
of s
30P. The relevant part of this section provides:
â
Access
to court
- (1) Any party who feels aggrieved by a determination
of the Adjudicator may ⦠apply to the division of the [High] Court
which
has jurisdiction, for relief, â¦
(2) The
division of the [High] Court contemplated in subsection (1) shall
have the power to consider the merits of the complaint
in question,
to take evidence and to make any order it deems fit.â
As was
explained by Trollip J in
Tikly & Others v Johannes NO and
Others
1963 (2) SA 588
(T) 590F-591A, an appeal usually falls
into one of the following three categories:
â
(i) an appeal in the
wide sense, that is, a complete re-hearing of, and fresh
determination on the merits of the matter with or
without additional
evidence or information â¦;
(ii) an appeal in the
ordinary strict sense, that is, a re-hearing on the merits but
limited to the evidence or information on which
the decision under
appeal was given, and in which the only determination is whether
that decision was right or wrong â¦;
(iii) a review, that is,
a limited re-hearing with or without additional evidence or
information to determine, not whether the decision
under appeal was
correct or not, but whether the arbiters had exercised their powers
and discretion honestly and properly â¦â
From
the wording of s 30P(2) it is clear that the appeal to the High
Court contemplated is an appeal in the wide sense. The High
Court
is therefore not limited to a decision whether the Adjudicatorâs
determination was right or wrong. Neither is it confined
to the
evidence or the grounds upon which the Adjudicatorâs determination
was based. The Court can consider the matter afresh
and make any
order it deems fit. At the same time, however, the High Courtâs
jurisdiction is limited by s 30P(2) to a consideration
of â
the
merits of the complaint in questionâ
. The dispute
submitted to the High Court for adjudication must therefore still be
a âcomplaintâ as defined. Moreover, it
must be substantially
the same âcomplaintâ as the one determined by the Adjudicator.
Since it is an appeal, it follows that
where, for example, a dispute
of fact on the papers is approached in accordance with the
guidelines formulated by Corbett JA in
Plascon Evans Paints Ltd v
Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) 634E-635D, the
complainant should be regarded as the âapplicantâ throughout,
despite the fact that it is the other side
who is formally the
applicant to set the Adjudicatorâs determination aside. In case
of a âgenuine dispute of factâ on the
papers as contemplated in
Plascon Evans,
the matter must therefore, in essence, be
decided on the version presented by the other side unless that
version can, in the words
of Corbett JA, be described as â
so
far-fetched and clearly untenable that the court is justified in
rejecting [it] merely on the papers
â.
THE
ADJUDICATORâS DETERMINATION
[9] What
runs through the Adjudicatorâs reasons for his determination like
a golden thread, is his finding that, since the pension
benefits
received by Meyer were substantially less than those afforded to
other members of the Fund who retired under the amended
rule, he was
unfairly discriminated against. This unfair discrimination, the
Adjudicator found, amounted to âmaladministrationâ
of the Fund
as contemplated in para (b) of the definition of a âcomplaintâ.
A proper evaluation of the Adjudicatorâs reasons
for his finding
that Meyer was unfairly discriminated against calls for a somewhat
more detailed exposition of the background facts.
During about 1983
Iscor started an extensive rationalisation programme which resulted
in its workforce being reduced from 58 000
to about 38 000
over the next ten years. As part of this greater rationalisation
scheme Iscor decided, in April 1993, to
embark on a new round of
retrenchments which was to commence on 1 May 1993 and, it was
envisaged, to terminate at the end of December
that year. By
agreement with the trade unions concerned, the 1993 rationalisation
programme started with a voluntary phase and
then became a
compulsory one. During the voluntary phase employees were invited
to accept ârationalisationâ or âterminationâ
packages. Then
followed the compulsory phase during which retrenchment notices were
served on those employees who were regarded
as supernumerary. An
employee who received such notice and who was over the age of 50
years was again afforded an option. This
time his choice was
between taking early retirement or being retrenched.
[10] From
the minutes of the meetings between Iscor and the trade unions it
appears that at an early stage during the negotiations
between them
there was some concern on the part of the unions that employees who
volunteered to accept termination packages during
the initial phases
of the programme would be prejudiced if, through later negotiations,
there was an improvement in these packages.
Iscor responded to
these concerns by giving an express undertaking that any improvement
of rationalisation or retrenchment benefits
negotiated with the
unions at a later stage would be implemented retrospectively and
would therefore apply to everyone whose employment
was terminated
during the course of the 1993 rationalisation programme. This
promise by Iscor was repeated, not only at its subsequent
meetings
with the unions, but also in circulars distributed to its employees.
[11] During
the first half of 1993 Meyer occupied a senior position in the
electrical section of Iscorâs drawing office at Pretoria.
He
opted not to accept early retirement during the voluntary phase.
During the compulsory phase, however, he and six of his erstwhile
colleagues were informed that since their office was being closed
down, they had become supernumerary and their retrenchment
inevitable.
Even though Meyer was disappointed by the imminent
termination of his employment, staying was not an option. He
therefore took
early retirement on 31 July 1993, being the date upon
which he would in any event have been retrenched. As appears from
what
I have said before, Meyerâs pension benefits were then
calculated on the basis of rule 6.2 as it stood on the date of his
retirement,
that is prior to its amendment on 20 September 1993.
[12] Probably
as a result of the reduction formula of rule 6.2 in its unamended
form, Iscorâs employees clearly did not find early
retirement an
attractive option. Between 1 January 1993 and 30 September 1993
only 839 members of the Fund took early retirement.
They were in
the same position as Meyer in that their pension benefits were
calculated on the basis of the unamended rule 6.2.
Early in 1993
the trustees of the Fund informed Iscor that the Fund enjoyed a
considerable surplus. At the beginning of September
1993 Iscor
suggested to the trustees that this surplus might be utilised to
promote the rationalisation scheme in progress by creating
a window
of opportunity during which employees who were prepared to take
early retirement would receive additional pension benefits.
The
suggestion met with the approval of the trustees with the result
that the amendment to rule 6.2 was effected. The amendment
plainly
achieved its goal in that 2 843 Iscor employees were persuaded
to take early retirement during the first quarter
of 1994. Since
the amendment was aimed at this group they obviously received the
benefits for which it provided.
[13] For
reasons that are less obvious the benefits of the rule were also
afforded to 173 Iscor employees who retired during the
last quarter
of 1993, despite the fact that the terms of the amended rule
expressly limited its range of application to those who
retired
during the first quarter of 1994. It appears that the trustees of
the Fund simply acted beyond the scope of their powers
by extending
the ambit of the amended rule to this group. Included in the latter
group were three of Meyerâs erstwhile colleagues
who were employed
in the mechanical section of the Pretoria drawing office. Like
Meyer they were also notified during the compulsory
phase of the
1993 rationalisation programme that they were about to be retrenched
and like Meyer they also applied to take early
retirement.
However, because they were required to wind down their section of
the office which took longer than the winding down
of Meyerâs
electrical section, they only left Iscor during October 1993 as
opposed to Meyer who left at the end of July 1993.
The fact that
they were still employed by Iscor during October 1993 while Meyer
was not, was therefore purely fortuitous.
[14] What
seems to have grieved Meyer the most was the favourable treatment
afforded by the Fund to the employees of one of Iscorâs
subsidiaries, referred to in the papers as âUskoâ. It appears
that the Usko employees formerly belonged to their own separate
pension fund which was taken over by the Fund during January 1993 at
a cost of over R40 million. In the result, Meyer stated,
these new
members made no contribution to the surplus in the Fund. In fact,
their membership caused the surplus to be reduced.
Despite all
this, Meyer complained, some of these Usko members received the
increased benefits of the amended rule whereas he,
who contributed
to the surplus in the Fund for more than thirty years, was excluded
from them.
[15] The
Adjudicatorâs conclusion that Meyer was the victim of unfair
discrimination by the Fund was based on a comparison of
his position
with that of other former members in three different categories.
First, the group of 173, including Meyerâs three
erstwhile
colleagues, who left Iscor prior to the end of 1993; secondly, the
members of the Usko Pension Fund and lastly, the
approximately 2 800
employees who retired from Iscorâs service during the first
quarter of 1994.
[16] With
regard to the group of 173 it appears that the Adjudicator had
failed to appreciate the significance of the consideration
that this
group did in fact not qualify for the benefits of the amended rule.
Insofar as the Fund conferred benefits upon them
for which they did
not qualify, the Fund acted in breach of its own rules. This
probably amounted to âmaladministrationâ of
the Fund as
contemplated by the definition of a âcomplaintâ in para (b) of s
1 of the Act. However, Meyerâs case is not
that he suffered any
loss as a result of payments to this group. His allegations
therefore fall short of the second requirement
of para (b), namely
that the complainant must have â
sustained prejudice
in consequence of such maladministration
â. Furthermore,
what Meyerâs objection amounted to is that, although he did not
qualify for the benefits of the amended rule,
he should still have
received these benefits because they were afforded to others who
equally did not qualify. Unlike the Adjudicator,
I find this
argument untenable. In terms of s 13 of the Act â
the
rules of a registered fund shall be binding on the fund and the
members ⦠thereof, and on any person who claims under the
rules
â¦
â. Consequently, Meyer could not claim benefits for
which he admittedly did not qualify in terms of the amended rule
6.2. Moreover,
because the trustees were also bound to apply the
amended rule 6.2 in accordance with its terms, they acted
ultra
vires
their powers when they bestowed the benefits of the
amended rule on the group of 173. The fact that the Fund had acted
in breach
of its rule in respect of some of its members does not
mean that it can be compelled to do so again.
[17] Insofar
as the Adjudicatorâs finding of discrimination against Meyer is
based on the benefits received by the members of
the Usko Pension
Fund, the answer is in my view simple. Whether or not the Usko
employees should have been allowed as members
of the Fund with or
without making an additional contribution is not an issue in this
case. After they became members, they were
entitled to all the
benefits provided for by the Fundâs rules, including those
conferred by the amended rule 6.2. As far as
payment of the
increased benefits to this group is concerned, Meyerâs objection
is not that he was prejudiced by such payment.
His objection is
that he was discriminated against because he did not receive the
same payment. However, the preferential treatment
received by these
members resulted from the fact that, in terms of the amended rule,
they qualified for its benefits whereas Meyer
did not. Since the
trustees of the Fund were bound to apply the amended rule strictly
in accordance with its terms, differentiation
which resulted from
the application of the rule cannot be described as unfair
discrimination.
[18] This
leaves only the group of some 2 800 employees who retired
during the first quarter of 1994. Inasmuch as the Adjudicatorâs
finding of discrimination is based on the fact that this group was
preferred by the Fund through the application of the amended
rule,
the answer, again, seems to be that the Fund had no choice. These
employees qualified for the benefits provided for by the
amendment
whereas Meyer did not. Consequently, the Fund was neither entitled
nor obliged to offer Meyer the same benefits. In
short, to the
extent that the Adjudicatorâs finding of discrimination against
Meyer is founded on the
application
of the amended rule, it
cannot be justified.
MEYERâS
ARGUMENT IN THIS COURT
[19] In
this Court Meyerâs objection based on discrimination took a
somewhat different course. In essence the focus of his objection
shifted from the way in which the amended rule was
applied
t
o
the way in which the amended rule was
formulated
. More
specifically, Meyerâs contention in this Court was that the
amendment to rule 6.2 should have been formulated so as to
include
him and other former employees in his position. In its failure to
adopt a rule broad enough to cover these former employees,
Meyer
argued, the Fund committed a breach of its duty towards them (a) by
discriminating against them unfairly and (b) by frustrating
their
legitimate expectations that were engendered by Iscorâs promises
to the effect that improved retrenchment benefits would
be
implemented with retrospective effect.
[20] In
developing these arguments Meyer conceded that the trustees of the
Fund enjoyed a wide discretion in matters of rule amendment
which
entitled them to decide whether an amendment should be made and to
determine its content. In view of the provisions of rule
12.8 of
the Fundâs rules this concession was rightly made. Rule 12.8
states:
â
The
Board of Trustees may, with the consent of Iscor Ltd, amend these
rules at any time provided that such amendments are not inconsistent
with the provisions of the Income Tax Act and the [Pension Fund] Act
and are approved by the Registrar and the Commissioner for
Inland
Revenue.
â
[21] Meyerâs
contention was, however, that this wide discretion afforded by rule
12.8 was bounded by the rights vested in members,
including their
right to be treated with impartiality, as well as by the membersâ
legitimate expectations engendered during the
currency of their
membership. As to the origin of these duties towards members on the
part of the Fund, Meyerâs proposition
was twofold. First, that
these duties arose from the fiduciary relationship between the
members and the Fund and, secondly, from
the fact that the grounds
for administrative review had been impliedly incorporated into the
contractual relationship between the
Fund and its members.
[22] The
general proposition that the trustees of the Fund are under a
fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the members,
appears
to be supported by authority (see eg
Tek Corporation Provident
Fund and Others v Lorentz
1999 (4) SA 884
(SCA) 898H-I). I
accept that the trusteesâ fiduciary duty towards its members
includes a duty of impartiality, that is, an obligation
not to
discriminate between members unfairly. It seems to me to be
inherent in the proper exercise of any discretion, that it
should be
done with impartiality. The fact that the decision under
consideration was taken before the introduction of the new
constitutional dispensation is therefore of no consequence. On the
view that I hold on the ultimate validity of Meyerâs contentions
in this regard, I am prepared to assume, without deciding, that as a
matter of principle, a court is entitled to scrutinise the
decisions
taken by the trustees in the exercise of their discretion under rule
12.8 on a basis analogous to the review of administrative
decisions,
that is, in accordance with the principles of natural justice (cf
Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa
1974 (3) SA 633
(A)
645H-646B;
Lunt v University of Cape Town and Another
1989
(2) SA 438
(C) and
Edge and Others v Pension Ombudsman and
Another
1999 (4) All ER 546
(CA) 567d-569g).
[23] The
Fundâs first answer to Meyerâs case based on the manner in which
the amendment to rule 6.2 was formulated, is that
this objection
does not constitute a âcomplaintâ as contemplated by the
definition of that term in s 1 of the Act in that,
even if the
objection were valid, it could not relate to âmaladministration of
the fundâ in terms of para (b) of the definition.
Consequently,
the objection cannot be entertained under the provisions of the Act.
In support of this contention the Fund argued
that
âmaladministration of the fundâ must be confined to the
administration of the Fund contrary to the provision of its rules
and that it does not extend to the sphere of rule amendments.
Though I am inclined to agree with the meaning of the term
âmaladministrationâ
contended for by the Fund, I find it
unnecessary to come to any final conclusion on this issue since
Meyerâs objection falls
within the ambit of para (a) of the
definition of a âcomplaintâ. Paragraph (a) of the definition
contemplates an objection
â
that a decision of the
fund ⦠purportedly taken in terms of the rules [of the Fund] â¦
was an improper exercise of [the Fundâs]
powersâ
. That
would, in my view, include Meyerâs objection that the way in which
rule 6.2 was amended amounted to an improper exercise
of the Fundâs
powers under rule 12.8.
[24] I
now turn to consider the merits of Meyerâs objection that the
trustees exercised their discretion in formulating the rule
unlawfully in that it resulted in unfair discrimination against him
and other former members of the Fund. In considering this
objection
it must be borne in mind that when the decision to amend rule 6.2
was taken on 20 September 1993 Meyer had already retired
and was no
longer a member of the Fund. At the time he no longer had any claim
against the membersâ portion of the Fund or an
interest in the
membersâ portion of the surplus. An amendment to the rules of a
pension fund quite frequently brings about an
improvement in the
position of existing members. Normally such improvement cannot be
regarded as discrimination against those
members who have ceased to
be members prior to the amendment. The question that therefore
arises is why the amendment to rule
6.2 should be regarded as being
different from the norm. Meyerâs first answer to this question
was that the circumstances surrounding
the amendment to rule 6.2
were peculiar in that retirements which occurred both prior and
subsequent to the amendment were all
part of a single
rationalisation scheme. In determining the validity of this answer,
it must be accepted that the idea to utilise
the surplus in the Fund
as an incentive for Iscorâs employees to accept early retirement,
was raised with the trustees of the
Fund for the first time at the
beginning of September 1993. It follows that when the amendment was
considered by the trustees
for the first time Meyer had already
ceased to be a member. In these circumstances I do not believe that
the trustees can be criticised
for taking the view that, like most
other rule amendments bestowing benefits on members, the amendment
under consideration need
not be retrospective in its effect. The
fact that in this case the former members ceased to be members as a
result of the same
rationalisation scheme does not, in my view,
detract from the validity of the consideration that there are
distinct differences
between members and former members and that
differentiation between these two groups does not in itself amount
to unfair discrimination.
[25] The
second reason advanced by Meyer for his contention that the
amendment to rule 6.2 should, unlike other rule amendments
with
prospective effect, be regarded as discriminating against former
members, rested on the promise made by Iscor during the early
stages
of the 1993 retrenchment programme, namely that improved
retrenchment benefits would be implemented with retrospective
effect. As appears from what I have said earlier, Meyerâs
contention in this regard was not that the Fund was contractually
bound to fulfil Iscorâs promise, but that he was entitled to rely
on the doctrine of legitimate expectation recognised in
administrative
law. At the end of his argument in this Court, Meyer
relied on the doctrine of legitimate expectation not only to
reinforce his
objection based on unfair discrimination, but as the
mainstay of his whole case. He was, however, immediately
confronted with
the fundamental difficulty that, in administrative
law, the doctrine of legitimate expectation has traditionally been
utilised
as a vehicle to introduce the requirements of
procedural
fairness and not as a basis to compel a substantive result.
According to the traditional approach, it matters not whether the
expectation of a procedural benefit is induced by a promise of the
procedural benefit itself or by a promise that some substantive
benefit will be acquired or retained. The expectation remains a
procedural one. This appears clearly from the following statements
by Hoexter JA in
Administrator, Transvaal, and Others v Zenzile
and Others
1991 (1) SA 21
(A) 39E-I:
â
The
nature, scope and limits of the doctrine of legitimate expectation
are explored in the judgment of this Court in
Administrator,
Transvaal, and Others v Traub and Others
[1989] ZASCA 90
;
[1989 (4) SA 731
(A)].
In
Traubâs
case this Court accepted that, in certain
circumstances, the dictates of fairness require that a public body
or a public official
should afford a person a hearing before taking
a decision concerning him although the decision has no effect on
such personâs
existing rights.
â¦
In
regard to the doctrine of legitimate expectation Goldstone J in
Mokoenaâs
case [ie
Mokoena and Others v Administrator,
Transvaal
1988 (4) SA 912
(W)] stated (at 918D) that, on his
understanding of the position,
â â¦
the
legitimate expectation refers to
the rights sought to be taken
away
and
not the right to a
hearingâ.
(Emphasis
supplied.) In
Traubâs
case, however, in delivering the
unanimous judgment of the Court, Corbett CJ expressed (at 758F) the
opposite view.
This Court [therefore affirmed]
that the doctrine of legitimate expectation relates to the right to
a hearing rather than to the
rights sought to be taken away â¦
â
[26] As
appears from the aforegoing, Meyer does not claim any procedural
benefit. On the basis of a legitimate expectation of a
substantive
benefit, he claims that the promise that gave rise to the
substantive benefit should be fulfilled. In answer to the
difficulty raised by the traditional limits of the legitimate
expectation doctrine, as formulated by this Court in
Traub
and
Zenzile
, Meyer sought support for his claim based on the
fulfilment of a substantive legitimate expectation in the judgment
of the Constitutional
Court in
Premier, Mpumalanga, and Another v
Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern
Transvaal
1999 (2) SA 91
(CC). However, in my view the judgment
of OâRegan J in the
Mpumalanga
case decided no more than
that the attempt by the Provincial Government to terminate the
payment of bursaries, contrary to its
earlier undertaking and
without affording the respondentâs members an opportunity to be
heard, was in breach of their right to
procedural fairness
under s 24(b) of the 1993 Constitution. In fact, OâRegan J makes
it clear (in para 38 of her judgment at 108F-G) that the
â
legitimate
expectation that bursaries would continue to be paid subject to
reasonable notice meant that if the second applicant
wished to
terminate the bursaries he could not do so unless he gave reasonable
notice prior to termination. Once, however, he
had given reasonable
notice there would have been no obligation to consult with the
governing bodies or the schools concerned.â
Accordingly,
this judgment of the Constitutional Court went no further than the
judgments of this Court in acknowledging that a
legitimate
expectation of fair procedure can be induced by a promise that a
substantive benefit will be acquired or retained.
[27] In
an alternative argument, Meyer invited this Court to follow the
example of the recent developments in English law by extending
the
doctrine of legitimate expectations so as to substantiate a claim
for the fulfilment of a promise or undertaking. In this
regard he
relied,
inter alia
, on the judgments of the Court of Appeal
in
R v North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex parte Coughlan
[2001] QB 213
(CA) and in
R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough
Council
[2001] EWCA Civ 607
;
[2002] 1 WLR 237
(CA). These judgments may be
understood to constitute authority for the proposition that in
English law the doctrine of legitimate
expectations has now
developed into a comprehensive code that embraces a spectrum of
administrative relief ranging from a claim
for procedural fairness
to a claim for substantive relief. (See also, eg, Karen Steyn,
Substantive Legitimate Expectations
, [2001] JR 244.) Despite
these decisions, I believe that we must decline Meyerâs invitation
to follow them in this case. The
question whether we should emulate
the developments in English law by incorporating, what has been
described as the doctrine of
substantive legitimate expectation,
into our law, is a difficult and complex one. Before simply
transplanting a legal concept
from one system of law to another it
is imperative to first examine the context in which that concept
originated and developed
in its system of origin. In deciding
whether to adopt the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation
as part of our law, we
will have to consider the possibility that
the doctrine was developed as a solution to problems arising from
the rule in English
law that, generally speaking, an undertaking
without valuable consideration is not enforceable. Since our law
does not require
valuable consideration for the enforceability of an
undertaking (see eg
Conradie v Rossouw
1919 AD 279
at 320,
McCullogh v Fernwood Estate, Ltd
1920 AD 204
at 206 and R H
Christie,
The Law of Contract
, 4
th
ed at 7-12) the
problem does not arise. In England these developments were
initially accompanied by a fair amount of controversy.
Not so long
ago, it was described by the Court of Appeal itself in
R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Hargreaves
and Others
[1996] EWCA Civ 1006
;
[1997] 1 WLR 906
(CA) 921E as âheresyâ (though
its status is now closer to doctrine). However, the Australian High
Court found this extension
of the doctrine of legitimate expectation
unacceptable (see eg Cameron Stewart,
Substantive Unfairness: A
New Species of Abuse of Power?
(2000) 28 Fed. L. Rev. 617 at
634). In Canada the issue of substantive legitimate expectation was
raised in the Supreme Court
in
Mount Sinai Hospital Center v
Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services)
2001 SCC 41
;
[2001] 2 S.C.R.
281.
The minority (Binnie J with McLachlan CJ concurring) decided
to follow the Australian and South African approach (the latter with
reference to the
Traub
case) and confirmed that in Canada
âthe doctrine of legitimate expectation is limited to procedural
reliefâ (see para 35 of
the judgment). The majority decided the
matter on a different basis. (See also pronouncements to the same
effect by the Supreme
Court of Canada in
Reference Re Canada
Assistance Plan (BC)
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 525
at 528 and 557.)
[28] Why
I do not believe that this is the case in which this Court should
finally pronounce on the difficult question whether the
English
doctrine of substantive relief should be grafted onto our legal
system, is that Meyer would, even on the acceptance of
the doctrine
as part of our law, not be entitled to compel performance of the
promise by Iscor that forms the basis of his claim.
I say this for
two reasons. First, the promise relied upon by Meyer, namely that
improved retrenchment benefits would be implemented
with
retrospective effect, was made by Iscor and not by the Fund. As to
why the Fund would be liable to fulfil a promise made
by a separate
entity, Meyerâs contention was that the majority of the trustees
of the Fund were appointed by Iscor; that the
trustees were, in any
event, all employed by Iscor; that they were aware of Iscorâs
undertaking and that the main purpose of
the amendment was to
promote Iscorâs interests. It is obvious, however, that these
factors were not sufficient to render Iscor
an agent of the Fund.
In fact Meyer quite rightly insisted, in a somewhat different
context, that the Fund should act independently
from Iscor.
According to the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations, as
applied in English law, it appears to be a requirement
that the
promise relied upon was made by someone with actual or ostensible
authority to make it on behalf of the authority that
is sought to be
held liable (see
R v Inland Revenue Commissioner, Ex parte
Matrix-Securities Ltd
[1994] 1 WLR 334
(HL) and Cameron Stewart,
op cit
626). In any event, I can see no reason why someone
who relies on a substantive legitimate expectation should be in a
stronger
position than one who seeks to enforce a contractual
provision in his favour.
[29] The
second reason why Meyerâs claim for specific performance of
Iscorâs promise cannot succeed is that, in my view, he
has failed
to establish the contents of the promise upon which he relies. It
is not denied by the Fund that Iscor made a promise
at an early
stage of its 1993 rationalisation programme that improved
rationalised benefits would be implemented retrospectively.
What
is, however, denied by the Fund is that the rationalisation benefits
contemplated in the promise included
pension
benefits.
Accordingly, the Fund denied that the promise relied upon by Meyer
had anything to do with the improvement in pension
benefits that
were brought about by the amendment of rule 6.2. This denial gave
rise to a genuine or bona fide dispute of fact
as contemplated by
Corbett JA in
Plascon Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints
(Pty) Ltd (supra)
634E-635C. As I have already indicated, Meyer
must, for purposes of the
Plascon Evans
rule, be regarded as
the âapplicantâ. In accordance with the rule, the matter must
therefore be decided on the Fundâs version
of the facts unless
that version is, in the words of Corbett JA, â
so
far-fetched or clearly untenable that the Court is justified in
rejecting it merely on the papers
â. Both parties found
support for their respective versions in the contents of various
documents annexed to the affidavits.
I find it unnecessary to
repeat these references. Suffice it to say that, having regard to
all these documents, I do not find
the Fundâs version
âfar-fetchedâ or âuntenableâ at all and that, therefore, the
matter must be decided on the facts presented
by the Fund which, as
I have said, excludes the improved pension benefits of the amended
rule from the scope of Iscorâs promise
that forms the whole basis
of Meyerâs claim.
APPROPRIATE
REMEDY
[30] Apart
from the aforegoing, there is another overriding consideration why
the Adjudicatorâs determination in favour of Meyer
could not stand
and why it was rightly set aside by the Court
a quo
. It will
be remembered that in terms of the order granted by the Adjudicator
(see para [5] above), the Fund is obliged to place
Meyer, by way of
compensation, in the position that he would have been in if he had
qualified for the increased benefits of the
amended rule. We know,
however, that in terms of the amended rule, Meyer did not so qualify
and that the Fund cannot be compelled
to do something not allowed by
its rules. Meyerâs case is, in essence, that the trustees of the
Fund should have considered
the terms of the amendment on the basis
that he and some 800 other former members of the Fund are to be
included in the advantaged
group. There is, however, no probability
that if the parameters of the advantaged group were to be determined
on that basis, the
benefits conferred upon every individual member
of the group would remain the same. On the contrary, the inherent
probabilities
appear to indicate that if the number of members to be
benefited were to be increased from about 3 000 to about 3 800,
the benefits acquired by each member of the group would be
substantially reduced. In fact, it appears from the evidence given
by one of the Fundâs trustees during the Labour Court proceedings
that the decision on the parameters of the group that would
be
entitled to the benefits of the amendment, was not a straightforward
matter. Different alternatives were considered and each
alternative
was submitted to the Fundâs actuary for his view on its impact on
the surplus in the Fund. An example of an alternative
so considered
by the trustees was to set the age of those eligible for the
increased benefits at 52 instead of 50. If the latter
alternative
had been adopted, Meyer would in any event have been excluded from
the group. The problem is that one simply cannot
determine what
decision the trustees of the Fund should have taken if they knew
that the amendment should be retroactive. This
problem goes to the
heart of Meyerâs case. What he sought, in substance, was for the
Fundâs decision regarding the formulation
of the amendment to be
reviewed on administrative law grounds. If successful, he would
have been entitled to an order (a) setting
the Fundâs decision
aside and (b) referring the matter back to the Fund for
reconsideration of its decision on a proper basis.
That, however,
was not the order that Meyer wants. What he wants was an order (a)
reformulating the amendment so as to extend
its benefits to every
member, including himself, who retired during 1993 and (b)
compensating him on the basis of the properly
amended rule. The
fundamental difficulty with this request is that neither the
Adjudicator nor the Court was ever placed in a
position to determine
what the terms of the amendment should have been if its benefits
were to have been made available to everyone
who retired in 1993.
The problem is, of course, exacerbated by the fact that even when
the matter was considered by the Adjudicator,
but even more so now,
the train has moved on. In the meantime, a substantial part of the
surplus in the Fund had been paid out
to some 3 000 former
members and nearly ten years had elapsed during which period the
fortunes of the Fund may well have changed
dramatically.
Accordingly - and leaving aside all the other difficulties in
Meyerâs case - neither the Adjudicator nor the Court
was ever in
the position to grant Meyer the relief that he essentially sought.
Consequently the appeal cannot succeed and it is
therefore not
necessary to consider the other arguments raised by the Fund.
[31] The
only remaining issue relates to the costs of this appeal. Normally
these costs would not give rise to any issue since
they would simply
follow the event. However, it was urged upon us on Meyerâs behalf
that, after all the trials and tribulations
he had gone through and
the costs that he had already incurred to remove, what he, quite
understandably, thought to be discrimination
against him, he should
not be mulcted in further costs. Although I am not without sympathy
for Meyer, I believe that it would
be wrong to deprive the Fund,
purely on the basis of sympathy, of a costs order that it is
entitled to.
[32] For
these reasons the appeal is dismissed with costs, including the
costs of two counsel.
â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦
.
F
D J BRAND
JUDGE
OF APPEAL
Concur
:
HARMS
JA
CAMERON
JA
NAVSA
JA
JONES
AJA