SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 2025-077993
In the matter between:
CORNELIUS TOBIAS VERMAAK First Applicant
JP RAUTENBACH t/a RAUTENBACH LUNDALL Second Applicant
AND ASSOCIATES
and
JOHANNES JACOBUS POTGIETER First Respondent
DREAM LIFE PROPERTIES Second Respondent
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
3 JUNE 2026 SM MARITZ AJ
DATE SIGNATURE
I
WEST HENDRIKS Third Respondent
DIETER JOHAN OOSTHUIZEN Fourth Respondent
JUDGMENT
MARITZ AJ
A. INTRODUCTION
[1] This matter comes before the Court on the return date of a rule nisi granted
on 29 May 2025 by Mooki J, extended on 14 October 2025 by Mngqibisa -
Thusi J, and further extended on 23 February 2026 by Millar J to 11 May
2026. The First Applicant, Cornelius Tobias Vermaak ("Vermaak"), and the
Second Applicant, JP Rautenbach t/a Rautenbach Lundall and Associates
("Rautenbach") (collectively "the Applicants"), seek final interdictory relief
against the First Respondent, Johannes Jacobus Potgieter ("Potgieter"), the
Second Respondent, Dream Life Properties ("Dream Life"), and the Third
Respondent, West Hendriks (“Hendriks”), and the joinder of Dieter Johan
Oosthuizen (“Oosthuizen”) for purposes of the adjudication of the Part B relief.
The application was heard on 14 May 2026 on the opposed motion roll
(number 40). It comprises Part A and Part B. Only Part A fell to be adjudicated
on the date of hearing . Part B is postponed sine die for determination on a
date to be determined (the Part B relief being , inter alia : declaration of the
First and Fourth Respondents as vexatious litigants under section 2(1)(b) of
the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956, an order requiring prior judicial
approval before further proceedings may be instituted, contempt proceedings,
and the authority of the Sheriff to sign transfer documentation). The
application is opposed by the First and Fourth Respondents. The Second and
Third Respondents filed a notice of withdrawal of opposition and of abiding
the Court's decision on 14 October 2025.
[2] On the date of hearing, an order was made extending the rule nisi from 11
May 2026 to 14 May 2026, and further extending it pending delivery of the
reserved written judgment, during which period the interim relief was to
remain in full force and effect.
[3] On the date of hearing, the Court was required to deal with a preliminary issue
before the merits of the application could be addressed. That issue concerned
a further supplementary affidavit filed on 7 May 2026 — seven days before
the hearing — deposed to by the First Respondent's attorney, Ms Riekie
Erasmus ("Erasmus"), in her personal capacity and purportedly on behalf of
the First Respondent. On 8 May 2026 the Second Applicant served a Notice
in terms of Rule 30 and a Notice in terms of Rule 30A, each challenging the
further supplementary affidavit as an irregular step. The Court dealt with the
preliminary issue on 14 May 2026 and delivered an ex tempore judgment and
costs order thereon. That ex tempore judgment remains valid and of full force
and effect , and is incorporated herein. The costs order granted therein is
incorporated in the order below. In summary: the further supplementary
affidavit filed on 7 May 2026 was declared pro non scripto and struck from the
record; the First Respondent and Ms Erasmus, jointly and severally in her
personal capacity, the one paying the other to be absolved, were ordered to
pay the costs of the Rule 30 and Rule 30A applications and of the notice of
motion dated 8 May 2026 on the attorney -and-client scale, including the costs
of counsel. The reasons for that ruling are fully set out in the ex tempore
judgment and are not repeated here, save where necessary for context.
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[4] The First Applicant, Vermaak, is the holder of a judgment debt obtained
against the First Respondent, Potgieter, in the Pretoria High Court on 27
September 2023 under case number 031447/2022, in the sum of
R620,000.00. The judgment was obtained jointly against Potgieter and the
R620,000.00. The judgment was obtained jointly against Potgieter and the
proposed Fourth Respondent, Dieter Johan Oosthuizen ("Oosthuizen").
Attempts to satisfy the judgment by attachment of movable property by the
Sheriff yielded a nulla bona return.
[5] On 16 July 2024, Vermaak and the Second Applicant, Rautenbach, concluded
a written cession agreement — Annexure "FA1". In terms of that agreement,
Vermaak, as cedent, transferred, ceded and made over to Rautenbach, as
cessionary, all his rights, title and interest in the claim against the debtors —
being both Potgieter and Oosthuizen — for the purpose of recovering the
outstanding debt. The cession encompassed the High Court judgment under
case number 031447/2022 (R620,000.00) and the value of the pledged
vehicles (R275,600.00). The precise legal content of the cession and its
consequences for Vermaak's locus standi in these proceedings are addressed
comprehensively below.
[6] Rautenbach, as cessionary, instituted enforcement proceedings in the
Cullinan Regional Court under case number RC80/2024, directed jointly
against both Potgieter and Oosthuizen as co -respondents in relation to the
pledged vehicles. On 3 February 2025 the Cullinan Regional Court granted an
order — Annexure "WR5" — directing both Potgieter and Oosthuizen either to
present the pledged vehicles to the Applicants or to make payment of the
outstanding debt. Both failed to comply. Contempt of court proceedings
followed, and on 24 March 2025 Magistrate Mncube granted a contempt order
— Annexure "JP1" — directing Potgieter to surrender himself to Zonderwater
Prison for a minimum period of three months should he fail to make payment.
That contempt order was subsequently stayed on 7 April 2025 in the context
of settlement negotiations.
[7] On 25 March 2025, settlement negotiations took place between Rautenbach
and Potgieter at the offices of counsel, resulting in the conclusion of a deed of
settlement — Annexure "FA2". The terms of the settlement, and in particular
the tripartite structure arising from its operative clause, lie at the heart of the
the tripartite structure arising from its operative clause, lie at the heart of the
locus standi dispute and are addressed in detail below. In summary:
Potgieter, as respondent, acknowledged his liability to the Applicant,
Rautenbach, for the full judgment debt together with co sts and interest under
both RC80/2024 and case number 031447/2022, and consented to transfer
the immovable property situated at POX 9[...] Derdepark, Plot 377,
Derdepoort 326-JR, Pretoria ("the property") to Cornelius Tobias Vermaak in
lieu of the amounts so owed, and to sign all documents necessary to effect
transfer. On 24 April 2025 the settlement was made an order of the Cullinan
Regional Court — Annexure "FA3" ("the Regional Court Order"). The
Regional Court Order is extant, binding, and has not been appealed,
rescinded, stayed, or set aside.
[8] On 27 May 2025, Vermaak discovered that Potgieter had mandated the
Second Respondent, Dream Life Properties, and its agent, the Third
Respondent, West Hendriks, to market and sell the property in open defiance
of the Regional Court Order (Annexure "FA4"). On the same day, the Second
Applicant's office served a letter of demand on Riekie Erasmus Attorneys —
who had been present in court on 24 April 2025 when the settlement was
made an order of court — advising that all of Potgieter's rights in the Property
had been ceded to Vermaak and that Potgieter had no right to sell (Annexure
"FA5"). Riekie Erasmus Attorneys replied by email the same day, confirming
that the First Respondent intended to proceed with the sale on the basis that
the Regional Court Order was not regarded as binding (Annexure "FA6").
Potgieter's agents had already entered the property without Vermaak's
consent to take marketing photographs — conduct amounting to trespass —
and had arranged for it to be shown to prospective purchasers on 29 May
2025 (Founding Affidavit, paragraph 24). An urgent application was launched
on 28 May 2025, and the rule nisi was granted by Mooki J on 29 May 2025.
[9] As regards the proposed Fourth Respondent, Oosthuizen's role in the
underlying litigation founding the joinder application is set out in the Joinder
Founding Affidavit at paragraphs 25.1 to 25.11 and amplified in the
Supplementary Founding Affidavit at paragraphs 37 to 181. He was a co -
Supplementary Founding Affidavit at paragraphs 37 to 181. He was a co -
respondent in case RC80/2024 from the outset; he failed to comply with the
order of 3 February 2025; he filed an unsigned and uncommissioned affidavit
on 10 March 2025 (Annexure "WR8") in purported explanation of his non -
compliance; he noted an appeal (case A2025 -061324) against the order of 3
February 2025, filing his notice of appeal 44 days outside the prescribed 20 -
day period; he filed two fatally defective condonation applications (Annexures
"WR41" and "WR43") without prosecuting the appeal to finality; he has
refused to pay the security for costs required under Magistrate Court Rule 51;
he has jointly with Potgieter filed rescission applications enrolled for hearing
on 21 July 2026 before Magistrate Singh in the Pretoria Central Regional
Court; and he has refused to pay the multiple costs orders granted against
him (Joinder Founding Affidavit, paragraph 25.10). Throughout these
proceedings, both Potgieter and Oosthuizen have been represented by Riekie
Erasmus Attorneys.
C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
[10] The issues for determination are the following:
10.1 Whether the rule nisi should be confirmed or discharged;
10.2 Whether the First Respondent's points in limine should be upheld or
dismissed;
10.3 Whether a final interdict should be granted in favour of the Applicants
against the First, Second and Third Respondents;
10.4 Whether Dieter Johan Oosthuizen should be joined as a party to the
proceedings (Part B); and
10.5 Costs.
D. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Return Date Enquiry
[11] On the return date of a rule nisi, the Court does not merely revisit whether the
interim order was correctly granted on the material originally before it; it
exercises its discretion afresh on the totality of all the evidence now before it:
Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson and Others 1996 (4) SA 348 (A) at 361B –E. The
enquiry on the return date is therefore whether, on the full record as it now
stands, the Applicants have established an entitlement to final interdictory
relief.
Requirements for a Final Interdict
[12] For the confirmation of a rule nisi as a final order, the Applicants must
establish: (a) a clear right — as opposed to the prima facie right sufficient at
the interim stage; (b) an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended;
and (c) the absence of any other adequate remedy: Setlogelo v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221 at 227; Hotz and Others v University of Cape Town 2017 (2) SA
485 (SCA) para 20; L F Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town
Municipality 1969 (2) SA 256 (C) at 267B –C. These requirements are to be
assessed holistically: National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban
Tolling Alliance 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) para 25. The elevation from the interim
to the final standard requires the Applicants to demonstrate their right with
reasonable certainty, though it need not be entirely incontestable: Culverwell v
Beira 1992 (4) SA 490 (W) at 499B–F.
Disputes of Fact
[13] In motion proceedings, disputes of fact are resolved on the Plascon-Evans
approach: the respondent's version, together with the admitted facts,
generally prevails unless it is palpably false, inherently improbable, or directly
contradicted by objective contemporaneous evidence: Plascon-Evans Paints
Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634H –635C;
Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) paras 55 –56. A
version that is internally contradictory and mutually destructive does not
attract the protection of the Plascon-Evans rule and need not be accepted:
Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA
371 (SCA) para 13.
Binding Effect of Court Orders and Pending Rescission Applications
[14] Section 165(5) of the Constitution provides that an order or decision issued by
a court is binding on all persons to whom and organs of state to which it
applies until lawfully set aside. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed in
Municipal Manager, OR Tambo District Municipality and Another v Ndabeni
2023 (4) SA 421 (CC) paras 27 –34 that even a flawed or contestable court
order must be obeyed until lawfully set aside; a party may not disregard a
binding order merely because it disputes its correctness. Disobedience of
court orders is inimical to the rule of law: South African Broadcasting
Corporation SOC Ltd v Democratic Alliance 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) para 48.
A pending rescission application does not suspend the operation of the order
sought to be rescinded: Fismer v Thornton 1929 AD 17 at 25; Gentiruco AG v
Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 589 (A) at 635B –C; Eke v Parsons 2015
(11) BCLR 1319 (CC) paras 30 –32. A party who wishes to suspend the
operation of a court order must apply specifically for a stay and obtain it
before declining to comply. No stay of the Regional Court Order of 24 April
2025 has been granted in these or any other proceedings.
The Law of Duress
[15] For duress to vitiate a contract, three requirements must be satisfied: the
threat must be unlawful — that is, contra bonos mores ; the threat must have
induced the conclusion of the contract; and the aggrieved party must have
had no reasonable alternative but to comply: Arend and Another v Astra
Furnishers (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 298 (C) at 306A –B; Broodryk v Smuts NO
1942 TPD 47 at 52–53. A threat to invoke or enforce a lawful court process —
including a threat of imprisonment pursuant to a valid contempt of court order
— does not constitute the unlawful threat required to establish duress:
Savvides v Savvides and Another 1986 (2) SA 325 (W) at 328G –H; Preller v
Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A) at 494D. Pressure arising from the legitimate
Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A) at 494D. Pressure arising from the legitimate
enforcement of legal rights, however severe it may feel to the party under
pressure, does not satisfy the unlawfulness requirement.
The Law of Cession and its Consequences
[16] In South African law, cession is the transfer by agreement of a personal right
from the cedent to the cessionary. Upon valid cession, the cedent is entirely
and irrevocably divested of the ceded right, which thenceforth vests
exclusively in the cessionary: Grobler v Oosthuizen 2009 (5) SA 500 (SCA)
para 15; First National Bank of SA Ltd v Lynn NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 339
(A) at 344G –I; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) at 11A –B. The
cedent thereafter has no right to sue on, enforce, or receive benefits under the
ceded claim in that capacity: Kriel v Terblanche NO and Another 2002 (6) SA
132 (NC) at 136D–E.
[17] A cession transfers only those rights that fall within its defined scope. Rights
arising from instruments concluded after the date of cession — even if
causally linked to it — are not automatically included: Scott and Others v
Liquidators of Hanover Fire and Marine Insurance Co 1907 TS 764 at 771.
The scope of a cession is determined by construing its terms in context:
KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA
399 (SCA) para 39.
[18] South African law recognises the stipulatio alteri — a contract between two
parties that contains a term expressly conferring a benefit on a third party.
The third party acquires an enforceable right against the promissor upon
accepting the benefit stipulated in his favour: Crookes NO and Another v
Watson and Others 1956 (1) SA 277 (A) at 289H –290B; Swart and Another v
Vosloo and Others 1965 (1) SA 100 (A) at 106H. Upon acceptance, the third
party's right is direct, independent, and irrevocable: Rhoode v De Kock and
Another 1977 (1) SA 804 (A) at 811C–D.
[19] South African law also recognises the datio in solutum — the satisfaction of a
debt by delivery of something other than what was originally due, with the
consent of the holder of the debt claim. A datio in solutum requires the
creditor's consent (or, where the debt has been ceded, the cessionary's
creditor's consent (or, where the debt has been ceded, the cessionary's
consent as holder of the claim) and extinguishes the underlying debt upon
delivery: Towermed (Pty) Ltd v Pretoria City Council 1992 (1) SA 673 (T) at
680B–C; Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa and Another 2006 (4) SA
581 (SCA) paras 14–16.
Joinder — Rule 10 of the Uniform Rules of Court
[20] The substantive power to join a party in Superior Court proceedings derives
from Rule 10 of the Uniform Rules of Court. Rule 10(1) permits any person to
bring an application on notice to join another person as a party. Rule 10(3)
empowers the Court to order the joinder of any person whose joinder is
necessary for the proper adjudication of all matters in dispute, with the motion
procedure in Rule 6 serving as the procedural vehicle: Erasmus, Superior
Court Practice, Vol 1 (2 nd ed, 2023) at D1-419. The test for joinder is whether
the person to be joined has a direct and substantial interest in the subject
matter of the litigation and in the order the Court may make: Amalgamated
Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A) at 657; Gordon v
Department of Health, KwaZulu -Natal 2008 (6) SA 522 (SCA) para 9. The
interest must be a direct legal interest: Hermitage Holdings (Pty) Ltd v
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1993 (4) SA 445 (C) at 453G –H. Joinder
gives expression to the audi alteram partem principle by ensuring the
proposed party is before the Court before any order affecting him is made. A
vexatious litigant declaration cannot competently be made against a person
who is not a party to the proceedings: Beinash and Another v Ernst & Young
and Others 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC) para 13.
E. THE FIRST RESPONDENT'S POINTS IN LIMINE
The First Respondent raised the following points in limine:
(a) Urgency
[21] The urgency challenge to the original interim order is overtaken by events.
The return date enquiry is not whether urgency existed in May 2025 — that
was resolved by Mooki J. The enquiry is whether, on the full record, the rule
nisi should be confirmed as a final interdict. Urgency at the interim stage is not
a requirement for the granting of final interdictory relief. This point is
dismissed.
(b) Locus Standi of the First Applicant
The Argument Advanced by the First Respondent
[22] The First Respondent raises the locus standi of the First Applicant, Vermaak,
as a point in limine in the heads of argument at paragraphs 21 to 23. The
argument is that the cession agreement (FA1) divested Vermaak of all rights
in and to the claim against Potgieter, vesting those rights exclusively in
Rautenbach as cessionary, so that Vermaak, as cedent, has no legal standing
to bring or maintain this application. The authorities cited are: First National
Bank of SA Ltd v Lynn NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 339 (A) at 344G –I; Kriel v
Terblanche NO and Another 2002 (6) SA 132 (NC) at 136D –E; United Watch
& Diamond Co (Pty) Ltd v Disa Hotels Ltd 1972 (4) SA 409 (C) at 415H–416A;
Gory v Kolver NO and Others 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) para 22; and Henque
Trust v Wesbank 2015 (6) SA 359 (SCA). The First Respondent submits at
paragraph 23(f) that the defect is "jurisdictional, fatal, and incurable".
[23] This argument raises a genuinely important question of law requiring careful
and comprehensive analysis, which is set out below.
The Material Provisions of the Cession Agreement — Annexure “FA1”
[24] The cession agreement was executed on 16 July 2024 between Vermaak (ID:
7[...]) as cedent and Rautenbach t/a Rautenbach Lundall and Associates
(CDPC Practice Number: 00128680/23) as cessionary. Its material provisions
are the following:
[25] The preamble records that Vermaak " has a claim against the debtors known
as Dieter Johan Oosthuizen... (1 st Debtor) and Johannes Jacobus Potgieter...
(2nd Debtor) for monies due and payable" arising from: (1) the High Court
judgment under case number 031447/2022 in the amount of R620,000.00
obtained against both debtors; and (2) the reasonable retail/book value of the
pledged vehicles in the amount of R275,600.00.
[26] The operative cession clause provides: "The Cedant hereby makes, transfers
and makes over to the Cessionary all rights, title and interest the Cedant now
has in and to the said claim" — being the judgment debt and the vehicle
security. This is the clause upon which the First Respondent primarily relies.
[27] Clause 10 of FA1 records: "The Cedant acknowledges and its authority to
cede, grant the cessionary the power to institute any action in the cessionary's
name against any of its debtors in order to prosecute the claim ceded to the
cessionary."
[28] Clause 12 of FA1 provides: "The Cedant acknowledges and pledges that this
cession agreement will be in full force until such time that the Cessionary has
collected the liability of the debt from the debtor, or the debtor's liability has
otherwise been discharged." This clause is critical: it confirms that the cession
remains operative until the debt is either collected or otherwise discharged.
Satisfaction of the debt by means of the transfer of the property — a datio in
solutum — would constitute “otherwise discharged” within the meaning of this
clause, at which point the cession is extinguished.
[29] Clause 13 of FA1 provides: "Irrespective of whether the debtor has been
notified of this cession or not, all sums of money which the Cessionary
collects from the debtor or others shall be collected and received by the
cessionary to do with and pay to any person/entity as the cessionary sees fit,
free from any liability towards any person for whatsoever reason, except for
written consent attached hereto (mandate)." This clause vests in Rautenbach,
as cessionary, the express and unfettered contractual authority to direct all
recovery from the debtors — whether in money or in any other form — to any
person or entity as he sees fit. It is a specific provision of the cession
person or entity as he sees fit. It is a specific provision of the cession
agreement conferring on Rautenbach the right to determine the ultimate
beneficiary of recovery.
[30] Clause 14 of FA1 provides: "The Cessionary shall be entitled at any time to
cede and make over to any person, firm or company this cession agreement
whether it is donated, sold or set off against any debt of the Cessionary for
whatsoever reason." This clause confers on Rautenbach the express power to
assign or cede the entire cession agreement — and with it the rights of
recovery thereunder — to any third party.
[31] Clause 15 of FA1 provides: "The Cessionary may utilise any legal procedure
to secure the claim, alternatively, prosecute the claim to its finality which
includes any interim measures in any court of law made provision for in any
court rule or procedure to give effect to the cession with the aim to collect the
claim and/or collection of the principal debt amount." This clause authorises
Rautenbach to employ any legal mechanism — including interim court
measures — to collect the debt, which is precisely what these proceedings
represent.
The Material Provisions of the Settlement Agreement and the " In Lieu"
Clause — Annexure “FA2”
[32] The settlement agreement was executed on 25 March 2025, some eight
months after the cession. It was concluded between Rautenbach as Applicant
(signing on behalf of JP Rautenbach t/a Rautenbach Lundall and Associates)
and Potgieter as Respondent. Three provisions require specific attention.
[33] Clause 1 of FA2 provides: "The Respondent acknowledges his liability
towards the Applicant for payment in the amount of the judgment debt plus
legal costs and interest under case number HC80/2024 in the Cullinan
Regional Court as well as for the judgment debt plus costs and interest under
case number 031447/2022 in the Pretoria High Court, as full and final
settlement."
[34] Clause 2 of FA2 provides: "The Respondent hereby consents to transfer the
property situated at POX 9[...] Derdepark, Plot 377, Derdepoort 326 -JR,
Pretoria, 0186 (the property) to Cornelius Tobias Vermaak in lieu of the
amounts owed to the Applicant, and to sign any and all documents necessary
to effect transfer of the property." This is the operative "in lieu" clause. Several
features are legally significant. First, the settlement of the debt —
acknowledged in clause 1 as owed to the Applicant (Rautenbach) — is
effected not by payment of money to Rautenbach but by transfer of an asset,
the property: this is a datio in solutum. Second, the transfer is directed not to
the Applicant (Rautenbach) but to a third party, Cornelius Tobias Vermaak,
who is not a signatory to the settlement. Third, the phrase "in lieu of the
amounts owed to the Applicant" confirms that the debt is owed to
Rautenbach, but is being discharged by a transfer to Vermaak. The structure
is therefore tripartite: Potgieter (promissor) undertakes to Rautenbach
(stipulans/cessionary) to transfer the property to Vermaak (the
tertius/designated beneficiary) in satisfaction of the debt owed to Rautenbach.
[35] Vermaak himself describes the arrangement in precisely these terms at
paragraph 16 of the Founding Affidavit: "In terms of the settlement agreement
the First Respondent consented to the property situated at POX 9[...]
Derdepark, Plot 377, Derdepoort 326 -JR Pretoria 0186 to be transferred to
me in lieu of the amounts owed to the Second Applicant." The First Applicant
thus acknowledges that the amounts were owed to the Second Applicant
(Rautenbach), not to himself, and that the transfer was directed to him as the
in lieu beneficiary. This self -description confirms that the in lieu transfer to
Vermaak is a disposition directed by Rautenbach as cessionary in the
exercise of his rights under the cession, and specifically under clause 13 of
FA1.
[36] Clause 8 of FA2 — the anti -novation clause — provides: "This agreement
does not constitute a novation of the Applicant's causes of action, judgments,
orders, rights and/or remedies." This clause confirms that the settlement does
orders, rights and/or remedies." This clause confirms that the settlement does
not extinguish the underlying debt obligation or the associated rights of the
Applicant until the settlement is actually performed. All of Rautenbach's rights
under the cession and the underlying judgments are preserved until the
property is actually transferred to Vermaak in terms of the Regional Court
Order.
The Four Legal Bases for Vermaak's Locus Standi
[37] Against this background of the specific operative provisions of FA1 and FA2,
the locus standi argument may be restated precisely: Vermaak ceded "all
rights, title and interest" in the debt claim to Rautenbach in July 2024; the
settlement was concluded by Rautenbach as cessionary in March 2025; yet
the settlement directs the benefit of the datio in solutum — the property — not
to Rautenbach but to Vermaak. The question is whether Vermaak has
independent standing to enforce and protect that benefit. The Court finds that
he does, on four distinct and independently sufficient grounds.
[38] First — the scope of the cession. The operative cession clause of FA1
transfers "all rights, title and interest the Cedant now has in and to the said
claim." The phrase "now has" is in the present tense, referencing the date of
the cession, 16 July 2024, at which time Vermaak had only a money debt
claim. The settlement and the Regional Court Order both post -date the
cession by eight months. The right to receive the property in lieu of the debt
— created by the settlement and confirmed by the Regional Court Order — is
a wholly new right that came into existence only on 25 March 2025 and was
not in existence at the time of the cession. It therefore falls outside the scope
of the cession: Scott v Liquidators of Hanover Fire and Marine Insurance Co
at 771; KPMG v Securefin para 39. The authorities cited by the First
Respondent — FNB v Lynn NO; Kriel v Terblanche — establish that a cedent
loses the right to collect the ceded money debt. They say nothing about rights
created by post -cession instruments in which the cedent is a named
beneficiary.
[39] Second — the clause 13 authority of the cessionary to direct the in lieu
transfer to Vermaak. Clause 13 of FA1 expressly authorises Rautenbach, as
cessionary, to receive all recovery from the debtors and "to do with and pay to
cessionary, to receive all recovery from the debtors and "to do with and pay to
any person/entity as the cessionary sees fit." The settlement, in directing the
property transfer to Vermaak as the in lieu beneficiary, is a direct and explicit
exercise of this clause 13 authority. Rautenbach, as holder of the debt claim,
was entitled to determine in what form satisfaction was rendered and to whom
it would accrue. He determined that it would accrue to Vermaak, in the form of
the property — an exercise of authority authorised by the cession agreement
itself. Clause 14 of FA1 further reinforces this: Rautenbach was "entitled at
any time to cede and make over to any person... this cession agreement." The
direction of recovery to Vermaak in the settlement is comfortably within the
authority conferred by clauses 13 and 14 of FA1. This is not a re -cession or
novation — it is the cessionary exercising his contractual authority to
determine the ultimate beneficiary of recovery.
[40] Third — the settlement as a stipulatio alteri of which Vermaak is the accepted
third party ( tertius). On a proper legal analysis, the settlement is a contract
between Rautenbach as stipulans and Potgieter as promissor containing a
stipulation expressly in favour of Vermaak as tertius: the promissor
undertakes to deliver the property not to the contracting party Rautenbach but
to the third party Vermaak — a textbook stipulatio alteri . All three
requirements are present: there is a contract between Rautenbach and
Potgieter (FA2); that contract contains a term specifically intended to benefit
Vermaak (the in lieu clause of FA2, clause 2); and Vermaak has accepted that
benefit — demonstrated by his confirmation of the settlement in his own
Founding Affidavit at paragraph 16 and, most powerfully, by the institution of
this application to enforce it: Crookes NO and Another v Watson and Others
1956 (1) SA 277 (A) at 289H –290B; Swart and Another v Vosloo and Others
1965 (1) SA 100 (A) at 106H. Upon acceptance, the stipulatio alteri vests in
Vermaak a direct, independent, and irrevocable right against Potgieter to
receive the property: Rhoode v De Kock and Another 1977 (1) SA 804 (A) at
811C–D. This right derives not from the cession but from the settlement itself,
in favour of Vermaak as the designated tertius.
in favour of Vermaak as the designated tertius.
[41] Fourth — the Regional Court Order as an independent and self -standing
source of obligation. Even setting aside the contractual analysis, the
settlement was made an order of the Cullinan Regional Court on 24 April
2025 — Annexure "FA3". That court order is an independent juridical act
giving rise to rights and obligations that are separate from and additional to
those in the underlying contractual instruments: Eke v Parsons 2015 (11)
BCLR 1319 (CC) paras 30 –32; Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa and
Another 2006 (4) SA 581 (SCA) paras 14 –16. The Regional Court Order
specifically and directly names Vermaak as the beneficiary of the transfer
obligation. A person who is the direct and express beneficiary of a court order
directing performance to him has unimpeachable standing to enforce that
order and to seek relief to protect it from threatened or actual breach. That
standing flows from the court order itself — independently of the cession,
independently of the settlement, and independently of any contractual
analysis — and is a sufficient, self -standing source of Vermaak's standing in
these proceedings.
[42] To hold otherwise would produce a manifestly absurd result: it would mean
that Potgieter could breach the Regional Court Order with impunity on the
basis that the person named in that order as beneficiary lacks standing to
seek its enforcement, even though the order was made in proceedings to
which both Applicants were parties. That result would be directly contrary to
section 165(5) of the Constitution and to the principle reaffirmed in Ndabeni
paras 27 –34 that court orders must be obeyed until lawfully set aside. The
rule of law demands that a person directly named as beneficiary in a court
order has standing to enforce it.
Conclusion on Locus Standi
[43] The locus standi point, measured against the actual terms of FA1 and FA2
and against the applicable principles of cession law, the law of stipulatio alteri,
the law of datio in solutum, and the effect of a court order as an independent
source of obligation, fails comprehensively on four separate and
independently sufficient grounds. The legal authorities cited by the First
Respondent — FNB v Lynn NO ; Kriel v Terblanche — are correctly stated as
general propositions but are inapplicable on the specific facts of this matter,
general propositions but are inapplicable on the specific facts of this matter,
where the benefit enforced by Vermaak is not the ceded debt claim but a
distinct right arising from the in lieu clause of a post -cession settlement
confirmed by a court order that names him personally as transferee. The point
in limine on locus standi is dismissed.
(c) Non-Joinder
[44] The First Respondent raises non -joinder in respect of three categories of
parties at paragraphs 24.1 to 24.5 of the heads of argument, relying on
Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A) at
659 and Absa Bank Ltd v Naude NO 2016 (6) SA 540 (SCA) para 10. The
three categories are: (i) an unidentified bondholder; (ii) the First Respondent's
former wife, alleged to hold a claim of R1,000,000 secured on the property by
a bond noted on the title deed pursuant to a divorce order; and (iii) any
prospective purchaser or estate agent acting under an existing mandate.
[45] The applicable test requires that the party whose joinder is sought must have
a direct and substantial legal interest in the relief sought and in the order the
Court may make: Amalgamated Engineering Union at 657; Gordon v
Department of Health para 9. A mere consequential or financial interest is
insufficient: Hermitage Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd
1993 (4) SA 445 (C) at 453G–H.
[46] In relation to the bondholder: no bondholder is identified by name, no bond
registration number is provided, and no bond documentation or deeds registry
extract evidencing a mortgage bond over the property is produced in any of
the affidavits before me. The title deed produced by the First Respondent as
Annexure "JP3" does not reflect a current mortgage bond registration on its
face. The bare assertion of an unidentified bondholder, unsupported by any
documentation across multiple rounds of affidavits spanning more than twelve
months, is insufficient to establish a non -joinder objection. The Court cannot
join a party who has not been identified.
[47] In relation to the former wife: this allegation has been raised persistently from
the original answering affidavit through to the heads of argument at paragraph
the original answering affidavit through to the heads of argument at paragraph
24.3. Despite ample opportunity across multiple rounds of affidavits to
produce the divorce order, the bond schedule, or any extract from the title
deed reflecting the alleged notation, no such documentation has been
produced. The bare assertion remains unsupported. In any event, an order
restraining Potgieter from marketing and selling the property does not
extinguish, vary, or adversely determine the former wife's rights — it merely
preserves the status quo pending the final determination of the competing
claims.
[48] In relation to the prospective purchaser: this category falls entirely with the
striking out of the First Respondent's supplementary affidavit. Without that
affidavit, no prospective purchaser with any legal interest in the property is
identified in the admissible record. This point falls away.
[49] The non-joinder point is dismissed.
(d) Supplementary Founding Affidavit — Procedural Objection
[50] The First Respondent contends at paragraph 1.3.4 that the Applicants filed
the Supplementary Founding Affidavit without leave of court. The answer is
short. The order of 29 May 2025 of Mooki J expressly granted leave to both
parties to supplement their papers prior to the adjudication of Part B. The
Applicants filed the Supplementary Founding Affidavit in terms of that leave
on 13 February 2026, and no further application for leave was necessary. The
First Respondent himself filed multiple supplementary affidavits availing
himself of the same leave; he cannot invoke that leave for his own papers and
simultaneously seek to deny its benefit to the Applicants. This objection is
dismissed.
F. THE MERITS: CONFIRMATION OF THE RULE NISI
The Court considered the requisites for the granting of an final interdict as
follows:
(a) Clear Right
[51] The clearest possible right in the context of a final interdict is one flowing
directly from an extant, operative, and unrescinded court order. The Regional
Court Order of 24 April 2025 (Annexure "FA3") is precisely such an order: in
terms of clause 2, it directly and specifically orders Potgieter to transfer the
property to Cornelius Tobias Vermaak. The existence of this order is not
disputed. Potgieter does not deny having signed the settlement or that it was
made an order of court. For all four of the reasons stated in the locus standi
analysis above, Vermaak's right arising from the Regional Court Order is clear
and direct. The Regional Court Order has not been rescinded, suspended, or
set aside. A clear right is established.
[52] The First Respondent's only challenges to the existence of a clear right rest
on duress and the pending rescission applications, both of which are
addressed below.
The Duress Defence
[53] The centrepiece of the First Respondent's substantive opposition is the
allegation that the settlement was concluded under duress. This allegation is
maintained in the answering affidavit at paragraphs 21.1 to 21.7, repeated in
the heads of argument at paragraphs 3 to 11, and reiterated in the
supplementary answering affidavit. Potgieter alleges that Rautenbach coerced
him into signing the settlement under the threat of incarceration pursuant to
the contempt order (Annexure "JP1"), and that Rautenbach refused to permit
him to sign the amended version proposed by his attorney (Annexure "JP2").
[54] The duress allegation is rejected for the following six reasons, each of which
is independently sufficient.
[55] First, and most fundamentally, the threat relied upon — incarceration pursuant
to a valid contempt of court order — is not an unlawful threat. It is not a threat
made by Rautenbach at all; it is the consequence of Potgieter's own prior non-
compliance with a valid court order, imposed by a court. A threat to allow
lawful legal consequences to take effect does not constitute duress vitiating a
subsequently concluded agreement: Savvides v Savvides and Another 1986
(2) SA 325 (W) at 328G –H; Preller v Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A) at 494D;
Arend and Another v Astra Furnishers (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 298 (C) at 306A–
B; Broodryk v Smuts NO 1942 TPD 47 at 52 –53. The first and most essential
requirement of duress — an unlawful threat — is not met.
[56] Second, Potgieter had full access to legal advice throughout the settlement
negotiations. His attorney, Riekie Erasmus Attorneys, was engaged in the
negotiations, proposed the alternative amended settlement (Annexure "JP2"),
and was available for telephonic consultation during the meeting. After
consulting with his attorney, Potgieter elected to sign the unamended
settlement. A party who receives full legal advice, considers an alternative,
and then freely chooses to sign cannot thereafter rely on duress to escape the
consequences of that choice.
[57] Third, Potgieter himself deposed to a sworn supporting affidavit on 25 March
2025 — the same day as the settlement — confirming it as his free and
voluntary act (Annexure "WR15"). A contemporaneous sworn statement made
on the very day of the allegedly coerced act is directly irreconcilable with the
subsequent assertion of coercion. This is objective evidence of the highest
order, and Potgieter has not sought to challenge or explain away this
contemporaneous affidavit in any of his subsequent papers.
[58] Fourth, the transcript of the settlement negotiations (Annexure "WR16")
constitutes objective, contemporaneous evidence of the manner in which the
settlement was concluded. It records the Second Applicant's representative
explicitly asking Potgieter whether he was signing freely and confirming that
he was not being compelled, with Potgieter's recorded response indicating
agreement to proceed. Potgieter has neither denied the accuracy of this
agreement to proceed. Potgieter has neither denied the accuracy of this
transcript, nor sought its exclusion, nor applied for its rejectio n in any of his
subsequent affidavits. His complete silence on the objective record of the
negotiations is telling. It is difficult to understand why a party who was
genuinely coerced would fail to engage with the very transcript recording the
allegedly coercive encounter.
[59] Fifth, the duress allegation was not raised until 4 April 2025 — nine days after
the settlement was signed — in an irregular ex parte letter from Riekie
Erasmus Attorneys to the Cullinan Magistrate (Annexure "WR44"). That letter
is itself procedurally improper as an ex parte communication to a judicial
officer without notice to the opposing party. Had there been genuine and
immediate coercion, one would expect the allegation to have been raised
formally at once. The delayed emergence of the allegation in an irregular
letter, rather than in a formal affidavit, is inconsistent with genuine coercion.
[60] Sixth, the First Respondent's versions in these proceedings are mutually
contradictory in multiple material respects. At one point Potgieter claimed to
have offshore Bitcoin assets sufficient to satisfy the debt; at another, he said
the property was his only substantial asset; at another, he claimed that
transferring the property would constitute an act of insolvency — which it
could only if the debt was smaller than the value of the property, directly
contradicting the claim that a R620,000 debt could not be satisfied by a
property worth R2,375,000; at another, he said he intended to sell the
property privately and settle the debt from the proceeds; and then he alleged
coercion. These versions are mutually destructive and cannot simultaneously
be true. Under the Plascon-Evans approach and as applied in Wightman v
Headfour 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) para 13, a version that is internally
contradictory and mutually destructive does not require acceptance by the
Court.
[61] The duress defence is rejected in its entirety. The settlement was validly
concluded and the Regional Court Order of 24 April 2025 stands as a binding,
operative, and enforceable order.
The Pending Rescission Applications
[62] The First Respondent relies on two pending rescission applications in the
Cullinan/Pretoria Central Regional Court to argue that the Regional Court
Order is contestable and therefore does not give rise to a clear right. The First
Rescission Application was dismissed as fatally defective and non -compliant
with Magistrate Court Rule 49 on 19 May 2025, with costs against the
Respondents (Supplementary Founding Affidavit, paragraph 143). The
Second Rescission Application (case 2025 -3368) targets the orders of 7 April
2025 and 24 April 2025 and is enrolled before Magistrate P Singh in the
Pretoria Central Regional Court on 21 July 2026.
[63] The proposition that a pending rescission application deprives the impugned
order of its binding force is not the law. The Regional Court Order of 24 April
2025 remains fully operative and binding. No stay of its operation has been
sought or granted in these or any other proceedings. The First Respondent is
bound to comply with the Regional Court Order while pursuing its rescission,
not entitled to treat it as suspended merely because he has instituted
proceedings challenging it: Fismer v Thornton 1929 AD 17 at 25; Gentiruco
AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 589 (A) at 635B –C; Eke v Parsons
2015 (11) BCLR 1319 (CC) paras 30 –32. The pending rescission does not
displace the clear right.
(b) Injury Actually Committed or Reasonably Apprehended
[64] The injury complained of in this application is not apprehended — it has
actually been committed. Potgieter mandated the Second and Third
Respondents to market the property for sale (Founding Affidavit, paragraph
20). His agents entered the property without Vermaak's consent to take
marketing photographs, constituting trespass (paragraph 24). The property
was listed for sale on electronic platforms (Annexure "FA4"), and a showing to
prospective purchasers had been arranged for 29 May 2025. All of this
occurred with full knowledge of the Regional Court Order — Riekie Erasmus
occurred with full knowledge of the Regional Court Order — Riekie Erasmus
Attorneys had been present in court when it was granted on 24 April 2025 —
and in defiance of the Applicants' demand (Annexure "FA5"), which Riekie
Erasmus Attorneys explicitly rejected on the same day (Annexure "FA6"). The
breach was deliberate, open, and conducted at the direction of the First
Respondent. The injury element is established.
[65] The First Respondent now submits in the supplementary answering affidavit
that since the interim interdict has been in place, the property has not been
marketed, and he undertakes not to deal with it until the litigation is finally
determined. This undertaking does not displace the injury element for two
reasons. First, it is an informal undertaking from a party who has
demonstrated serial disregard of court orders and undertakings — Riekie
Erasmus Attorneys gave an undertaking on 8 April 2025 to sell the property
and settle from the proceeds, which was followed immediately by the renewed
marketing and trespass that gave rise to this application. Second, Potgieter's
own answering affidavit asserted that the Regional Court Order was not
binding on him. The objective apprehension of a repetition of the breach,
absent the protection of a final court order, is established. The conduct of a
party who must be compelled by an interdict to comply with a court order
cannot found an argument for the discharge of that interdict on the ground
that the interim interdict is effective.
(c) No Adequate or Satisfactory Remedy Available
[66] The First Respondent submits at paragraph 26.5 of the heads of argument
that the Applicants have always had available to them a warrant of execution
against immovable property or a sequestration application, and that these
constitute adequate alternative remedies. The Court disagrees.
[67] A warrant of execution against immovable property requires the property to be
preserved and available for judicial sale through the Sheriff. If Potgieter is
permitted to complete a private sale and transfer the property, execution
against it becomes impossible. The protection of an innocent third -party
purchaser's real right upon transfer may ultimately defeat even a subsequent
execution attempt: Legator McKenna Inc and Another v Shea and Others
execution attempt: Legator McKenna Inc and Another v Shea and Others
2010 (1) SA 35 (SCA) paras 22 –25. The interdict preserves the possibility of
enforcement by preventing the very event that would make enforcement futile.
[68] As for sequestration: this remedy was previously pursued (case 2024-074393)
and then withdrawn. Even on the First Respondent's own account, the
withdrawal occurred because of complications surrounding the property's title
position. If the property's ownership is subject to competing claims,
sequestration would not produce a clean distribution of the proceeds. In any
event, if the proceeds of a private sale were dissipated after transfer — a real
apprehension given this litigation history — a sequestration order would also
produce no recovery.
[69] Most importantly, Potgieter has himself admitted that the property is his only
substantial asset (answering affidavit, paragraph 27.1). Once the property is
sold and the proceeds are dissipated, all alternative remedies become
valueless. The irreversibility of that prejudice is sufficient to displace any
argument for an alternative remedy: National Treasury v OUTA 2012 (6) SA
223 (CC) para 73. The no adequate alternative remedy requirement is
satisfied.
(d) Balance of Convenience
[70] Although balance of convenience is primarily a consideration in interim
proceedings, it remains relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion on
the return date: OUTA para 25. The rule nisi has been operative since 29 May
2025 — nearly twelve months at the time of hearing. During that entire period,
the First Respondent has vacated the property and has demonstrated no
ongoing prejudice arising directly from the operation of the interdict; it
restrains him only from doing what the Regional Court Order already prohibits.
By contrast, if the rule is discharged, the property can immediately be sold
and transferred to a third party, permanently and irreversibly extinguishing the
rights of both Applicants under the Regional Court Order. The balance of
convenience decisively favours confirmation.
Confirmation of the Rule Nisi
[71] I am satisfied that the Applicants have established all three requirements for a
final interdict. The clear right arises from the Regional Court Order of 24 April
2025. The injury has been actually committed. There is no adequate
alternative remedy. The balance of convenience supports confirmation. The
rule nisi granted on 29 May 2025 and extended on 14 October 2025 and 23
February 2026 is accordingly confirmed as a final order.
G. THE DISCOUNT BOARD MATTER — EVEN IF THE FIRST
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTARY AFFIDAVIT HAD BEEN ADMITTED
[72] The First Respondent's Supplementary Affidavit was struck out, and with it the
Discount Board argument. For completeness, and to demonstrate that the
striking out does not affect the outcome, the substance of the argument is
addressed below.
[73] The First Respondent’s Affidavit asserts that Potgieter sold the property to
Discount Board Specialists Group on 11 March 2021; that Rautenbach knew
of this prior sale when he obtained the Regional Court Order of 24 April 2025;
and that Rautenbach failed to disclose it to the Cullinan Regional Court. From
these allegations two propositions are advanced: that the Regional Court
Order is invalid for non -disclosure, and that the prior Discount sale defeats
Vermaak's right to the property.
[74] Neither proposition succeeds even on the hypothesis that the First
Respondent's Supplementary Affidavit had been admitted. The title deed
produced as Annexure "JP3" reflects the property as registered in Potgieter's
name at all material times up to the present. The First Respondent's
Supplementary Affidavit itself acknowledges that transfer to Discount was not
completed — the Deeds Office amendment remained outstanding (paragraph
6). A sale agreement that has not resulted in registered transfer does not vest
the property in the purchaser or defeat a subsequent court order made
against the registered owner.
[75] If Rautenbach withheld material facts from the Cullinan Regional Court when
obtaining the order of 24 April 2025, the appropriate remedy is rescission of
the Regional Court Order in the Cullinan/Pretoria Central Regional Court
proceedings, on the grounds of fraud or material non -disclosure. Those
proceedings already exist in the form of the Second Rescission Application,
enrolled for 21 July 2026. This Court, on the return date of a rule nisi, is not
the appropriate forum to investigate and determine a complex allegation of
fraud and non -disclosure in Magistrate's Court proceedings — particularly
where all the material facts are disputed and where the primary documents
would need to be produced and tested.
[76] Furthermore, the entire factual basis of the First Respondent's Supplementary
Affidavit on the Discount matter rests on hearsay: Ms Erasmus characterises
what she read in the Caselines file of another case and what she was told in a
telephone call. No copy of the Discount sale agreement, no copy of
Rautenbach's joinder affidavit in the Discount matter, and no copy of the
alleged Johannesburg interdict has been produced. The Court cannot make
findings of non -disclosure and bad faith on the basis of an attorney's
unverified characterisation of documents not before it.
[77] The Discount Board argument therefore fails substantively in all respects,
even on the hypothesis that the First Respondent's Supplementary Affidavit
had been admitted. It provides no basis for the discharge of the rule nisi.
H. THE JOINDER APPLICATION — DIETER JOHAN OOSTHUIZEN AS
FOURTH RESPONDENT
Introduction and Procedural Background
[78] The Applicants' joinder application seeks to join Oosthuizen as the Fourth
Respondent for the purposes of the Part B relief. The substantive power to
join a party in Superior Court proceedings derives from Rule 10 of the Uniform
Rules of Court, with the motion procedure in Rule 6 as the procedural vehicle.
Rules of Court, with the motion procedure in Rule 6 as the procedural vehicle.
The joinder Notice of Motion is at CL 23 -1 to 23-5, the founding affidavit at CL
23-6 to 23 -15, and Annexures "JA1" to "JA3" at CL 23 -16 to 23 -26. The
Applicants' replying affidavit on the joinder application is at CL 29 -1 to 29-18,
filed on 17 March 2026 within the timetable. The First Respondent's heads of
argument at paragraph 1.3.3 dismiss the joinder application in a single,
unargued sentence: "The application for joinder of Oosthuizen is bad in law."
No argument in support of that bare assertion is developed anywhere in the
heads, which are purportedly also filed on behalf of Oosthuizen "to the extent
necessary" — an unusual position given that Oosthuizen filed his own
answering affidavit opposing joinder on separate grounds.
[79] The procedural history is relevant. The Applicants first attempted to bring
Oosthuizen into the proceedings by serving a Notice to Amend the Part B
Notice of Motion on 14 January 2026 (Annexure "JA1", CL 23 -16 to 23 -18).
The notice was served one day late due to a miscalculation of the dies by 24
hours (Joinder Founding Affidavit, paragraph 20, CL 23 -9). The amendment
was effected on 28 January 2026 (Annexure "JA2", CL 23 -20 to 23 -24). The
First Respondent objected in terms of Rule 30(2)(b) to the late amendment. In
response, the Applicants withdrew the amended Notice of Motion on 13
February 2026 (Annexure "JA3", CL 23 -25 to 23 -26) and on the same day
launched the present separate joinder application — the procedurally
orthodox alternative mechanism after the amendment route was foreclosed by
the First Respondent's own procedural objection.
The Factual Basis for Joinder — The Applicants' Case
[80] The basis for Oosthuizen's joinder is established in the Joinder Founding
Affidavit at paragraphs 25 to 38 and amplified in the Supplementary Founding
Affidavit at paragraphs 37 to 181.
[81] The following matters are highlighted at paragraphs 25.1 to 25.11. At
paragraph 25.1: Oosthuizen has been a party to the proceedings in the
Cullinan Regional Court under case number RC80/2024 from inception and is
Cullinan Regional Court under case number RC80/2024 from inception and is
personally bound by all orders made therein. At paragraph 25.4: Oosthuizen
refused to comply with the Regional Court order of 3 February 2025
(Annexure "WR5"), which required him to present vehicles or make payment
— the direct trigger for the section 72 proceedings and the contempt
application, which in turn led to the settlement and the Regional Court Order.
At paragraph 25.5: Oosthuizen launched a fatally defective appeal (A2025 -
061324) against the Regional Court order of 3 February 2025, filing his notice
of appeal 44 days outside the prescribed 20-day period: Motaung v Minister of
Police 2024 ZANWHC 258 para 13. He failed to bring an adequate
condonation application and has not prosecuted the appeal to finality. At
paragraph 25.6: he refused to tender security for costs as required by Rule
51, notwithstanding multiple demands. At paragraph 25.7: he has refused to
bring the appeal to finality. At paragraph 25.8: despite the pendency of the
appeal, Oosthuizen filed rescission applications in the Regional Court
targeting the very orders that are the subject of that appeal — applications
characterised in the Supplementary Founding Affidavit as non -compliant with
Magistrate Court Rule 49 and brought for orders that were not granted in
default and therefore incapable of rescission under that Rule. At paragraphs
25.9 and 25.10: Oosthuizen has expressed an intention to continue with
further proceedings and has refused to pay any of the multiple costs orders
made against him and Potgieter. At paragraph 25.11: Oosthuizen, in concert
with Potgieter and under the hand of Riekie Erasmus Attorneys, has randomly
set down matters that were not ripe for hearing and then failed to attend court,
causing the Applicants to incur wasted costs.
[82] At paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Joinder Founding Affidavit, Vermaak states
that the questions of law and fact arising from the conduct of both Potgieter
and Oosthuizen are identical, the relief sought against them is the same, and
that joining Oosthuizen promotes judicial efficiency by consolidating the
related relief in one proceeding. At paragraph 38 he concludes that
related relief in one proceeding. At paragraph 38 he concludes that
Oosthuizen's joinder is just and fair, that he has a direct and substantial
interest in the matter, that the merits relating to both the First and Fourth
Respondents are intertwined and not easily separated, and that Oosthuizen
must be joined to ventilate all issues relating to the same question of law or
fact in one proceeding.
Oosthuizen's Opposition to Joinder
[83] Oosthuizen's opposition rests on the following grounds: procedurally, that the
joinder application is an impermissible attempt to amend the Notice of Motion;
that he cannot be cited before joinder is formally granted; and that the
application is non-compliant with Rule 10. Substantively, he contends that he
has no direct or substantial interest in the property dispute; that his litigation in
RC80/2024 concerned his own vehicles and is separate from the property
dispute; that his litigation was conducted in good faith to protect his own
rights; and that the Applicants are engaged in a campaign of harassment
against him.
Oosthuizen's Points in Limine
[84] The procedural points in limine are dismissed for the following reasons:
[85] On amendment versus joinder: the joinder application is not an amendment of
the Notice of Motion. It is an independent application for joinder under Rule
10, brought by way of the motion procedure under Rule 6. The Applicants
explicitly acknowledge at paragraph 14 of the Joinder Founding Affidavit that
Oosthuizen will not be a party to the main application until the joinder order is
granted, and that the citation of Oosthuizen in the heading of the joinder
papers is for the purposes of the joinder application only. Rule 10(1) requires
that notice of the joinder application be given to the person whose joinder is
sought — which is precisely the mechanism employed. The fact that the
Applicants previously attempted a Rule 28 amendment — which they
withdrew — does not preclude them from pursuing joinder under Rule 10. The
two mechanisms are distinct.
[86] On citation before formal joinder: for this Court to consider and grant the
joinder application, Oosthuizen must be before it. The citation of Oosthuizen
in the joinder application heading is the procedural means by which he is
brought before the Court for the purposes of the joinder application itself. Far
brought before the Court for the purposes of the joinder application itself. Far
from being irregular, it is the only way in which the Court can hear the
application. Oosthuizen was notified of the application, elected to participate,
filed an answering affidavit, and has been heard. The audi alteram partem
principle has been fully satisfied.
[87] On Rule 10 non -compliance: the Rule 10 objection is advanced without
identifying any specific provision of Rule 10 that has been breached. Rule 10
governs the power and procedure for joinder and does not prohibit a separate
joinder application brought after an amendment was withdrawn. The objection
is too vague to found a point in limine and is dismissed.
Oosthuizen's Substantive Opposition
[88] Oosthuizen submits that he has no direct or substantial interest in the property
dispute. This submission fundamentally mischaracterises the joinder
application. The Applicants do not seek to join Oosthuizen to Part A of the
proceedings, which concerns the property. They seek his joinder for Part B —
specifically so that the Part B relief directed personally and individually against
him (the vexatious litigant declaration, the order requiring prior judicial
approval of future proceedings, and the security for costs order) may be
granted with him as a party before the Court. An order under section 2(1)(b) of
the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 will directly restrict Oosthuizen's
individual legal capacity to litigate freely, will require him to seek and obtain
judicial approval before instituting further proceedings against the Applicants,
and will require him to pay security for costs. These consequences are
directed at Oosthuizen personally — it is difficult to imagine a more direct
personal interest: Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour at
657; Gordon v Department of Health para 9. A vexatious litigant order
cannot be made against a person who is not a party to the proceedings:
Beinash v Ernst & Young 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC) para 13.
[89] Oosthuizen's own answering affidavit confirms his active participation in
[89] Oosthuizen's own answering affidavit confirms his active participation in
exactly the litigation matrix that underlies Part B. He acknowledges his co -
respondent status in RC80/2024, his noting of the appeal, his filing of
rescission applications, and his intention to bring further proceedings. By his
own account, he is not a stranger to the dispute. As Vermaak observes at
paragraph 38.4 of the Joinder Founding Affidavit: both the First and Fourth
Respondents, in concert, worked to frustrate the Applicants by launching
vexatious and fatally defective legal processes repeatedly, each of which
produced the same defeated result for both of them on every occasion.
[90] The same questions of law and fact must be determined in Part B in relation
to Oosthuizen as in relation to Potgieter: whether there has been persistent
institution of proceedings without reasonable grounds; whether the purpose
was to harass rather than to vindicate a genuine right; whether the pattern
constitutes vexatious litigation under the Act. The evidence relevant to these
questions — the history of RC80/2024, the defective appeal, the defective
rescission applications, the de bonis propriis costs order against Ms Erasmus
of 2 June 2025 (Annexure "WR32"), and the contempt and appeal history —
is common to both respondents. Determining Part B without Oosthuizen
would result in fragmented litigation, inconsistency of outcome, and would
expose the Applicants to the very vexatious litigation that Part B is designed
to curb: Maserumule and Another v Motsepe and Others [2006] ZAGPHC 39.
[91] Oosthuizen's good faith argument is not a defence to joinder. Good faith goes
to the merits of the Part B vexatious litigant allegation, which is the very
question to be determined once he is joined. Joinder does not determine
whether he has acted vexatiously — it ensures he is properly before the Court
when that question is adjudicated. As Vermaak correctly observes at
paragraph 35 of the Joinder Founding Affidavit, joinder actually protects
Oosthuizen's constitutional rights under section 34 by ensuring he is heard
before any adverse order is made against him.
[92] The harassment allegation is denied as entirely unsupported by any factual
foundation. The Applicants are entitled under Rule 10 to seek Part B relief
foundation. The Applicants are entitled under Rule 10 to seek Part B relief
against Oosthuizen, and pursuing that relief by the prescribed procedural
mechanism is not harassment — it is the lawful invocation of the Court's
jurisdiction.
[93] The joinder application is granted. Oosthuizen is joined as the Fourth
Respondent for the purposes of Part B.
I. COSTS
[94] On the costs of the confirmation of the rule nisi, the First Respondent is wholly
unsuccessful and is accordingly liable for the costs of this application. The
Applicants seek costs on the punitive scale as between attorney and client.
Having regard to the following features of this litigation, the Court is satisfied
that the punitive scale is appropriate.
[95] The First Respondent defied the Regional Court Order of 24 April 2025 on the
express legal advice of his attorney that the order was not binding on him, as
recorded in his own answering affidavit at paragraph 24.1. That advice was
plainly wrong and, given the elementary principles applicable to court orders,
foreseeably so. The resulting urgent application, and all the litigation flowing
from it, was the direct and foreseeable consequence of that defiance. The
points in limine argued in the heads — the locus standi point and the non -
joinder point — were advanced on bare assertions unsupported by
documentation across multiple rounds of affidavits spanning more than twelve
months. The locus standi point, while raising a question worth engaging with
seriously, rests on a fundamental misapplication of cession principles to the
specific tripartite structure of this particular settlement agreement. The
Respondents' versions have throughout been internally contradictory,
mutually destructive, and in material respects directly contradicted by
objective contemporaneous documentary evidence. The First Respondent's
Supplementary Affidavit — filed one week before the hearing without leave,
without condonation, without primary documents, and without affording the
Applicants any opportunity to respond — is a further egregious example of the
disregard for court orders and procedural rules that has characterised this
litigation.
disregard for court orders and procedural rules that has characterised this
litigation.
[96] On the joinder application, the Fourth Respondent is wholly unsuccessful. His
procedural points in limine were vague, unsubstantiated, and inconsistent with
the applicable provisions of Rule 10. His substantive opposition
mischaracterised the nature of the joinder application and ignored the direct
and personal interest he has in the Part B relief directed against him. He is
ordered to pay the costs of the joinder application.
[97] The question of a de bonis propriis costs order against Ms Riekie Erasmus
personally, and the question of a referral of her conduct to the Legal Practice
Council, are reserved for determination at the Part B hearing. The full pattern
of her conduct across these proceedings — including the First Respondent’s
Supplementary Affidavit, the adverse comments of the Appeal Court on 7 May
2026 (CL 34-9), the multiple defective applications, the de bonis propriis costs
order already granted against her in the Regional Court on 2 June 2025
(Annexure "WR32", CL 25 -304+), and the sustained disregard of court -
ordered timetables — will be comprehensively before the Court at that stage.
[98] The costs of the appearances on 14 October 2025 before Mngqibisa -Thusi J
and on 23 February 2026 before Millar J are included in and form part of the
costs order in favour of the Applicants below. The costs in respect of the
Second and Third Respondents' period of opposition from 28 May 2025 to 14
October 2025 are reserved for separate determination.
J. ORDER
[99] In the result, the following order is made:
1. The further supplementary affidavit deposed to by Ms Riekie Erasmus and
filed on 7 May 2026 on behalf of the First Respondent is declared pro non
scripto and is struck from the record as constituting an irregular step, and
remains of no force or effect in these proceedings. The First Respondent and
Ms Riekie Erasmus, in her personal capacity, jointly and severally, the one
paying the other to be absolved, are ordered to pay the costs of the Rule 30
and Rule 30A applications and of the notice of motion dated 8 May 2026 on
the scale as between attorney and client , including costs of Counsel on scale
B.
2. The rule nisi granted by Mooki J on 29 May 2025, extended by Mngqibisa -
Thusi J on 14 October 2025, further extended by Millar J on 23 February
2026, and by this Court on 14 May 2026, is confirmed.
3. The interim relief contained in paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 3 of the order dated 29
May 2025 is made a final order of Court in the following terms:
3.1 The First, Second and Third Respondents are finally interdicted and
restrained from advertising or offering the property described as POX
9[...] Derdepark, Plot 377, Derdepoort 326 JR Pretoria 0186 for sale to
any person.
3.2 The First, Second and Third Respondents are finally interdicted and
restrained to allow and/or causing any person to enter, advertise for
sale, alternatively, offering for sale or allowing or causing entry to the
property described as POX 9[...] Derdepark, Plot 377, Derdepoort 326
JR Pretoria 0186 by any person or entity for any reason without the
written consent of the First Applicant.
3.3 The First, Second and Third Respondents is ordered to remove all
adverts on any electronic property platform and any social media
platform offering the property described as POX 9[...] Derdepark, Plot
377, Derdepoort 326 JR Pretoria 0186 or any abbreviation of the
property discretion for sale.
4. The parties are afforded leave to supplement their papers, if needed, prior to
the adjudication of Part B.
5. The application for the joinder of Dieter Johan Oosthuizen as the Fourth
Respondent in these proceedings is granted in terms of Rule 10 of the
Uniform Rules of Court.
5.1 Dieter Johan Oosthuizen is joined as the Fourth Respondent in the
main application for the purposes of the adjudication of the Part B
relief.
5.2 The Applicants are directed to serve the complete record of
proceedings filed in the main application on the Fourth Respondent
within 15 (fifteen) court days of this order.
5.3 The Fourth Respondent's right to deliver such further affidavit material
in relation to Part B as the parties may agree, or as the Court may
direct, within agreed or directed time periods, is preserved.
6. Part B of the application is postponed sine die for hearing on a date to be
arranged with the Registrar.
7. The First Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the confirmation of the
rule nisi, including all costs of this application from the granting of the rule nisi
on 29 May 2025 to the date of this judgment, including the costs of all
appearances before Mooki J, Mngqibisa -Thusi J, Millar J, and this Court, and
including the costs reserved on 14 October 2025 and 23 February 2026, on
the scale as between attorney and client, including the costs of counsel on
Scale B.
8. The Fourth Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the joinder application
on the party and party scale, including the costs of counsel on Scale B.
9. The question of a de bonis propriis costs order against Ms Riekie Erasmus
personally and the question of a referral of her conduct to the Legal Practice
Council are reserved for determination at the Part B hearing.
10. Costs in respect of the Second and Third Respondents' period of opposition
from 28 May 2025 to 14 October 2025 are reserved for separate
determination.
BY ORDER
SM MARITZ AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearances:
Instructing Attorneys for the Applicants: Janus Stefanus Kruger Attorneys
Counsel for the Applicants: Adv EDL Jacobus (Circle
Chambers)
Attorneys for the First and Fourth Respondents: Riekie Erasmus Attorneys
Appearance for First and Fourth Respondent: Ms Riekie Erasmus
Second and Third Respondents: Abiding (No appearance)
Date of Hearing: 14 May 2026
Date of Delivery of Judgment: 3 June 2026