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[2019] ZASCA 93
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Gold Circle (Pty) Ltd v Maharaj (1313/17) [2019] ZASCA 93 (3 June 2019)
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THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
No: 1313/17
In
the matter between:
GOLD CIRCLE (PTY)
LTD
APPLICANT
and
ANIL
B MAHARAJ
RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
Gold Circle (Pty) Ltd v
Maharaj
(1313/17)
[2019] ZASCA 93
(3 June 2019)
Coram:
Majiedt, Wallis, Saldulker and Molemela
JJA and Weiner AJA
Heard:
6 May 2019
Delivered:
3 June 2019
Summary:
Complaint of unfair discrimination in
terms of the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act, 4 of 2000
–
earlier
application dismissed by Equality Court – whether second
referral precluded by the operation of doctrine of
res
judicata
or issue estoppel –
remittal to Equality Court for
de novo
hearing.
ORDER
On
appeal from
KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court,
Pietermaritzburg (
Seegobin and Balton JJ sitting
as court of appeal):
1 The application for
leave to appeal is granted.
2 Save to the extent as
set out in paragraph 3 below, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
3 Paragraph 2 of the
order of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with the
following:
‘
The
matter is remitted to the Equality Court for a hearing
de novo
before any presiding officer.’
JUDGMENT
Molemela
JA (
Majiedt, Wallis, Saldulker JJA and Weiner
AJA concurring
)
Introduction
[1]
The respondent, Mr Anil Bhagwan Maharaj, a professional racehorse
trainer, instituted proceedings in terms of the Promotion
of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 4 of 2000
(PEPUDA) alleging that the applicant, Gold Circle (Pty) Ltd
(Gold
Circle), a racing operator, had unfairly discriminated against him on
racial grounds. His claim was instituted in the Durban
Magistrate’s
Court sitting as the Equality Court. At the directions hearing held
at the Equality Court (presided over by
Magistrate van Rooyen), Gold
Circle raised a special plea of
res judicata
in the form of
issue estoppel. The Equality Court upheld the special plea and
dismissed Mr Maharaj’s claim with costs.
[2]
Mr Maharaj appealed against the finding of the Equality Court to the
KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court (Seegobin and
Balton JJ)
(the court a quo). It upheld that appeal with costs and remitted the
matter to the Equality Court for a hearing
de novo
before
another magistrate. Gold Circle unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal
that decision. On petition to this court, the matter
was referred for
oral argument as contemplated in s 16(1)
(c)
read with
s
17(2)
(d)
and
(e)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
.
The parties were also directed to be prepared to argue the merits of
the appeal at the hearing.
Issues
[3] Accordingly, the
first issue to be determined is whether or not Gold Circle should be
granted leave to appeal. The second issue
is whether the court a quo
was correct in not upholding the special plea of
res judicata
.
The final issue is whether, if the matter is remitted, Magistrate van
Rooyen is disqualified from hearing it and whether the issues
should
be circumscribed.
Factual
Background
[4]
In order to determine whether the special plea was properly upheld,
it is necessary to examine the factual background of this
litigation,
which has a rather long and troubled history. Mr Maharaj leased
stables from Gold Circle for a number of years. In
2002 the National
Horse Racing Authority (NHA) found Mr Maharaj guilty of two counts of
assault, one in relation to a jockey and
the other in respect of a
steward. The sanction imposed on him was an order suspending his
training licence for 5 years. As a sequel
to the NHA’s finding,
Gold Circle ordered Mr Maharaj to remove his horses from the stables
it
had leased to him. It took Mr Maharaj
three months to transfer the horses he was training to other
trainers. This rendered him liable
to Gold Circle for the rent in
respect of the stables for that period. It is common cause that Mr
Maharaj did not settle the arrear
rent at that stage.
[5]
Following the expiry of his period of suspension, Mr Maharaj decided
to resume his racehorse-training activities. He accordingly
approached Gold Circle seeking stabling facilities as well as funding
from the transformation fund Gold Circle was statutorily
required to
ring-fence for previously disadvantaged persons operating in the
horseracing industry. Both requests were denied by
Gold Circle and no
reasons were furnished. Having formed the view that the refusal to
grant him facilities and funding was prompted
by unfair racial
discrimination on account of his being Indian, Mr Maharaj lodged a
complaint of unfair discrimination with the
Magistrate’s Court,
Durban, sitting as the Equality Court (the 2008 claim). Gold Circle
defended the claim.
[6]
The essence of Gold Circle’s defence was that the reasons for
denying Mr Maharaj’s request had nothing to do with
unfair
discrimination. It was alleged that its refusal was based on his
previous misconduct, coupled with his failure to settle
his
indebtedness to Gold Circle in respect of arrear rent. In a judgment
handed down in May 2011, the Equality Court found that
the reasons
advanced by Gold Circle were sound. It dismissed Mr Maharaj’s
claim with costs on the basis that he had not shown
that Gold Circle
had unfairly discriminated against him. Mr Maharaj appealed against
that judgment.
[7]
In its appeal judgment delivered in November 2012, the KwaZulu-Natal
High Court endorsed the Equality Court’s findings
and held that
Gold Circle had shown what it termed ‘moral’ and
‘commercial’ reasons for its refusal to
accede to the
requests. It considered the moral reason to be Mr Maharaj’s
previous misconduct which had culminated
in his suspension by the NHA
and the commercial reason to be Mr Maharaj’s failure to
liquidate his indebtedness in respect
of arrear rent and the cost
orders previously granted against him in favour of Gold Circle. Mr
Maharaj was refused leave to appeal
that judgment by both the high
court and this court.
[8]
In 2013, Mr Maharaj again approached the Equality Court (Magistrate
Motala), this time citing the KwaZulu-Natal Gambling Board
as the
first respondent, the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal as the second
respondent and Gold Circle as the third respondent. That court
ruled
that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as it amounted
to a review of administrative action. Mr Maharaj’s
attempts to
appeal against that ruling were unsuccessful.
[9]
On 13 January 2016 Mr Maharaj once again approached Gold Circle for
the renting of stables and for financial assistance from
its
empowerment fund. His application was couched as follows:
‘
Application
for training / stabling facilities at Summerveld
Dear Sir
I am a horse trainer
since 1993. My career started off in Australia, then I moved to South
Africa in 1997 until 2002, when I was
suspended.
Racing has been my
passion and that is what I dedicated my life to.
During my suspension and
more recently, despite efforts, I have found it extremely difficult
to focus on other alternative careers.
My focus remains with horse
racing.
I have decided to
approach you humbly again with a request to be allocated boxes and
training facilities at your facility in Summerveld
in order that I
may resume working.
A lengthy period of time
has passed. I am aware that I had experienced some anger management
problems in the past. To this end,
over a period of 7 years, I have
enrolled in various programmes and counselling to learn strategies
and techniques to manage anger.
I am now confident in my ability to
control my emotions.
I am acutely conscious of
the fact that I owe you money and the only way I can repay you is if
I go back to work and start earning
money so [that] I can make some
arrangements with you.
In the conditions
stipulated by the KZN Betting and Gaming Board there is a clause
stating that the historically previously disadvantaged
persons should
be assisted financially and if my request for boxes and facilities is
accepted I would apply for such funds in the
hope that you [will]
look kindly at my request.’
[10]
On 22 January 2016 Gold Circle advised Mr Maharaj of its refusal to
accede to his request, advancing a number of factors, the
sum total
of which amounted to the ‘moral reason’ and ‘commercial
reason’ as referred to in the High Court
judgment relating to
the 2008 complaint. Mr Maharaj then referred an unfair discrimination
complaint to the Equality Court (the
2016 claim), again claiming to
have been unfairly discriminated against on the basis of his Indian
descent. His claim for unfair
discrimination rested on five grounds.
First, he averred that he had received counselling for his
anger-management issues. The
second ground was that there was
disparity of treatment because stabling facilities were denied to him
on account of being found
guilty on the assault charges, while a
white horserace trainer, namely Mr Laird, was still being afforded
stabling facilities despite
having been found guilty of assault in
2008 and 2012. In the third ground relied upon, Mr Maharaj alleged
that Gold Circle had
exhibited unfairly discriminated against him
insofar as white trainers who had committed other
transgressions were still
being afforded stabling facilities. The
example he cited was that of Mr Lafferty, who had allegedly
administered prohibited drugs
to racehorses, was dismissed but was
later re-employed by Gold Circle. As his fifth ground Mr Maharaj
averred that Gold Circle
was transgressing its licensing conditions
by failing to
meet
the statutory transformation requirements. Gold Circle
contended that with the exception of the first ground, the rest of
the grounds
had already been considered in previous proceedings and
had already been found to be
res judicata
in the 2013 judgment
of Magistrate Motala. It contended that the first ground was
irrelevant to a claim of unfair racial
discrimination.
[11]
The 2016 claim was allocated to Magistrate van Rooyen. At the
directions hearing, he requested the parties to file affidavits
setting out the facts on which they would rely to prove their
respective cases. In due course, Mr Maharaj filed his affidavit,
but
Gold Circle instead raised a plea of
res judicata
and filed
written submissions in that regard. Mr Maharaj’s response was
that he had, in the 2016 complaint, raised a number
of issues that
had previously not been raised in his complaints to the Equality
Court. The Equality Court found that Mr Maharaj
had not raised any
new issues and
accordingly
upheld the
plea of
res judicata
in the form of issue estoppel.
[12]
Dissatisfied with that finding, Mr Maharaj appealed to the court a
quo. The crisp issue before that court was whether the Equality
Court’s ruling in respect of the
res judicata
plea was
correct or not. The court a quo upheld the appeal. It held that the
2016 complaint was based on a new cause of action.
It also held that
the facts pertaining to the anger management therapy allegedly
received by Mr Maharaj constituted new evidence
that was relevant to
the claim of unfair discrimination. It further found that the second
incident of assault pertaining to Mr
Laird and the alleged
infractions of Mr Lafferty were new facts that had not been
considered by the Equality Court.
[13]
Gold Circle’s attack on the court a quo’s judgment is
principally on the following grounds. It contended that the
first
ground was irrelevant for purposes of determining whether or not Mr
Maharaj had been discriminated against on the basis of
his race. With
regards to the other grounds raised by Mr Maharaj, it maintained that
they were previously considered by the Equality
Court and were merely
being rehashed in the 2016 complaint. With specific reference to the
second assault committed by Mr Laird,
it held that this had been
raised in the 2013 complaint that served before the Equality Court
(Magistrate Motala), in which he
not only ruled that the Equality
Court had no jurisdiction, but also expressly stated that the assault
claims had previously been
entertained and were thus
res judicata
.
[14]
Before this court, Mr Maharaj contended that, whereas Mr Laird and Mr
Lafferty had committed transgressions similar to his,
Gold Circle
continued to afford them stabling facilities but refused to grant him
the same facilities. It further denied his request
for a grant from
the empowerment fund. He considered Gold Circle to have exhibited a
disparity of treatment which was prompted
by racial discrimination
and considered the reasons it had proffered to be a farce. He
asserted that its refusal to accede
to his requests denied him an
opportunity of participating in the horseracing industry and thus
amounted to discrimination as contemplated
in
s 1
of PEPUDA.
[15]
Gold Circle, on the other hand, maintained that its refusal to accede
to Mr Maharaj’s requests was motivated by the same
commercial
and moral reasons which another court had already found to be valid.
It argued that the misdemeanours of Mr Laird and
Mr Lafferty were not
comparable. It denied having unfairly discriminated against Mr
Maharaj. Its alternative defence was that in
the event that it is
found that there was differential treatment amounting to
discrimination, then such discrimination is not unfair.
Gold Circle
contended that the finding of the Equality Court in respect of the
2016 claim was correct, as all the legal requirements
of issue
estoppel have been met. Mr Maharaj on the other hand, maintained that
none of the five grounds he had raised were previously
pronounced
upon by another court.
Discussion
a)
Res Judicata
[16]
It is appropriate at this stage to first dispose of the issue raised
in respect of the remarks made by Magistrate Motala in
relation to
the issue of
res
judicata
.
It is well established that a court’s finding of its lack of
jurisdiction prevents any binding decision by that court on
the
merits of the matter.
[1]
It
follows that the only finding that is binding in relation to the 2013
Equality Court case before Magistrate Motala is the one
in terms of
which he found that the Equality Court had no jurisdiction to hear
the case as he considered it to be an application
for review. His
views on
res
judicata
were
obiter and not binding.
[17]
As stated before, Mr Maharaj’s complaint is premised on the
provisions of PEPUDA. The objects of PEPUDA are, inter alia,
to enact
legislation required by s 9 of the Constitution; to give effect to
the letter and spirit of the Constitution, in particular
the
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms by every person; the
promotion of equality; the prevention of unfair discrimination
and
protection of human dignity as contemplated in ss 9 and 10 of the
Constitution; to provide for procedures for the determination
of
circumstances under which discrimination is unfair; and to provide
remedies for victims of unfair discrimination.
[18]
The relevant definitions in terms of terms of s 1 of the
Act
are as follows:
‘“
discrimination”
means any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule practice,
condition or situation which directly or indirectly-
(a) imposes
burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or
(b) withholds
benefits, opportunities or advantages from,
any person on one or more
of the prohibited grounds;
“
Prohibited
grounds”
are- (a) race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age
disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth
. . . .’
[19] It is trite that the
expression
res
judicata
means that the dispute raised for adjudication has already been
finally decided. In terms of the common-law, the three requisites
of
res
judicata
are: that the dispute to be adjudicated relates to the same parties,
for the same relief and in relation to the same cause. With
time, the
common law requirements were relaxed, giving rise to the expression
issue
estoppel
,
which describes instances where a party can successfully plead that
the matter at issue has already been finally decided even
though the
common law requirements of
res
judicata
have not all been met.
[2]
The
crux of the matter is whether the plea of
res
judicata
in the form of issue estoppel was correctly upheld in relation to the
2016 claim. This requires a brief consideration of the applicable
principles. In
Prinsloo
NO & others v Goldex 15 (Pty) Ltd & another
,
[3]
Brand JA gave a detailed exposition of the development of our law
pertaining to
res
judicata
.
Any attempt to do more than that in this judgment would be
supererogatory.
[20]
Brand JA acknowledged issue estoppel as part of our law. He aligned
himself with the following dictum enunciated in
Smith
v Porritt & others
:
[4]
‘
Following the
decision in
Boshoff v Union Government
1932 TPD 345
the ambit
of the
exceptio rei judicata
has over the years been extended
by the relaxation in appropriate cases of the common-law requirements
that the relief claimed and
the cause of action be the same (
eadem
res
and
eadem petendi causa
) in both the case in question
and the earlier judgment. Where the circumstances justify the
relaxation of these requirements those
that remain are that the
parties must be the same (
idem actor
) and that the same issue
(
eadem quaestio
) must arise. Broadly stated, the latter
involves an inquiry whether an issue of fact or law was an essential
element of the judgment
on which reliance is placed. Where the plea
of
res judicata
is raised in the absence of a commonality of
cause of action and relief claimed it has become commonplace to adopt
the terminology
of English law and to speak of issue estoppel. But,
as was stressed by Botha JA in
Kommissaris van Bnnelandse Inkomste
v Absa Bank Bpk
1995 (1) SA 653
(A) at 669D, 670J-671B, this is
not to be construed as implying an abandonment of the principles of
the common law in favour of
those of English law; the defence remains
one of
res judicata
. The recognition of the defence in such
cases will however require careful scrutiny. Each case will depend on
its own facts and
any extension of the defence will be on a
case-by-case basis. (
Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Absa
Bank
(supra) at 670E-F.) Relevant considerations will include
questions of equity and fairness not only to the parties themselves
but
also to others. As pointed out by De Villiers CJ as long ago as
1893 in
Bertram v Wood
(1893) 10 SC 177
at 180, “unless
carefully circumscribed, [the defence of
res judicata
] is
capable of producing great hardship and even positive injustice to
individuals”.’
[21]
Furthermore, Brand JA pointed out that the relaxation of the
requirements of
res
judicata
in this way creates the potential of causing inequity and unfairness
that would ordinarily not arise upon application of the three
Roman
Dutch law requirements of
res
judicata
.
He warned that the application of issue estoppel be considered on a
case by case basis in order to guard against the potential
prejudice
of impinging on the constitutional right of access to justice. The
doctrine of
res
judicata
must be carefully delineated and demarcated in order to prevent
hardship and actual injustice to the parties.
[5]
[22]
The question that must be answered is whether there was any new
evidence placed before the Equality Court in the 2016 claim,
which
was not previously adduced in the adjudication of the 2008 claim. For
the reasons that follow, I am of the view that the
answer to this
question must be answered in the affirmative. First, the new evidence
regarding Mr Maharaj having undergone extensive
anger management
counselling, is directly relevant to his previous infractions which
resulted in his five year suspension. It was
admitted in the
answering affidavit on behalf of Gold Circle that this evidence is
new. The reports of Professor Gangat, a specialist
psychiatrist, and
Dr Motala, a clinical psychologist, indicate that Mr Maharaj has
successfully undergone anger management counselling
and that he has
responded positively to treatment. Mr Maharaj wishes to use this
evidence to show that the reasons advanced by
Gold Circle for its
decision are a sham. Whether it does so is not for this court to
decide, but Mr Maharaj is entitled to seek
to use it for that
purpose.
[23]
The grounds of his complaint may be the same as in 2008, but Mr
Maharaj contends that facts that have arisen since then may
undermine
the reasons given by Gold Circle. We do not say that they will, but
he is entitled to advance them in support of his
contentions.
[24] It follows that the
finding of issue estoppel was an error on the part of the Equality
Court. Given that finding, there is
no reason why Mr Maharaj should
be precluded from placing evidence before the Equality Court. As no
evidence was led in respect
of the merits of the 2016 claim, the
court a quo correctly remitted the matter to the Equality Court for a
hearing
de novo
. This, however, is not the end of the matter.
b)
Judicial Restraint
[25]
I consider next the issue whether the court a quo’s remarks
constituted a lack of judicial restraint. It is indeed so
that
judicial officers wield great power.
[6]
While judges may have occasion to express critical views about
litigants or witnesses, such criticism requires circumspection and
must be supported by all the facts. Given its unfortunate history of
structured racism, South Africa is still a racially charged
society.
That this is so, is evident from a number of cases recently brought
before the courts in which accusations of racism are
made.
These cases attest to the far-reaching consequences that a mere
accusation of racism may bring. Courts must therefore
be alive to the
sensitivity of disputes involving racial connotations. Circumspection
is required not only in relation to the order
that is ultimately made
but also in relation to remarks made
en
passant
.
As aptly stated by a US Court of Appeal dealing with the materiality
of racism, ‘some toxins can be deadly in small doses.’
[7]
[26]
A proper determination of the matter warranted that the facts
constituting new evidence be presented in the Equality Court
be
tested. The court a quo thus correctly remitted the matter to the
Equality Court for evidence to be presented on the merits.
However,
given that the allegations of racism had not been tested by
cross-examination and that Gold Circle had countered the allegations
of its lack of transformation by presenting names of black people who
had allegedly benefitted from transformation policies of
Gold Circle,
there was simply no basis for the court a quo to have made remarks
from which it could be implied that Gold Circle
is racist. The court
a quo seems to have made findings pertaining to the very nub of the
case based on unproved facts. This is
contrary to established legal
principles which dictate that inferences be drawn only if they are
justified by proven facts. Moreover,
since there were disputes of
facts on that very aspect, it was impermissible for the court a quo
to make the remarks it made on
the basis of averments made by just
one party.
[8]
[27] Equally unjustified
were the court a quo’s conclusions regarding Magistrate Van
Rooyen’s state of readiness to
proceed with the matter. The
statement that Magistrate Van Rooyen had confessed to not having read
the papers was taken out of
context as he had referred to documents
that had been handed up during the hearing. He later adjourned before
giving his judgment
and would obviously have had the time to peruse
all the documents before giving judgment. On the conspectus of the
record, there
was also no justification for concluding that he had
been rude to Mr Maharaj. In the absence of any suggestion as to how
any party
would potentially be prejudiced if the matter were to be
remitted to Magistrate van Rooyen, there is therefore no cogent
reason
why he should be precluded from presiding over the matter in a
de novo
hearing.
[9]
(c)
Should the remittal to the Equality Court be circumscribed?
[28] Gold Circle
contended that in the event that this court decided to remit the
matter to the Equality Court for a
de
novo
hearing,
it should circumscribe the remittal by limiting Mr Maharaj to the
five points raised in his complaint. The legal principles
applicable
to the remittal of a matter for a
de
novo
hearing are well-established. The pleadings already filed in the
matter continue to stand. In relation to this matter, the pleadings
are Mr Maharaj’s referral, Gold Circle’s response thereto
and all the affidavits filed in compliance with the directions
made
by Magistrate van Rooyen. Having said that, sight must not be lost of
the clear provisions of PEPUDA and its regulations
[10]
in relation to the conduct of proceedings before the Equality Court.
In terms of Regulation 10(1), the hearing must be conducted
in an
expeditious and informal manner which facilitates and promotes
participation by the parties. Regulation 10(5)
(b)
provides
that the presiding officer must give such directions in respect of
the conduct of the hearing as he or she deems fit. Section
3(3) of
PEPUDA also enjoins a presiding officer applying or interpreting
PEPUDA to take into account the context of the dispute
lodged by the
party referring the complaint and the purpose of the Act. It is
therefore not for this court to prescribe how the
adjudication of the
matter at the Equality Court should unfold. Both parties will have to
comply with any further directions that
may be given by the
magistrate who will preside over the matter pertaining to the giving
of evidence at that hearing.
[11]
Order
[29]
In the result, the following order is made:
1 The application for
leave to appeal is granted.
2 Save to the extent as
set out in paragraph 3 below, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
3 Paragraph 2 of the
order of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with the
following:
‘
The matter is
remitted to the Equality Court for a hearing
de novo
before
any presiding officer.’
___________________
M
B Molemela
Judge
of Appeal
Counsel
for Applicant: A Katz SC (with him A Boulle)
Instructed
by: Barkers Attorneys, Umhlanga
Matsepes
Incorporated, Bloemfontein
Counsel
for Respondent: S Moodley
Instructed
by: Narain Naidoo & Associates, Pietermaritzburg
Webbers
Attorneys, Bloemfontein
[1]
See
Lewis
& Marks v Middel
1904
TS 291
at 303 and
The
Master of the High Court, North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria v
Motala NO & others
[2011]
ZASCA 238
;
2012 (3) SA 325
(SCA) paras 12-14.
[2]
See
Kommissaris
van Binnelandse Inkomste v ABSA Bank Bpk
1995
(1) SA 653
(A) at 670I-671B.
[3]
Prinsloo
NO & others v Goldex 15 (Pty) Ltd & another
[2012] ZASCA 28
;
2014 (5) SA 297
(SCA) para 10.
[4]
Smith v
Porritt & others
2008 (6) SA 303
(SCA) para 10.
[5]
Molaudzi
v S
[2015]
ZACC 20
(CC);
2015 (2) SACR 341
(CC);
Royal
Sechaba Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Coote & another
[2-14] ZASCA 85 (SCA);
2014 (5) SA 562
(SCA);
Prinsloo
NO
supra fn2;
Holtzhausen
& another v Gore NO & others
2002
(2) SA 141
(C);
Man
Truck and Bus (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Dusbus Leasing CC & others
2004 (1) SA 454 (N).
[6]
See
S
v Mamabolo
[2001] ZACC 17
;
2001
(3) SA 409
(CC) para 15;
Cathay
Pacific Airways Ltd and another v Lin and another
[2017] 2 All SA 722
(SCA) para 1.
[7]
Buck
v Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division
580
U.S (2017) at 19-20.
[8]
See
Fischer
& another v Ramahlele & others
[2014]
ZASCA 88
;
2014 (4) SA 614
(SCA) paras 17 and 24.
[9]
S v
Teek
(SA 44/2008)
[2009] NASC 5
(28 April 2009) at para 31.
[10]
Regulations made in terms of s 30 of the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination, 2000 (Act 4 of 2000)
published
in Government Notice No. R. 764 of 13 June 2003 (Government Gazette
No. 25065.
[11]
See Regulation 10(5)
(c)(xiii)
.