SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2026-105000
In the matter between:
In the matter between:
MANDISA NDABA Applicant
and
C[…] V[…] BODY CORPORATE Respondent
Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the judge whose name is reflected
and is handed down electronically and by circulation to the parties/their legal representatives
by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of his matter on Caselines. The date for
handing down is deemed to be 25 May 2026.
ORDER
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
25 May 2026 __________________
DATE SIGNATURE
2
a. The application is heard as one of urgency and the non-compliance with the
ordinary forms and service provided for in the Uniform Rules is condoned.
b. The respondent is directed to restore the electricity supply to the applicant’s
unit known as Unit 7[ …] - Door Number 6[ …] , C[…] V[…] , 1[…] F[… ] Road,
N[…] , Randburg, within 24 hours of service of this order.
c. The restoration contemplated in paragraph (b) shall endure unless and until
the respondent exercises its rights in accordance with clause 3.2 of the
Acknowledgement of Debt concluded between the parties.
d. Each party shall pay its own costs.
JUDGMENT
CARELSE AJ
Introduction
[1] This is an opposed urgent application for the restoration of electricity supply to
the applicant’s sectional title unit. The relief sought is interim in nature.
[2] The dispute arises from the respondent’s disconnection of electricity supply to
the applicant’s unit following alleged breaches of an acknowledgement of debt
concluded between the parties (“the AOD”).
[3] The applicant contends that the respondent unlawfully disconnected the
electricity supply without complying with clause 3.2 of the AOD , which required
written notice and an opportunity to remedy the breach prior to disconnection.
[4] The respondent contends that there is a court order authorising it to
disconnect the applicant’s electricity supply; that the applicant remained in material
breach of the AOD ; that notice of the applicant’s breach was given during February
2026; and that , in any event, the applicant enjoyed substantially more than the
contractual 14-day period before the eventual disconnection in April 2026.
3
[5] The respondent further contends that the applicant has failed to satisfy the
requirements for interim interdictory relief and that the application should either be
struck from the urgent roll or dismissed.
Brief background
[6] During 2025, the applicant fell into arrears in respect of levies, electricity,
water, and related charges owing to the respondent.
[7] On 23 June 2025, this Court, under case number 2025- 030619, granted an
order authorising the respondent to terminate electricity supply to the applicant’s unit
pending payment of the arrears in electricity and water charges.
[8] Following the granting of that order, the parties entered into negotiations
regarding the payment of the arrears and concluded the AOD. The applicant signed
the AOD on 27 November 2025 and the respondent’s representatives signed it on 2
December 2025. In terms thereof , the applicant acknowledged her indebtedness to
the respondent in the capital amount of R568 755.71, being arrears of levies and
charges due and payable in respect of her unit for the period up to 1 November
2025. The applicant undertook to repay the capital amount in 12 consecutive
monthly instalments of R47 396.31 commencing on 7 December 2025.
[9] Clause 3.2 of the AOD provides:
"3.2 Further, the debtor consent to the disconnection of the electricity
supply to the unit shoul d they fail to remedy their breach within 14 (fourteen)
days of dispatch of a written Notice to remedy such breach. The electricity
shall remain disconnected until such time as all outstanding amounts due and
owing in terms of the agreement have been paid in full.”
[10] Clause 5.2.1 of t he AOD expressly recorded that the instalments towards the
capital amount were payable over and above ongoing monthly levies and charges.
[11] Clause 5.2, in full, records that:
“5.2 All payments and monthly instalments due in terms of clause 2.3 made
by the Debtor will be made -
4
5.2.1 OVER AND ABOVE CURRENT MONTHLY LEVIES AND CHARGES
due in full by no later than the 7th day of each month as set out below;
Capital Amount: R568 755.71 / (divided by 12 (months) = R47 396 .31
(monthly instalment);
Monthly Levies and Charges: (which charges include but are not
limited to utilities, ACR, interest and legal costs) approximately = ±R16
000.00;
Total payment due: ±R63 396.31 (monthly instalment + monthly levies
and charges);
5.2.2 All payments and monthly instalments made in terms of this agreement
shall be appropriated firstly towards monthly levies and charges and
secondly towards the capital amount.
5.2.3 without set-off or deduction of any amount for whatsoever reason.”
[12] The applicant’s case is that she complied with the AOD by paying the agreed
instalments (R47 396.31) and that the respondent unlawfully disconnected the
electricity supply to her unit without proper notice as contemplated in clause 3.2.
[13] The respondent disputes compliance. While the respondent admits that the
applicant made payments equal to the capital instalment amount (the R47 396.31), it
contends that the applicant failed to pay the ongoing monthly levies and charges of
about R16 000.00 in addition to the capital instalments of R47 396.31, as set out in
clause 5.2 of the AOD.
[14] On 4 February 2026, the respondent’s attorneys addressed correspondence
to the applicant alleging breach of the AOD. The correspondence acknowledged
receipt of the capital instalment payments made during December 2025 and January
2026 but alleged non- payment of the ongoing monthly levies and charges
contemplated in clause 5.2. The applicant was called upon to regularise the position
before 9 February 2026, failing which “legal action” would proceed. The notice did
not refer to clause 3.2 of the AOD , nor did it state that electricity supply would be
5
disconnected in the event of a continued breach. The respondent relies on this
correspondence as constituting compliance with clause 3.2 of the AOD.
[15] Electricity supply to the applicant’s unit was ultimately disconnected on or
about 8 April 2026.
[16] The applicant complains that it is not clear how the said “Monthly Levies and
Charges” of approximately R16 000.00 per month are computed and that her
inquiries relating thereto remain unanswered. She, accordingly, on 7 May 2026,
referred this billing dispute to the CSOS for resolution.
[17] This application was launched on 8 May 2026 and set down for hearing in the
urgent court on 19 May 2026. It was, however, allocated for hearing on 21 May
2026.
Urgency
[18] The respondent contends that the matter lacks urgency because the applicant
delayed approximately one month after the disconnection before launching the
application or engaging with them.
[19] It is so that the applicant did not approach the Court immediately after the
disconnection and that the applicant only engaged the respondent on 30 April 2026
regarding the disconnection. However, the prejudice relied upon by the applicant is
ongoing in nature. The matter concerns the continued deprivation of electricity
supply to a residential property occupied by a tenant and a minor child. The applicant
alleges that the tenant has threatened to vacate the premises and that the rental
income derived from the property constitutes her sole source of income.
[20] In those circumstances, and notwithstanding the delay, I am satisfied that the
matter is sufficiently urgent to warrant hearing in terms of Rule 6(12).
The applicable legal principles
[21] The requirements for interim interdictory relief are trite. The applicant must
establish:
(a) a prima facie right, though open to some doubt;
6
(b) a reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm if interim relief is not
granted;
(c) the absence of a satisfactory alternative remedy; and
(d) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of interim relief.
[22] The applicant relied heavily on authorities dealing with unlawful electricity
disconnections, including Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others
2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) and Lion Ridge Body Corporate v Alexander; Lion Ridge Body
Corporate v Morata; Lion Ridge Body Corporate v Mukona and Another
(17074/2022; 18106/2022; 19220/2022) [2022] ZAGPJHC 713 (21 September 2022).
[23] The respondent correctly submitted that Joseph arose within a public -law
setting involving a municipality exercising public power. The present matter concerns
a private-law contractual relationship between a body corporate and a sectional title
owner. It is unnecessary in this urgent matter to determine the extent to which the
procedural fairness considerations discussed in Joseph apply directly in such
circumstances. Courts, nevertheless, approach the disconnection of residential
electricity supply with caution.
Prima facie right
[24] The applicant does not possess a free- standing right to electricity irrespective
of payment obligations. The applicant remains bound by the statutory and
contractual obligations arising from ownership within the sectional title scheme and
by the AOD concluded between the parties.
[25] The applicant’s asserted right is narrower. It is the right not to have electricity
disconnected otherwise than in accordance with the contractual enforcement
mechanism agreed upon between the parties in clause 3.2 of the AOD.
[26] In my view, the applicant has established such a prima facie right, albeit one
open to some doubt.
[27] Once the parties concluded the AOD following the June 2025 order, the
respondent elected to regulate future enforcement through the contractual machinery
7
created by the AOD itself, including clause 3.2. Electricity was restored after the
conclusion of the AOD, and the respondent thereafter accepted payments in terms
thereof. Having elected to regulate future enforcement through the AOD, the
respondent was required to comply with the procedure agreed upon in clause 3.2.
[28] The respondent’s contention that the applicant remained in breach of the AOD
is neither fanciful nor implausible. The applicant admittedly fell into substantial
arrears, and the AOD expressly contemplated ongoing monthly obligations beyond
the capital instalments.
[29] Equally, however, the applicant’s complaint cannot simply be dismissed as
technical formalism.
[30] The respondent’s submission that the applicant in fact enjoyed substantially
more than 14 days before the eventual disconnection carries force. The difficulty for
the respondent, however, is not merely the period stipulated in the notice. The
difficulty lies elsewhere . The February 2026 correspondence did not expressly
invoke clause 3.2 of the AOD, nor did it communicate that electricity supply would be
disconnected in the event of continued breach. The respondent instead threatened
unspecified “legal action”. In circumstances where the parties expressly regulated
the circumstances under which residential electricity supply could be disconnected, I
am unable to conclude on the present papers that sufficiently clear compliance with
clause 3.2 was demonstrated.
[31] The relief presently sought by the applicant is interim in nature. The Court is
not presently called upon finally to determine:
(a) whether the applicant is indebted to the respondent;
(b) whether the respondent will ultimately be entitled to disconnect
electricity in terms of the AOD;
(c) whether the June 2025 order survived unaffected by the AOD; or
(d) whether the respondent’s February 2026 notice ultimately amounted to
sufficient contractual compliance.
8
[32] Those disputes remain open for determination in due course.
[33] In those circumstances, and without finally determining the parties’ competing
contractual contentions, I am satisfied that the applicant has established a prima
facie right to insist upon compliance with the contractual disconnection procedure
agreed upon between the parties.
Irreparable harm
[34] The electricity supply to the premises has already been disconnected and the
deprivation is ongoing.
[35] The premises are occupied by a tenant and a minor child. The applicant
alleges continuing prejudice flowing from the absence of electricity and the
threatened loss of the tenant.
[36] While financial prejudice alone would ordinarily not suffice, the continued
deprivation of residential electricity constitutes prejudice not readily remediable by a
damages claim.
[37] In my view, the applicant has established a reasonable apprehension of
irreparable harm if interim relief is refused.
Alternative remedy
[38] The respondent correctly points out that the applicant has referred the
underlying dispute to CSOS.
[39] However, the papers indicate that CSOS is directed at determination of the
accounting and levy disputes between the parties and cannot provide immediate
interim restoration relief.
[40] Without interim relief the applicant will remain without electricity despite the
unresolved disputes concerning the parties’ respective obligations under the AOD. In
those circumstances, I am satisfied that the applicant lacks an adequate alternative
remedy.
Balance of convenience
9
[41] The respondent correctly contends that the applicant is substantially indebted
and that compliant owners within the sectional title scheme should not indefinitely
subsidise the applicant’s obligations. Counsel for the respondent relied, correctly in
my view, on authorities recognising the prejudice occasioned to compliant owners
when a body corporate is compelled to continue supplying utilities notwithstanding
ongoing default.
[42] There is force in the respondent’s submission that the applicant enjoyed
actual notice of the alleged breach during February 2026 and that, notwithstanding
the shorter period stipulated in the notice itself, the applicant in fact enjoyed
substantially more than 14 days before the eventual disconnection during April 2026.
[43] Were this merely an ordinary commercial dispute concerning acceleration or
cancellation provisions, the respondent’s submission that there was substantial
compliance with clause 3.2 may well ultimately prove correct.
[44] Disconnection of the electricity supply to a residence is, however, not an
ordinary commercial remedy . In Joseph the Constitutional Court recognised the
importance of electricity supply in contemporary life and emphasised the need for
procedural fairness before termination by a public authority. Although Joseph arose
within a public -law setting, courts have approached the disconnection of residential
electricity with caution, including within sectional title schemes.
[45] In Lion Ridge this Court emphasised that a body corporate must demonstrate
a proper legal basis for the disconnection of electricity supply and cautioned against
resort to self-help absent clear authority.
[46] Similarly, in Body Corporate of Balboa Park v Skeyi and Another (2023-
061020) [2024] ZAGPJHC 361 (12 April 2024) , this Court reiterated that bodies
corporate exercising disconnection powers must act within the authority conferred
upon them by law, rule or agreement.
upon them by law, rule or agreement.
[47] The present matter is further distinguishable from Lion Ridge and Balboa. In
those matters the courts were not satisfied that the bodies corporate had established
a sufficiently clear contractual or other legal basis entitling them to disconnect
electricity. In the present matter, by contrast, clause 3.2 of the AOD expressly
10
authorised disconnection and the applicant expressly consented thereto. Moreover,
the AOD itself followed upon an earlier court order authorising disconnection arising
from the applicant’s arrears.”
[48] The issue is therefore not whether the respondent possessed the power to
disconnect electricity. The issue is whether the respondent sufficiently complied with
the agreed contractual mechanism before exercising that power.
[49] The respondent’s contention that substantial compliance suffices may
ultimately prove correct. However, on the present papers and within the confines of
urgent proceedings, I am unable to conclude that the respondent demonstrated
sufficiently clear compliance with clause 3.2 to justify the continued disconnection.
[50] The prejudice to the respondent must be weighed against the continued
deprivation of electricity supply to a residence occupied by a tenant and minor child,
together with the unresolved disputes concerning the parties’ obligations under the
AOD.
[51] The respondent retains the ability to pursue contractual remedies in due
course. By contrast, refusal of interim relief would permit continuation of the
disconnection notwithstanding the existence of unresolved disputes concerning the
proper invocation of the contractual disconnection mechanism.
[52] In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the balance of convenience
favours the interim restoration of the electricity supply. Such restoration should not,
however, operate as an indefinite restraint upon the respondent’s contractual
enforcement rights. The respondent remains entitled, should it be so advised, to
invoke clause 3.2 of the AOD in accordance with its terms.
[53] The applicant does not seek a final determination that no monies are owing to
the respondent, nor a final order permanently restraining the respondent from
exercising its contractual rights. The applicant instead seeks interim restoration of
exercising its contractual rights. The applicant instead seeks interim restoration of
the electricity supply pending the determination of the disputes referred to CSOS. I
am, however, not persuaded that the applicant established a prima facie right to
relief framed in those terms. The disputes presently before CSOS concern, inter alia ,
the computation and correctness of ongoing levies and charges. Those disputes do
11
not, without more, suspend the respondent’s contractual enforcement rights arising
from the AOD.
[54] What the applicant has established, on an interim basis, is a right to insist
upon sufficiently clear compliance with the agreed disconnection procedure before
electricity supply may be terminated. The interim relief granted should therefore be
tailored to that right.
[55] Both parties squarely addressed whether the respondent had complied with
clause 3.2 before disconnecting electricity supply. The order granted accordingly
reflects the true contractual issue arising on the papers. Compare Fischer v
Ramahlele 2014 (4) SA 614 (SCA) paras 13–15.
Costs
[56] Both parties achieved partial success in the arguments advanced before
Court. The applicant succeeded in obtaining interim relief, but the respondent raised
substantial and legitimate disputes concerning indebtedness, contractual
interpretation and substantial compliance with clause 3.2.
[57] In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate that each party pay its own
costs.
Order
[58] The following order is made:
(a) The application is heard as one of urgency and the non-compliance
with the ordinary forms and service provided for in the Uniform Rules is
condoned.
(b) The respondent is directed to restore the electricity supply to the
applicant’s unit known as Unit 7[ …] - Door Number 6 […] , C [… ] V[…] ,
1[…] F[…] Road, N […] , Randburg, within 24 hours of service of this
order.
12
(c) The restoration contemplated in paragraph (b) shall endure unless and
until the respondent exercises its rights in accordance with clause 3.2
of the Acknowledgement of Debt concluded between the parties.
(d) Each party shall pay its own costs.
___________________________
CARELSE AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Date of hearing: 21 May 2026
Judgment delivered: 25 May 2026
Appearances:
For the Applicant: V Mukwevho
instructed by Maswanganyi Hlapolosa Inc
For the Respondent: TK Mahapa
instructed by Kramer Attorneys
1