IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
SOUTHERN CIRCUIT, PORTSHEPSTONE
Case No: CC 47/2023P
In the matter between:
THE STATE
versus
MBUYISENI CHRISTOPHER GEMA ACCUSED
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE
Delivered on:
Mngadi J
Introduction
[1] The accused stands convicted on one charge of murder. The charge is read with
the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the CLAA) . Section
51(1) read with Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the CLAA provides that the prescribed minimum
sentence is life imprisonment if no substantial and compelling circumstances are found
to exist for a court to impose a lesser sentence. These provisions are invoked by the
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State in that the death of the deceased by the accused resulted from physical abuse, as
contemplated in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘domestic violence’ in s 1 of the
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (DVA), as they were in a domestic relationship , as
defined in s 1 of that Act . The accused and deceased were in a love relationship from
which the deceased conceived triplets, such a relationship falls within the definition of a
domestic relationship. The killing of the deceased by strangulation constituted violence
in the form of physical abuse.
[2] Factors relevant to sentence. The accused’s conviction is based on the court’s
finding that he took the deceased with him, and with whom he was in a love relationship
and she was nine months pregnant with triplets , from her home to a spot where he
strangled her to death. The court has also found that the aforementioned provisions of
the CLAA invoked by the State , and on the grounds stated by the State , as set out
above, are applicable.
[3] The State did not prove any previous convictions against the accused. His record
of previous convictions (SAP69) shows that he has no previous convictions . At the
instance of the accused, the court ordered that a pre -sentence report be prepared ,
which was admitted into the record as evidence. The defence in mitigation of sentence
lead evidence from the accused and from the accused’s father Reuben Gema. The
State lead evidence from probation officer who prepared the presentence report. The
evidence of the defence deals with the personal circumstances of the accused and
nothing more turns from that evidence. The probation officer’s evidence is in line with
the contents of the pre-sentence report handed in as evidence. The accused’s defence
counsel as well as the State counsel addressed the court.
[4] Ms Qhamukile Sithole, a probation officer, compiled the requested pre-sentence
report. She visited the accused and consulted with him. She also visited the accused’s
report. She visited the accused and consulted with him. She also visited the accused’s
home and consulted with his mother, his father and his sister. Unfortunately, when the
probation officer started interviewing the family, the mother collapsed and the accused’s
sister started crying and the probation officer could not get much information from the
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family. The probation officer had to respect the family’s wish as they requested her to
leave.
[5] The accused ’s family owns a home at Mahehle location, where his mother and
sister currently reside. The accused has also built his own house within the same area ,
not far from his family home. The area is predominantly rural in nature. The accused is
employed by the South African Police Service holding the rank of a sergeant. His
mother is a pensioner. His sister is employed. The accused i s 50 years old. He is
unmarried. He reported that he had five (5) children from different relationships . He is
reported to be in good health. He grew up in a stable family environment. He completed
matric and later underwent training to qualify as a police officer.
[6] The accused is a first offender. He does not accept full responsibility for the
offence. He did not display signs of remorse, nor did he express emotional distress
regarding the death of the deceased, testified Ms Sithole.
[7] The probation officer reported that she visited and intervi ewed the family of the
deceased. The mother of the deceased reported that she lost not only her daughter but
also her unborn grandchildren. The deceased was her only daughter and a significant
pillar of support within the family. She did not know much about the relationship
between the accused and the deceased. The accused had not been introduced to the
family. She did not know of any support given by the accused to the deceased during
her pregnancy. The deceased told her in the evening prior to her death that the accused
had requested her to come out and meet with him. The deceased is survived by an
eleven (11) year old son. The deceased’s son continues to experience severe emotional
distress and struggles to cope with the loss of his mother.
[8] The evidence shows that t he accused’s highest level of education is a matric
certificate. He is 50 years old. He was employed as a police officer in the South African
certificate. He is 50 years old. He was employed as a police officer in the South African
Police Services. The accused came from a disadvantaged background. He grew up in
a limited resources household. It was quite an achievement for him to pass matric and
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get employed as a p olice officer. The accused as a first offender is regarded as a well-
behaving person who avoids being in conflict with the law. The accused ‘s family regard
him as a useful person who assist in supporting the family and his children. He has five
(5) children with three of the children dependent on him and still at school.
[9] It remains unknown what the accused’s motive for killing the deceased was. The
killing of the deceased by strangulation is a barbaric brutal act. The deceased was
heavily pregnant with triplets. She was due to go to hospital the following day to give
birth. The accused having arranged with her to take her to hospital. There is no
evidence that the deceased had done anything to provoke the accused . The deceased,
due to her relationship with the accused, the fact that he was a police officer, and she
was pregnant with his children, must have felt safe in the presence of the accused. She
had been in a love relationship with the accused for a period of about five years.
[10] It has been argued on behalf of the accused that the re are substantial and
compelling circumstances for this court to impose a sentence less than the prescribed
minimum sentence of life imprisonment. The main consideration is that the accused is a
first offender, he was gainfully employed and he contributed in supporting his family. He
has been in custody awaiting trial for a period of close to three years.
[11] It is argued on behalf of the State that there are no substantial and compelling
circumstances for this court to consider imposing a sentence less than the prescribed
minimum sentence of life imprisonment. The accused did not tell the court what caused
him to kill the deceased. He has shown no remorse . The accused in killing a heavily
pregnant women killed the unborn children. The deceased, being heavily pregnant with
the accused’s unborn children, looked upon the accused for protection. The deceased
the accused’s unborn children, looked upon the accused for protection. The deceased
suffered a gruesome agonizing death. Her body was left exposed in an open spot on
the side of the road.
[12] The only weighty mitigating factor in favour of the accused, in my view, is that he
is a first offender. It must also be accepted in favour of the accused that there is no
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evidence that he had pre -planned the murder of the deceased . There are numerous
aggravating factors. The accused as a police officer is employed to uphold the law. The
deceased and her unborn children were in a most vulnerable position. The accused as
the boyfriend of the deceased and as the father of the unborn children had, apart from a
legal duty, a moral duty not to harm the deceased and the unborn children. He took the
deceased from the privacy and sanctity of her home, harmed her and she never
returned to her home. He took the life of his own innocent children before they were
even born . He literally squeezed the life of the deceased by strangling her unti l she
died. It is regrettable that he shows no regret and no reflection. It appears that the
death of the de ceased and his unborn children have had no impact on him as testified
by Ms Sithole.
Legal principles
[13] In S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 866A-C the court held that:
‘A judicial officer should not approach punishment in a spirit of anger because, being human,
that will make it difficult for him to achieve that delicate balance between the crime, the criminal
and the interests of society which his task and the objects of punishment demand of him. Nor
should he strive after severity; nor, on the other hand, surrender to misplaced pity. While not
flinching from firmness, where firmness is called for, he should approach his task with a humane
and compassionate understanding of human frailties and the pressures of society which
contribute to criminality.’ In S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) the court stated the factors to be
considered to determine an appropriate sentence is the triad consisting of the crime, the
offender and the interests of society . The triad epitomises the essence of a balanced ,
effective sentence which meets all the sentencing objectives.
[14] The purposes of punishment are deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and
[14] The purposes of punishment are deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and
prevention. Deterrence is meant to deter the offender and would be offenders from
committing crime. Retribution is directed at imposing punishment as payment for the
damage caused by committing the crime to the victim and the society. The offender by
committing a crime has incurred a debt and serving the sentence is a form of payment.
Prevention emphasis es that the purpose of imposing punishment is to prevent the
commission of crime. Rehabilitation focuses on imposing a punishment that will have
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the effect to rehabilitate the offender, making him a better member of society. In R v
Karg 1961 (1) SA 231 (A) at 236A -B the court held that: ‘While the deterrent effect of
punishment has remained as important as ever, it is, I think, correct to say that the retributive
aspect has tended to yield ground to the aspects of prevention and correction. That is no doubt
a good thing. But the element of retribution, historically important, is by no means absent from
the modern approach. It is not wrong that the natural indignation of interested persons and of
the community at large should receive some recognition in the sentences that Courts impose,
and it is not irrelevant to bear in mind that if sentences for serious crimes are too lenient, the
administration of justice may fall into disrepute and injured persons may incline to take the law
into their own hands.’
Terblanche in his book Guide to Sentencing in South Africa (2 nd ed) states that: ‘true
retribution is effected only by imposition of an appropriate sentence, by a sentence which is in
proportion to what is deserved by the offender.’
[15] In S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA) paras 7 -9 it was held that the court
should approach the question of sentence conscious of the prescribed minimum
sentence which should ordinarily be imposed ensuring a severe, standardised and
consistent response from the courts to the commission of such crimes. In deciding
whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances , factors traditionally taken
into account when sentencing offenders must be taken into consideration. The ultimate
cumulative impact of mitigating factors must be such as to justify a departure from
imposing the prescribed minimum sentence . Crimes like murder committed in the
course of domestic violence calls for robust sentences wherein deterrence and
retribution is emphasised over the personal circumstances of the offender. See Mudau
v S [2014] ZASCA 43 para 6; S v JN [2024] ZAMPMBHC 60 para 10.
v S [2014] ZASCA 43 para 6; S v JN [2024] ZAMPMBHC 60 para 10.
[16] In S v Vilakazi [2008] ZASCA 87; 2009(1) SACR 552 SCA para 58 it was held: ‘
Once it becomes clear that the crime is deserving of substantial period of imprisonment the
question whether the accused is married or single, whether he has two children or three,
whether or not he is employed, are in themselves largely immaterial to what period should be
and those seem to me to be kind of ‘flimsy’ grounds Malgas said should be avoided.’
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[17] In S v SMM [2013] ZASCA 56; 2013 (2) SACR 292 (SCA) para 13 at 297 the
court, having remarked that the vexed question of sentence is always an extremely
difficult exercise, stated that: ‘sentence must always be individualised, for punishment must
always fit the crime, the criminal and the circumstances of the case. It is equally important to
remind ourselves that sentencing should always be considered and passed dispassionately,
objectively and upon a careful consideration of all relevant factors. Public sentiment cannot be
ignored, but it can never be permitted to displace the careful judgment and fine balancing that
are involved in arriving at an appropriate sentence. Courts must therefore always strive to arrive
at a sentence which is just and fair to both the victim and the perpetrator, has regard to the
nature of the crime and takes account of the interests of society. Sentencing involves a very
high degree of responsibility which should be carried out with equanimity.’
[18] Life imprisonment is the most severe sentence that a court can impose. On the
other hand, to kill a person in a domestic or intimate relationship who is heavily
pregnant with your own child/children shows total disregard for human life. The
accused killed the deceased in the most brutal manner. In S v Dodo [2001] ZACC 16;
2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC) para 38 the court held that a sentence of life sentence is only
justified if having considered the individual circumstances of the offender, it is found to
be a proportionate sentence to the crime committed by the offender. By his conduct, the
accused caused unimaginable suffering to the family of the deceased and her child. He
took the lives of four innocent persons, the children just before they were born . The
punishment imposed on the accused must truly reflect the harm he has caused. The
community at large look to the courts to properly punish those who have committed
community at large look to the courts to properly punish those who have committed
serious crimes, failing which, there would be no respect for the law. However, for the
sentence to be proportionate it must fit the crime, the offender and the interest of the
community. The court in dispensing justice is required to do a fine balancing act
between competing interests.
Unborn children
[19] The evidence established that at the time the deceased was mu rdered she was
pregnant with male triplets that had reached a viable stage of development, they were in
8
a position to survive outside the womb of the deceased as recorded in the postmortem
report. It appeared that the deceased was murdered to stop her from giving birth the
following day although no conc rete finding on the evidence could be made in this
regard. The State did not charge the accused with the murder of the unborn triplets,
because it is not a crime to kill an unborn child. In addition, there is no is no provision in
the CLAA that murder of a woman heavily pregnant attracts a heavier sentence. There
is also no statutory provision making it an offence to murder an unborn child . The
evidence was that the accused, as far as he knew , the deceased was pregnant with
twins. But in law , as an example, a person knowing that there are people beyond the
curtain who directs shots at those beyond the curt ain may be charged with and
convicted of murder for each of the persons that died. The law defines murder as the
unlawful intentional killing of a human being. A human being is a person born alive.
The common law rule is premised on ‘born alive’. Hence, murder can only be committed
by the killing of a legally recognised person, and a person is not legally recognised until
he or she is fully born in a living state. Therefore, the law as it stands for criminal
purposes only recognises a person as an independent entity from the moment he or she
is born.
[20] The State, with the current definition of the crime of murder , could not charge the
accused with murder of the unborn children. It urged me to reconsider development of
the common law definition of the crime of murder to include the killing of unborn children
for future purposes. Although the accused still could not be charged with such a crime
because even if development is granted it could not be granted retrospectively. If the
sought development is granted, it will have a prospective effect enabling the State to
prefer charges relating to murder of unborn children in future. In S v Mondzinger [2023]
prefer charges relating to murder of unborn children in future. In S v Mondzinger [2023]
ZANCHC 79 para 40 the court , whilst relying on Masiya v Director of Public
Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Another,
Amici Curiae) [2007] ZACC 9; 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC) paras 38-39, held that based on
the current definition of murder an accused cannot be convicted on a charge of murder
of an unborn child. Masiya warned the courts that the development of common law
cannot have a retrospective effect.
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[21] The high court in S v Mshumpa and Another 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E) refused to
extend the common law definition of the crime of murder to include murder of an unborn
child. The judgment constitutes the current state of the law , except if I am of the view
that it is wrong. I am of the view that the court was wrong in refusing to develop the
common law by extending the definition of the crime of murder to include murder of
unborn children at an advanced stage of pregnancy. Section 173 of t he Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) provides that high courts have
inherent power to develop common law. See article by G A Du Plessis ‘ Feticide:
creating a statutory crime in South African Law (2013) 24(1) Stell LR 73.
[22] The court in Mshumpa provided the following impediments to the development of
common law by extending the definition of the crime of murder to include murder of
unborn children: present definition of the crime of murder ; the courts have no power to
create new crimes ; principle of legality prohibits conviction for conduct that is not an
offence at the time it was committed ; the Constitution does not expressly confer any
fundamental rights to unborn children; the ‘born alive’ principle gives legal recognition to
an unborn child from birth; failure to develop the law does not leave an unborn child
with no protection because the conduct is punished as part of the offence committed
against the mother, the practical difficulties like whether the extended definition should
require that viability be proved, whether such a crime be restricted to only third party
killings, and how such a crime fits in with the offence of illegal abortion under the
Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 (Choice Act). The court at para 63
found that it could not extend the ambit of the crime of murder to include unborn
children, because there is no counterpart in the Constitution for the protection of the
children, because there is no counterpart in the Constitution for the protection of the
rights of an unborn child, the protection of the unborn child is through the protection of
the mother of the unborn child. Lastly, the court at par a 64 found it problematic that an
extension of the definition by the trial court will not be subject to a referral for
confirmation by the Constitutional Court.
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[23] The courts in appropriate cases have acceded to the development of common
law. Section 39(2) of t he Constitution grants power to the high courts to develop
common law to be in line with the values enshrined in the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. In Masiya the Constitutional Court approved the development of the common
law by extending the comm on law definition of rape to include non -consensual anal
penetration of females . It is held that it is not in conflict with the principle of lega lity if
such an extension does not have a retrospective effect. It did not see any impediment
that the development by the high court is not subject to a referral for confirmation by the
Constitutional Court. It also did not regard the development as creating a non-existing
crime nor did the court defer the issue for consideration by the legislature.
[24] The development of the common law must be shown to be necessary. There is
no doubt that unborn children are the most vulnerable. The legal convictions of civil
society call for the protection of unborn children as far as possible. The laws regulating
the termination of pregnancy are directed at the protection of unborn children as
deserving of distinct protection from the interest of those that have interest in their
welfare. They are protected not only against third parties but even against their mothers.
These are measures taken by the State to protect prenatal life as part of the duty of the
State to protect prenatal life. It cannot be argued that the State has no concern as to
what happens to an unborn child prior to birth. There is no provision in the Constitution
to the effect that the protection of human life commences at birth. The court i n
Mshumpa para 64 stated that there was merit in making the killing of an unborn child a
crime. The Choice Act in limiting the right of a woman to terminate pregnancy protects
the rights of an unborn child. In Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and
the rights of an unborn child. In Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and
Others (Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicus Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 509 (T) the court
held that the fundamental right to individual self-determination lies at the very heart and
base of the constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy, the State has a legitimate role
in the protection of prenatal life as an important value in our society. The protection of
prenatal life is not in any way different from the protection of human life. Therefore, an
argument that a foetus is not a beare r of constitutional rights has no impact in the
protection of prenatal life by an appropriate development of the common law. The
11
development of the common law to protect prenatal life once the foetus is viable is a
logical step from the limited protection provided by the provisions of the Choice Act. In
the case of unborn children, in my view, it is of no help to try an answer a question
whether in general an unborn child is the bearer of constitutional rights or no t. A better
approach is to ask whether in respect of a particular constitutional right the unborn child
is a bearer thereof or not. C Pickles in an article, ‘The introduction of a statutory crime to
address third-party foetal violence’ (2011) 74(4) THRHR 546, states that the Choice Act
advances female autonomy by providing a means for women to exercise their
reproductive rights and at the same time limit s these rights as the pregnancy
progresses and the foetal viability sets in. Therefore, the Choice Act recognises and
protects foetal interests based on constitutional values . The author acknowledges the
need for reform and the criminalisation of third-party violence that terminates pregnancy
of a viable foetus . However, in my view, the development of the common law need not
be deferred for the creation of statutory offence. It should be directed at the protection
or preservation of prenatal life once the foetus has reached viability, it should not be
made incidental to the protection of any rights held by any other person. In Carmichele v
Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies
Intervening) [2001] ZACC 22; 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 36 (quoting with approval from
Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another [1996] ZACC 10; 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC)
para 61 and R v Salituro 1991 CanLII 17 (SCC); [1991] 3 SCR 654 ) it was said :
‘Judiciary should confine itself to those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the
common law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of society ’ … ‘courts must remain
vigilant and should not hesitate to ensure that common law is developed to reflect the spirit,
vigilant and should not hesitate to ensure that common law is developed to reflect the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights…whether or not the parties in any particular case
request the court to develop the common law under s39(2).’ Masiya para 33, also quoting
the above with approval, added ‘ where there is deviation from the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights courts are obliged to develop the common law.’
[25] The court in Mshumpa appears to have contradicted itself in holding that there is
merit in the argument to develop the common law to make it a crime to kill an unborn
child and at the same time to hold that there is no need and that failure to develop the
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law does not leave unborn children unprotected as the conduct is punished as part of
the offence committed against the mother. If the mother alone or with others is the
perpetrator of the crime, they will do so with impunity. Further, the perpetrator is liable to
be prosecuted, and if convicted to be punished for the crime for which he has been
convicted. If the view is that the killing of an unborn child is not a crime, it follows that no
punishment can be imposed for such conduct.
[26] There are calls for the ‘born alive’ rule to be abandoned as it is anachronistic and
adopts an artificial and non -scientific concept of when life begins. Various jurisdictions
have eliminated the effect of the rule by creating statutory offences to prevent harm to
unborn children. This is towards an attempt to recognise the loss of an unborn child as a
separate and distinct loss than a mere injury suffered by a pregnant woman . See L
Finlay ‘When unborn children are killed, how does the law deal with culpability ?’ The
Conversation, 3 October 2018 . (https://theconversation.com/when-unborn-children-are-
killed-how-does-the-law-deal-with-culpability-104222, accessed 20 March 2026 ). In
most jurisdictions an injury to an unborn child , which causes its death after it has be en
born, is punished as a crime. An attempt to kill an unborn child , which fails, and the
child is born alive is prosecuted as an attempted murder, but if it succeeds it is not a
crime. The Court of Appeals of California in Keeler v Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal 3d
619) remarked in relation to the ‘born alive’ rule that the question is one of law, not of
morality, medicine or popular belief. The inquiry into the rule’s present status should be
considered in the light of modern life, not in that of the past centuries which witnessed
its formation , and that twentieth century advances in obstetrics and paediatrics show
that premature infants’ lives can be preserved by use of modern hospital techniques
that premature infants’ lives can be preserved by use of modern hospital techniques
and equipment. It means the rationale for the ‘born alive’ rule has fallen away.
[27] The view is that the ‘born alive’ rule be abandoned or modified in the same
perspective as used in determining civil liability for prenatal injuries. The nasciturus
fiction in succession law recognises an unborn child from conception for inheritance
purposes, if born alive. The relaxation of the ‘born alive’ rule in other s pheres of the law
supports the relaxation thereof in the field of criminal law to extend protection to unborn
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children. There is concern that there is no assurance that the foetus would have
survived the rigours of birth. The concern is, in my view, misplaced. A person charged
with murder cannot raise as a defence that the deceased would have been killed by
someone else in any case or that there was no assurance that he would not have died
of some other causes. The crux of the matter is whether at the time of the actus reus
was the foetus alive and viable, which must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
[28] The protection of unborn children at advanced stages of pregnancy is necessary
and it is long overdue. It cannot be put off in the hope that the legislature shall attend to
it in due course. It is absurd that the law recognises the right to prenatal life and for
certain purposes as stated above, and thereby grants rights to unborn children , but
denies them protection under the law. In my view, there are no cogent reasons for not
extending the common law definition of the crime of murder to inc lude killing of unborn
children of not less tha n seven months old from conception. If those involved in such
killing did so to save the life of the mother, the defence of necessity is available to them.
The so-called impediments referred to in Mshumpa, in my view , they don’t withstand
scrutiny. The State has to prove that the foetus was older than 28 weeks at the time and
that it was viable in that it had the potential of being born alive . See S v Molefe 2012 (2)
SACR 574 (GNP); S v Jasi 1994 (1) SACR 568 (ZH); S v Madombwe 1977 (3) SA 1008
(R); and S v Mango 1980 (3) SA 1041 (V). The extension of the common law definition
of murder does not create a new crime. The crime is murder. The victims of the conduct
and the perpetrator s thereof are not being created by the extended definition . The
extension recognises the conduct for what it is, a criminal offence . It is necessary in
order to afford protection for the victims and the victims to be, the most vulnerable
order to afford protection for the victims and the victims to be, the most vulnerable
sector of the community , to place them more or less in the same level as the other
victims of crime . It does not, in my view, in any way differ from the position the court
was faced with in Masiya. I accordingly here by declare that the common law is
developed by extending from the date of this judgment the definition of the crime of
murder to include unlawful intentional killing of a viable unborn child of not less than
seven months old from the date of conception.
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Conclusion
[29] Having considered and weighed the mitigating factors against the aggravating
factors, the accused’s killing of the deceased who was heavily pregnant with his unborn
children is not excusable. He had an opportunity to reflect and to stop what he was
doing but he did not . Even if there was no prescribed minimum sentence of life
imprisonment, it is found that the sentence of life imprisonment is the proportionate ,
appropriate, fair and just sentence in the circumstances . It is found that there are no
substantial and compelling circumstances for a court to impose a lesser sentence than
the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment.
[30] The accused on the charge of murder as set out in the indictment is sentenced
as follows:
1. The accused is sentenced to life imprisonment.
2. No order in terms of s 103(1) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000.
Further ancillary orders:
3. State counsel, Mr Miza, to serve a copy of this judgment to the Director of Public
Prosecutions: KwaZulu-Natal within fourteen (14) days from the date hereof and return
to my registrar a copy endorsed with acknowledgement of receipt for filing.
………………………
Mngadi J
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_______________________
Adv M Miza for DPP