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[2026] ZAGPPHC 540
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Mr. Sola Installations (Pty) Ltd v Vorster and Brandt Attorneys and Others (2026-099682) [2026] ZAGPPHC 540 (2 June 2026)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO.:
2026-099682
In
the matter between:
MR.
SOLA INSTALLATIONS (PTY)
LTD
APPLICANT
and
VORSTER
& BRANDT ATTORNEYS
FIRST RESPONDENT
CLEAR
CHOICE BUILDERS (PTY) LTD
SECOND RESPONDENT
TUMISANG
REGINALD KGABOESELE N.O.
THIRD RESPONDENT
Delivered:
This judgment is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. In the
event that there
is a discrepancy between the date the judgment is signed and the date
it is uploaded to CaseLines, the date the
judgment is uploaded to
CaseLines is deemed to be the date that the judgment is handed down.
REASONS
VAN DER SCHYFF J
[1]
This application came before me on the urgent
roll in the Insolvency Court. The applicant sought,
inter
alia,
an order directing the first respondent
to release funds held in its trust account and a declarator that such
funds did not form
part of the insolvent estate of the second
respondent.
[2]
When the matter was argued, Labuschagne J had already struck
the application from the roll the preceding week. Before Labuschagne
J, the second respondent had been placed under final liquidation. The
first respondent raised several preliminary objections, noting
that
section 359(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 suspended the
proceedings, and that the relief could not be adjudicated
without the
Master of the High Court and the liquidator. Labuschagne J struck the
matter from the roll with costs.
[3]
Having considered the papers and submissions, I am satisfied
that the second respondent's liquidation and the operation of section
359 bar the continuation of these proceedings. The relief sought
directly implicates the rights, obligations, and assets of the
liquidated company. Consequently, it is neither necessary nor
appropriate to determine the substantive merits of the dispute.
[4]
I accordingly struck the application from the
roll with a punitive costs order.
[5]
A costs award on the attorney and own client scale is reserved
for conduct warranting the Court’s marked disapproval. This
discretion must be exercised judicially upon a consideration of all
relevant circumstances.
[6]
First, the applicant persisted with the
application after becoming aware of the final liquidation. The legal
consequences of the
liquidation and the first respondent’s
reliance upon section 359 were expressly brought to its attention.
Given the opportunity
to reconsider, the applicant elected to
proceed.
[7]
Secondly, the applicant was warned that the first
respondent regarded the application as procedurally incompetent and
would seek
punitive costs. Despite this, the applicant forced the
respondents to incur further opposing costs.
[8]
Thirdly, the applicant persisted despite
substantial procedural obstacles. The statutory suspension under
section 359, and the non-joinder
of parties whose interests are
directly affected, were fundamental defects going to the competency
of the relief.
[9]
Fourthly, the litigation history demonstrates a
stubborn refusal to heed repeated warnings. The supplementary
answering affidavit
records that the applicant sought to re-enroll
the matter after being informed of these fatal defects. This conduct
forms part
of a pattern of persistence that justifies the court’s
intervention.
[10]
I emphasise that the punitive costs order was not
granted merely because the applicant advanced unsuccessful legal
arguments. Litigants
may approach the courts to resolve
bona
fide
disputes. The order was granted because
the applicant forced the matter forward despite clear warnings that
the application was
incompetent post-liquidation.
[11]
The applicant’s conduct caused unnecessary
trouble and expense for the first respondent. An ordinary costs order
cannot adequately
reflect the court’s disapproval.
[12]
For these reasons, I ordered the applicant to pay
the first respondent’s costs on attorney-and-own-client scale.
E VAN DER SCHYFF
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA