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[2026] ZAGPPHC 538
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Kosmosdal Ext 61 and Ext 62 Homeowners Association NPC v Dube-Rakgosi and Others (2025/033592) [2026] ZAGPPHC 538 (22 May 2026)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case No: 2025/033592
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/
NO
(3)
REVISED.
SIGNATURE
DATE 22/05/2026
In
the matter between:
KOSMOSDAL
EXT 61 AND EXT 62 HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION
NPC
Applicant
and
ANDILE
DUBE-RAKGOSI
First Respondent
OUPA
KGASAGO
Second Respondent
YOLISA
NOMATHAMSANQU
DYASI
Third Respondent
MAITE
MODIBA
Fourth Respondent
MZUKISI
DYASI
Fifth Respondent
NKOATSE
MASHAMAITE
Sixth Respondent
JUDGMENT
GRIESSEL
AJ:
[1]
The Applicant seeks an order that each of the First to
Sixth
Respondents be held in contempt of court for alleged failure to
comply with an interim order of this Court granted on 18
December
2024 in case number 112164/2024.
[2]
Under the aforementioned order of 18 December 2024, the
Court granted
an interim interdict pending the final determination of the matter on
22 April 2025. The interim order was
made final on that date.
[3]
The Respondents’ alleged conduct relied upon by
the Applicant
in these contempt proceedings occurred in December 2024, when the
interim order was in force.
[4]
Paragraph 2.1 of the order dated 18 December 2024 provides
that the
Respondents in case number 112164/2024 are interdicted “
from
spreading or dispensing misleading communications regarding the
Applicant and the board of the Applicant, which communications
include, but are not limited to:
2.1.1 That
a valid members’ meeting occurred on the 19
th
of
September 2024;
2.1.2 That
the resolutions, as provided for in terms of the meeting on the 19
th
of September 2024, were validly adopted;
2.1.3 That
the meeting on the 19th of September 2024 resulted in the removal of
the Applicant’s existing
directors;
2.1.4 From
attempting to alter the records of the Companies and intellectual
Property Commission in respect
of the directors of the Applicant.”
[5]
Paragraph 2.2 of the order of 18 December 2024 provides
that:
“
Any funds paid in accordance
with the Respondent’s directions to Trafalgar Property
Management (Pty) Ltd is to be kept in
Trust until this matter is
finalised by the said Trafalgar.”
[6]
Contempt of court in the context of civil proceedings
is itself a
criminal offence that can be prosecuted by the State. See in
this regard
S v Beyers
1968 (3) SA 70
(A).
[7]
Civil contempt is defined as the wilful and
mala fide
refusal
or failure of a party to comply with an order of the Court other than
a money judgment.
[8]
The Applicant in contempt proceedings must show that
an order was
granted against the Respondent and that the Respondent was either
served with the order or informed of its contents,
and that he or she
either disobeyed it or neglected to comply with it.
[9]
Bona fides
or reasonable mistake is a good defence against a
charge of contempt of court.
[10]
In the present matter, it is undisputed that the Court granted the
interim
interdict on 18 December 2024. It is also common cause
that the Respondents in the present contempt application had
knowledge
of the order.
[11]
However, the Applicant’s first difficulty is to establish that
the order of 18 December 2024 was granted against the present
Respondents.
[12]
In case number 112164/2024, the First Respondent is cited as “
Xolani
Njokweni”
and the Second Respondent as “
Members of
the Kosmosdal Ext 61 and 62 Homeowners, as indicated in Annexure ‘A’
”. This is also how they are recorded in the 18
December 2024 order. However, no Annexure “A” is
attached
to the order. It is therefore impossible to ascertain
from the order who the members cited as the Second Respondent are.
The Applicant’s founding affidavit provides no assistance in
this regard.
[13]
In paragraph 22 of the founding affidavit, the Applicant states that
the application under case number 112164/2024 was brought on an
urgent basis because the “
Respondents”
were
attempting to have funds paid to a third party. This obviously
refers to the Respondents in case number 112164/2024,
not the present
Respondents, as the First Respondent in that case is not a Respondent
in the present matter.
[14]
I find that the Applicant has failed to establish that the order of
18
December 2024 in case number 112164/2024 was granted against the
Respondents in the present contempt application.
[15]
In support of its contention that the Respondents contravened the
order
of 18 December 2024, the Applicant relies on two distinct
events. The first is a WhatsApp message that was sent by one
Andile,
which states: “
Good day. The court has
ruled that money be paid into a trust (Trafalgar) until we set for
the Metter
(sic)
in April.”
[16]
It is not in dispute that this message was sent by the First
Respondent
in the present application.
[17]
Although the message does not correctly record what is stated in
paragraph
2.2 of the order, paragraph 2.2 does not form part of the
interim interdict granted by the court. The interim interdict
is
contained in paragraph 2.1 of the order. The relief sought
in this application is that the Respondent be held in contempt
of the
interim interdict contained in the order of 18 December 2024.
[18]
Even if the interim interdict applied to the First Respondent, which
the Applicant fails to establish, then I fail to see on what basis
the message constitutes a non-compliance with the interim interdict.
[19]
The mere fact that the message does not correctly record the contents
of paragraph 2.2 of the order does not constitute a wilful and
mala
fide
refusal or failure by the First Respondent to comply with
the order of 18 December 2024.
[20]
In the founding affidavit, the Applicant states that the First
Respondent
sent the message. During argument, the Applicant
contended, based on the doctrine of common purpose, that the Second
to Sixth
Respondents must be regarded as having been involved in the
sending of the message as
socii criminis
. No such case
is made out in the founding affidavit. There is no allegation
in the founding affidavit that the Second
to Sixth Respondents knew
or should reasonably have foreseen that the First Respondent intended
to send the message and reconciled
themselves to that possibility.
[21]
If the order of 18 December 2024 was granted against the present
Respondents
(which the Applicant failed to establish), then the
sending of the message does, in any event, not constitute a wilful
and
mala fide
refusal or failure to comply with the interim
interdict contained in the order.
[22]
The Applicant further contends that the Respondents failed to comply
with the order of 18 December 2024, in that they caused a letter to
be sent “
as directors”
of the Applicant. A
copy of the letter is attached to the founding affidavit as Annexure
“FA15”. During
argument, the Applicant contended
that by sending the letter, the Respondents misrepresented that they
were directors of the Applicant.
[23]
There is no allegation whatsoever in the founding affidavit
identifying
either the author of the letter or the person responsible
for its circulation. The Applicant contended that, on the
probabilities,
the Court ought to infer that the Respondents
circulated the letter. Such an inference cannot properly be
drawn from the
facts before me. For the same reasons set out
above, the doctrine of common purpose does not avail the Applicant in
establishing
that the Respondents were responsible for the
dissemination of the letter. Accordingly, even if the interim
interdict of
18 December 2024 were applicable to the present
Respondents, the Applicant has failed to establish that the
Respondents circulated
the letter in question.
[24]
In light of the foregoing, the Applicant has failed to establish that
any of the First to Sixth Respondents acted in wilful and
mala
fide
disregard of the interim interdict contained in the order
granted on 18 December 2024 under case number 112164/2024. The
Applicant
has accordingly failed to make out a case for contempt of
court against any of the Respondents, and the application falls to be
dismissed. There is no reason why the costs should not follow
the result.
[25]
The Applicant made serious allegations against the Respondents,
accusing
them of criminal conduct. These allegations are
completely unsupported by the facts. At least one of the
Respondents
is an attorney. Accusations of contempt of court
against an attorney carry serious implications, both professionally
and
reputationally. In these circumstances and having regard to
the fact that the application is entirely devoid of merit, a punitive
costs order is justified.
[26]
In the result, I make the following order:
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The Applicant is to pay the First to Sixth
Respondents’ costs
of the application on an attorney and client scale.
GRIESSEL
AJ
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT