SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case No: A43/2025
In the matter between:
A[...] V[...] E[...] Appellant
and
A[...]2 T[...] V[...] E[...] (nee D[...]) Respondent
Coram: DOLAMO, J et RALARALA, J et ADAMS, AJ
Heard: 23 July 2025
Delivered: 05 June 2026
Summary: Appeal - motion proceedings where a dispute of fact arises - whether a
court correctly exercised its discretion by not mero motu referring the matter for oral
evidence - rule 6(5)(g) - contemplates the exercise of a discretion in the true sense
wherein the judicial decision-making process involves a choice between a number of
equally permissible options - court not compelled to mero motu refer the matter for
oral evidence - appeal dismissed.
ORDER
In the result, I would propose the following order:
1. The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include costs of the
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, with costs of
counsel on scale A.
JUDGMENT
RALARALA, J
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an appeal against a judgment and order of Mthimunye , AJ handed
down on 03 June 2024. In the court aquo, the Appellant launched an application to
enforce clause 3 of a written agreement (‘the Suzuki Agreement’) concluded by the
Appellant and the Respondent on 16 December 2021. In terms of the said
agreement the appellant gave the respondent a gift of a Suzuki Jimny GLX motor
vehicle. (‘the Jimny’). The Jimny was purchased by the Appellant in terms of an
instalment sale / lease agreement entered into between the Respondent and MFC
Nedbank ( ‘the Nedbank Agreement’). In terms of the Suzuki agreement, the
Appellant undertook to pay to MFC Nedbank the monthly instalments for the
purchase of the Jimny.
[2] According to clause 3 of the Suzuki agreement, the Respondent would remain
the rightful owner of the Jimny in all instances, with the exception that if she
separates from or divorces the Appellant for any reason, prior to the settlement or
closure of the Nedbank agreement, in which case ownership will cede to Appellant.
[3] The court aquo dismissed the application with costs. It is that order that is the
subject of this appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[4] Subsequent to the conclusion of the Suzuki agreement, the parti es concluded
an antenuptial contract on 11 March 2022. On 13 March 202 2, the parties were
married and on 4 April 2022, the antenuptial contract was registered by the Registrar
of Deeds.
[5] On 8 August 2023, Appellant refinanced the Nedbank agreement in respect of
the Jimny with Investec Bank Limited (‘Investec’) and entered into an instalment sale
agreement and credit facility in respect of the Jimny (‘the Investec Agreement’). The
Investec agreement resulted in the settlement of the MFC Nedbank debt in terms of
the Suzuki agreement, thereby terminating the Nedbank Agreement between the
Respondent and MFC Nedbank. On 15 August 2023 , MFC Nedbank addressed
correspondence to the Respondent confirming that the account has been settled . On
7 September 2023, Investec was registered as the owner of the Jimny.
[6] The marriage relationship between the parties deteriorated rapidly. As a
result, On 29 December 2023 , the Respondent applied for and obtained an interim
protection order in terms of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 against the
Appellant. In terms of the said interim protection order the Appellant was precluded
from refusing the Respondent access to their marital home. The return date for the
hearing of the protection order application was 22 January 2024, which was
subsequently postponed to 18 Marc h 2024. The protection order was ultimately
withdrawn pursuant to a settlement agreement concluded by the parties on 15 March
2024.
[7] Preceding the settlement agreement an incident occurred on 27 January
2024, which resulted in the Respondent leaving the marital home to reside with her
2024, which resulted in the Respondent leaving the marital home to reside with her
mother, upon advice of her attorney. On 28 January and 09 February 2024 , the
Respondent communicated to the Appellant her intention to return to the marital
home to collect her possessions. The Appellant refused her access to their marital
home and changed the door locks notwithstanding the preclusion of same in terms of
the interim protection order.
[8] As a result of the above incident, the Appellant launched an application
seeking an order that the Respondent transfer ownership of the Jimny to him. The
Appellant contended that the Respondent moved out of the marital home and by
doing so she breached clause 3 of their written agreement , which precluded the
Respondent from separating from the Appellant before the Jimny was paid off by the
Appellant.
[9] The court a quo had to determine whether the dispute of fact raised by the
Respondent amounted to a material and bona fide dispute of fact. Secondly,
notwithstanding the said dispute of fact whether the court a quo can still decide the
matter on the papers. Thirdly, whether ownership has passed to the Respondent in
respect of the Jimny on settlement of the MFC Nedbank Agreement. In a detailed
judgment which it handed down on 4 June 2024 the court a quo determined that the
Appellant failed to satisfy the court that the Res pondent has separated or divorced
from him and thereby breached clause 3 of the Suzuki Agreement.
[10] Aggrieved by the outcome, the Applicant applied for leave to appeal, however
he was unsuccessful. On 27 November 2024 , leave to appeal was granted by the
Supreme Court of Appeal to the full court of this Division.
[11] The central issue in the Appellant's grounds of appeal is whether the court a
quo was obligated to exercise its discretion in favour of referring the matter to oral
evidence mero motu. The secondary issue pertains to the court a quo’s handling of
the factual disputes presented by the Respondent, particularly the court’s
interpretation of clause 3 of the written agreement.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND DISCUSSION
[12] The extent to which a court of appeal may intervene in the determinations of a
court of first instance is well -defined in our legal framework. The fundamental
premise is that an appellate court possesses limited power to interfere with the
decision of a trial court. The observations of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Malan
and Another v Law Society of the Northern Provinces1 are pertinent:
"A court of appeal has limited powers to interfere with a decision of the court of first
instance. In relation to the first leg of the inquiry, which is factual, appeals are subject
to the general limitation that courts of appeal defer to the factual findings of courts of
first instance (R v Dhlumayo 1948 (2) SA 677 (A))."
[13] However, the deference ordinarily accorded to a lower court's factual findings
in trial proceedings essentially has a different basis when the matter on appeal was
decided in motion proceedings, as is the case in this matter. The distinction is
significant and was articulated with clarity, in Malan as well. The rule contemplates
that a court of appeal may interfere with a decision of the court aquo where that court
decided the case on the papers in motion proceedings, as in such a case the court of
appeal is in as good a position to judge the facts as was the court a quo.
[14] The circumstances when a court of appeal can interfere with the exercise of a
discretion2 by the court a quo also generally forms part of an appeal court’s
considerations. Depending on the type of discretion the court a quo exercised,
whether ‘strict’ or ‘loose’ will determine the appellate court’s degree of interference.
An appellate court is generally slow to interfere with a loose discretion, while a strict
discretion is open to interference if it was not exercised judicially. This would be in an
instance where it had been influenced by wrong principles or a misdirection on the
facts, or that it had reached a decision which in the result could not reasonably have
facts, or that it had reached a decision which in the result could not reasonably have
been made by a court properly directing itself to all the relevant facts and principles3.
1 2009 (1) SA 216 (SCA) at par 12
2 See Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd and
Another 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC) at paras 85 – 89 and Knox D'Arcy Ltd and Others v Jamieson and Others 1996
(4) SA 348 (A) at 361I.
3 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [1999]
ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) at para 11.
[15] This appeal involves a matter that w as determined in the court a quo on
motion proceedings. Accordingly, save to the extent that any finding turns on matters
uniquely within the advantage of the court a quo, this Court is in as good a position
as the court a quo to evaluate the evidence on the papers, to decide the factual
issues on the record, and to apply the Plascon-Evans4 approach to resolve genuine
and bona fide disputes of fact.
[16] It is also trite that an appeal lies against the order of a court, not its reasons.
Even if the reasoning of the court a quo is found to be wanting, the appeal must be
dismissed if the order is nonetheless correct5.
[17] In motion proceedings a court is generally confined to
the common-cause facts6. Nevertheless, where genuine factual issues emerge from
the affidavits, the court is not compelled to automatically grant or deny relief; instead,
it possesses several alternatives as stipulated by rule 6(5)(g) 7. A court may dismiss
the application outright if the disputes were reasonably foreseeable and the applicant
nonetheless opted for motion proceedings 8 alternatively if the application is not
dismissed, the court can adopt the procedure that best ensure s that justice is served
with the least delay 9 and in that regard exercises a discretion 10. The court can also
decide the matter on the respondent’s version 11 or resolve the dispute where it can
be resolved on the papers.
4 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A)
5 See President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Tembani and Others 2025 (2) SA 371 (CC) at
; Zurich Ins Co SA Ltd v Gauteng Provincial Govt 2023 (1) SA 447 (SCA)
6 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] 2 All SA 366 (A), 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at
634
7 Rule 6(5)(g) provides: Where an application cannot properly be decided on affidavit the court may dismiss the
application or make such order as it deems fit with a view to ensuring a just and expeditious decision. In
particular, but without affecting the generality of the afore -going, it may direct that oral evidence be heard on
specified issues with a view to resolving any dispute of fact and to that end may order any deponent to appear
personally or grant leave for such deponent or any other person to be subpoenaed to appear and be examined
and cross-examined as a witness or it may refer the matter to trial with appropriate directions as to pleadings or
definition of issues, or otherwise
8 Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1949 (3) SA 1155 (T);
9 Johannesburg City Council v The Administrator Transvaal (1) 1970 (2) SA 89 (T)
10 Cresto Machines(Edms) Bpk v Die Afdeling Speuroffisier SA Polisie Noord -Transvaal 1970 (4) SA 350 (T)
365; Pautz v Horn 1976 (4) SA 572 (O)
11 As per the Plascon-Evans supra-approach
[18] The Respondent argues contrary to the stance taken by the Appellant to the
effect that there was a duty on the court a quo to mero motu refer a matter for oral
evidence. Appellant’s counsel in this regard relied on Du Plessis En ‘n Ander v
Tzerefos12, where the court stated:
“Nie een van die partye het op enige stadium aansoek gedoen dat die
aangeleentheid vir mondelinge getuienis verwys moes word nie of dat een van die
deponente aan kruisverhoor onderwerp moes word nie. ‘n hof kan egter ook mero
motu n bevel met sodanige strekking maak...”
[19] The Respondent's counsel contends that the court a quo had no obligation to
mero motu refer the matter for oral evidence, it can similarly be inferred from the
above text that a court , in exercis ing its judicial discretion may mero motu refer a
matter for oral evidence sua sponte rather than being duty bound or compelled to do
so. Rule 6(5)(g) contemplates the exercise of discretion in the true sense wherein
the judicial decision-making process involves a choice between a number of equally
permissible options.13
[20] The judgement of the court a quo demonstrates that the court
comprehensively acknowledged this reality, as well as the available options and
other pertinent considerations. This is evident in the exercise of its discretion when it
chose to resolve the matter based on written submiss ions, despite identifying a
substantial and genuine factual dispute, and then dismissed the Appellant's
application, as this was a permissible option under the circumstances.
[21] In Joh-Air (Pty) Ltd v Rudman 14 the court recogni sed that it requires a bold
move by the court to refer the matter for oral evidence or trial mero motu, given the
possibility that the Applicant opted not to request that the matter be referred for oral
evidence or trial. The court similarly recogni sed that the said omission on the part of
12 1979 (4) SA 819 (O) 838 A translated into English as:
12 1979 (4) SA 819 (O) 838 A translated into English as:
“Neither of the parties at any stage applied for the matter to be referred for oral evidence, nor for any of the
deponents to be subjected to cross -examination. However, a court may also, mero motu, make an order to that
effect...”
13 Repas v Repas (A151/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 24 (13 February 2023) para 25.
14 [1980] 3 All SA 404 (T) at 429
the applicant may be due to avoidance of being involved in costs occasioned in the
said procedures. Furthermore , it may well be a stratagem adopted pursuant to the
consideration of the answering papers, recognising the likelihood that prospects of
success are unlikely. Where there has been no request for a referral to oral evidence
it is generally undesirable that a court mero motu orders such referral.15
[22] The record clearly indicates, and the Respondent contends, that the court a
quo was not requested to refer the matter to oral evidence; rather, the judgement of
the court a quo specifically states that the Appellant urged the court to resolve the
issue based on the submitted documents. In Kalil v Decotex (P ty) Ltd and Another16
the Appellate Division (AD) reiterated that an application to refer a matter for oral
evidence should be made at the onset and not after argument. In accordance with
the principles articulated in Repas, Joh-Air, Bula, and Kalil, supra, the learned Judge
was not compelled nor can be criticized for failing to sua sponte submit the issue for
oral testimony.
[23] I note with concern that the Appellant, in his replying papers, failed to address
the issues raised in the answering affidavit. The Appellant neither denied nor
admitted that the Responde nt vacated their marital home in response to Appellant’s
threats which were essentially in violation of the interim protection order granted
against him. Significantly the Respondent in her answering papers manifests that the
triggering of the resolutive condition in clause 3 of the Suzuki Agreement was
orchestrated by the Appellant.
[24] At the hearing the court engaged counsel for the Appellant in respect of
correspondence from the Respondent’s erstwhile attorneys dated 28 January 2024
describing the events of 27 January 2024 which induced fear in the Respondent and
clearly stating that the Respondent had upon their advice left the marital home for a
clearly stating that the Respondent had upon their advice left the marital home for a
few days to live with her mother. And the Appellant’s actions of denying Respondent
access to the marital home by changing locks to their home. Counsel could not
refute the reasons for Respondent to vacate the marital home and neither did the
Appellant address the Respondent’s averments in this regard. The court a quo
15Bula and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [2012] 2 All SA 1 (SCA) para 53.
16 [1988] 2 ALL SA 159(A) 159(A) at 981
correctly found that the Respondent in her answering papers seriously and
unambiguously addressed the facts said to be disputed.
[25] The Respondent further contended that the Suzuki agreement could not be
interpreted to include the refinancing term relied on by the Appellant, hence the
Respondent was released from clause 3 on settlement of the Nedbank Agreement.
Developing this argument, it is contended that no consent was given by the
Respondent to Appellant for the refinancing of the Jim ny. The Appellant submitted
that the refinancing of the Nedbank Agreement through Investec had no material
change to the parties’ obligations and duties in respect of the Suzuki Agreement. The
court a quo correctly dealt with clause 3 of the Suzuki Agreement reading it in the
context of the entire agreement. At paragraph 57 of the judgment the court a quo
stated the following:
“It is apparent from the pleadings that clause 3 of the Suzuki/Jimny agreement is the
main factual dispute. As it gives rise to many issues raised by the respondent.
Clause 3, however, cannot be read in isolation but must be read with all relevant
terms in the Suzuki /Jimny agreement to see whether the relief sought by the
applicant is justified. The relevant terms are as follows:
“A[...]2 received a Gift from A[...] in November 2020, a Suzuki GLX, AT, Registration
Number C[...]. A[...]2 is the registered Owner of the vehicle. The Instalment
Sale/Lease Agreement is between A[...]2 and MFC Nedbank.
[1] Although the vehicle is financed in A[...]2’s name, A[...] accepts full
responsibility for the instalment sale /lease agreement between A[...]2 and
MFC and undertakes to honour the repayment arrangement with MFC,
Nedbank (NO exceptions).
[2] A[...] accepts all the terms and conditions as laid out in the instalment
sale/agreement an extra tax invoice attached, with reference part one:
repayment arrangements. This includes all instalments due and ballon
payment (a lump sum instalment due and payable on the last date of
payment (a lump sum instalment due and payable on the last date of
R109,839.00 due 01/12/2026).
[3] A[...]2 shall remain the rightful Owner of the Suzuki in ALL instances, with the
exception, if she separates or divorces from A[...] for any reason, prior to the
settlement or closure of the instalment Sale/ Lease Agreement in which case
she cede Ownership to A[...].
[4] If A[...] separates or divorces from A[...]2 for any reason, prior to the
settlement or closure of the instalment sale / lease agreement, A[...]2 will
retain ownership off(sic) the vehicle and A[...] will honor these obligations as
laid out (pt. 1-5 Above).
[5] A[...] undertakes to pay the monthly car insurance and general vehicle
upkeep for the duration of the instalment/ lease agreement with MFC,
Nedbank.”
[26] Interpretation, which is a process of attributing meaning to the words used in a
contract, is indeed a matter for the court. In such exercise the context provided must
be considered by reading the specific provision in light of the entire document /
contract as a whole a nd the circumstances attendant upon its coming into
existence.17
[27] The Nedbank Agreement is between MFC Nedbank and the Respondent, with
the Appellant responsible for the payment of instalments until the vehicle is fully paid.
Firstly, the Appellant paid up the vehicle in terms of the Nedbank Agreement. Thus,
with the proper interpretation of clause 3 the ownership of the Jimny ought to have
passed to the Respondent as intended by the parties . That this ought to have been
the case is clear from the Suzuki Agreement. The Appellant’s notice of motion
specifically sought an order in the following terms in prayer 3:
“That the Respondent be ordered to transfer ownership of the 2020 Suzuki Jimny 1.5
GLX A/T motor vehicle bearing registration number C[...] to the Applicant within
3(three) days of the order being granted.”
[28] Clearly, from the onset the Appellant was of the view that ownership of the
Jimny vested with the Respondent , hence the order sought is formulated
Jimny vested with the Respondent , hence the order sought is formulated
accordingly. Notwithstanding the existence of the Investec Agreement, which would
17 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012(4) SA 593(SCA) ([2012] 3 ALL SA 262;
[2012] ZASCA 13 page 603 para 18.
confer ownership of the Jim ny to Investec. Similar to the issue of the referral of the
matter for oral evidence which was only raised post judgment in the application for
leave to appeal, that is also the case in respect of the finding on ownership by the
court a quo. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that ‘factually and contractually’ the
Respondent is only the bona fide possessor of the Jim ny until such time as all
instalments, in respect of any instalment sale agreement with any financial
institution, have been paid, which has been authoritatively decided in the locus
classicus Info Plus v Scheelke and Another.18
[29] This argument is problematic as it omits consideration of the terms of the
Suzuki Agreement, which explicitly indicates that the Nedbank Agreement is between
the Respondent and MFC Nedbank, and that the Respondent is the registered
owner of the Jimmy. It remains an uncontroverted fact that all installments in respect
of the Nedbank Agreement have been paid as was the case in Info Plus supra,
signifying that ownership ought to have been transferred to the Respondent in terms
of the Suzuki Agreement. It is clear that the Appellant laboured under the very same
impression and believed that , as set out in notice of motion, the relief sought is the
‘transfer of ownership’ of the Jimny which is in line with the text of the Suzuki
Agreement.
[30] The Respondent contends that the Investec Agreement is between the
Appellant and Investec thus having no bearing on the relief sought by the Appellant.
Moreover, the Investec Agreement does not substitute the Nedbank Agreement
because there is no express provision for refinancing in the Suzuki Agreement. This
averment is not addressed by the Appellant in its replying papers.
[31] In terms of clause 3 of the Suzuki Agreement, ownership of the Jimny was
contingent upon a resolutive condition , stipulating that the Respondent would be
obliged to relinquish and cede ownership thereof to the Appellant in the event the
obliged to relinquish and cede ownership thereof to the Appellant in the event the
Respondent separat ing or divorc ing the Appellant before the Nedbank Agreement
was fully paid. The alleged breach of clause 3 on 27 January 2024 was orchestrated
by Appellant himself in that , while fully aware of the interim protection order that
181998 (3) SA 184 (SCA)
precluded him from preventing the Respondent access to the marital home, he
induced fear in the Respondent leading to her attorney advis ing her to leave the
marital home for a few days to avert any danger. It can not therefore be successfully
argued that her actions constitute separation if the intention is to return to the marital
home. Put differently, if it was not for the incident that induced fear into the
Respondent, she would not have left the marital home. Noteworthy is that the
Appellant does not allow her access to their marital home and change s locks to the
doors hindering her return. The court a quo’s finding that the Respondent’s leave of
absence was orchestrated by Appellant in order to invoke clause 3 of the Suzuki
Agreement cannot be faulted.
[32] In Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty)Ltd19 it was held that a court
must take a robust approach when assessing the existence of genuine dispute s of
fact in motion proceedings. In applying this approach, the respondent’s version of
events must not be so far -fetched, clearly untenable or contrary to all reasonable
probabilities, if that is found to be the case the court would simply reject the
Respondent’s version on the papers without referring the matter to oral evidence.
The court expects the respondent to seriously address the applicant’s material
averments. A bona fide dispute of fact requires that there be something of
consequence raised by the respondent, both as to substance and factual detail . In
this manner a factual dispute of facts manifests and similarly allows the court to
categorise it as a genuine or bona fide dispute of fact. Where a material dispute of
facts exists, a final relief cannot be granted, the court must either dismiss the
application or refer the specific dispute to oral evidence.
[33] The Constitutional Court in African Congress for Transformation v Electoral
Commission of South Africa; Labour Party of South Africa v Electoral Commission of
Commission of South Africa; Labour Party of South Africa v Electoral Commission of
South Africa; African Alliance of Social Democrats v Commission of South
Africa20remarked as follows:
“Motion proceedings are unsuitable to decide probabilities. Instances where final
relief is sought, motion proceedings are aimed at resolving issues of law based on
19 2008(3) SA 371(SCA)
20 [2024] ZACC7; 2024 (8) BCLR 987 (CC) para 95
common cause facts. And where disputes of fact arise, absent a referral for oral
evidence, the Plascon Evans approach, as amplified in Wightman, must be
employed. There is no basis to reject the Commission’s denial that these two
applicants’ failure to comply with the Election Timetable was not due to the
malfunction of the OCNS, but due to their own procrastination and ineptitude. The
Commission supported its denial with positive facts. There is thus genuine dispute of
fact on the papers.” (underlining supplied)
[34] The position proffered by Counsel for the Appellant at the hearing, that the
robust approach envisages that only one version has to be considered is
unsubstantiated and meritless. The Appellant approached the case on the basis that
there are factual disputes and urged the court to resolve same on the papers .
Similarly, the relief sought in their notice of motion is transfer of ownership from the
Respondent to the Appellant, they argued on that basis before the court a quo and it
was only during leave to appeal that they impermissibly seek to redesign the issues
beyond the pleadings. Belatedly the Appellant argues that the Respondent is only
the bona fide possessor of the Jimny th erefore the court erred in finding that
ownership of the Jimny passed to the Respondent in August 2023. It is well to
remind ourselves that in application proceedings the notice of motion and affidavits
define the issues between the parties and the affidavits embody the evidence. Molusi
and Others v Voges N.O. and Others21.
[35] The argument posited by Counsel for the Appellant that the court a quo in its
adoption of the robust approach failed to have regard to Buffalo Freight Systems v
Cadtleigh Trading 22 where the court dealt with uncontradicted evidence and
observed that the court a quo must have concluded that no genuine factual dispute
existed and that the respondent’s defense was implausible and entirely untenable. In
existed and that the respondent’s defense was implausible and entirely untenable. In
this instance, the court a quo found differently i.e. the existence of a bona fide and
material dispute of fact , hence there was no basis to reject the Respondent’s
version, instead the court correctly opted to dismiss the application. In my view
Buffalo Freight Systems is distinguishable from this matter. The concerns about the
robust approach are fallacious in my view.
21 CCT96/15) [2016] ZACC 6;2016(3) SA 370 (CC)2016(7) BCLR 839 (CC) (1 March 2016) para 28
22 2011(1) SA 8 (SCA) para 21; [2011] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) (24May 2010)
[36] On consideration of the record, I find that the foreshadowed disputes were not
of such a nature that the court a quo could not determine them on the papers.
Consequently, the court a quo’s decision to determine the matter on the papers does
not amount to an error that justify interference.
ORDER
[37] In the result, I would propose that the following order be made:
[37.1] The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include costs of the
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, with
costs of counsel on scale A.
________________________
N.E. Ralarala
Judge of the High Court
I agree,
________________________
M.J. Dolamo
Judge of the High Court
I agree, and it is so ordered.
________________________
Adams, AJ
Acting Judge of the High Court
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant : M Holland
Instructed by : Parker Attorneys
For the Respondent : K Taylor-Vermaak
Instructed by : Shields Attorneys