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[2] The application for leave to appeal is brought in terms of section 17(1)(a) of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. The test for granting leave to appeal is
established. The enquiry is whether the appeal would have reasonable prospects
of success, alternatively whether there is some other compelling reason why the
appeal should be heard.
[3] The application for leave to appeal identifies several grounds of appeal
concerning the proper application of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
3 of 2000 (PAJA); the procedural obligations of the respondent, a public
university and the effect of the absence of a contemporaneous record of the
CRW-2 proceedings; and the proper boundary between institutional academic
autonomy and constitutional accountability.
[4] A central factual issue the applicant relied upon to support her contention was
that there were no minutes, recording or a contemporaneous record the WRC-2
proceedings. This evidentiary gap, applicant argued should not have benefited
the University, because in a PAJA review the respondents must justify the
lawfulness of its decision. The applicant criticises the finding that the
respondents’ version prevailed despite the absence of an objective record.
[5] On the question of predetermination, The applicant relies on the respondents’
statement that even if the psychologist’s letter had been considered, it would not
have changed the outcome. The applicant argues that this shows the outcome
was treated as inevitable, meaning the discretion was not genuinely exercised.
[6] The medical evidence is also central. The applicant says the psychologist’s letter
supported her academic fitness, confirmed her ability to continue studying, and
showed that her health difficulties were relevant to the discretionary enquiry. The
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applicant argues that the Court wrongly evaluated the medical evidence itself
instead of asking whether the University had lawfully considered it.
[7] In my view, another court may reasonably come to a different conclusion on
whether the absence of an objective record of the WRC -2 proceedings was
appropriately dealt with in the review. The absence of minutes, a recording, or a
contemporaneous record gives rise to an arguable question as to whether the
respondents sufficiently justified the lawfulness, rationality and procedural
fairness of its decision.
[8] It is reasonably arguable that, in a PAJA review, an evidentiary gap arising from
the absence of the record of the WRC-2 hearing should not automatically operate
to the benefit of the respondent whose decision is under review. Another court
may find that the absence of such a record affected the Court’s ability to assess
whether the respondent considered all relevant material and exercised its
discretion lawfully.
[9] A further arguable issue concerns the respondents’ stance that the psychologist’s
letter would not have altered the outcome even if it had been considered. The
applicant contends that this demonstrates predetermination by the WRC -2
committee or that it fetter ed the discretion of the committee . The respondents
contend that it merely reflects the immateriality of the letter in light of the binding
academic progression rules.
[10] In my view, this issue warrants the attention of an appeal court. Another court
may reasonably conclude that a statement that evidence would not have altered
the outcome raises a material question about whether the decision- making
process was genuinely out come-sensitive, particularly where the empowering
framework required consideration of exceptional circumstances which the
applicant contends the psychologist’s letter proved.
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[11] There is also a reasonable prospect that another court may differ on whether this
Court impermissibly substituted its own assessment of the medical evidence for
that of the WRC-2 Committee. The applicant’s complaint is not merely that this
Court reached the wrong academic conclusion, but that this Court may have
approached the matter as if it were determining the merits of the academic
decision rather than reviewing the legality of the administrative process.
[12] The psychologist’s letter and the applicant’s health-related representations are
central to this dispute. Whether such evidence was properly before WRC -2,
whether it was considered, and whether it was capable of affecting the exercise
of discretion are all matters on which reasonable judicial disagreement may
arise.
[13] The interpretation of the WRC Policy Booklet also raises an arguable point of
law. The applicant contends that WRC-2 was required, in an N+2 case involving
exceptional circumstances, not to refuse renewal but to recommend the matter
to the VPC for consideration. The respondents contend that WRC-2 acted within
its mandate and that there was no discretion to depart from the minimum
progression requirements. The only instance allowing for referral to the VPC was
if a member of the committee was of the view that the process required such
referral. The respondent argued that the applicant ought to be saved from her
decision to take the matter on appeal in view of the time that will have lapsed by
the time the appeal is considered. The applicant’s credits would expire by that
time which would be more detrimental to her academic career.
[14] T he proper interpretation of the relevant clauses of the WRC Policy Booklet,
including the relationship between the WRC -2 process, procedural complaints,
exceptional circumstances, and VPC consideration, is an issue on which another
court may reasonably differ.
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[15] The question is not whether the applicant should ultimately succeed on appeal.
The question at this stage is whether there is a sound and rational basis to
conclude that another court could reasonably reach a different conclusion. I am
satisfied that such a basis exists.
[16] I am also persuaded that there are compelling reasons for the appeal to be heard.
The matter implicates broader questions concerning administrative
accountability in public universities, the keeping and production of records in
student exclusion or non- renewal decisions, and the extent to which academic
autonomy coexists with PAJA review.
[17] The issues raised are not limited to the a pplicant’s individual circumstances.
They have potential significance for students subject to academic progression
rules, particularly where exclusion or non- renewal decisions involve allegations
of exceptional circumstances, health- related evidence, and discretionary
institutional processes.
[18] I am further satisfied that the appeal is not rendered academic merely because
the 2026 registration period has closed. The a pplicant contends that the
impugned decision continues to affect her academic standing and future
registration prospects. If that contention is correct, effective relief may still be
available, including setting aside and remittal.
[19] Having considered the a pplicant’s grounds of appeal, the r espondents’
submissions in opposition, and the nature of the issues raised, I am satisfied that
the matter crosses the threshold contemplated in section 17(1)(a).
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Appearances:
On behalf of the applicant: In Person
mwilacm03@gmail.com
Instructed by: I n person
On behalf of the respondents: Adv Musatondwa Musandiwa
Instructed by: MVMT Attorneys
winston@mvmtinc.co.za
Date of hearing: 2 April 2026
Date of judgment: 3 June 2026