THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case 2026/017521
In the matter between:
NATHANIEL TSAKANE MAKHUBELE Applicant
and
RONALD TSAKANE MABUNDA
First Respondent
MHLAVE INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD
Second Respondent
SHERIFF OF THE HIGH COURT - SOWETO WEST
(MAUREEN CIBE)
Third Respondent
SHERIFF OF THE HIGH COURT - WESTONARIA
Fourth Respondent
JUDGMENT: LEAVE TO APPEAL
DU PLESSIS J
(1) REPORTABLE: Yes☐/ No ☒
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes☐ / No ☒
(3) REVISED: Yes ☒ / No ☐
Date: 29 May 2026
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Introduction
[1] This is a leave to appeal against my judgment delivered on 1 April 2026 1, where
I dismissed an urgent application brought by the applicant in which he sought, in
substance, a declaratory order that an interim order granted by Mia J on 13 February
2026 was suspended pending an appeal, and that earlier orders granted by Tebeile
AJ and Wanless J remained operative and enforceable. The applicant also sought
substantive relief in the enforcement of the orders of Tebeile AJ and Wanless J.
[2] I found that there was no pending leave to appeal against the Mia J order, as
the application had been rejected by the Court Online system for non-compliance with
the Rules. I further found that, even if there had been, the Mia order was an
interlocutory order establishing a case -management regime and was therefore not
automatically suspended under section 18 of the Superior Courts Act.
2 I also held that
section 18 could not be used as a vehicle to obtain entirely new substantive relief such
as eviction orders and monetary claims.
[3] The third respondent also brought a counter-application which I granted, and
thereby declared the applicant a vexatious litigant in terms of section 2(1)(b) of the
Vexatious Proceedings Act
3 and imposed procedural controls requiring him to obtain
written leave from the office of the Judge President before enrolling any new
application or interlocutory step in this Division. I awarded costs to the third respondent
on the attorney-and-client scale.
[4] The application for leave was not without procedural difficulty: the record
disclosed non-compliance with the Uniform Rules and the applicable practice
directives. I nonetheless address the merits in the interests of finality.
[5] When the application for leave was heard, the applicant again appeared in
person. The third respondent was also present with legal representation. The first and
second respondents did not appear, but Mr Mabunda (the first respondent) joined the
second respondents did not appear, but Mr Mabunda (the first respondent) joined the
1 Makhubele v Mabunda [2026] ZAGPJHC 404.
2 10 of 2013.
3 3 of 1956.
3
virtual hearing. The first and second respondents filed heads of argument. Those
heads were read but did not materially assist in resolving the questions arising for
determination, as they did not engage with the central issues on the merits. They are
accordingly not addressed in detail in this judgment.
[6] The applicant’s written and oral submissions raised numerous complaints and
alleged irregularities, many of which were repetitive and internally inconsistent. They
were often difficult to follow and did not present a structured challenge to the reasoning
of the main judgment. In this judgment I therefore do not attempt to deal with every
point he has raised, but confine myself to the main aspects that can properly be
understood as grounds of appeal against the orders I made.
[7] The applicant advances five grounds of appeal:
a. That I erred in finding that there was no properly pending application for
leave to appeal against the order of Mia J and in treating that order as
interlocutory for purposes of section 18 of the Superior Courts Act, with
the result (he says) that the Mia order ought to have been regarded as
suspended and the earlier orders of Tebeile AJ and Wanless J as fully
operative.
b. That I failed to give effect to, or undermined, the extant orders of Tebeile
AJ and Wanless J, thereby (according to the applicant) failing to uphold
the rule of law and his rights as owner of the property.
c. That I misdirected myself in declaring him a vexatious litigant under
section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act and in imposing
Division-wide procedural controls, including by allegedly not following
the approach set out in authorities.
d. That the third respondent’s counter -application was procedurally
defective and/or not properly before the court, and that I afforded the
third respondent procedural indulgences and allowed her to participate
in circumstances that rendered the proceedings unfair to the applicant.
in circumstances that rendered the proceedings unfair to the applicant.
e. That the award of costs on the scale as between attorney and client in
favour of the third respondent constituted a misdirection and was, on his
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version, tainted by the dismissal of the recusal application and by the
alleged failure to consider all relevant authorities.
[8] For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that the application for leave to
appeal must be refused. The applicant has not demonstrated reasonable prospects of
success on any of the five grounds advanced, nor has he identified any compelling
reason of public importance or legal novelty that would warrant the grant of leave to
appeal.
[9] Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 provides that leave may
only be given where the court is of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable
prospect of success, or that there is some other compelling reason why it should be
heard. As explained in MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha
4, a mere possibility of
success, an arguable case, or a matter that is not hopeless is not enough. There must
be a sound, rational basis for the conclusion that another court could reasonably arrive
at a different outcome on the facts and the law. Against this standard, the applicant’s
five grounds of appeal must be assessed.
Ground 1: Section 18 and the Mia J order
[10] I found that, as a matter of fact, the applicant’s leave application was rejected
by the Court Online system for non-compliance with the Rules, and that he did not
cure the defect. On the material before me, there was no properly pending leave
application. There is no realistic prospect of success.
[11] I also found that, in any event, Mia J’s order was interim, pending the final
determination of the application and the counter-application she consolidated. Her
order did not finally determine the parties’ substantive rights to the property. The order
referred the matters for case management, directed rescission proceedings, and
created interim arrangements pending those proceedings. This means that even if
there were an appeal, the order would not be suspended. There is no reasonable
prospect that another court would differ.
prospect that another court would differ.
4 [2016] ZASCA 176 para 17,
5
Ground 2: Failure to enforce earlier orders
[12] The second ground is that I failed to give effect to the order of Tebeile AJ and
Wanless J, and thereby undermined the rule of law.
[13] This mischaracterises the judgment. The refusal must be understood in the
context of multiple orders, one of which was Mia J's order that expressly regulated the
position pending case management and rescission proceedings. What Mr Makhubele
requested was that that order be ignored, despite its existence.
[14] Court orders must be obeyed, and a litigant cannot insist that only favourable
orders be enforced while disregarding unfavourable ones, such as the order of Mia J.
My judgment required compliance with the Mia J order and the framework it
established. There is no reasonable prospect that another court would hold that the
earlier orders of Tebeile AJ and Wanless J must be enforced at the expense of a later
Mia J order regulating an interim process involving those two orders. Also on this
ground, there is no reasonable prospects of success on appeal.
Ground 3: Vexatious litigant declaration
[15] The third ground challenges the finding that the applicant is a vexatious litigant
and the procedural controls imposed under section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious
Proceedings Act.
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[16] The record shows he has a history of making repeated urgent applications and
other behaviours, which I discussed in the main judgment. These proceedings are part
of that pattern, as they aim to reopen issues despite an existing interdict and case-
management order that put them on hold until the disputes are finally determined.
[17] In assessing whether the applicant’s conduct satisfies section 2(1)(b), it is
relevant that his litigation has not been confined to a single misjudged application but
has followed a sustained pattern. Over the years, the applicant has repeatedly sought
5 3 of 1956.
6
to reopen disputes concerning the same property and related parties (under different
case numbers), including prior proceedings in Pretoria in which he has already been
declared a vexatious litigant. More recently, he has launched multiple urgent
applications arising from the same underlying dispute, sought contempt findings and
the Sheriff's incarceration, brought a spoliation-related counter-application, pursued
leave to appeal and section 18 relief against an interim order, and sought to have
judges against whom he has lodged complaints recused. These steps were often
accompanied by criminal and professional complaints against opposing parties and
their legal representatives, and were taken notwithstanding existing orders regulating
how the disputes were to be managed. Taken together, this history demonstrates
persistent and unwarranted resort to the courts, which burdens other litigants and the
administration of justice. On that basis, the vexatious litigant order and the associated
procedural controls were granted.
[18] The applicant argued that I failed to comply with the approach outlined in
Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Co
-operative Governance and
Traditional Affairs v Maphanga.6 That submission is unfounded. In the main judgment
I did what Maphanga requires: I identified the statutory source of the power (section
21(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act), I considered the litigant’s broader litigation
history and not only the present case, I distinguished between mere persistence and
abuse, and I fashioned a remedy that is tailored and proportionate, namely a screening
mechanism requiring prior leave to institute further proceedings, rather than an
absolute bar. The order does not prevent the applicant from accessing the courts, but
it does regulate how and when he may do so, in line with the constitutional approach
endorsed in Beinash v Ernst & Young
7 and applied in Maphanga. There is no basis to
endorsed in Beinash v Ernst & Young
7 and applied in Maphanga. There is no basis to
suggest that the wrong test was applied, or that my discretion was exercised on a
wrong principle.
[19] The conduct described in the main judgment and summarised above is not just
repetitive. In my opinion, based on the record, it is improper and disrespectful, and
disruptive of the proper functioning of the court and its officers. Court procedures and
6 2021 (4) SA 131 (SCA).
7 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC) para 15.
7
complaint mechanisms, which exist to ensure fair dispute resolution and uphold
judicial integrity, are often misused against parties, judicial officers, and staff, rather
than serving their intended purpose. The issue is not with these mechanisms being
used, but with their improper invocation in this matter.
[20] Whether a litigant’s conduct meets the statutory threshold is a value judgment
grounded in the evidence. On the facts found in the main judgment, there is no sound
basis on which another court would interfere with the declaration and the associated
procedural controls.
Ground 4: Alleged procedural unfairness
[21] The fourth ground is that the counter -application was not properly before the
court, urgency was not established, and the third respondent was afforded procedural
indulgence.
[22] The counter-application was filed in the very proceedings the applicant had
chosen to bring urgently. It was therefore properly ventilated at the same hearing; no
separate enrolment was required. The third respondent placed an affidavit before the
court in support of her counter-application. The applicant had full notice of the case he
had to meet. He argued at length in person. There is nothing on the record to suggest
that he was taken by surprise or deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard.
[23] These are, again, essentially factual and discretionary issues. There is no
realistic prospect that another court would find that I committed a material irregularity
that would justify interference on appeal.
Ground 5: costs
[24] The fifth ground concerns the costs order on the attorney-and-client scale.
[25] A punitive costs order remains a discretion to be exercised judicially. In the main
judgment, I identified the factors that cumulatively justified such an order: the abusive
character of the proceedings; the attempt to obtain substantive relief under section 18;
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the disregard of an existing interdict and case management order; and the broader
pattern of conduct already recognised in previous litigation.
[26] This conduct warrants attorney-and-client costs, both to compensate the
innocent party and to mark the court’s disapproval of abuse of process. There is no
indication that I took irrelevant considerations into account, omitted relevant ones, or
misdirected myself on principle. In those circumstances, an appellate court will be slow
to interfere. There is no reasonable prospect that another court would differ.
Other issues raised
[27] The applicant also sought to rely, in support of his grounds, on the fact that he
had brought a recusal application against me and filed a complaint with the Judicial
Service Commission. The recusal application was dismissed in the main judgment,
where I applied the well-known objective test for a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Nothing advanced in the present application for leave discloses any misdirection in
that reasoning or any new fact that could alter the outcome. There is no reasonable
prospect that another court would differ.
Compelling reasons
[28] Once it is accepted that there are no reasonable prospects of success on the
merits of any ground, the remaining question is whether there is nonetheless some
compelling reason to grant leave, for example because the matter raises a novel
question of law or an issue of wider public importance.
[29] This application does not do so. It turns on the application of settled principles
to the particular facts of this case. It does not present a legal question that needs
clarification by an appellate court.
Conclusion
[30] In sum, none of the grounds advanced discloses a reasonable prospect that
another court would come to a different conclusion. The application for leave to appeal
must therefore be refused. There is no reason to depart from the usual principle that
costs follow the result
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Order
[31] The following order is made:
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the third respondent’s costs of this
application.
_____________
WJ du Plessis
Judge of the High Court, Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
Date of hearing:
25 May 2026
Date of judgment:
29 May 2026
For the applicant:
In person
For the respondent:
L C M Morland instructed by Warrener de
Agrela and Associates