IN THE IDGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
In the matter between:
MARIUS XAVIERUS COETZEE
and
THE CONGREGATION OF THE DUTCH
Not reportable
Case no: 109951/2025
Applicant
First Respondent
REFORMED CHURCH KARATARA-SEDGEFIELD
THE CIJURCH COUNCIL OF THE CONGREGATION
OF THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH
KARATARA-SEDGEFIELD Second Respondent
THE KNYSNA PRESBYTERY OF THE DUTCH
REFORMED CHURCH
Third Respondent
2
THE DISCIPLINARY BODY Fourth Respondent
OF THE PRESBYTERY OF KNYSNA
THE SYNOD OF THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH
OF THE WESTERN CAPE Fifth Respondent
THE SYNODICAL BODY FOR APPEAL OF Sixth Respondent
THE SYNOD OF THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH
OF THE WESTERN CAPE
THE GENERAL SYNOD OF Seventh Respondent
THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH
THE GENERAL SYNODICAL BODY FOR APPEAL
OF THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH Eighth Respondent
GENERAL SYNOD MODERAMEN Ninth Respondent
OF THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH
GENERAL TASK TEAM LEGAL OF THE Tenth Respondent
GENERAL SYNOD OF THE DUTCH
REFORMED CHURCH
3
Neutral citation: Marius Xavier Coetzee v The Congregation of the Dutch
Reformed Church Karatara-Sedgefield and Others ( Case
no 109951/2025) [2026] ZAWCHC (2 June 2026)
Coram: LOUW AJ
Heard: 2 June 2026
Delivered: 2 June 2026
EXTEMPORE JUDGMENT
Louw AJ:
[I] This is an opposed review application brought in terms of Rule 53 of
the Uniform Rules of Court. The applicant seeks an order reviewing
and setting aside decisions of the fourth, sixth and eighth respondents
in terms of which he was found guilty of skeunnakery (schism or
causing division within the church) and was subsequently removed
from office as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church.
[2] The applicant, Mr Coetzee, further seeks an order remitting the matter
to the disciplinary body of the Knysna Presbytery of the Dutch
4
Reformed Church ("the DBPK"), being the fourth respondent, for
reconsideration before a differently constituted disciplinary tribunal.
[3] The applicant is employed as reverend (in Afrikaans "dominee") by the
Congregation of the Dutch Reformed Church Karatara-Sedgefield and
the congregation and has an employment contract with the Church
Council of the Congregation of the Dutch Reformed Church Karatara
Sedgefield (the second respondent). This is thus a triparty relationship.
In addition to his contractual obligations, the applicant is subject to the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the structures established under the Church
Order of the Dutch Reformed Church.
[4] The disciplinary proceedings giving rise to this review originated from
approximately thirty-two complaints lodged by members of the
congregation. Following a preliminary investigation, the DBPK
formulated three disciplinary charges against the applicant. The
principal allegation was that he had been guilty of skeurmakery, namely
conduct alleged to have caused division within the congregation and
the broader church community. Two additional charges were pursued,
one relating to an allegedly false (dishonest) statement he made
concerning church funds not being paid over. The applicant was
ultimately acquitted on one of the additional charges, and nothing
further turns on that aspect.
[5] The DBPK found the applicant guilty of the remaining charges. These
findings ultimately resulted in his removal from the ministry. The
applicant unsuccessfully pursued internal appeals before the Synodical
5
Appeal Body of the Dutch Refonned Church in the Western Cape ("the
SBA") and thereafter before the General Synodical Appeal Body ("the
GSBA").
[ 6] The central question before this Court is whether the proceedings
before the DBPK were so procedurally irregular and fundamentally
unfair as to warrant judicial intervention. If that question is answered
in the affirmative, it necessarily follows that the subsequent appellate
proceedings cannot cure the defects that occurred at first instance.
[7] The disciplinary processes of the Dutch Refonned Church are not
regulated by legislation. Rather, they derive their authority from the
Church Order and the voluntary association constituted by the church
and its members. It is common cause that the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 does not apply to the present
dispute. Accordingly, the matter falls to be determined primarily with
reference to the Church Order and the common-law principles of
natural justice.
[8] The courts have repeatedly recognised that disciplinary proceedings
conducted by voluntary associations are not to be approached with the
same degree of technical rigidity applicable to statutory tribunals.
Nevertheless, such bodies remain bound to observe the fundamental
requirements of procedural fairness. At the heart of those requirements
lie the principles of natural justice.
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[9] The first is the audi alteram partem principle, which requires that a
person whose rights or interests may be adversely affected must be
afforded adequate notice of the allegations against him and a reasonable
opportunity to present his case. The second is the rule against bias,
encapsulated in the maxim nemo judex in causa sua, which requires that
disciplinary proceedings be conducted by impartial decision-makers.
Closely associated with these principles is the requirement that
decisions be properly reasoned, thereby promoting transparency,
accountability and meaningful appellate scrutiny.
[10] The Church Order itself expressly incorporates these principles.
Regulation 22 provides that disciplinary proceedings must be
conducted in a manner that is fair, just and consistent with Biblical
principles. Article 60 specifically provides that official supervision and
discipline within the church are pastoral and canonical in nature and
must be exercised from a Biblical and spiritual perspective in a fair and
equitable manner.
[ 11] Regulation 22 further expressly recognises the principles of natural
justice, including sufficient notice, a fair hearing, the absence of
prejudice, and adherence to the audi alteram partem rule.
[12] Regulation 22.4.2.1 prescribes the composition of a presbytery
disciplinary body. Such a body must consist of no fewer than five
members, including three members appointed by the presbytery ( or its
delegate) and at least two members appointed by the Synodical Legal
Commission, Church Order Commission or relevant task team.
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Provision is further made for the co-option of additional suitably
qualified members. Importantly, Regulation 22.4.3.1 requires the
disciplinary body to be approved by the relevant church assembly or its
delegate before commencing its functions.
[ 13] The regulation further recognises that circumstances may arise in which
a fair and impartial hearing cannot be achieved because of the
composition of the disciplinary body. In such circumstances either the
disciplinary body or the accused may request the appointment of a
differently constituted tribunal. Conflicts of interest, close familial
relationships and circumstances giving nse to reasonable
apprehensions of bias are expressly identified as relevant
considerations. The counsel for the third to tenth respondents submitted
that regulation 22.8.3, read with Article 25, provides for circumstances
in which, due to unforeseen developments necessitating the withdrawal
or inability of certain members to continue, a disciplinary body may
nonetheless proceed with a reduced composition of three members,
irrespective of which members withdraw. That reliance, however, is
misplaced. The present matter does not concern a situation where
members of the disciplinary body were unable to continue due to
unforeseen circumstances. Accordingly, the provisions relied upon find
no application on the facts before this Court.
[ 14] The Church Order also makes provision for mediation and
reconciliation processes as alternatives to formal disciplinary
proceedings, reflecting the pastoral nature of church discipline.
8
[15] Regulation 22.7.2.2 provides that an accused person must receive at
least seven days' notice of a disciplinary hearing. Regulation 22.9.5.4
regulates the presentation of evidence and requires that written
evidence be disclosed to all parties with sufficient time to enable proper
preparation. The names of witnesses are similarly required to be
furnished in advance.
[16] Against this framework, it is unnecessary to recount every factual
dispute appearing in the papers. Rather, it is sufficient to focus upon
those facts relevant to the procedural fairness of the disciplinary
process. It is not the function of this Court to determine whether the
applicant was guilty of the charges preferred against him or whether the
sanction ultimately imposed was appropriate. The issue is whether the
process leading to those findings was lawful, fair and consistent with
the Church Order.
[17] The applicant received notice of the disciplinary hearing on Monday,
20 May 2024. The hearing was scheduled to commence on Tuesday, 28
May 2024. Whilst this seemingly provided eight days' notice, the
evidence demonstrates that all the supporting documentation would
only be made available after midday on the intervening Friday, namely
24 May 2024. In practical terms, the applicant had little more than one
and a half business days within which to prepare or 3 ,5 days if all days
are counted to prepare his defence to serious allegations carrying
potentially career-ending consequences.
9
[18] Upon receiving the notice, the applicant promptly requested on 21 May
2024 an extension of at least fourteen days to enable him to prepare
properly for the hearing. In his written request, he explained that the
proposed hearing date fell during Pentecost, one of the busiest periods
in the church calendar, and that his ministerial duties required his
presence within the congregation. The request was supported by his
employer, by one Nico Basson, the chairperson of the Church Council
of the Congregation of the Dutch Reformed Church Karatara
Sedgefield, the second respondent. Significantly, the applicant did not
refuse to participate in the disciplinary proceedings; he merely sought
a reasonable extension of time within which to prepare adequately. In
substance, the request amounted to no more than an additional week
beyond the period already afforded to him, a modest indulgence sought
to ensure that he could prepare properly and participate meaningfully
in the hearing.
[19] The request was summarily refused. The applicant was advised that, if
he elected not to attend the hearing, the disciplinary proceedings would
proceed in absentia. It duly did so.
[20] On 22 May 2024, Reverend (in Afrikaans "dominee") Stanley informed
the applicant in writing that the disciplinary board required him to
furnish a list of all witnesses he intended to call, together with the
details of the person who would assist him during the hearing. This
request was made notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had not
yet been provided with the names of the complainants, copies of the
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original complaints or sufficient infonnation regarding the composition
of the disciplinary body.
[21] Against this backdrop, the applicant addressed a further letter to
Reverend Stanley on 24 May 2024. In paragraph 2 of that letter, he
recorded that, because Reverend Stanley had not furnished him with the
names of the complainants or the original complaints, he was left to
speculate as to the composition of the disciplinary body and was
consequently unable to assess the independence and impartiality of its
members. The applicant expressly emphasised that he required this
information to ensure that he received a fair and equitable hearing and
to enable him properly to prepare his defence, including the
identification and calling of relevant witnesses. The correspondence
illustrates that, despite being required to disclose his witnesses and
prepare for the hearing, the applicant remained without the information
he had repeatedly requested and considered necessary for that purpose.
On the papers before this Court, there appears to have been no response
to this correspondence.
[22] In assessing whether the applicant received sufficient notice, regard
must be had not merely to the number of calendar days between notice
and hearing, but to the actual opportunity afforded to prepare for
proceedings of this magnitude. Relevant considerations include the
seriousness of the charges, the complexity of the allegations, the
potential consequences, and the prejudice occasioned by inadequate
preparation time. It is noteworthy that approximately four years elapsed
between the initial complaints and the formal institution of disciplinary
11
proceedings. The complaints giving rise to the present matter date back
to 2 February 2024, yet the formal complaint was only forwarded to the
applicant on 20 May 2024. This significant delay creates the impression
that the matter was not treated as urgent, considering the considerable
time taken to initiate formal proceedings against the applicant. In these
circumstances, it is difficult to see how the granting of a further short
extension of one week could have resulted in any material prejudice to
the DBPK. Against that background, it is difficult to discern what
prejudice would have arisen had the hearing been postponed for a short
period.
[23] The applicant also objected to the composition of the disciplinary body.
His objection centred on the involvement of Reverend Stanley, whom
he alleged had been involved in matters or had personal knowledge of
events relating to the complaints and with whom he had previously held
differing views on contentious religious issues. All communications
concerning the disciplinary proceedings were exchanged through
Reverend Stanley during the month of May 2024.
[24] Respondents three to ten contend that Reverend Stanley merely acted
as a scribe and was not a member of the disciplinary body. However,
this submission gives rise to a difficulty. If Reverend Stanley was not a
member of the disciplinary body, the body consisted of only four
members and therefore failed to satisfy the minimum composition
requirements prescribed by Regulation 22. It would thus amount to the
DBPK being inquorate. In that event the disciplinary body was not
properly constituted and lacked the authority to proceed.
12
[25] Conversely, if Reverend Stanley formed part of the disciplinary body,
serious concerns arise regarding his independence and impartiality. On
either version, the composition of the disciplinary tribunal was
fundamentally problematic.
[26] Counsel for the respondents three to ten contended that the applicant's
conduct amounted to a deliberate defiance of both the disciplinary
structures of the Dutch Reformed Church and the Church Order to
which he had subjected himself upon becoming a member. This
submission, however, cannot be sustained. As correctly argued on
behalf of the applicant, the conduct in question does not reflect a refusal
to submit to authority, but rather an attempt to raise legitimate and
substantive concerns regarding the composition and constitution of the
disciplinary body convened to hear his matter. In my view, the
applicant's actions are more appropriately characterised as a bona fide
challenge to procedural fairness rather than an act of wilful non
compliance.
[27] I am persuaded that the applicant's challenge to the constitution of the
disciplinary body is well-founded. The DBPK bore an obligation to
ensure strict compliance with the Church Order. It failed to do so.
[28] The hearing proceeded in the applicant's absence. Approximately six
witnesses testified in person at the hearing, representing only a fraction
of the complainants whose complaints formed the basis of the
disciplinary charges. No recordings or transcripts of the proceedings
13
were made available to the applicant. Instead, he received only brief
notes and a summary prepared by Reverend Stanley. To this day, Mr
Coetzee has not been furnished with copies of the affidavits and
statements upon which the proceedings were based.
[29] The consequences of this are self-evident. The applicant was denied the
opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, challenge their evidence, or
test their credibility through questioning. He was similarly deprived of
a proper record upon which to formulate meaningful appeals before the
SBA and GSBA. At no stage was he afforded a genuine opportunity to
present his case before either the disciplinary tribunal or the appellate
structures.
[30] Of some significance is the fact that neither the applicant's employer,
the second respondent, with whom the applicant concluded his
employment contract, nor the congregation was called to testify during
the disciplinary proceedings. Nor does it appear that any written
statement was obtained from either entity regarding the allegations
levelled against the applicant. This is somewhat peculiar. Given the
tripartite nature of the relationship and the employer's direct
involvement in the applicant's day-to-day employment, the employer
would ordinarily be best placed to assess the applicant's performance,
conduct, and the factual basis, if any, for the charges brought against
him. The absence of any evidence from the employer raises questions
as to whether all relevant and potentially material evidence was placed
before the disciplinary body. At the very least, this circumstance may
14
warrant scrutiny through the lens of natural justice and the applicant's
entitlement to an equitable and fair hearing.
[31] Counsel for respondents three to ten placed considerable emphasis on
the allegation that the applicant acted in defiance of his suspension, as
communicated in the letter dated 20 May 2024, by continuing to
perform his duties. On this basis, it was argued that the applicant did
not consider himself bound by the disciplinary framework of the Dutch
Reformed Church. This contention, however, does not withstand closer
scrutiny.
[32] The letter issued by Reverend Stanley afforded the applicant only two
days within which to object to his suspension. Counsel for the applicant
correctly drew the Court's attention to regulation 22.5.2, which requires
that the disciplinary body notify the accused in advance, in writing, of
a proposed suspension. Such notice must include a brief description of
the alleged doctrinal and/or ethical transgression and must further
inform the accused that written representations may be submitted
within three days before a decision to suspend is finalised. In the present
instance, the applicant was afforded only two days' notice, in clear
deviation from the prescribed procedural requirements contained in the
Church Order.
[33] This failure to adhere to the applicable procedure lends credence to the
submission that the outcome may have been pre-determined.
Furthermore, it is significant that the second respondent, being the
applicant's employer, supported the applicant's request for an
15
extension to prepare his case and for him to continue performing his
duties during Pentecost. In these circumstances, it can hardly be
contended that the applicant acted in open defiance of his suspension;
rather, his conduct must be viewed in light of the procedural
irregularities and the support he received from his employer.
[34] The failure to pursue mediation is likewise noteworthy. While the
Church Order expressly contemplates mediation and reconciliation as
alternatives to formal disciplinary proceedings, no meaningful attempt
was made to invoke or pursue these mechanisms at the time the
complaints were received on 2 February 2024, nor at any stage prior to
the commencement of the disciplinary process. This is difficult to
reconcile with the spirit and objectives of the Church Order.
[35] Much argument was directed at the delay in launching these
proceedings. However, the explanation advanced by the applicant is
both plausible and reasonable. He sought first to exhaust the internal
remedies available to him within the structures of the church. In the
circumstances, I am satisfied that any delay ought to be condoned.
[36] Having considered the papers and the submissions of counsel> I am
unable to conclude that the principles of natural justice were observed.
The applicant was not afforded sufficient notice. He was denied a
reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his case. His request for
a modest postponement was reasonable and made in good faith. No
material prejudice would have been suffered by the DBPK had the
request been granted. The refusal was, in my view, unreasonable.
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[37] Furthermore, the disciplinary body was not properly constituted in
accordance with the Church Order. The involvement of Reverend
Stanley, whether as a member or merely as a scribe, rendered the
proceedings irregular. The disciplinary process was therefore
fundamentally flawed from its inception.
[38] These defects strike at the heart of procedural fairness. They are not
irregularities capable of being cured on appeal. The subsequent
appellate proceedings could not remedy the absence of a fair hearing
before a properly constituted disciplinary tribunal.
[39] The proceedings before the DBPK were consequently inconsistent with
the Church Order and the requirements of natural justice. The review
must therefore succeed.
[40] There is a further aspect of this matter that warrants comment. The
Church Order expressly recognises mediation, reconciliation and
pastoral engagement as mechanisms through which disputes may be
resolved before resorting to formal disciplinary proceedings. These
provisions are not incidental. They reflect the theological foundations
upon which the Church is built and embody values of grace,
reconciliation, forgiveness and restoration.
[ 41] Against that backdrop, it is regrettable that no meaningful attempt was
made to mediate this dispute before embarking upon a disciplinary
process that ultimately resulted in the applicant's removal from the
17
ministry. Equally concerning is the refusal to grant what was, on any
objective assessment, a modest and reasonable request for a short
postponement. The granting of such an extension would have
occasioned little, if any, prejudice to the disciplinary body, whilst
significantly advancing the interests of fairness.
[42] This Court is mindful that it should be slow to interfere in the internal
affairs of a religious body. Courts are neither theologists nor religious
tribunals. Matters of doctrine and church governance are, as a general
principle, best left to the institutions entrusted with those
responsibilities. It is therefore always unfortunate when disputes of this
nature find their way into the secular courts.
[43] However, where a church voluntarily adopts procedures designed to
ensure fairness and justice, and where those procedures are not
observed, the courts cannot simply avert their gaze. Respect for the
autonomy of religious institutions does not extend to permitting
proceedings that fall short of the standards of fairness which those very
institutions have chosen to impose upon themselves.
[ 44] There is a particular irony in a matter such as the present. One would
have expected that an institution founded upon principles of
reconciliation, forgiveness and redemption would have exhausted every
reasonable avenue to restore relationships before resorting to measures
carrying such profound consequences for both the applicant and his
congregation. Regrettably, the record reveals little evidence that such
efforts were genuinely pursued.
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[45] Whilst this Court expresses no view on the merits of the allegations
against the applicant, the manner in which the disciplinary process
unfolded is difficult to reconcile with both the spirit of the Church
Order and the foundational values which it seeks to promote.
[ 46] In the result, the following order is made:
1. The decision of the fourth respondent (DBPK), dated 30 May 2024
( contained in annexure F A8 to the founding affidavit), which found the
applicant guilty of count 1 ("skeunnakery") and of count 2.2
("dishonesty") as contained in the Disciplinary Notice ( dated 20 May
2024), and which imposed a sanction of delegitimation, is hereby
reviewed and set aside.
2. The decision of the sixth respondent (SBA), dated 31 August 2024,
dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decision of the fourth
respondent is reviewed and set aside.
3. The decision of the eighth respondent (GSBA), dated 27 December
2024, dismissing the applicant's further appeal against the decision of
the fourth respondent, is reviewed and set aside.
4. The matter is remitted to a new presbytery disciplinary body
(ringtugliggaam) of the Dutch Reformed Church to be convened and
constituted in accordance with the Church Order and Regulations, for
19
the de novo investigation of the complaints submitted in respect of the
applicant and, if warranted, to hold a formal disciplinary hearing.
5. The third to tenth respondents are ordered, jointly and severally, the one
paying the other to be absolved, to pay the applicant's costs of this
review application, such costs to include the costs of two counsel,
where so employed, on the High Court scale C.
6. The third to tenth respondents are ordered,jointly and severally, the one
paying the other to be absolved, to pay the applicants' costs of the
urgent interdict application (under case number 112215/2025), such
costs to include the costs of two counsel, where so employed, on the
High Court scale C, which costs are costs in the cause in this review
application.
MLOUW
ACTING JUDGE OF THE IDGH COURT