REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
18 May 2026
DATE
In the matter between:
BETHESDA CHRISTIAN CENTER NPC AND NPO
and
WORLD OUTREACH PTY LTD
BETHESDA DREAM CENTER
BETHESDA BUSINESS FOUNDATION TRUST
~~
FORTUNE IBE
CLEMENTIKECHUKWUIBE
ELVIN IBE
SAMSON MASEKO N.O.
JOHNSON OLUMUIWA DEHINBO
Case Number: 141493-2024
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
.
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Respondent
Sixth Respondent
Seventh Respondent
Eighth Respondent
MARIA SEBA TE
DAVID MOLEFE
TEBOHO LETUKA
SADIA HANSLO
ALICE MUTHONI KITHEKA
MAMUYOVWI KOKA
MPOVA MPONGO KOKA
GAPE FREDDY MOSWEU
OKEY ANTHONY NWAFOR
REKENORTH
CITY PROPERTY
MORENA PROPERTIES
CITY OF TSHWANE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
DEEDS REGISTRY OFFICE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT
NPO DIRECTORATE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Ninth Respondent
Tenth Respondent
Eleventh Respondent
Twelfth Respondent
Thirteenth Respondent
Fourteenth Respondent
Fifteenth Respondent
Sixteenth Respondent
Seventeenth Respondent
Eighteenth Respondent
Nineteenth Respondent
Twentieth Respondent
Twenty First Respondent
Twenty Second Respondent
Twenty Third Respondent
Twenty Fourth Respondent
Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Acting Judge whose
name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties I their
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter
on CaseLines. The date of the judgment is deemed to be 18 May 2026
RAUBENHEIMER, AJ
Introduction
JUDGMENT
[1] This matter 'is before Court in the context of ongoing litigation between the
applicant, Bethesda Christian Center NPC & NPO (BCC) and the respondents, World
Outreach (Pty) Ltd (WO) and others. The matter has reached this stage following a
2
series of procedural disputes that have culminated in the interlocutory applications
before Court.
[2] There are three interlocutory applications before Court arising from the main
application; the first being a Rule 30 application brought by WO and other respondents
against the seventh respondent (Maseko) seeking to set aside his explanatory
affidavit, which was later renamed as an answering affidavit, as an irregular step.
[3] In the second application, brought by BCC, a formal challenge was raised under
Uniform Rule 7 in which the authority of the fourth respondent (lbe) and the legal
representatives (Mashishi Attorneys) acting on behalf of the first, second and third
respondents was challenged. The applicant contends that the lawyers for the
respondents have failed to demonstrate that they are duly authorized to act on behalf
of the respondents.
[4] Concurrently, BCC launched an application to strike out specific averments
contained within the respondents' answering affidavit, asserting that these allegations
are scandalous, vexatious, and irrelevant, and that their inclusion is designed to
disparage SCC rather th~n to address the factual or legal issues properly before the
court.
[5] The third interlocutory application is against the applicants in the second
interlocutory application on the basis that that application amounted to an irregular
step.
[6] The applications are procedurally intertwined and will, therefore, be adjudicated
together.
Factual background of the Main Application
[7] SCC is a long-established church organisation. WO is a property holding entity
historically associated with BCC. The Bethesda Business Foundation Trust (the Trust)
was registered in 2005 and is the owner of the Trust. BCC, in turn, is the sole
beneficiary of the Trust.
3
[8] The disputes concern the legitimacy of competing Boards, the validity of a proxy
allegedly providing the fifth respondent with a sole mandate, the lawfulness of the
formation of the Trust, the transfer of all the shares of WO to the Trust, the legitimacy
of the intervention of the Directorate of Social Development, the appointment of an
administrator and the ownership and control of church property.
[9] The seventh respondent denies authorising the trust or the transfer of shares,
while the fourth respondent claims that the proxy empowered the fifth respondent to
act alone. BCC, in turn, claims the proxy to be invalid as it is contrary to the provisions
of the Companies Act.
[1 O] The Trust deed contains automatic-termination clauses in respect of trustees
who cease to be members of the church.
[11] The decisions of the directors were upheld in previous litigation.
[12] The mentioned factual disputes form the backdrop to the interlocutory
applications.
Procedural chronology
[13] BCC issued the main application on 3 December 2024 to which the fourth, fifth,
sixth, eighth, nineth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and the fifteenth respondents
entered an opposition on 31 January 2025. At that stage, the mentioned respondents
were represented by the same firm of attorneys, Mashishi Attorneys. The said
respondents filed their answering affidavit on 25 February 2025. On the same day,
Mashishi Attorneys filed a notice of withdrawal in respect of the thirteenth respondent,
as well as a notice to oppose on behalf of the first, second and third respondents.
[14] BCC filed its replying affidavit together with a Rule 7(1) notice in which the
authority of Mashishi Attorneys to represent the respondents was requested on 20
March 2025. BCC also filed a notice in terms of Rule 6(15) to have certain paragraphs
struck out from the respondents' answering affidavit.
4
[15] Shortly thereafter, on 4 April 2025, the respondents filed a Rule 30 Notice
containing three causes of complaint, firstly that the applicant's Rule 7(1) Notice was
filed out of time and was not accompanied by an application for condonation, secondly,
that the Rule 6(15) Notice was incorrectly worded and thirdly, that there were new
averments in the applicant's replying affidavit, which must be struck out. BCC
subsequently withdrew the Notice in terms of Rule 6(15) and replaced it with an
interlocutory application in terms of Rule 6(15), which application also included an
application in terms of Rule 7(1) to the effect that Mashishi Attorneys lacked the
requisite authority to act on behalf of the first three respondents. It also sought
condonation for the possible late filing of the Rule 7(1) Notice.
[16] Prior to the application, BCC filed a reply to the complaint that there were new
averments in the replying affidavit. The respondents replied with a letter in which they
alleged that their cause of complaint was not cured. The respondents contended
further that the applications in terms of Rule 6(15) and Rule 7 were further irregular
steps. The respondents proposed to address the Rule 7 objection and 6(15) by filing
the resolutions, which they had, in any case, attached to their answering affidavit.
[17] On 26 May 2025, the respondents sent a letter, accompanied by their
resolutions in reply to the Rule 7(1) Notice, together with their Notice of intention to
oppose BCC's application in terms of Rule 6(15) and 7(1 ).
[18] BCC was not satisfied with the resolutions as it did not prove that Mashishi
Attorneys had been authorised to act on behalf of the third respondent.
[19] On 30 June 2025, the respondents filed their answering affidavit to BCC's
application in terms of Rule 6(15) and Rule 7(1) (second Interlocutory application).
[20] On 14 July 2025, BCC filed their replying affidavit to the respondents' answering
affidavit.
affidavit.
[21] On 25 June 2025, the respondents filed their application in terms of Rule 30,
pursuant to the filling of their Rule 30 notice of 4 April 2025. The application also
prayed for condonation for the late filling of the same application. BCC responded to
the respondents' application in terms of Rule 30 by raising an irregular step in terms
5
of Rule 30 since the application itself constituted an irregular step as the respondents
could not bring such an application after having taken several further steps.
[22] On 15 July 2025, the respondents filed a reply thereto stating that they could
not file the application in terms of Rule 30 timeously since there were correspondences
exchanged which aimed at attending to the raised issues to avoid interlocutory
applications.
[23] Dissatisfied with the reply to the Rule 30 Notice on 4 August 2025, BCC filled
the application in terms of Rule 30.
[24] The respondents filed their noti~e to oppose and answering affidavit.
Determination of the second interlocutory application disposes of the third interlocutory
application. The only issue which shall remain alive is the aspect of costs and the scale
thereof.
The chronology of the first interlocutory application
[25] The chronology commenced on 9 January 2025 when the seventh respondent
filed a notice of intention to oppose the main application and filed an explanatory
affidavit on 17 April 2025 after the other respondents had filed their answering
affidavits and BCC had filed its replying affidavit. The seventh respondent indicated
that he did not wish to oppose the relief sought but found it necessary to file the
explanatory affidavit to clarify certain aspects and to assist the court in the adjudication
of the main application.
[26] The respondents (one to five) filed a Rule 30 notice on 6 May 2025 challenging
the filing of the explanatory affidavit as such affidavit could only be filed with the leave
of the court in their submission. The seventh respondent responded on 14 May 2025
by withdrawing the explanatory affidavit and filing it as an answering affidavit instead
on the same day.
[27] The respondents were not satisfied with this attempt at curing the irregular step
and filed an application in terms of Rule 30 on 4 June 2025, which the seventh
6
respondent opposed on 10 June 2025 and filed an answering affidavit on 27 June
2025.
[28] The respondents filed their replying affidavit on 1 0 July 2025.
Discussion
First Interlocutory application
[29] The basis for the irregular step application is firstly that the filing of an
"explanatory affidavit" is not provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court and secondly,
that the affidavit substantially traversed not only the substance of BCC's founding
affidavit, but also the answering affidavit of the other respondents and BCC's replying
affidavit. Even when re-labelled as an "answering affidavit'\ it was filed well out of time
and after the replying affidavit had already been delivered, and without any application
for condonation in terms of Rule 27.
[30] The general rule in motion proceedings is that there are only three sets of
affidavits.1
[31] The court retains a discretion in terms of Rule 6(5)(e), which provides that the
court may, in its discretion, permit the filing of further affidavits and the party seeking
such an indulgence must provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the information
was not produced earlier, and show that the admission of the affidavit will not cause
irremediable prejudice to the other parties.2
[32] Apart from seeking permission,3 the respondent must apply for condonation in
terms of Rule 27 by showing "good cause," which includes a reasonable explanation
'
for the delay and a bona fide defence.4
1
Hano Trading CC v JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 2013 (1) SA 161 (SCA) at para 12 quoting from
James Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd (Previously named Gilbert Hamer & Co Ltd) v Simmons NO 1963 (4) SA 656 (A)
at 6600- H.
2 James Brown & Hamer (Ply) Ltd v Simmons, NO id at 660O-H.
3
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sewpersadh and Another2005 (4) SA 148 (C) at para 13.
4
Smith, NO v Brummer, NO and Another Smith, NO v Brummer 1954 (3) SA 352 (0) at 357H-358A. See also
Melane v Sanlam Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (4) SA 531 (A) at 532B-E and Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority
and Another 2014 (2) SA 68 (CC) at para 22-23 & 50-51.
7
[33] That the matter involves multiple parties complicates matters somewhat and is
a respondent generally entitled to respond to the version of a co-respondent if that
version is adverse to their interests or introduces new facts not contained in the
founding affidavit.5 The court further emphasized that the interests of justice require
that a party should be allowed to deal with allegations made against them by any other
party to the proceedings, provided such party seek the necessary leave from the court.
[34] Dealing with the applicant's replying affidavit in an answering affidavit is
however totally different as the reply is regarded as the last word, however, if the
applicant introduced a new matter in the replying affidavit, the respondent has a right
to answer that new matter.6
[35] A respondent who has not previously filed an answering affidavit may do so
after the applicant has already replied only with ·the leave of the court and by applying
for condonation.7
[36] The seventh respondent withdrew the explanatory affidavit and therewith also
the condonation application which accompanied the explanatory affidavit.
[37] When the seventh respondent filed the explanatory affidavit as an answering
affidavit, he did not apply for condonation for the late filing thereof, which was now
more than two months after the withdrawal of the explanatory affidavit, which had, in
any case, been filed late and had been withdrawn. The reason why he did not seek
condonation was that he had obtained consent from the applicants.
[38] This approach to condonation is misdirected as it is only the court that can grant
condonation. Consent by the applicant does not replace condonation.8
[39] What makes the explanation even more untenable is that no permission from
the court to file the atfidavit after the pleadings had closed was sought, and no full and
reasonable explanation was given for the initial silence.9
5 Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum Ltd and Others 1999 (3) SA 517 (BH)
5 Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum Ltd and Others 1999 (3) SA 517 (BH)
6 Mostert and Others v First Rand Bank tla RMB Private Bank 2018 (4) SA 443 (SCA) at para 13.
7 Rens v Gutman NO and Others [2002] 4 All SA 30 (C) at 36. See also Hano Trading CC v JR 209 Investments
(Pty) Ltd and Another 2013 (1) SA 161 (SCA) at para 12, quoting from James Brown & Hamer (Ply) Ltd (previously
named Gilbert Hamer & Co Ltd) v Simmons NO 1963 (4) SA 656 (A) at 660O-H.
8 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sewpersadh and Another above n 3 at para 1 0.
9 Melane v Sanlam Insurance Co Ltd above n 4 at 532B-E.
8
[40] BCC and the other respondents were consequently placed in an untenable
position and could only respond to the answering affidavit with leave of the court.
[41] The answering affidavit of the seventh respondent amounts to an irregular step
and is hereby set aside.
The second interlocutory application
[42] As the second and third interlocutory applications deal essentially with the same
questions of fact and law, the parties are ad idem that determination of the second
interlocutory application also disposes of the third interlocutory application.
[43] The second interlocutory application dealt with the Rule 7(1) and 6(15) Notices
by BCC to the respondents. In response to the Notice, the respondents brought a Rule
30 application on the basis that the Rule 7 Notice was out of time and was not
accompanied by a condonation application.
[44] On receipt of the Rule 30 Notice, the BCC simply withdrew the Rule 7(1) notice
and the Rule 6(15) Notice and issued an application in respect of both, which was
opposed by the respondents.
Discussion
[45] Rule 30 deals with an irregular step, defined as a procedural step conflicting
with the rules or in disregard of the rules, having the effect of advancing the litigation
process and thereby causing unfairness or inefficiency, and ultimately, prejudice to the
innocent party's rights in the litigation process.10
[46] The adjudication of a Rule 30 application entails a two a step process, 11 of
which the first step is to ascertain whether the step taken by the respondent amounts
to an irregular step. Once that has been determined, the court has wide remedial
10 BMW Financial Services South Africa v Doola [2025] 2 All SA 107 (GP) at para 18.
11
Afrocentric Projects and SeNices (Pty) Ltd tla Innovative Distribution v State Information Technology Agency
(SITA) SOC Ltd and Others 2023 (4) BCLR 361 (CC) at para 26.
9
powers, ranging from setting aside, granting leave to amend or any other order it
deems fit in the circumstances.
[47] The time period for the filing of the Rule 7(1) Notice was within 10 days after
BCC became aware that Mashishi is acting on behalf of the third respondent. Mashishi
came on record for the third respondent on 25 February 2025.
[48] A power of attorney has been defined as a declaration in writing, in which the
client authorises an attorney to institute or defend legal proceedings and to do all
necessary steps in connection therewith as the client's representative.12
[49] The purpose of the rule is to eliminate unnecessary speculation about the
existence of authority.13
[50] In Johannesburg City Council v Elesander Investments (Pty) Ltd & Others, 14
the court held with reference to the similar rule in the Magistrates Court Rules:15
"The Rule is concerned with the representation of parties, and with nothing else. It was
designed to dispense with the necessity of an attorney obtaining a power of attorney
to act, and to provide for a procedure whereby an attorney can be challenged to satisfy
the court that he is authorised to act for a party. The Rule contemplates that a challenge
of authority can be met by proof of such authority (which need not be in the form of a
power of attorney), and all that is required is that the court must be satisfied that
authority exists at the time when proof of it is proffered. We can find nothing in the Rule
to suggest that a magistrate is obliged, or even entitled, to investigate the validity of
past acts in the context of the authority to act. When an attorney's authority is
challenged, he may not act further until he satisfies the court that he is authorised to
do so, but the effect of the Rule does not go beyond that; the Rule does not require
him, either expressly or by implication, to satisfy the court that he had authority at any
particular point of time in the past. The concept of representation as dealt with in the
particular point of time in the past. The concept of representation as dealt with in the
Rules involves no more than an investigation into the state of affairs relating to authority
as at the time when the challenged attorney seeks to satisfy the court on that score.
11
12 Cilliers, Loots and Ne/ Herbstein and Van Winsen: Civil Practice of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of
Appeal of South Africa 5 ed (Juta e- publications 2009) at 267.
13 Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA).
14 1979 (3) SA 1273 (T) at 1279H-1280C.
15 Rule 52(2) Magistrates Court Rules.
10
[51] BCC filed its Rule 7(1) notice on 20 March 2025, which was out of time by some
margin.
[52] The removal of a cause of complaint is an act of bringing the proceeding back
into alignment with the Rules.16
[53] After receipt of the Rule 30 notice, BCC could have cured the irregularity by
filing a condonation application. Instead, it withdrew the notice and filed an application
to obtain leave of the court to challenge the authority of the lawyers to act on behalf of
the respondents.
[54] The respondents, in opposition to th.is challenge, contend that the production of
resolutions, allegedly authorizing their participation in these proceedings, renders the
applicant's challenge moot. They argue that the mere provision of a document
purporting to grant authority satisfies the requirements of the Rule. This interpretation
is fundamentally flawed.
[55] The principle established In Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of
Johannesburg17 is that Rule 7(1) is not merely a mechanism for the formal production
of a document but to verify that the person or entity before the court has the actual,
legal authority to act. The court cannot simply accept a document at face value if the
veracity and legal validity of the authority contained therein are in dispute. Where the
challenge goes to the substantive validity of the resolution itself, the production of that
document does not cure the defect if the signatories of that document lacked the legal
standing to pass it.
[56] The essence of the challenge concerns the interpretation of Clause 5.8 of the
Trust Deed. The applicant contends that the signatories purportedly authorising the
attorneys for the respondents had, by virtue of the provisions of the Trust Deed,
vacated their office as trustees prior to the passing of the resolutions. This clause
provides that any trustee who ceases to be a member of the BCC immediately forfeits
their position as a trustee of the Foundation.
16 Bloem v NWK Ltd [2024] ZANWHC 83 at para 9.
17 Above n 11.
11
[57] In support of this assertion, the applicant relies on documentation procured from
the Master of the High Court providing contemporaneous records in substantiation of
the cessation of the particular individuals as members of the BCC. The evidence
presented in these annexures is compelling as it demonstrates that the status of the
signatories as trustees had terminated by the date the resolutions were purportedly
signed.
[58] The respondents have failed to provide a cogent rebuttal to the effect of Clause
5.8. Reliance on the formal existence of a resolution is misplaced when the substance
of that resolution is derived from unauthorised individuals.18 Because the individuals
who signed the resolutions were no longer legally empowered to act for the Trust at
the time of signing, the resolutions are fatally defective. Therefore, the legal
representatives of the respondents lack the mandate required to represent the Trust,
and the Rule 7(1) challenge must consequently succeed.
The Rule 6(15) Striking out application
[59) The focus of this application pertains to a multiple page narrative detailing the
history of the parties' relationship, which the applicant contends is entirely extraneous
and constitute scandalous, vexatious, and irrelevant matter, the inclusion of which
serves no purpose other than to prejudice the applicant and burden the court record
with unnecessary and inflammatory detail.
[60] The legal framework governing the striking out of matter from an affidavit is set
out in Rule 6(15) of the Uniform Rules of Court and entails a twofold threshold. Firstly,
whether the matter is indeed scandalous, vexatious, or irrelevant, and secondly,
whether the applicant will be prejudiced if the offending material remains in the
record.19 It is prejudicial where the inclusion of such subject matter obliges the
applicant to traverse irrelevant factual disputes, and in so doing, unnecessarily
applicant to traverse irrelevant factual disputes, and in so doing, unnecessarily
18 Ma// (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Merino Ko-Operasie Bpk 1957 (2) SA 347 (C). See also Tattersal and Another v Nedcor
Bank Ltd 1995 (3) SA 222 (A) at 228G-229D.
19 Vaatz v Law Society of Namibia 1990 NR 332 (HC) at 335F.
12
increasing the costs of litigation or causing reputational harm without a legitimate legal
basis.20
[61] From a scrutiny of the passages identified in the notice to strike out, it is evident
that the respondents have included various averments delving into historical disputes
and personal character assessments, having no bearing on issues presented in this
application. Litigation should be confined to the real issues between the parties; the
inclusion of material designed to annoy, embarrass, or harass constitutes an abuse of
the court's process.21
[62] The Court finds that the allegations identified by the applicant satisfy the criteria
for striking out under Rule 6(15) for the following reasons:
[63] Irrelevance: The targeted paragraphs introduce historical grievances regarding
the parties' relationship that predate the current cause of action and do not assist the
Court in determining the merits of the present dispute.
[64] Vexatious Nature: The language employed in the affidavit is argumentative and
accusatory, exceeding the bounds of a legitimate defence and appearing intended
primarily to cause vexation to the applicant.
[65] Prejudice: Allowing these allegations to remain would compel the applicant to
file a lengthy replying affidavit, addressing collateral issues that do not advance the
resolution of the matter, thereby incurring unnecessary costs and delaying the
finalisation of the proceedings.
[66] Consequently, the Court finds that the respondents' affidavit includes material
that is both irrelevant and vexatious. Further, the applicant has successfully
discharged the onus of proving both the objectionable nature of the material and the
prejudice that would result from its retention.
[67] In considering the application to strike out, the court must weigh the relevance
of the impugned material against the rights of the parties to plead their case. It is a
requirement that the material be not only scandalous or irrelevant but also prejudicial
requirement that the material be not only scandalous or irrelevant but also prejudicial
20 Beinash v Wixley 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA) at 733C-F.
21 Mostert and Others v First Rand Bank tla RMB Private Bank above n 6 at para 13.
13
to the party seeking the strike-out.22 The Court acknowledges the principle which
emphasises that court processes should not be burdened with peripheral and
unnecessary narratives. 23
[68] Furthermore, referencing the constitutional imperative regarding the orderly
conduct of litigation in Afrocentrics Projects and Services (Pty) Ltd tla Innovative
Distribution v State Information Technology Agency (SITA) SOC Ltd and Others,24 this
Court is obligated to excise matter that obstructs the efficient resolution of the case.
Synthesis and Findings
[69] In conclusion, the Court finds that the respondents have failed to satisfy the
onus placed upon them under Rule 7 to prove the requisite authority to oppose the
application. Simultaneously, the Court finds that the applicant has met the threshold
under Rule 6(15) for the striking out of irrelevant and vexatious matter. The Court's
role is to ensure that the litigation is conducted with due regard to the Rules of Court;
allowing these defects to remain would undermine the judicial process. Accordingly,
the Court grants the orders as requested, finding that the respondents' authority is not
established and that the offending material must be excised from the record.
Conclusion
[70] Having considered the papers filed on record and the arguments presented by
the respective parties, and for the reasons detailed in the preceding analysis, the Court
makes the following order:
1. The Rule 7 Challenge:
22
Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pfy) Ltd and Others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others
1999 (2) SA 279 (T) at 337.
23
Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; In Re: Glenister v President
of South Africa and Others [2014] 1 All SA 671 (WCC) at para 10-11.
24 2023 (4) BCLR 361 (CC) at para 22.
14
1.1. The applicant's challenge to the authority of the respondents is
upheld.
1.2. The respondents are directed to rectify the defect in- their
representation by filing a valid, formal resolution authorizing the
opposition of these proceedings within ten (1 O) court days of the
date of this order.
1.3. Should the respondents fail to comply with the directive in
paragraph 1.2, their opposition to the main application shall be
deemed to have been withdrawn, and the applicant may, upon
notice, enrol the matter for adjudication as an unopposed
application.
2. The Application to Strike Out under Rule 6(15):
2.1 . The application to strike out is granted.
2.2. The following paragraphs contained in the respondents' answering
affidavit are hereby struck out as scandalous, vexatious, and
irrelevant: 2.4; 2.6; 2.7; 2.8; 2.11;2.12; 2.13-2.17 - 2.21; 2.25; 4.1;
4.2; 4.12; 4.16; 4.21; 4.22; 4.25-4.27; 4.29 and 4.42.
2.3. The respondents are granted leave to file a supplementary affidavit,
restricted solely to the merits of the main application and excluding
the material struck out by this order, within fifteen (15) court days
of the date of this order.
3. Costs:
3.1 . The respondents are ordered to pay the costs on scale B of the
Rule 7 challenge and the Rule 6(15) application, jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
E RAUBENHEIMER
15
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
16
Appearances:
For the Applicants (main application):
For the Seventh Respondent:
For the 1st-6th• 8th• 12th• 14th & 15th
l I I
Respondents:
Date of hearing:
Date of Judgment:
Adv Muza instructed by Mabapa
Adv Mpya & Maboea instructed by
Rambauli Attorneys
Adv Lekalakala instructed by Mashishi
Attorneys
7 November 2025
18 May 2026
17