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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case No.: 2025-014734
In the matter between:
JURGENS JOHANNES STEENKAMP N.O. First Applicant
CORNELIA MARIA CLOETE N.O. Second Applicant
And
BRIAN CHARLES HIGGS First Respondent
STELLENBOSCH MUNICIPALITY Second Respondent
Coram: Francis J
Heard: 13 May 2026
Delivered: 4 June 2026
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
1. The first respondent and all persons holding occupation under him as residential
occupiers are evicted from Portion 28 of the Farm Devon Vale No. 9 […], B[…]
Road, Stellenbosch (“the property”).
2. For the purposes of this order, “residential occupier” means a person who uses
any building or structure on the property as a form of dwelling or shelter within
the meaning of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act 19 of 1998.
3. The first respondent and all persons holding occupation under him as residential
occupiers shall vacate the property by 12h00 on 5 August 2026.
4. In the event of non -compliance with paragraph 3, the Sheriff of this Court is
authorised and directed to evict the first respondent and any person referred to in
that paragraph from the property, and to take such steps and obtain such
assistance from the South African Police Service as the Sheriff considers
necessary. The Sheriff shall execute against persons falling within the definition
of “residential occupier” in paragraph 2 and may apply for directions from this
Court in the event of any dispute on that question.
5. The applicants shall, within seven days of the date of this order, instruct the
Sheriff of this Court to serve a copy of this order on each adult person presently
in occupation of the property and on the second respondent. Any person on
whom the order is so served, who contends that he or she is a residential
occupier within paragraph 2 and that this order should not apply to him or her,
may, within fourteen days of the date of service, apply to this Court on the same
papers, supplemented as necessary, for an order varying paragraphs 1 and 3 in
his or her favour.
6. The second respondent shall, within twenty -one days of the date of service of
this order on it under paragraph 5, file a supplementary report that:
(a) explains the legal and factual basis for the moratorium on the 10%
Emergency Housing Assistance Policy provision and indicates what steps
the Municipality is taking to restore emergency housing assistance;
(b) identifies any further emergency -housing options that have become
available since 22 April 2026 or that can be made available
notwithstanding the moratorium;
(c) indicates what steps the Municipality proposes to take in respect of any
person on the property who claims to be at risk of homelessness,
including whether the Wendy structure offer can be extended without
requiring the occupier to identify a host; and
(d) addresses why this case cannot be treated as an exception to the
moratorium, having regard to the constitutional obligations identified in
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and
Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) and City of Johannesburg v Blue Moonlight
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC).
7. The costs of this application, including the costs of counsel on Scale B, are costs
in the insolvent estate of the first respondent.
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________________
FRANCIS, J:
Introduction
[1] The applicants are the joint trustees of the insolvent estate of Mr Brian Charles
Higgs (“Mr Higgs”). They seek an order under section 4 of the Prevention of Illegal
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), evicting Mr Higgs,
together with all persons occupying under him, from Portion 28 of the Farm Devon Vale
No. 9[…], B[…] Road, Stellenbosch (“the property”). The Stellenbosch Municipality, the
second respondent, has not filed answering papers but has filed a departmental report
under section 4(7) of PIE.
[2] The answering affidavit raised four defences: that the Extension of Security of
Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) applied rather than PIE; that the trustees had tacitly
consented to Mr Higgs’s continued occupation pending sale; that eviction would not be
just and equitable, particularly given the age and ill health of Mr Higgs and his wife; and
that vacant possession would not enhance the price obtainable on sale. By the time of
the hearing, the defence had narrowed considerably. Mr Nöthling, who appeared for Mr
Higgs, accepted that the trustees had standing and that PIE governed the application.
He contended that the just and equitable balance favoured allowing Mr Higgs to remain
until the property was sold; alternatively, that any date for vacation must be triggered by
the date of sale rather than fixed by the court.
Background
[3] The property extends to approximately 4.3 hectares and is zoned for agricultural
use. The improvements comprise a main dwelling, four cottages, and several guest
flats. Mr Higgs acquired the property in 2006 and remains the registered owner. Four
mortgage bonds in favour of Standard Bank of South Africa Limited encumber the
property.
[4] Mr Higgs defaulted on his loan agreements in 2008. On 29 September 2017,
Standard Bank obtained an opposed money judgment against him in the amount of R7
359 064.44, together with an order declaring the property specially executable at a
reserve price of R13 million. Davis AJ later reduced the reserve to R10 million. Five
unsuccessful attempts to sell the property in execution followed. The first attracted no
bidders. Two were postponed by agreement. One was overtaken by the COVID -19
pandemic, and the f ifth produced bids below the reserve. Standard Bank then applied
for the sequestration of Mr Higgs’s estate. Grobbelaar AJ granted a provisional order on
3 March 2023. Parker AJ confirmed the final order on 10 January 2024.
[5] The Master appointed the applicants as joint trustees of the estate on 17 April
2023, following the provisional order. A creditors’ resolution dated 22 January 2024
authorised them to realise the immovable property. Standard Bank, as the principal
secured creditor and bondholder, has directed that the property be sold with vacant
possession. From February 2024, the trustees engaged Mr Higgs on the basis that he
and those in occupation under him would be required to vacate the property before it
was marketed.
[6] Mr Higgs did not vacate. He informed the trustees on more than one occasion
that he would do so only after the property had been sold. An auction scheduled for 27
March 2024 was cancelled because the trustees were unable to deliver vacant
possession. On 16 April 2024, Mr Higgs’s attorney recorded an intention to apply for
leave to appeal against the final sequestration order. The application was brought well
out of time. Parker AJ dismissed it, remarking that the only inference to be drawn was
that the application had been brought “solely due to the impending and imminent
eviction process”. The Supreme Court of Appeal refused leave on 14 February 2025.
[7] On 15 March 2024, the trustees’ attorneys served a formal notice to vacate by 18
April 2024. Mr Higgs did not comply. The present application was issued on 2 May
2025. The applicants applied ex parte for service directions under section 4(2) of PIE.
The court granted that relief on 20 February 2026. Service was thereafter effected by
affixing copies of the application and order to the property on 31 March 2026 and by
electronic transmission to Mr Higgs’s attorney. The Municipality was joined, and the
papers were served on it as well. The Municipality made several unsuccessful attempts
to inspect the property between October 2025 and March 2026. Only telephonic
to inspect the property between October 2025 and March 2026. Only telephonic
engagement was possible, and one meeting was held via Microsoft Teams on 5 March
2026. The Municipality’s departmental report, dated 8 March 2026, was filed on 22 April
2026.
The issues
[8] Three questions arise for determination: whether ESTA or PIE applies; whether
eviction would be just and equitable for the purposes of section 4(7) of PIE; and the
date on which any eviction order should take effect, together with the conditions to be
attached to it.
Whether ESTA or PIE applies
[9] Mr Nöthling conceded this point in argument. I deal with it briefly because it
raises a jurisdictional question that the court must satisfy itself upon, regardless of the
concession.
[10] Section 1 of ESTA defines an “occupier” as a person residing on land which
belongs to another and excludes a person using the land mainly for commercial
purposes. The definition of “unlawful occupier” in section 1 of PIE excludes an occupier
protected by ESTA. The two statutes are mutually exclusive.
[11] Mr Higgs is the registered owner of the property. His estate vested in the Master
under section 20(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 upon the provisional order of 3
March 2023, and in the trustees upon their appointment on 17 April 2023. The question
is whether that vesting brings the land within the phrase “belongs to another” for
purposes of ESTA.
[12] The vesting provisions of the Insolvency Act operate to transfer control of the
estate first to the Masr and, upon their appointment, to the trustees, so that the estate
may be realised for the benefit of creditors. In De Villiers v Delta Cables (Pty) Ltd 1992
(1) SA 9 (A), the Appellate Division held that the trustee becomes the owner of the
insolvent’s property, an approach accepted by the Constitutional Court in Harksen v
Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). In Fourie v Edkins 2013 (6) SA 576 (SCA) at paragraph
15, the Supreme Court of Appeal treated section 20(1) as vesting control rather than
ownership, though that observation was not central to the decision and the question has
since attracted differing views. It is unnecessary to resolve it here. Even on the view
most favourable to the trustees, the insolvent retains a reversionary interest, and the
property has not passed to a third party. ESTA is directed at protecting occupiers
against the owners of the land they occupy. An insolvent who continues to reside on
property still registered in his own name does not, in my view, occupy land that “belongs
to another” within the meaning of that Act. Whatever incidents of ownership Mr Higgs
may have lost, the registered title remains in his name.
[13] The property is used principally for short -term rentals and Airbnb
accommodation. That much appears from Mr Higgs’s own statements at the enquiry
held in terms of section 65 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, from his Facebook
advertisements, and from the Airbnb listings. It follows that the second leg of the ESTA
exclusion is satisfied, and that PIE governs this application.
Standing
[14] The trustees of an insolvent estate are the persons in whom the estate is vested
and who are charged with its administration. Where the registered owner is the
insolvent and remains in occupation, the trustees may apply for his eviction under PIE.
This Division has so held in the full -court decision in Mayekiso v Patel NO 2019 (2) SA
522 (WCC) at paragraphs 20 to 22. Nothing on the present record distinguishes this
case on that question. Standing is established.
Whether eviction is just and equitable
[15] Section 4(7) of PIE requires the court to have regard to all the relevant
circumstances, including the availability of suitable alternative accommodation and the
rights and needs of the elderly, the disabled, women -headed households and children.
The enquiry proceeds in two stages. The court must first decide whether eviction is just
and equitable. If so, it must then set a vacation date and determine what conditions
should attach to the order. As the Supreme Court of Appeal observed in City of
Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA), the enquiry
cannot be concluded until the court is satisfied that it has all the information necessary
to make both findings on grounds of justice and equity.
[16] It follows from Changing Tides that each side bears the burden of placing before
the court the information that lies within its peculiar knowledge. The applicant bears the
onus on the application as a whole. Matters within the occupier’s exclusive knowledge
are for the occupier to put up. The Constitutional Court adopted that approach in
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) and again in
Occupiers, Berea v De Wet NO 2017 (5) SA 346 (CC). In Mayekiso, the full court
approved the trial judge’s observation that the insolvents in that matter had not brought
their personal circumstances to the court’s attention. An occupier who declines to lead
the evidence that section 4(7) is designed to consider cannot then expect the court to
weigh factors that have not been placed before it. Where the occupier’s averments are
answered only by his own omissions, the court must decide the matter on what is before
answered only by his own omissions, the court must decide the matter on what is before
it, applying the approach in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints ( Pty) Ltd
1984 (3) SA 623 (A), but giving such averments no greater weight than their evidentiary
foundation will bear.
[17] The factual picture relevant to section 4(7) has shifted markedly between the
answering affidavit and the hearing. On the papers initially filed, the case was that Mr
Higgs and his wife, who was said to be elderly and in ill health, would be rendered
homeless. It emerged at the hearing that Mrs Higgs is in Singapore, where she resides
with a relative. She is not in occupation of the property. The departmental report records
that seven households occupy the property in addition to Mr Higgs himself, five of which
are described as female -headed and include at least one minor. It became apparent
during argument that these households comprise both Airbnb guests and cottage
tenants. Mr Higgs’s adult son, Christopher, is also on the property. He is 32 years old, a
businessman, and, according to his father’s own version, paid R100 525.01 towards his
father’s Eskom debt between January and June 2025.
[18] PIE protects those who use a building or structure as a form of dwelling or
shelter. It does not extend to commercial occupants. The Constitutional Court so held in
MC Denneboom Service Station CC v Phayane 2015 (1) SA 54 (CC) at paragraphs 16
to 18, and the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed it in Stay at South Point Properties
(Pty) Ltd v Mqulwana 2024 (2) SA 640 (SCA). The Airbnb guests stay on a nightly basis.
The cottage occupants are tenants who pay R8 950 per month on four -month terms, as
advertised on Mr Higgs’s Facebook page. Their occupation is for a defined purpose and
a limited period. The cottages are not their home in any settled sense. They fall outside
the protective scope of PIE. Should the position of a particular tenant, on its own facts,
be different, I make provision in the order for that tenant to approach this court. I return
to this below.
[19] That leaves Mr Higgs and Christopher. Christopher is not a vulnerable person
[19] That leaves Mr Higgs and Christopher. Christopher is not a vulnerable person
within the contemplation of section 4(7). As for Mr Higgs, he is 63 years old and within
the working-age range. He is not, on his own evidence at the section 65 enquiry, the
recipient of any pension or grant. With his wife and the commercial occupants set aside,
his vulnerability case reduces to an assertion that he has no income, no bank account,
and no means of securing alternative accommodation. The evidentiary burden of
placing his personal circumstances and those of any person occupying under him
before the court rested on him. He has not discharged it.
[20] Mr Higgs’s assertion that he is without means sits uneasily with the evidence that
he conducts an Airbnb business, advertises rental units bearing his own telephone
number at R8 950 per month, and makes use of the “Western Cape Pickers” page. His
affidavit does not engage with any of this. Nor is his position assisted by his refusal of
the site inspection on 20 February 2026, which would have enabled the Municipality to
assess his circumstances and those of the other occupants. That refusal detracts from
the weight to be given to his claims of vulnerability, the more so where he asks the court
to accept those claims on behalf of persons who have not been identified. On the
evidence before me, I am unable to find that eviction would render him homeless.
[21] Section 4(7) concerns the availability of alternative accommodation. It does not
guarantee it. The Constitutional Court said in Grobler v Phillips 2023 (1) SA 321 (CC) at
paragraphs 36 to 38 that a private landowner bears no obligation to provide alternative
accommodation, and that section 26 of the Constitution does not entitle an occupier to
choose where he wishes to live. What stands in the way of an eviction order is not that
Mr Higgs would prefer to remain at Devon Vale, but the prospect that an order would
render him homeless. That prospect has not been established on the present record.
[22] The departmental report states that the Municipality cannot assist due to a
moratorium on the 10% Emergency Housing Assistance Policy provision, no current
moratorium on the 10% Emergency Housing Assistance Policy provision, no current
housing projects, filled allocations for Jamestown and Klapmuts, and the Klapmuts
community’s refusal to accept further relocations. The only positive undertaking is that, if
an occupier identifies a host in the WC024 area, the Municipality will provide a Wendy
structure. A municipal policy moratorium does not, however, extinguish constitutional
obligations. The Constitutional Court held in Government of the Republic of South Africa
and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) that the state must devise a
comprehensive and workable plan to meet its obligations regarding access to adequate
housing, and that those in desperate need cannot be left without relief. In City of
Johannesburg v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC), the Court
clarified that a municipality cannot rely on budgetary constraints or policy limitations to
avoid its obligations to those who would be rendered homeless by eviction. The report
does not explain the legal basis for the moratorium, nor does it indicate what steps the
Municipality is taking to restore emergency assistance or why this case cannot be
treated as an exception. The Klapmuts community’s refusal to accept relocations is a
social reality the Municipality must address, but it does not absolve the Municipality of
its duties.
[23] Nonetheless, the section 4(7) enquiry concerns whether eviction is just and
equitable in all relevant circumstances. The availability of alternative accommodation is
a factor, not a precondition to eviction, as the Supreme Court of Appeal noted in
Changing Tides at paragraph 20. Where an occupier has not shown that eviction would
render him homeless, the absence of alternative accommodation does not preclude an
eviction order. The Municipality’s response is insufficient, but on the present record,
where Mr Higgs has not established homelessness, this deficiency does not require a
different outcome. The question arises whether the position of other occupants, who
may yet establish that they are residential occupiers under PIE, requires a different
approach. The order below addresses that possibility. Insisting on a further site
approach. The order below addresses that possibility. Insisting on a further site
inspection, which Mr Higgs has obstructed, would reward that conduct and is not
required in these circumstances.
The argument advanced by the respondent
[24] Mr Nöthling referred to three cases. The first was Absa Bank Ltd v Murray and
Another 2004 (2) SA 15 (C), where Binns -Ward AJ explained how PIE balances the
rights of property owners and occupiers. I accept that summary. The argument did not,
however, engage with a further passage of the judgment, at paragraph 22, in which
Binns-Ward AJ observed that lenders must be able to rely on the efficacy of their
security, failing which the availability of housing finance will be prejudiced. Standard
Bank is such a lender, and its security has been eroded by five failed sales and
eighteen months of delay in the administration of the estate. The balance struck in
Murray does not operate in one direction only.
[25] The second authority was Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113
(SCA), cited for the proposition that PIE does not expropriate the landowner but delays
or suspends the exercise of full proprietary rights. This is correct and was recently
endorsed by the Constitutional Court in Grobler at paragraph 37. However, Ndlovu
stands against reading PIE as a substantive shield against any eviction. It does not
support a refusal when the balance of the evidence favours the owner.
[26] The third authority was City of Johannesburg v Blue Moonlight Properties 39
(Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) at paragraph 40, cited for the proposition that a
commercial owner aware of long -standing occupation may, in some circumstances,
need to be “somewhat patient.” In Blue Moonlight , eviction would have rendered the
occupiers homeless, a fact that underlies the passage. That premise does not apply
here, for the reasons given in paragraphs 19 to 21. Even on that premise, Blue
Moonlight requires patience; it does not direct refusal.
[27] The reversionary -interest component of the defence does not survive the
arithmetic that Mr Higgs himself has put up. Standard Bank’s judgment debt, as at 6
December 2024, stood at R14 100 157.07 and continues to accrue interest. The Knight
December 2024, stood at R14 100 157.07 and continues to accrue interest. The Knight
Frank draft valuation on which Mr Higgs relies values the property at R13.5 million.
Municipal rates rank ahead of the bond under section 118(3) of the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, and the August 2025 invoice reflects arrears of R281
239.56. Eskom arrears stood at R195 399.67 as at August 2024, which were not
extinguished by Christopher’s subsequent payment. The costs of administration of the
estate and the trustees’ fees remain to be added. On these figures, the bond debt
already exceeds the valuation. The R2 810 018.10 residual figure punted by Mr Higgs
was an earlier estimate based on more favourable assumptions. It cannot withstand the
current numbers. The submission that residual funds will fund alternative
accommodation is, on this record, speculative at best.
The alternative submission: vacate on sale
[28] In the alternative, Mr Nöthling submitted that the just date for vacation is the date
of sale. Mr Higgs has undertaken to the trustees that he will vacate once the property
has been sold, and a date framed in that way might appear to accommodate both
parties. The submission has a superficial attraction, but it cannot be accepted.
[29] A sale of the property while Mr Higgs remains in occupation is precisely what the
trustees have sought to avoid over the past eighteen months, and with reason. The
cancellation of the auction of 27 March 2024, the belated application for leave to appeal
(which Parker AJ found had been brought only because eviction was imminent), the
refusal of the site inspection on 20 February 2026, and the criminal charges laid against
a trustee together demonstrate that a sale on those terms is not a realistic prospect.
The five failed sales in execution before sequestration, each while Mr Higgs remained in
occupation, are a measure of how the market has responded.
[30] The trustees are, in any event, bound by the directions of the major secured
creditor under sections 82, 83 and 90 of the Insolvency Act. Standard Bank has directed
that the property be sold with vacant possession. Even if the marketability submission
could be tested on the merits, the trustees would not be free to act on it.
[31] There is a more fundamental difficulty. Section 4(8) of PIE requires the court to
determine a just and equitable date for vacation. A date made contingent on an event
that the occupier has shown both the ability and the willingness to defer is, in
substance, no date at all. To tie vacation to a sale that has been frustrated over a
sustained period would defeat the very purpose of the provision.
The date for vacation and the conditions
[32] A number of considerations inform the determination under section 4(8). Mr
Higgs has known that he would be required to vacate since at least 15 March 2024 and,
by the date of the hearing, had enjoyed more than 21 months’ notice. Christopher is
engaged in business and has shown himself capable of marshalling funds at short
notice. The Municipality has done what it is presently able to do. I have had regard to Mr
Higgs’s age and to his state of health. There are no children, disabled persons, or
pensioners on the property whose position calls for particular protection. His lengthy
period of residence, while a relevant consideration, does not outweigh the factors
pointing the other way. In my judgment a period of sixty days is sufficient. I have
considered longer periods, of ninety or one hundred and twenty days, but they are not
warranted on these facts. The interests of creditors cannot indefinitely yield to
assertions of homelessness that have not been established.
[33] It remains to deal with the position of any cottage tenant whose occupation may,
on its own facts, have ripened into the kind of settled occupation that PIE protects. The
record does not suggest that to be the case. But because Mr Higgs has obstructed
disclosure of the identities and lease terms of those tenants, the matter cannot be put
entirely beyond doubt. Provision is made in the order for any such tenant to return to
court on the same papers within fourteen days of service. That will guard against the
risk that an unidentified PIE -protected occupier is bound by an order made in his or her
absence.
Costs
[34] The applicants seek their costs on Scale B, to be costs in the insolvent estate.
The application was opposed throughout. The first respondent’s conduct in
administering the estate made the application necessary and materially increased its
complexity. The question whether costs should be ordered against Mr Higgs personally
arose. An insolvent opposing eviction by his trustees is in a peculiar position, as his
livelihood and shelter are at stake. Mr Higgs’s opposition is not justified, and he has
engaged in conduct designed to delay and obstruct. A personal costs order would
ordinarily follow. Nonetheless, the proper order is that the costs be costs in the
administration of the insolvent estate, including the costs of counsel on Scale B.
Order
[35] I make the following order:
1. The first respondent and all persons holding occupation under him as residential
occupiers are evicted from Portion 28 of the Farm Devon Vale No. 9 […], B[…]
Road, Stellenbosch (“the property”).
2. For the purposes of this order, “residential occupier” means a person who uses
any building or structure on the property as a form of dwelling or shelter within
the meaning of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act 19 of 1998.
3. The first respondent and all persons holding occupation under him as residential
occupiers shall vacate the property by 12h00 on 5 August 2026.
4. In the event of non -compliance with paragraph 3, the Sheriff of this Court is
authorised and directed to evict the first respondent and any person referred to in
that paragraph from the property, and to take such steps and obtain such
assistance from the South African Police Service as the Sheriff considers
necessary. The Sheriff shall execute against persons falling within the definition
of “residential occupier” in paragraph 2 and may apply for directions from this
Court in the event of any dispute on that question.
5. The applicants shall, within seven days of the date of this order, instruct the
Sheriff of this Court to serve a copy of this order on each adult person presently
in occupation of the property and on the second respondent. Any person on
whom the order is so served, who contends that he or she is a residential
occupier within paragraph 2 and that this order should not apply to him or her,
may, within fourteen days of the date of service, apply to this Court on the same
papers, supplemented as necessary, for an order varying paragraphs 1 and 3 in
his or her favour.
6. The second respondent shall, within twenty -one days of the date of service of
this order on it under paragraph 5, file a supplementary report that:
(a) explains the legal and factual basis for the moratorium on the 10%
Emergency Housing Assistance Policy provision and indicates what steps
the Municipality is taking to restore emergency housing assistance;
(b) identifies any further emergency -housing options that have become
available since 22 April 2026 or that can be made available
notwithstanding the moratorium;
(c) indicates what steps the Municipality proposes to take in respect of any
person on the property who claims to be at risk of homelessness,
including whether the Wendy structure offer can be extended without
requiring the occupier to identify a host; and
(d) addresses why this case cannot be treated as an exception to the
moratorium, having regard to the constitutional obligations identified in
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and
Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) and City of Johannesburg v Blue Moonlight
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC).
7. The costs of this application, including the costs of counsel on Scale B, are costs
in the insolvent estate of the first respondent.
____________________
M FRANCIS
Judge of the High Court
Appearances:
For Applicant: Adv C Morgan
Instructed by: ENS Inc.
For First Respondent: Adv B Nothling
Instructed by Sune van der Merwe Attorneys