IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, GQEBERHA
Not Reportable
Case no: PR305/22
S LOUW Applicant
and
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES,
NORTHERN CAPE PROVINCE First Respondent
THABO MARUPING, N.O. Second Respondent
GENERAL PUBLIC SERVICE SECTORAL BARGAINING
COUNCIL Third Respondent
Heard: 13 May 2026.
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties' legal representatives by email and publication on the
Labour Court’s website. The date and time for the hand- down is
deemed to be on 25 May 2026.
JUDGMENT
TLHOTLHALEMAJE, J.
Introduction:
[1] In this opposed application, the Applicant seeks an order to review and set
aside the arbitration award issued by the Second Respondent (Arbitrator) ,
acting under the auspices of the Third Respondent (GPSSBC). The Arbitrator
had confirmed the dismissal of the Applicant in circumstances where the latter
(1) Reportable: Yes/NO
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised
____________ ______________
Signature Date
2
had challenged the fairness of his dismissal on account of allegations of
sexual harassment
The factual background:
[2] The Applicant was employed by the First Respondent, the Department of
Correctional Services ( DCS), as a Grade 2 Correctional Officer , with effect
from July 2008, at its De Aar Correctional Centre, a medium-security facility in
the Northern Cape Province. He was dismissed on 25 March 2022 following a
complaint of sexual harassment lodged by a fellow employee (Complainant),
who was also a Correctional Officer in the facility's female section.
[3] Following his dismissal, the Applicant referred an alleged unfair dismissal
dispute to the GPSSBC. When attempts at conciliation failed, a certificate of
outcome was issued on 20 April 2022, and the dispute was referred for
arbitration. The dispute came before the Arbitrator, who had issued the
impugned award.
The evidence at arbitration proceedings:
[4] At the arbitration proceedings, the Complainant did not testify in view of the
misconduct of sexual harassment not having been disputed. Reliance was
placed on her affidavit in which she averred that the incident took place after
she had finished her shift (First watch) from 15h00 to 23h00 on 15 February
2021. After her shift, she proceeded to the control gate and discovered that all
her colleagues who were on the late shift had already left. The CDS’s Mr
Mouton had then instructed the Applicant to drive the Complainant home.
[5] On the way to her house, the Complainant noticed that the Applicant had
deviated from the route and was instead driving in the opposite direction.
When the Complainant enquired of the Applicant why he had deviated from
her route to her house and w hether he was going to fetch another official, the
latter initially denied having deviated from the route. When the Complainant
continued to ask where the Applicant was going, he gave no direct response.
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[6] At some point , the Applicant turned onto a dark gravel road and stopped the
vehicle in a secluded area behind a High School 's premises . When the
Complainant enquired why he had s topped instead of taking her home, his
blunt response was that he was going to have sex ual intercourse with her .
The Complainant responded that she would not do such a thing with him.
[7] As the Complainant protested, the A pplicant attempted to remove items she
had on her thighs. He further attempted to touch her private parts and ignored
her protests and resistance. She kept telling him to stop whatever he was
doing. The Applicant, in the process , also attempted to pull the Complainant
over to his car seat to kiss her. He further told her that they should both get
out of the vehicle, as he wanted to ‘hold and squeeze ’ her. The Complainant
had refused to get out of the vehicle.
[8] Throughout the episode, the Complainant was resisting. T he Applicant
ultimately gave up and drove her home. As she alighted from the vehicle, she
attempted to retrieve her possessions when the Applicant again attempted to
grab her but without success . Even after he had left, the Applicant had
continued to send the Complainant WhatsApp messages into the night.
Copies of those text messages were also placed before the Arbitrator.
[9] The following morning after the incident, the Complainant had first sent a text
message to the Applicant, informing him that he was going to report the
incident to a management official, Mr Xolela Cube. She then requested a
meeting with Cube and was accompanied by shop stewards , Messrs.
Ndumelo and Qondani . Cube had brought the matter to the attention of the
then Head of Correctional Centre, Mr Michael Mtantsi.
[10] At a meeting convened with Cube and Mtantsi as requested by the
Complainant, she had relayed the events of the previous night after her shift.
Mtantsi decided that the Applicant should also be called to the meeting so that
Mtantsi decided that the Applicant should also be called to the meeting so that
his side of the story can be heard. The Applicant was however off duty at the
time and was nonetheless called to come to the DCS’s premises for a
meeting. When the Applicant arrived, and after initially speaking to Cube,
Mtantsi, and Qondani, the Complainant was called. At that stage the
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Complainant only sought an apology from the Applicant, as she felt sorry for
him and his family.
[11] In her affidavit, the Complainant averred that a t the end of her shift , a day
after the incident, she had requested that another official, Mr Venter, should
take her home instead of the Applicant . Venter took her home, and on the
way, he informed her that the Applicant was dis pleased that she had asked
him (Venter) to take her home instead of him.
[12] On 17 February 2021, the Complainant confronted the Applicant about what
Venter had said and told him that she was no longer comfortable with being
taken home by him after her shift. The Complainant averred that the
Applicant, however, told her that it was his responsibility to take her home. It
was at that stage that the Complainant had formed the view that the Applicant
would not change his behaviour and had not shown genuine remorse when
he apologised the previous day.
[13] The Complainant then approached Cube and Mtantsi and indicated that she
had changed her mind in that in her view, the Applicant’s apology was not
genuine and she therefore wanted to pursue the matter . The Complainant
further averred that , because of the incident, she had to consult with a
Psychologist and was subsequently admitted for treatment for two weeks.
Upon her discharge, she was booked off sick for a further week.
[14] It is common cause that t he Applicant was subsequently suspended following
intervention by the DCS ’s area management. The documents before the
Commissioner indicate that an investigation was conducted and concluded
between 23 February and 15 April 2021. On 11 June 2021, t he Applicant was
issued with a notice to attend a disciplinary enquiry scheduled for 24 June
2021. After the outcome, a termination notice was served on the Applicant on
16 February 2022.
[15] The Applicant had appealed on 23 February 2022. It is a further common
cause that at some point before the outcome of the disciplinary enquiry was
cause that at some point before the outcome of the disciplinary enquiry was
issued, the Applicant’s suspension was uplifted. During that period, the
Applicant had continued to render his services.
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[16] The oral evidence of Mtantsi was that after the Applicant was called to a
meeting and had heard the Complainant ’s complaint and her version of
events, he initially disputed the allegations. This was until Cube told him to
stop playing games and tell the truth instead of wasting their time. The
Applicant had ultimately admitted that the misconduct took place. He had
apologised to the Complainant after being told that she had indicated that she
did not intend to take the matter further. However, Cube and Mtantsi were not
pleased with her decision. It appears that it was the Applicant’s understanding
that his apology would put an end to the matter.
[17] In regards to whether the Applicant’s apology that was made at the meeting of
17 February 2021 effectively constituted a disciplinary process that brought
the matter to an end, Mtantsi had testified that because of the informal nature
of the meeting, it could not have been a formal progressive disciplinary
hearing as contemplated in the DCS’s formal disciplinary code and procedure.
He had further disputed that there was any formal process, as that meeting
where the Applicant had apologised, was called at the behest of the
Complainant. Mtantsi further denied ever meeting the Applicant or discussing
the incident with him until he was called to a meeting.
[18] Mr Venter’s testimony was essentially that he took the Complainant home at
the end of her shift on the day after the incident. She had confided to him that
she felt uncomfortable about being taken home by the Applicant , and Venter
had indicated that the Applicant was not pleased that it was not he who was
taking the Complainant home. Flowing from her discussions with Venter , the
Complainant had formed the view that the Applicant’s apology earlier on had
not been a genuine show of remorse.
[19] The Applicant’s testimony was that Qondani and Cube informed him that ,
according to the Complainant, who had requested a meeting, if he (Applicant )
according to the Complainant, who had requested a meeting, if he (Applicant )
apologised to her, the matter would be closed. This was also repeated at the
meeting by Cube and Qondani in the presence of Mtantsi. The Complainant
was then called and met by the Applicant , Mtantsi and Qondani . They met
outside an office near the front gate of the premises.
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[20] When they met the Complainant, the Applicant had apologised to her as
requested by Cube and Mtantsi , and she had accepted his apology . This was
also in the presence of Mr Ndumela, who was a security guard at the front
gate. The Applicant also agreed that he should not approach the Complainant
and, in his view, the matter was resolved.
[21] The Applicant further disputed the appropriateness of the sanction,
contending that , since his suspension was lifted and he was allowed to
resume his duties among female employees, this indicated that the
employment relationship with the employer had not broken down.
[22] Under cross -examination, the Applicant had confirmed that after his
suspension, he had submitted a statement to the investigating officer in
response to allegations of sexual assault and attempted rape, and not sexual
harassment. It was based on that distinction that he continued to hold the
view that the issue of sexual harassment had been resolved with his apology.
He further testified that he had no knowledge of workplace sexual harassment
(or understood what it entailed), as no other employee was ever dismissed for
that type of misconduct at the workplace.
The Arbitrator’s award and findings:
[23] The Arbitrator in coming to his findings took into account that the misconduct
was not in dispute. He considered whether a defence of double jeopardy, as
raised by the Applicant, was sustainable in circumstances where the
Complainant had accepted his apology, yet the DCS had instituted a
disciplinary enquiry against him in respect of the same misconduct.
[24] The Arbitrator took into account the nature of the misconduct in reference to
Campbell Scientific Africa (Pty) Ltd v Simmers and Others
1. He also had
regard to the Code of Good Practice on Handling of Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace. He concluded that the DCS was compelled to apply it
notwithstanding the Applicant’s apology.
1 (CA 14/2014) [2015] ZALCCT 62 (23 October 2015)
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[25] Concerning the defence of double jeopardy, the Arbitrator concluded that
there was no record of the Applicant having been punished twice for the same
offence He further found that the Applicant had shown no remorse, that his
evidence was confusing and contradictory, and that a sanction of dismissal
was fair. The Arbitrator concluded that the conduct of the Applicant towards
the Complainant was reprehensible, taking into account his age relative to the
Complainant’s and that given his position as someone responsible for
transporting other officials, he could no longer be trusted in that role.
The grounds of review:
[26] The Applicant contends that the award is reviewable and unreasonable,
alternatively that it was vitiated by material errors of law and fact . It was
submitted that the award f ell outside the band of decisions that a reasonable
decision-maker could reach. In this regard, it was submitted that the Arbitrator
failed to apply the principle of progressive discipline properly, and failed to
consider whether the dismissal was an appropriate sanction in circumstances
where the Applicant had 14 years of service with no disciplinary record, and
where the D CS had not initially regarded the misconduct as warranting
immediate dismissal at the time.
[27] It was further submitted that the Arbitrator incorrectly rejected the defence of
double jeopardy, in circumstances where management had convened a
meeting and where the Applicant had apologised upon being called to answer
to the allegations.
The Legal framework and evaluation.
[28] The legal position in reviews of this nature is settled. The enquiry is whether,
based on the totality of the evidence before him/her, the Arbitrator's decision
is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not have reached. In Mashele v
South African Reserve Bank and Others (Mashele)
2, the Labour Appeal Court
recently reiterated the threshold of reasonableness in reference to other
authorities by stating that;
authorities by stating that;
2 (JA128/24) [2025] ZALAC 51; [2026] 1 BLLR 57 (LAC); (2026) 47 ILJ 168 (LAC)
8
‘In the application of the reasonableness threshold, as the Labour Court
correctly pointed out, it is not the function of a review court to adopt a
piecemeal approach in relation to the award under review; the court must
necessarily consider the totality of the available evidence. Put another way,
it is not open to an applicant in a review application, nor is it the function of
the review court, to microscopically analyse the evidence presented at the
arbitration hearing in an attempt to demonstrate that the award under
review is incorrect and that it should therefore be set aside. This approach
invites an evaluation of the correctness of the award and thus invites an
appeal in the guise of a review. What the reasonableness threshold entails
was recently explained by this Court (per Sutherland JA) in Makuleni v
Standard Bank of SA Ltd & others (Makuleni) , where the Court warned
against a review court yielding “to the seductive power of a lucid argument
that the result could be different”. The Court went on to state:
‘At the heart of the exercise is a fair reading of the award, in the
context of the body of evidence adduced and an even- handed
assessment of whether such conclusions are tenable. Only if the
conclusion is untenable is a review and setting aside warranted’’
(Internal citations omitted)3
[29] In defining the scope and impact of sexual harassment as an offence, the
Constitutional Court in McGregor v Public Health and Social Development
Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others4 held that:
‘“Sexual harassment is the most heinous misconduct that plagues a
workplace.” Although prohibited under the labour laws of this country, it
persists. Its persistence and prevalence “pose a barrier to the achievement
of substantive equality in the workplace and is inimical to the constitutional
dream of a society founded on the values of human dignity, the
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms… and non-sexism”. Not only is it demeaning to the victim, but it
undermines their dignity, integrity and self-worth, striking at the root of that
person’s being. Writing in 1989, in its first reported case of sexual
harassment, the erstwhile Industrial Court, sounding the alarm that sexual
3 At para 28
4 (CCT 270/20) [2021] ZACC 14; (2021) 42 ILJ 1643 (CC); [2021] 9 BLLR 861 (CC); 2021 (5) SA 425
(CC); 2021 (10) BCLR 1131 (CC) at para 1
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harassment cannot be tolerated, highlighted that “[u]nwanted sexual
advances in the employment sphere are not a rare occurrence” and it is “by
no means uncommon”. Unfortunately, that truth rings as loudly today as it
did then. The only difference between now and then is that today we hold
in our hands a Constitution that equips us with the tools needed to protect
the rights that are violated when sexual harassment occurs. Yet, what this
means is that for as long as sexual harassment persists, so the
Constitution becomes an eidolon, and its promises of equality and dignity,
equally illusive.’
[30] Against the above principles, it can only be reiterated that the Applicant,
notwithstanding his initial hesitation until rebuked by Cube, did ultimately
concede that he indeed sexually harass ed the Complainant. Even then, it is
apparent that th e admission did not come about on his own volition. On his
own version, he apologised because the Complainant, Cube and Mtantsi told
him to. There is no indication that he would have done so of his own volition.
[31] The point being made is that the incident of s exual harassment in this case
and the manner with which it took place cannot be disposed of through a
mere apology, or be reduced to a mere footnote in the overall consideration of
the appropriateness of the sanction of dismissal , and the ground of review
relied upon. The misconduct is indeed serious.
[32] To recap, when the Applicant agreed to take the Complainant home, it was
late at night after her shift. Evidence demonstrated that taking other
employees home after their shifts was also part of the Applicant’s functions.
He was entrusted with the Complainant's safety. He broke that trust in the
most heinous ways, by diverting off her route to her house, not being forthright
about where he was taking her , and stopping in a secluded dark area in the
middle of the night. Not only did he endanger the Complainant’s life in the
middle of the night. Not only did he endanger the Complainant’s life in the
course of his duties, but he had proceeded to invade the Complainant’s bodily
integrity and sought to impose himself upon her by attempting to touch her
private parts and forcefully kiss her. At some point, he had even told her to get
out of the vehicle in the middle of the night and in a secluded dark place, so
that he could ‘hold and squeeze’ her.
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[33] Unsurprisingly, the Applicant had, at some point, when making a statement
after his suspension, become confused as to whether he should answer to
allegations of sexual assault and attempted rape, when the issue was that of
sexual harassment. Indeed, his conduct towards the Complainant went
beyond mere sexual harassment. Throughout her harassment and invasion of
her bodily integrity by the Applicant who was clearly driven by his hormonal
instincts, t he latter completely disregarded his duty of care towards her. He
abused his position of trust towards her and the DCS.
[34] Arising from the above, it further needs to be said that the Complainant was
not only failed by the Applicant, but also by the Department. After her ordeal,
the Applicant was only dismissed a year later. It is not clear from the evidence
why it took a year between the initial suspension, investigations, the internal
hearing, the lifting of his suspension, and the outcome. Irrespective of the fact
that the Applicant was during the lift ing of his suspension deployed to another
section, the fact remains that following his confession and the manner with
which he had sexually harassed the Complainant , the Department had
allowed him to perform his duties together with other female employees as if
nothing had happened, instead of expeditiously but fairly finalising the matter
in order to bring some measure of closure and comfort to the Complainant.
[35] In Mashele, the Labour Appeal Court had pointed out that international labour
standards, the Constitution, the Employment Equity Act, and the Code of
Good Practice on the Prevention and Elimination of Harassment in the
Workplace (Code) take as their point of departure, the values of personal
integrity, dignity, equality, and the necessity for the working environment to be
free of sexual harassment 5. It is further common cause that the D CS has in
place, the Prevention and Management of Sexual Harassment in the DCS:
place, the Prevention and Management of Sexual Harassment in the DCS:
Policy and Procedures. It is against these instruments at its disposal , that it is
reiterated that the DCS miserably failed the Complainant.
[36] Against the very same instruments, it is perplexing that at some point after his
apology, the DCS was prepared to let the matter rest , even if it were the
wishes of the Complainant . The issue remains that , in circumstances where
5 At para 22
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such allegations arose, it was irrelevant whether the Complainant accepted
the apology. The misconduct in question, as correctly found by the Arbitrator,
obliged the DCS to act against the Applicant in accordance with those
prescripts and its own disciplinary code and procedure. This was to ensure
that female employees were protected from sexual harassment and/or any
form of discrimination by fellow employees who could not keep their urges in
check, such as the Applicant.
[37] The obligations of the employer in such instances were succinctly set out in
MEC for Education (North West Provincial Government) v Makubalo
(Makubalo)6 , where the Labour Appeal Court held that;
‘It stands to be noted that even had there been a resolution of the issue
between the respondent and Ms Monegi, workplace rules regulate the
standard of conduct required within the context of the employment
relationship. An employer is therefore entitled to take disciplinary action
against an employee whose conduct falls short of such rules or standards.
An amicable resolution of a dispute between two employees does not in
itself resolve the workplace misconduct from the perspective of an
employer, nor does it prevent the employer from taking disciplinary action
against the employee for such misconduct.’7
[38] It follows that, in this case, it was not for the Complainant to forgive and forget
about the incident simply because she felt sorry for the Applicant. It was not
her call that the Applicant should be exonerated, as the misconduct in
question negatively impacted the workplace environment, and thus called for
severe disciplinary measures.
[39] The above conclusions equally dispose of the Applicant’s contentions
regarding double jeopardy , without the need to refer to authorities on that
topic. It follows that the Applicant cannot, based on what was said in
Makubalo, contend that the informal meeting, where he apologised for his
Makubalo, contend that the informal meeting, where he apologised for his
conduct, could have been in the form of any disciplinary step to sustain a
defence of doubl e jeopardy. In any event, that meeting was called at the
6 (JA37/2012) [2017] ZALAC 13 (3 February 2017)
7 At para 20
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behest of the Complainant , and was held in circumstances where were no
formal charges were preferred against the Applicant, or where any formal
hearing as envisaged in the DCS’s disciplinary code and procedure was held.
[40] I further fail to appreciate how it can be said that any formalised process could
have been held outside an office and at the entrance of the control gate of the
DCS’s premises. T he Applicant sought to downplay the significance and
consequences of his conduct . T o the extent that he had persisted with his
contentions in this regard, it can only demonstrate his lack of appreciation of
the harm he caused as a result of his misconduct.
[41] This brings me to the issue of the appropriateness of the sanction. The
Applicant contended that the Arbitrator ignored his long, unblemished service
record, the fact that the DCS did not initially seek to take disciplinary action
against him , and his admission of the misconduct. It was contended that in
accordance with the DCS’s procedures and paragraph 5.1 of Resolution 1 of
2006
8, corrective counselling ought to have been considered, rather than a
dismissal.
[42] Flowing from Sidumo 9, the approach to a determination of the
appropriateness of a sanction of a dismissal could not have been clearer. In
this exercise, the arbitrator is not empowered to consider afresh what he or
she would do, but simply to decide whether what the employer did was fair. In
this regard, the arbitrator without deference to the decision of the employer, is
required to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances before him or
her, taking into account inter alia , the nature and seriousness of the
misconduct, the importance of the rule, the harm caused by the employee’s
8 Which provide;
“Collective counselling, in cases where the seriousness of the misconduct warrants
counselling, the manager of the employee must:
Bring the misconduct to the employee’s attention;
Bring the misconduct to the employee’s attention;
Determine the reasons for the misconduct and give the employee an opportunity to respond
to the allegations through himself/herself or by a Union representative;
Seek to get agreement on how to remedy the conduct; and
Take steps to implement the agreed course of action.”
9 At paragraphs 78 and 79
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conduct, the reason the employer imposed a sanction of dismissal, the basis
of the challenge to the dismissal, the employee’s disciplinary record, and all
relevant mitigating factors.
[43] Regarding mitigating factors, it can only be reiterated that an employee’s long,
unblemished service is not, on its own, sufficient to exonerate an employee of
misconduct10. This approach is even more apposite in circumstances where
the misconduct in question is so gross as to have a negative impact on the
employment relationship any form of trust relationship between the employer
and employee.
[44] There can be no doubt that the sexual harassment as described by the
Complainant in her affidavit was egregious in the extreme. In Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Municipality v South African Local Government Bargaining
Council and Others 11, the LAC reiterated that sexual harassment is, at its
core, concerned with the exercise of power and reflects the power relations
that exist both in society generally and, specifically, within a particular
workplace.
[45] In this case, by virtue of being tasked with taking the Complainant home in the
middle of the night, the Applicant effectively exercised power over her, as she
was vulnerable and at his mercy , to ensure that she arrived home safely. I n
this instance, the Applicant, like a predator , saw an opportunity and sexually
harassed the Complainant and betrayed her trust in the most deplorable
manner. As a side issue, t he Arbitrator ’s incorrect conclusion that the
Applicant had denied the misconduct is neither here nor there. This
misdirection and misconstruction of the evidence did not distort the ultimate
outcome he arrived at.
[46] On the undisputed facts , the Complainant had landed in hospital after her
ordeal. This indeed makes the misconduct and its impact even more gross,
something which the Applicant refused to acknowledge even in these
proceedings. Contrary to the submissions made on behalf of the Applicant,
proceedings. Contrary to the submissions made on behalf of the Applicant,
10 Mgaga v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others (DA 17/21) [2024] ZALAC 8;
[2024] 7 BLLR 699 (LAC); (2024) 45 ILJ 1576 (LAC) at para 29
11 (JA17/2021) [2022] ZALAC 2; [2022] 4 BLLR 324 (LAC); (2022) 43 ILJ 825 (LAC) at para 2
14
the Complainant’s medical admission and sick leave were not disputed. I
therefore fail to appreciate how these issues could have been irrelevant for
the determination of the sanction. Effectively, the misconduct was serious
enough to warrant the Applicant’s dismissal , and any form of counselling
under clause 5.1 of the Resolution, as the Applicant contended, would have
been an injustice to the Complainant. Equally, it would have been a failure on
the part of the DCS to properly implement the necessary instr uments, to
ensure that the workplace was free from predatory behaviour.
[47] I have already indicated that the DCS was found wanting to the extent that it
did not act immediately in accordance with the prescripts. Clearly, the DCS
needs to be rebuked not only for taking too long to finalise the disciplinary
process, but also for permitting the Applicant to remain at the workplace for
such a protracted period, and work amongst female employees . Throughout
the period whilst the Applicant was at the workplace , the DCS was clearly
oblivious to the harm he had caused and continued to cause to the
Complainant by his presence.
[48] The ineptitude of t he DCS does not however imply that the Applicant could
still be trusted or that he should get a free pass . Considering the egregious
nature of the misconduct, there was clearly a basis for imposing a sanction of
dismissal. It follows that the basis for challenging the sanction was meritless.
[49] Against the above considerations, it is concluded that there is no basis for any
finding to be made that the Arbitrator’s award is susceptible to any review or
any interference by this Court. There is no basis to conclude that the
Arbitrator committed any error of law and the like. T he overall evidence that
was served before him does not suggest that the decision which he came to
fell outside of the band of decisions to which a reasonable arbitrator could
come. On the contrary, the reasoning of the Arbitrat or was by all accounts
come. On the contrary, the reasoning of the Arbitrat or was by all accounts
sound and his decision was reasonable in the circumstances. It follows that
the review application ought to be dismissed.
[50] Regarding costs, the contentions made on behalf of the DCS were that it was
unreasonable for the Applicant to persist with the review application where
15
there was no basis to interfere with the Arbitrator's award. Even though I
agree that the review application ought not to have been before the Court ,
considering the conclusions reached in this judgment, I also agree that it was
neither frivolous nor vexatious to deserve a cost order. Against these
considerations, the requirements of law and fairness dictate that each party
bear its own costs.
[51] Accordingly, the following order is made;
Order:
1. The Applicant’s application to review and set aside the arbitration
award issued by the Second Respondent under Case No:
GPBC406/2022 is dismissed.
2. There is no order as to costs.
__________________
Edwin Tlhotlhalemaje
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
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APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Mr. C. Unwin of Lovius Block Attorneys
For the Respondent: Ms. K. Sassin-Schaaf of State Attorney,
Kimberley