IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
HELD AT JOHANNESBURG
Case no: 2026 – 101649
Date of hearing: 19 May 2026
In the matter between:
BUSAMED LOWVELD PRIVATE HOSPITAL Applicant
and
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION First Respondent
ARBITRATION
LEGASA MARCUS MATENCHE Second Respondent
NOMSA PRECIOUS DZIMBANETE Third Respondent
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES/NO
(3) REVISED: YES/NO
19 May 2026
JUDGMENT
SNYMAN, AJ
[1] This judgment concerns an urgent application brought by the applicant, in
which the applicant seeks to stay the execution of an arbitration award
granted in favour of the employee (third respondent). What must be decided is
whether the applicant’s application satisfies the requirements of urgency.
[2] The applicant has filed a review application to challenge the arbitration award
in favour of the employee. This review application has been filed under case
number 2026-084561, and is currently pending.
[3] It also appears from the papers that the third respondent, being the employee,
has commenced the process to certify the arbitration award in terms of
section 143 of the Labour relations act 66 of 1995 (LRA). There is however no
indication that the arbitration award has even been certified as yet .
Importantly, however, there has been no indication of any execution of the
arbitration award, nor has the applicant been visited by the sheriff, nor is there
any proven attempt that what is a certified arbitration award is sought to be
executed.
[4] When an arbitration award is certified, all that it means is that it makes the
arbitration award executable. It does not mean that the arbitration award is
automatically executed as a result. In order to make something that was
executable to be executed, requires the positive action of instructing the
sheriff to do so.
[5] It is the active execution of the certified arbitration award that creates the
urgency that entitles this court to intervene and stay enforcement pending the
finalization of the review application. This does not exist in this case.
[6] I however have another concern that impacts on urgency , even though the
applicant has indicated this issue is tied in with the merits of the application
still to be decided. Th is difficulty is that the LRA has been designed in such a
fashion that a stay of execution can be secured by effectively purchasing the
stay of execution i n the form of providing security under sections 145(7) and
145(8) of the LRA. Until the applicant purchased such security, there was
nothing wrong with the third respondent seeking to certify the award, and the
third respondent was perfectly entitled to do so. Under these circumstances, it
would be inappropriate to use that as a basis of urgency, considering this
prescribed remedy clearly available to the applicant.
[7] The applicant has said that due to its strong financial position, it should be
dispensed from providing security , as the third respondent does not need
protection. I do not need to decide on that at this stage, as the applicant
indicated that it would pursue that in the normal course. So that is another
battle for another day. The fact, however, remains that all these
circumstances set out above renders any urgency in this case, in my view, to
be non-existent, as there is no imminent harm or prejudice that needs to be
stopped. In addition, the applicant, considering the relief it seeks, has actual
substantive redress in the ordinary course, and as such, urgency has not
been shown
[8] In the circumstances, the applicant’s application falls to be struck from the role
on the basis of a lack of urgency. The applicant and the third respondent have
kindly agreed that the matter be struck from the roll for lack of urgency and
that is thus the order that needs to be given.
[9] In this instance, and considering everything that I've said above, there was no
need for the applicant to have bought the current application as one of
urgency. The basis for urgency does not exist, and the availability of
urgency. The basis for urgency does not exist, and the availability of
alternative remedies meant that this court should not be burdened where it
comes to its extremely busy urgent role with issues such as these, w here
there is no imminent harm or prejudice. The application was ill -founded from
the outset, and in my view, there should be no reason why the third
respondent should be burdened with the costs of opposing such an
application.
[10] I have a wide discretion under section 162(1) of the LRA when it comes to the
issue of costs. And even though the applicant still wants to pursue its
application in the ordinary course, at least where it comes to the issue of
urgency, there is no reason why the applicant should not be ordered to pay
the costs of the abortive urgent application.
[11] In the premises, the following order is made:
Order
1. The application is struck from the roll due to the lack of urgency.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the third respondent's costs only in
respect of the issue of the urgency of this matter, or in other words, the
appearance today for the urgent hearing, on the party and party scale B.
_____________________
S. Snyman
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa