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S v Khoasasa (515/2001) [2002] ZASCA 113 (20 September 2002)

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Criminal Procedure
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Brief Summary

Criminal Procedure — Right of appeal — Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence — Appellant convicted of theft and violation of mining regulations — Initial application for leave to appeal denied by trial court, subsequent application to Provincial Division also denied — Legal question of whether appellant has further right of appeal after denial of leave — Court held that denial of leave to appeal constitutes a decision of a Provincial Division, allowing for appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal under certain conditions.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This judgment in S v Khoasasa (515/2001) [2002] ZASCA 113; 2003 (1) SACR 123 (SCA); [2002] 4 All SA 635 (SCA) (20 September 2002) concerns appellate jurisdiction and procedure following the refusal of leave to appeal in criminal proceedings originating in a regional court.


The appellant was James Khoasasa, an accused convicted in the regional court. The respondent was the State. The matter came before the Supreme Court of Appeal (Streicher, Farlam and Mpati JJA) after a sequence of unsuccessful applications for leave to appeal.


Procedurally, the appellant was convicted and sentenced in the regional court. He then applied for leave to appeal in terms of section 309B of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which was refused. He subsequently petitioned the Judge President under section 309C, and that petition was refused by two judges of the Orange Free State Provincial Division. After his co-accused obtained sentence reductions on appeal, the appellant sought to take the matter further, leading to the proceedings in the Supreme Court of Appeal.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was not the merits of conviction or sentence as such, but the availability of any further right of appeal after a refusal of leave under section 309C, and if such an appeal existed, what procedural and jurisdictional requirements governed it.


Material Facts


The appellant was convicted on 23 December 1999 in a regional court of theft of a bar of fine gold with a mass of 17,886 kg and a value of R1 310 000,30. He was also convicted of contravening section 143(1) of the Minerals Act 20 of 1967 by selling the gold.


On the same date, he was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for the theft. A sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment was imposed for the statutory offence, but that 5-year term was suspended.


The court accepted evidence that the gold had been stolen by the appellant together with Hudson, Meiring, and Klein from the Saaiplaas mine. The appellant did not physically remove the gold from the plant; rather, he found a buyer, conducted negotiations, and received R40 000 for his role, while each of the other participants received R275 000. These facts were treated as part of the evidentiary basis for conviction, but the Supreme Court of Appeal’s determination in this matter did not turn on any factual dispute regarding the commission of the offences.


In procedural sequence, after conviction and sentence the appellant applied to the trial court for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence under section 309B, and the trial court refused leave. He then petitioned the Judge President under section 309C, and on 25 January 2000 two judges of the Orange Free State Provincial Division refused the petition (described as “the court below” in the judgment).


Hudson and Meiring, who had pleaded guilty, were later sentenced to 15 years (theft) and 5 years (section 143(1)), with the 5-year term not suspended but ordered to run concurrently with the 15-year term. The regional court granted them leave to appeal, and on 28 August 2000 their 15-year sentences were reduced on appeal to 6 years’ imprisonment.


After that outcome, the appellant applied to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal seeking leave to appeal against his sentences to the Orange Free State Provincial Division. Two judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal granted condonation and granted leave “to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal”, subject to an in limine argument on whether the Supreme Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The appellant then purported to proceed in the Supreme Court of Appeal, resulting in the present decision.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were concerned with jurisdiction and appellate procedure, rather than the substantive merits of conviction or sentence.


The court was required to determine whether, after a refusal by the High Court (acting under section 309C of the Criminal Procedure Act) to grant leave to appeal from a lower court conviction/sentence, the accused had any further right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, and if so, the source and requirements of that right.


A related legal question was whether the High Court’s refusal under section 309C constituted a decision “on appeal to it” for purposes of section 20(4) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, thereby triggering the statutory regime that requires further leave for a subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.


The dispute was primarily one of law (statutory interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Act and Supreme Court Act, and the characterisation of proceedings under section 309C), together with the application of those legal rules to the procedural facts (namely, what steps the appellant did and did not take in seeking the requisite leave).


Court’s Reasoning


The court began by situating the relevant statutory framework at the time of the appellant’s conviction and sentence, noting that sections 309(1)(a), 309B(1) and 309C(1) (introduced by the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 76 of 1997) were then in force. Those provisions created a system in which an accused convicted in a lower court could appeal to the High Court only with leave, first sought from the trial court and, if refused, by petition to the Judge President.


The court then addressed the Supreme Court of Appeal’s appellate jurisdiction under the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, focusing on sections 20 and 21. It held that the Supreme Court of Appeal does not have jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal against a conviction and sentence imposed by a lower court; the Supreme Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction is engaged only after the matter has been dealt with in the High Court appellate process, consistent with the proposition stated in S v N that there is no provision for a direct appeal from a magistrate to the Supreme Court of Appeal.


However, the court distinguished between an appeal against the magistrates’ court conviction/sentence and an appeal against the High Court order refusing leave. It accepted that the refusal by two High Court judges of leave to appeal under section 309C was an “order” or “decision” of a provincial division for purposes of sections 20(1) or 21(1) of the Supreme Court Act, relying on the general approach to appealability in Zweni v Minister of Law and Order and the Constitutional Court’s treatment of “decision” in Van der Walt v Metcash Trading Ltd.


The court then considered whether the High Court’s order refusing leave under section 309C was an order given “on appeal to it” for purposes of section 20(4) of the Supreme Court Act. Drawing on Sita and Another v Olivier NO and Another and S v Mohamed, it adopted the wider meaning of “appeal” as including an approach to the High Court for relief from a decision of an inferior court, even if the procedure is framed as a petition rather than a conventional appeal. On this reasoning, a petition under section 309C is, in substance, directed at correcting what is said to be a wrong refusal by the magistrate to grant leave, and therefore functions as an appeal in the relevant sense.


This interpretive approach was reinforced by the court’s view that the wording “on appeal to it” in section 20(4) should not be construed differently from the equivalent language in the former section 21(2)(a) considered in earlier jurisprudence, with reference to Buchanan v Marais NO and Others.


Having concluded that the refusal of leave under section 309C was an order “on appeal to” the High Court for purposes of section 20(4), the court then considered whether the Criminal Procedure Act provisions (sections 309, 309B and 309C) should nonetheless be read as limiting the Supreme Court of Appeal’s competence to entertain an appeal against such a refusal. The court found no express limitation and held that no implied limitation should be read in merely because the Criminal Procedure Act did not mention a further appeal. It relied on the presumption against altering the existing legal position without clear legislative language, referring to Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees and Kent NO v South African Railways and Another.


The court also addressed reliance by the respondent on an earlier Supreme Court of Appeal order in Ngwadi Mzamo v Die Staat (case no. 099/2000), where an application for leave was struck off for want of power. Because that matter contained no reasons and no oral argument had been heard, the court concluded, for the reasons it had given, that the decision was wrong.


The court then turned to the crucial procedural defect in the present matter. Although it held in principle that an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal could lie against the High Court’s refusal under section 309C, it emphasised that section 20(4) requires that such an appeal may proceed only with leave, either leave granted by the court whose decision is appealed against (the High Court), or if that leave is refused, leave granted by the Supreme Court of Appeal.


On the facts, the appellant had not first applied to the High Court for leave to appeal against the High Court’s refusal order. Because the High Court had therefore not refused such leave (as it had never been sought), the Supreme Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to grant leave at that stage. The earlier order by two Supreme Court of Appeal judges purporting to grant leave was therefore treated as a nullity, with reference to authorities cited for the proposition that an order granted without jurisdiction is void, including Voet 49.8.3, Lewis & Marks v Middel, and Suid-Afrikaanse Sentrale Ko-operatiewe Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren and Others and Taxing Master.


This absence of properly obtained leave meant the Supreme Court of Appeal could not entertain the appeal, and the matter had to be removed from the roll.


Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the absence of properly obtained leave to appeal against the High Court’s refusal order.


The appeal was accordingly struck off the roll.


No costs order is recorded in the judgment.


Cases Cited


S v Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 (CC)


S v N 1991 (2) SASV 10 (AA)


S v Sweigers 1969 (1) PH H10 (A)


S v Tsedi 1984 (1) SA 565 (A)


S v Botha 2002 (1) SASV 222 (HHA)


Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American Express Travel Service 1996 (3) SA 1 (A)


Zweni v Minister of Law and Order 1993 (1) SA 523 (A)


Van der Walt v Metcash Trading Ltd 2002 (4) 317 (CC)


Sita and Another v Olivier NO and Another 1967 (2) SA 442 (A)


Lawrance v A.R.M. of Johannesburg 1908 T.S. 525


S v Mohamed 1977 (2) SA 531 (A)


Buchanan v Marais NO and Others [1991] ZASCA 19; 1991 (2) SA 679 (A)


Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees 1909 T.S. 811


Kent NO v South African Railways and Another 1946 AD 398


Lewis & Marks v Middel 1904 T.S. 291


Suid-Afrikaanse Sentrale Ko-operatiewe Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren and Others and Taxing Master 1964 (1) SA 162 (O)


Ngwadi Mzamo v Die Staat (case no. 099/2000)


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, sections 1, 309(1)(a), 309B(1), 309C(1), 309C(4)(a), 309C(5)(c)(ii), 309C(5)(d)


Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 76 of 1997


Minerals Act 20 of 1967, section 143(1)


Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944


Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955, section 190


Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, sections 20(1), 20(4), 21(1), and reference to the repealed section 21(2)(a)


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court are expressly cited in the judgment.


Held


The Supreme Court of Appeal found that a High Court’s refusal of leave to appeal under section 309C of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 constitutes an order made by a provincial division “on appeal to it” for purposes of section 20(4) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. Consequently, a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against such refusal is competent in principle, but only with the requisite leave contemplated by section 20(4).


The court further held that the appellant had not followed the required leave procedure because he did not first seek leave from the High Court to appeal against the High Court’s refusal order. In those circumstances the Supreme Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to grant leave, with the result that the purported grant of leave was treated as void, and the appeal could not be entertained.


The appeal was struck off the roll.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


An accused has no direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against a conviction and sentence imposed by a magistrates’ court; the Supreme Court of Appeal’s criminal appellate jurisdiction is ordinarily engaged only after High Court appellate proceedings, and then only in accordance with statutory requirements.


A petition to a High Court under section 309C (following refusal of leave by the lower court) is, in substance, an approach seeking relief from a lower court decision and is therefore treated as an appeal in the broader sense adopted in South African appellate jurisprudence. For that reason, a High Court order refusing leave under section 309C is properly characterised as an order made “on appeal to” the High Court for purposes of section 20(4) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.


An appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against a High Court order made “on appeal to it” is subject to the leave requirements in section 20(4). Leave must be sought first from the court whose decision is being appealed. Only where that leave has been refused may the Supreme Court of Appeal be approached for leave.


Where leave is purportedly granted by a court that lacks jurisdiction to grant it at that stage (because statutory preconditions have not been met), the resulting order is treated as a nullity, and the appeal cannot be entertained.

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S v Khoasasa (515/2001) [2002] ZASCA 113; 2003 (1) SACR 123 (SCA); [2002] 4 All SA 635 (SCA) (20 September 2002)

DIE HOOGSTE HOF VAN APPèL
VAN SUID-AFRIKA
Rapporteerbaar
Saak nr:515/2001
In die saak tussen:
JAMES
KHOASASA
Appellant
en
DIE
STAAT
Respondent
Coram
:
Streicher,
Farlam en Mpati, ARR
Verhoor
:
20
Augustus 2002
Gelewer
:
20
September 2002
Reg van appèl teen weiering deur Provinsiale Afdeling,
ingevolge art 309C van Wet 51 van 1977, van verlof om te appelleer
teen vonnis opgelê in laer hof – vereistes.
U
I T S P R A A K
STREICHER
AR/
STREICHER AR:
[1] Die appellant is op 23 Desember 1999 in `n streekhof
skuldig bevind aan die diefstal van `n staaf fyngoud met `n massa van
17,886
kg en `n waarde van R1 310 000,30. Hy is ook skuldig bevind
aan `n oortreding van art 143 (1) van die Wet op Mynregte 20 van 1967
deurdat hy die staaf fyngoud verkoop het. Op dieselfde datum is hy
gevonnis tot 15 jaar gevangenisstraf ten opsigte van die diefstalklag
en tot 5 jaar gevangenisstraf ten opsigte van die oortreding van art
143 (1). Laasgenoemde gevangenisstraf is opgeskort. Nadat die
appellant skuldig bevind en gevonnis is, het hy, ingevolge art 309B
van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977, by die verhoorhof aansoek
gedoen
om verlof om te appelleer teen beide sy skuldigbevinding en vonnisse.
Die aansoek is geweier. Daarna het hy ingevolge art
309C van die
Strafproseswet, by wyse van `n aansoek gerig aan die Regter-president
van die Oranje Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling,
aansoek gedoen vir
sodanige verlof. Die aansoek is op 25 Januarie 2000 deur twee regters
van die Oranje Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling
(‘die hof benede’)
geweier. Die vraag wat in hierdie appèl beslis moet word is of
die appellant na sodanige weiering enige
verdere reg van appèl
het, en, indien wel, wat die vereistes vir sodanige appèl is.
[2] Volgens die getuienis op grond waarvan die appellant
skuldig bevind is, is die fyngoud deur die appellant, ene Hudson,
Meiring
en Klein van die Saaiplaas myn gesteel. Die appellant het nie
self deelgeneem aan die verwydering van die goud vanaf die goudaanleg
van die Saaiplaas myn nie maar het `n koper daarvoor gevind en het
die onderhandelinge met die koper gevoer. Hy het R40 000 van die
verkoopprys as vergoeding vir sy dienste ontvang terwyl elk van die
ander drie deelnemers R275 000 ontvang het.
[3] Die appellant was aanvanklik tesame met Hudson,
Meiring en Klein aangekla. Hy is egter later afsonderlik verhoor. Op
daardie stadium
was Hudson, Meiring en Klein, wat almal skuldig
gepleit het, reeds skuldig bevind aan beide aanklagte maar was hulle
nog nie gevonnis
nie. Na die afhandeling van die appellant se verhoor
is elk van Hudson en Meiring ook tot 15 jaar gevangenisstraf ten
opsigte van
die diefstalklagte en tot 5 jaar gevangenisstraf ten
opsigte van die klagte ingevolge art 143(1) gevonnis. In hulle geval
is die
5 jaar gevangenisstraf egter nie opgeskort nie maar is beveel
dat dit moet saamloop met die 15 jaar gevangenisstraf. Dit blyk nie
uit die appèloorkonde welke straf Klein opgelê is nie.
[4] Ten tyde van die appellant se skuldigbevinding was
die bepalings van art 309(1)(a), 309B(1) en 309C(1) van die
Strafproseswet
van krag. Hierdie artikels is ingevoeg ingevolge die
bepalings van die Strafproseswysingswet 76 van 1997 en het bepaal:
‘
309(1)(a) Iemand wat deur `n laer hof aan `n misdryf
skuldig bevind is (met inbegrip van iemand wat na skuldigbevinding
ontslaan is)
kan, behoudens artikel 309B, teen so`n skuldigbevinding
en teen `n gevolglike vonnis of bevel na die provinsiale of plaaslike
afdeling
appelleer wat regsbevoegdheid het.’
‘
309B(1) `n Beskuldigde wat teen `n belsissing of
bevel van `n laer hof wil appelleer, moet binne 14 dae of binne die
langer tydperk
wat op aansoek om gegronde redes toegelaat word, by
daardie hof aansoek doen om verlof om teen daardie beslissing of
bevel te appelleer.’
‘
309C(1) Indien `n aansoek kragtens artikel 309B(1) om
verlof om te appelleer . . . geweier word, kan die beskuldigde, binne
21 dae
na sodanige weiering of binne die langer tydperk wat om
gegronde redes toegelaat word, by wyse van `n versoekskrif aan die
Regter-president
van die afdeling van die Hoë Hof wat
jurisdiksie het, gerig, `n aansoek om verlof om te appelleer . . .
voorlê.’
`n
Laer hof word in art 1 van die Strafproseswet omskryf as ‘`n hof
wat kragtens die bepalings van die Wet op Landdroshowe, 1944
(Wet 32
van 1944), ingestel is’.
Streekhowe is so ingestel en
kwalifiseer dus as laer howe.
[5] Die aansoek om verlof om te appelleer waarna in art
309C(1) verwys word, word in kamers oorweeg deur twee regters deur
die Regter-president
aangewys (art 309C(4)(a)). Hulle kan die aansoek
toestaan of weier (art 309C(5)(c)(ii)) of kan die aangeleentheid na
die appèlhof
verwys vir oorweging en die appèlhof kan
daarop die aansoek toestaan of weier (art 309C(5)(d)).
[6] Op 29 November 2000 en wel in
S
v Steyn
2001 (1) SA 1146
(CC) het die Konstitusionele Hof art
309B en C asook die woorde ‘behoudens artikel 309B’ in art
309(1)(a) ongeldig verklaar maar
terselfdertyd die ongeldigverklaring
opgeskort vir `n tydperk van ses maande vanaf die datum van die
bevel. Tot op `n tydstip ses
maande na 29 November 2000 het die
bepalings van art 309(1)(a) en die bepalings van art 309B en 309C,
soos hierbo aangehaal, dus
gegeld. Ingevolge daardie artikels het die
appellant, asook sy drie makkers, `n reg van appèl na die
provinsiale afdeling
gehad maar slegs met die nodige verlof.
[7] Die streekhof wat Hudson en Meiring gevonnis het,
het wel aan hulle verlof toegestaan om teen hulle vonnisse na die
Oranje Vrystaatse
Provinsiale Afdeling te appelleer. Op appèl,
en wel op 28 Augustus 2000, is die 15 jaar vonnis ten opsigte van die
diefstalklag
in beide se geval na 6 jaar gevangenisstraf verminder.
[8] Na Hudson en Meiring se suksesvolle appèl het
die appellant by wyse van `n aansoek gerig aan die Hoofregter by
hierdie
hof aansoek gedoen vir verlof om teen sy vonnisse na die
Oranje Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling te appelleer. In `n beëdigde
verklaring ter ondersteuning van sy aansoek het die appellant, nadat
hy te kenne gegee het dat hy nie meer teen sy skuldigbevinding
wou
appelleer nie, gesê:
‘
19
In die lig van die redes hierbo verskaf voer ek
respekvol aan dat ek `n redelike vooruitsig op appèl teen my
vonnisse het en
dat daar fouteer is om nie verlof om te appelleer aan
my toe te staan nie.
20
Vervolgens versoek ek respekvol dat Sy Edele die
Hoofregter verlof aan my sal verleen om teen my vonnisse te appelleer
na die Oranje-Vrystaatse
Provinsiale Afdeling van die Hooggeregshof
van Suid-Afrika; In hierdie verband wens ek u respekvol te verwys na:
S v N 1991 (2) SASV
10 (AA) veral op bl.16; Du Toit et al: Commentary
on the Criminal Procedure Act op bl. 30-36 tot bl. 30-36A en bl.
31-15 tot bl.
31-16.’
In
S v N supra
het Smalberger
JA op 16c gesê:
‘Daar bestaan geen voorsiening vir
'n regstreekse appèl na hierdie Hof
teen 'n skuldigbevinding deur 'n
landdros nie (
S v Sweigers
1969 (1) PH H10 (A);
S v Tsedi
1984 (1) SA 565
(A) op 570B).’
[9] Die aansoek het voor twee regters van hierdie hof
gedien en die volgende bevel is deur hulle gemaak:
‘1 Condonation granted.
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is
granted, subject to the condition that the question whether this
court has jurisdiction
to hear the appeal be argued
in limine
.’
[10] Die appellant het daarop na
hierdie hof geappelleer.
`n Kennisgewing van mosie, wat
skynbaar bedoel is as `n kennisgewing van appèl, is afgelewer.
In hierdie kennisgewing van mosie
word verwys na die bevel van
hierdie hof en dan word gesê: ‘Derhalwe word die
aansoek
om appèl
na die bovermelde Agbare Hof verwys vir
beregting.’
(Klem bygevoeg.)
[11] Artikels 20(1), 20(4) en 21(1) van die Wet op die
Hooggeregshof 59 van 1959 bepaal soos volg:
‘
20(1) `n Appèl teen `n uitspraak of bevel van
die hof van `n provinsiale of plaaslike afdeling in `n siviele geding
of teen
enige uitspraak of bevel van so`n hof op appèl gegee,
word deur die appèlafdeling of `n volle hof, na gelang van die
geval, verhoor.
‘
(4) Daar is geen appèl teen `n uitspraak of
bevel van die hof van `n provinsiale of plaaslike afdeling in `n
siviele geding
of teen enige uitspraak of bevel van daardie hof op
appèl na hom gegee nie behalwe-
(a) in die geval van `n uitspraak of bevel in `n siviele
geding deur die volle hof van so`n afdeling gegee op appèl na
hom
ingevolge subartikel (3), met die spesiale verlof van die
appèlafdeling;
in enige ander geval, met verlof van die hof teen die
uitspraak of bevel waarvan die appèl aangeteken staan te word
of, waar
sodanige verlof geweier is, met verlof van die
appèlafdeling.’
‘
21(1) Benewens enige regsbevoegdheid deur hierdie Wet
of ander wetsbepalings aan hom verleen, is die appèlafdeling
regsbevoeg,
behoudens die bepalings van hierdie artikel en enige
ander wetsbepaling, om `n appèl teen enige beslissing van die
hof van
`n provinsiale of plaaslike afdeling te verhoor en te
beslis.’
[12] Artikel 21(1) is van toepassing
op beide siviele en strafsake (
S v Botha
2002 (1) SASV 222
(HHA) op 225h). Dit vestig in hierdie hof `n jurisdiksie wat dit nie
ingevolge art 20 het nie (
Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American
Express Travel Service
1996 (3) SA 1
(A) op 8 B-C).
Artikel
20 het betrekking op uitsprake of bevele van `n provinsiale of
plaaslike afdeling in `n siviele geding of op appèl
gegee.
Artikel 21 het dus betrekking op enige ander beslissing van die hof
van `n provinsiale of plaaslike afdeling. Die bevel van
die streekhof
ingevolge waarvan die appellant skuldig bevind is, asook die bevel
ingevolge waarvan hy gevonnis is, val nie in een
van daardie
kategorieë nie.
Geen jurisidiksie word aan
hierdie hof verleen om `n appèl aan te hoor teen `n
skuldigbevinding en vonnis in `n laer hof nie.
Dit is eers nadat `n
appèl vanaf `n laer hof na `n provinsiale of `n plaaslike
afdeling misluk het dat `n beskuldigde met
die nodige verlof na
hierdie hof appèl kan aanteken (sien
S v N supra)
.
[13] Dit beteken egter nie dat die appellant nie kan
appelleer teen die bevel ingevolge waarvan verlof aan hom geweier is
om teen
sy vonnisse te appelleer nie. Indien sodanige weiering
kwalifiseer as `n uitspraak of bevel van die hof van `n provinsiale
afdeling
op appèl gegee, sou die appellant met die nodige
verlof ingevolge art 20 kon appelleer na hierdie hof, behalwe indien
art
309, 309B en 309C uitgelê moet word om die bevoegdheid van
hierdie hof om so’n appèl aan te hoor, te beperk. Indien
nie, sou die appellant ingevolge art 21 na hierdie hof kon appelleer,
sonder om enige verlof daartoe te verkry, indien: (1) die
weiering
kwalifiseer as ‘ `n beslissing van die hof van `n provinsiale
afdeling’; (2) geen ander wetsbepaling die bevoegdheid
van hierdie
hof om `n appèl teen die betrokke beslissing aan te hoor,
beperk nie.
[14] Daar kan na my mening geen
twyfel bestaan dat die weiering, deur twee regters van die Oranje
Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling,
van verlof om te appelleer `n
‘uitspraak of bevel’ of ‘`n beslissing’ van die hof van `n
provinsiale afdeling soos bedoel
in art 20(1) of art 21(1) was nie en
geen een van die partye het betoog dat dit nie die geval was nie
(sien in hierdie verband
Zweni v Minister of Law and Order
1993
(1) SA 523
(A) op 532C-F; en
Van der Walt v Metcash Trading Ltd
2002 (4) 317 (CC) op 321B para [1] en 335H-J para [48]). In
Zweni
supra
is aan die hand gedoen dat die onderskeid tussen
‘uitspraak’ en ‘bevel’ formalisties en verouderd is. Ek sal
gevolglik in
die vervolg na die weiering van verlof om te appelleer
verwys as `n bevel. Die vraag is dan of dit `n bevel op appèl
na die
Oranje Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling was.
[15] In
Sita and Another v Olivier
NO and Another
1967 (2) SA 442
(A) het die appellante in die
streekhof geweier om te pleit op die aanklag teen hulle en het hulle
geëis dat hulle saak in die
hooggeregshof aangehoor word. Hulle
eis is deur die streekhof van die hand gewys. Hulle het daarna by die
Transvaalse Provinsiale
Afdeling aansoek gedoen vir `n bevel
ingevolge waarvan verklaar word dat hulle ingevolge art 190 van Wet
56 van 1955 geregtig was
om te eis dat hulle saak in die Transvaalse
Provinsiale Afdeling aangehoor word en ingevolge waarvan die eerste
respondent (die streeklanddros)
verbied word om van hulle te verlang
om op die aanklag teen hulle te pleit. Die Transvaalse Provinsiale
Afdeling het die aansoek
van die hand gewys. Op appèl na
hierdie hof is betoog dat die appellante nie kon appelleer sonder
verlof van die Transvaalse
Provinsiale Afdeling of, indien dit
geweier word, van hierdie hof nie. Die appellante daarenteen het
betoog dat die beslissing van
die Transvaalse Provinsiale Afdeling
nie `n beslissing was wat gegee is op appèl na daardie
afdeling nie en dat geen verlof
om te appelleer nodig was nie.
Artikel 21(2)(a) het op daardie stadium bepaal:
‘
21(2)(a) Daar is geen appèl na die
appèlafdeling . . . teen `n beslissing wat deur enige afdeling
op appèl na
hom gegee is nie, behalwe met verlof van die hof
teen die beslissing waarvan die appèl aangeteken staan te
word: Met dien
verstande dat waar sodanige verlof geweier is, die
appèlafdeling op aansoek aan hom gerig sodanige verlof kan
verleen . .
.’
[16] Hierdie hof het, by monde van Botha AR, op 448F-H
beslis:
‘
There can be no doubt that the appellants by their
petition to the Court
a quo
sought a correction of what they
considered was a wrong decision by the regional magistrate on the
question of law raised, namely,
whether they were entitled to demand,
in terms of sec. 190 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, that their
case be tried before a Superior
Court having jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the procedure adopted by the appellants, it was,
therefore, in effect, nothing but an
appeal against the magistrate's
decision on a question of law. (Cf.
Lawrance v A.R.M. of
Johannesburg
,
1908 T.S. 525
at p. 526). That being so, and having
regard to the object of the relevant provisions of sec. 21 (2) (a) of
the Supreme Court Act,
namely,
“
to limit the matter of higher resort to this Court
from a Superior Court in cases coming before the latter and which
have originated
in the magistrates' courts”,
it seems clear that the decision given by the Court
a
quo
on the appellants' petition, in regard to a matter which
originated in the regional court, was a decision given “on appeal
to it”
within the meaning of the expression in sec. 21 (2) (a), and
that the provisions of that section therefore apply in relation to a
further appeal to this Court.’
[17] In
S v Mohamed
1977 (2) SA 531
(A) op 541E het Trollip AR met
verwysing na
Sita
gesê:
‘
"Appeal" in the above-quoted phrase
1
is used, not in its strict, narrow, technical meaning, but in its
wider sense as comprehending any approach made to a Provincial
or
Local Division for relief from a decision of an inferior court (see
Sita's
case,
supra
, 1967 (2) SA at pp.
E
447H - 448H).'
[18] Soos duidelik blyk uit die
huidige bewoording van art 20(4), hierbo aangehaal, is die bepalings
van die herroepe art 21(2)(a)
grotendeels oorgeneem in art 20(4).
Daar bestaan geen rede om die woorde ‘op appèl na hom’ in
artikel 20(4) anders uit
te lê as wat hulle in die ou art
21(2)(a) uitgelê is nie (sien
Buchanan v Marais NO and
Others
[1991] ZASCA 19
;
1991 (2) SA 679
(A) op 684B-C).
[19] Die aansoek om verlof om te
appelleer teen `n skuldigbevinding of vonnis in `n laer hof gerig aan
die Regter-president van `n
provinsiale afdeling nadat sodanige
verlof deur die laer hof geweier is, word nie in art 309C beskryf as
`n appèl nie maar
is nogtans
daarop gerig om `n
regstelling te verkry van wat die aansoekdoener beskou as `n
verkeerde beslissing in die laer hof. In effek is
dit
niks
anders as `n appèl teen die landdros se weiering van verlof om
te appelleer nie. Ek is gevolglik van mening dat die bevel
van die
hof benede ingevolge waarvan verlof om te appelleer aan die appellant
geweier is, `n bevel van daardie hof is wat op appèl
na hom
gegee is, soos bedoel in art 20(4).
[20] Die oorblywende vraag is dan of
artikels 309, 309B en 309C uitgelê moet word om die bevoegdheid
van hierdie hof om `n appèl
teen `n provinsiale afdeling se
weiering van verlof om te appelleer, aan te hoor, te beperk. Die
artikels bevat geen uitdruklike
bepaling tot daardie effek nie. So`n
bepaling kan ook nie uit hoofde van die feit dat geen melding van `n
verdere appèl in
die artikels gemaak word, by implikasie in
die artikels gelees word nie. By die uitleg van `n statuut bestaan
daar `n vermoede dat
die wetgewer nie die bestaande regsposisie wou
wysig tensy dit duidelik blyk die geval te wees nie (sien
Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees
1909 TS 811
op
818 en
Kent NO v South African Railways and Another
1946
AD 398
op 405). Voor die wysiging teweeggebring deur Wet 76 van 1997
het `n beskuldigde, wat in `n laer hof skuldig bevind is, die reg
gehad
om sonder verlof na die hof van `n provinsiale afdeling of
plaaslike afdeling wat regsbevoegdheid het te appelleer en om met die
verlof van die provinsiale afdeling of van hierdie hof na hierdie hof
te appelleer. Die wysigings teweeggebring deur Wet 76 van 1997
het
die reg om na `n provinsiale afdeling of `n plaaslike afdeling te
appelleer beperk deur te vereis dat verlof soos voormeld vir
sodanige
appèl nodig is. Daar bestaan na my mening geen basis om in
daardie beperking ook`n beperking van die regte verleen
ingevolge art
20 in te lees nie.
[21] Die advokaat vir die respondent
het gesteun op `n beslissing van hierdie hof in
Ngwadi Mzamo v Die
Staat
(saak nr. 099/2000). Dit was `n aansoek om verlof om te
appelleer teen die weiering van verlof deur die Hoë Hof van
Bisho om
teen `n skuldigbevinding en vonnis in die landdroshof te
appelleer. Twee regters van hierdie hof het die volgende bevel
gemaak:
‘
This Court is not empowered to entertain the
application for leave to appeal. The application is accordingly
struck off the roll.’
Synde `n aansoek om verlof om te appelleer is geen
mondelinge argument aangehoor alvorens die bevel gemaak is nie en is
geen redes
vir die bevinding verstrek nie.
Vir die
redes hierbo genoem is ek van mening dat die beslissing verkeerd is.
[22] Ek is gevolglik van mening dat die appellant
ingevolge art 20 met die nodige verlof na hierdie hof kan appelleer
teen die hof
benede se bevel ingevolge waarvan verlof om teen sy
vonnisse te appelleer geweier is.
[23] Die advokaat vir die appellant sowel as vir die
respondent het die bevel ingevolge waarvan verlof om te appelleer
toegestaan
is, uitgelê as synde `n bevel wat verlof aan die
appellant verleen om teen sy vonnisse na hierdie hof te appelleer
onderhewig
daaraan dat hierdie hof regsbevoegdheid het om so `n appèl
aan te hoor. Ek het reeds bevind dat hierdie hof nie sodanige
regsbevoegdheid
het nie.
[24] Ek meen egter nie dat dit `n
korrekte uitleg van die bevel is nie. In die aansoek om verlof om te
appelleer gerig aan hierdie
hof het die appellant aangevoer dat die
hof benede fouteer het om nie aan hom verlof om teen sy vonnisse te
appelleer toe te staan
nie en gevra dat verlof aan hom verleen word
om na die Oranje-Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling te appelleer. In sy
aansoek het hy
verwys na
S v N supra
waarin dit duidelik
gestel is dat hierdie hof nie `n appèl regstreeks vanaf `n
landdroshof kan aanhoor nie. Onder die omstandighede
kon die
bedoeling nie gewees het om verlof aan die appellant te verleen om
teen sy vonnisse na hierdie hof te appelleer nie.
[25] Ek meen dat verlof aan die
appellant verleen is om teen die hof benede se bevel te appelleer.
Die appellant het skynbaar self
die bevel ingevolge waarvan verlof
verleen is, so verstaan. Dit blyk uit die feit dat die appellant se
‘kennisgewing van appèl’
‘die aansoek om appèl’
na hierdie hof ‘verwys vir beregting’. Of hierdie hof wel
jurisdiksie het om so `n appèl
aan te hoor is `n vraag wat
deur die Konstitusionele Hof in
S v Steyn
op 39 para 26
oopgelaat is. Dit is waarskynlik omrede daar onsekerheid in hierdie
verband was dat die bevel onderhewig gemaak is aan
die voorbehoud dat
die vraag of hierdie hof jurisdiksie het om die appèl aan te
hoor
in limine
geargumenteer moet word.
[26] Ek het reeds bevind dat hierdie
hof ingevolge art 20 wel regsbevoegdheid het om `n appèl teen
die hof benede se bevel
aan te hoor onderhewig daaraan dat die nodige
verlof verkry word. Die verlof wat benodig word, is die verlof van
die hof benede,
of waar sodanige verlof geweier word, die verlof van
hierdie hof. Die appellant het egter nie voordat hy by hierdie hof
aansoek gedoen
het om verlof om te appelleer by die hof benede
aansoek gedoen om sodanige verlof nie. Verlof om te appelleer is dus
nie deur die
hof benede geweier voor die appellant se aansoek om
verlof by hierdie hof nie. Onder die omstandighede het hierdie hof
geen jurisdiksie
gehad om verlof aan die appellant toe te staan om
teen die hof benede se bevel te appelleer nie en is die bevel
ingevolge waarvan
sodanige verlof aan die appellant toegestaan is,
nietig (
Voet
49.8.3;
Lewis & Marks v Middel
1904 TS
291
op 303;
Suid-Afrikaanse Sentrale Ko-operatiewe Graanmaatskappy
Bpk v Shifren and Others and Taxing Master
1964(1) SA 162(O) op
164D-G). Die appellant het dus nie verlof verkry om teen die hof
benede se bevel te appelleer nie. Dit volg dat
hierdie hof nie
regsbevoegdheid het om die appèl teen die hof benede se bevel
aan te hoor nie en dat die appèl van
die rol geskrap moet
word.
[27] Die appèl word van die rol geskrap.
_____________
P E Streicher
Appèlregter
Farlam, AR)
Mpati, AR) stem
saam
1
Die verwysing is na die frase ‘any decision given by any division
on appeal to it’ in art 21(2)(a) hierbo aangehaal.

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