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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case no: CT02671ADJ2026
In the matter between:
BRYTE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED Applicant
And
BRYTE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (PTY) LIMITED 1
st Respondent
(Registration No 2025/955312/07)
And
COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COMMISSION 2nd Respondent
Presiding Member of the Companies Tribunal: HLALELENI KATHLEEN DLEPU
Date of Decision: 23 May 2026
DECISION and REASONS
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Applicant brought this application brought in terms of Section 160 of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008 for an order that the First Respondent’s company
name, Byte Busine ss Enterprise (Pty) Limited does not satisfy the
requirements of Section 11(2) (a)(iii),11(2)(b) and 11(2)(c)(i)of the Companies
Act and that the First Respondent be directed to choose a new name, which
does not consist of or incorporate, the mark BRYTE or any other mark which
is confusingly and /or deceptively similar to the Applicant ‘s BRYTE trademark
as provided for in Section 160,and sub-section (3)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act.
1.2. In the event that the First Respondent fails to comply with the order set out in
paragraph 1.1. above within 2 months from the date of the order that the
Second Respondent be directed in terms of Section 160(3) ( b) (ii) read with
Section 14(2) of the Companies Act to change the First Respondent ‘s name
to “2025/955312/07 (Pty) Limited ” as the First Respondent ’s interim
company name on the Companies Register.
1.3. An order as to costs in favour of the Applicant in terms of Regulation 156 of
the Act
2. THE PARTIES
2.1. The Applicant is Bryte Insurance Company Limited, a company duly
incorporated and registered in terms of the laws of the Republic of South
Africa with the registration number 19365/006764/ 06 with its registered
address at 15 Biermann Avenue, Rosebank Towers, Rosebank ,2196,
Gauteng. South Africa. The Applicant is the proprietor of statutory and
common law rights in the well-known BRYTE trademark in South Africa.
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2.2. The First Respondent is Bryte Business Enterprise (Pty) Limited a company
duly incorporated in accordance with the company laws of the Republic of
South Africa with registration number 2025/955312/07 with its registered
address at Stand No, 1306, Swalala Trust, Mpumalanga 1240
2.3. The Second Respondent is the Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission (CIPC) established by Section 189 of the Companies Act with its
address at DTI Building, Block F, Meintjies Street, Sunnyside, Pretoria.
3. THE APPLICATION
3.1. The Applicant has an interest in the name of the First Respondent within the
meaning of Section 160(1) of the Act to file this Application to the Companies
Act. The Applicant’s interest will appear from the facts were initiated and
documented by the Applicant in its affidavit in particular the Applicants
trademark rights in and to the BRYTE trademark.
3.2. On the 26 March 2026 The Applicant filed an Application herein referred to as
the Main Application in terms of Form CTR 142 were served on the F irst
Respondent electronically by email, being m[…] @gmail.com as prescribed in
terms of Rule 4A of the Uniform Rules of Court read with Annexure3 of Table
CR3 of the Companies Act Regulations,2011.The copy of the email was
attached to the Applicants Affidavit as an annexure.
3.3. The Applicant instructed the Deputy Sheriff of the High Court to serve a copy
of the Application at the registered address of the First Respondent . The
Sheriff attempted to serve on the 1
st April 2026 a copy of the return of non-
service which return of non- service was attached to the Applicants affidavit,
despite the Sheriff ’s efforts to serve on the First Respondent the detailed
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return of non -service by the Deputy Sheriff states that the stand number
could not be located, and other efforts by the Deputy Sheriff making enquiries
from residents and local businesses around the area could not yield any
results.
3.4. Accordingly there was no other physical address available listed on the CIPC
documents where the Fi rst Respondent could be served. The documents
were also served on the Second Respondent by email also on the 26 th of
March 2026.
3.5. The Applicant therefor submits that the application for relief was properly
served on the First and Second Respondent s in terms of Regulation 143 of
the Companies Act and the First Respondent had until the 28th April to file and
serve its answer to the main Application.
3.6. It is evident from the sequence of events and numerous attempts made by
the Applicant to serve the Application on the First Respondent there was no
other available means to serve the Application on the F irst Respondent. The
Applicant submits that he has met all the requirements for service under the
Companies Act and the Uniform Rules of the High Court .
3.7. Having considered the Applicants’ submissions on attempts to make the First
Respondent aware of the application, I am satisfied that the applicant has
made out a case for the main application to be considered by default against
the First Respondent.
4. THE BACKROUND OF THE APPLICANTS CASE
4.1. In support of this Application the Applicant attached supporting affidavits in
the names of Nicholas Francis and confirmatory Affidavits of Gérard Muller du
Plessis, Esmé Van Rooyen, and Maya Daniella Drummond out the facts upon
which the Applicant relies on both duly authorised by resolutions. Attachments
to the Applicants Af fidavit included amongst others Disclosure Certificate
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issued by the Commissioner of the CIPC in respect Bryte Insurance Company
Limited and all the required authority to launch the Application.
4.2. The Applicant had submitted in its main application that it has an interes t in
the name of the First Respondent within the meaning of Section 160(1)of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008 in the following respects;
4.3. The Applicant is the proprietor in South Africa of, inter alia, the following
trademarks which were registered as contemplated in Section 35 of the Trade
Marks Act, 1993(Act 194 o 1993, includin g the registration in terms of the
Business Names Act, 1960 (Act 27 0f 1960) and Merchandise Marks Act 17
of 1941 all these acts protect all the names which have been registered under
the Acts that no other entity should register a similar name, trademark in a
manner that is confusingly similar to a name trademark belonging to another
company which has registered and filed such name, trademark.
4.4. The dominant and memorable portions of the First Respondent BRYTE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (PTY) LIMITED is “BRYTE” which is phonetically
and conceptually identical to the Applicant’s well known BRYTE trademark.
The remaining elements of the First Respondents name “BUSINESSS
ENTERPRISE” is purely descriptive and do not serve adequately to
distinguish the company name from the Applicants well- known “BRYTE”
trademark.
4.5. As a result of the extensive use and promotion of the Applicant’s BRYTE
trademark it is very likely that the members of the public will assume that the
First Respondent is in some manner, associated with the name or
trademark, or endorsed by the Applicant, when this is not the case.
4.6. The incorporation of the “BRYTE” trademark in the Fi rst Respondent’s name
is not sanctioned or authorised by Applicant.
4.7. The Applicant‘s registered rights in its BRYTE trademark date back to 2016
and the BRYTE trademark has been used by the Applicant for several years
and the BRYTE trademark has been used by the Applicant for several years
in South Africa and other counties throughout the world, the Applicant has
included in its affidavit details of the registered trademarks 14 (fourteen), their
registration numbers, class and what commodity, services each trademark
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covers copies of the trademark information sheets extracted from the Register
of Trademarks is also attached in detail annexures to the Applicants Affidavit.
4.8. The Applicant and its business are constantly profiled and reported on in both
local and international publications, the press, and the internet as “BRYTE”.
4.9. The Applicant has an interest in the First Respondents name within the
meaning of Act as the name incorporates the Applicants mark “BRYTE”. In
terms of Section 29(b) of the Trademark Act 194 of 1993 (hereinafter referred
to as “the Trademarks Act”), the Applicant ‘s trademark rights are enforceable
with effect from the date of filing of its trademark application. In terms of
Section 29 of the Trademark Act, that date shall be deemed to be the date of
registration.
4.10. In support of their request for an order the Applicants referred the Tribunal to
the principles as lai d down in the matter before the Tribunal Case, No
CT00875/ADJ/2021) Comair Limited v Kulula Holdings (Pty Limited which
dealt in details that by including the name “HOLDINGS ” included in the First
Respondent name ,does not sufficiently distinguish the First Respondent
name as it is purely descriptive and not serving to adequately distinguish the
First Respondents name form Comair’s trademark which is the same as
“BUSINESS ENTERPRISES “ in this matter ,it does not distinguish
adequately from the Applicants’ name which can easily be associated with the
Applicants name.
5. APPLICABLE LAW
5.1. Section 160(1) of the companies act provides that:
“any other person with an interest in the name of a company, may apply to
the Companies Tribunal in the prescribed manner and form for a
determination whether the name, or the reservation, registration or use of
the name, or the transfer of any such reservation or registration of a name,
satisfies the requirements of this Act”.
5.2. Section 160(2)(b) of the Companies Act provides that:
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“An application in terms of Subsection (1) may be made…on good cause
shown at any time after the date of the reservation or registration of the
name that is the subject of the application, in any other case”.
5.3. Sections 11(2)(a)(iii), 11(2)(b)(iii); and 11(2)(c)(i) of the Companies Act, in as
far as they are applicable, read as follows;
“(2) The name of a company must
(a) not be the same as –
(i) …
(ii) …
(iii) a registered trade mark belonging to a person other than the
company or a mark in respect of which an application has been
filed in the Republic for registration as a trade mark or a well -known
trade mark as contemplated in section 35 of the Trade Marks Act,
1993 (Act No. 194 of 1993), unless the registered owner of that
mark has consented in writing to the use of the mark as the name
of the company.
(b) not be confusingly similar to a name, trademark, mark, word, or
expression contemplated in paragraph (a) unless-
(i) …
(ii) …
(iii) in the case of a name similar to a trademark or mark referred to in
paragraph (a)(iii), the company is the registered owner of the
business name, trademark, or is authorised by the registered owner
or to use it; or …
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(c) not falsely imply or suggest, or be such as would reasonably
mislead a person to believe incorrectly, that the company – (i) is part of, or
associated with, any other person or entity…”
5.4. the question is whether the First Respondent’s name and the Applicant’ s
trademark are confusingly similar as envisaged in Section 11(2)(b) (iii) read
with Section 11 (2)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act.
5.5. The Applicant conducts and operates a vast variety of mining, other services
including consultancy and scientific and technical services, surveys an
exploration its registered trademarks and name are of exc lusive use by the
Applicants and also protected under the common law , and although the
nature of the Fir st Respondent’s Company is not known or clear , the use of
the Applicant’s name by the First Respondent is confusingly similar to the
Applicant’s name and trademarks. This elevates the risk of confusion between
the Applicant’s trademark and the First Respondent’s name, products, and
services in the marketplace.
5.6. I further agree the confusion and/or deception, can lead to injury to the
Applicant’s business. This is particularly so when it is considered that the
Applicant has absolutely no control whatsoever on the quality and type of
goods sold and services rendered by the Company.
5.7. The visual, phonetic, and conceptual similarities between the First
Respondent’s name and the Applicant’s trademark may mislead or confuse
others into believing that there is some authorised connection and/or
association in the course of trade between the products and/or services
offered by the First Respondent with those of the Applicant, when, from the
evidence before me, that it not the case.
5.8. In Plascon-Evans Paints (TVL) Ltd. V Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd.
(Plascon-Evans, CORBETT JA quoted MARGO J, delivering the judgment
in International Power Marketing (Pty) Ltd v Searles Industrials (Pty) Ltd.
1983(4) SA 163 (T), as follows on the meaning of the words “as to be likely to
1983(4) SA 163 (T), as follows on the meaning of the words “as to be likely to
deceive or cause confusion”.
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“the main legal principles relevant to the decision of the instant case may
be briefly summarised as follows:-
In an infringement action the onus is on the plaintiff to show the probability
or likelihood of deception or confusion.... it is enough for the plaintiff to
show that a substantial number of persons will probably be confused as to
the origin of the goods or the existence or non- existence of such a
connection … the comparison must be made with reference to the
sense, sound and appearance of the marks. The marks must be
viewed as they would be encountered in the marketplace and against the
background of relevant surrounding circumstances. The marks must not
only be considered side by side, but also separately. It must be
borne in mind that the ordinary purchaser may encounter goods,
bearing the defendant’s mark, with an imperfect recollection of the
registered mark and due allowance must be made for this. If each of
the marks contains a main or dominant feature or idea the likely impact
made by this on the mind of the customer must be taken into account. As
it has been put, marks are remembered rather by general impressions or
by some significant or striking feature than by a photographic recollection
of the whole. And finally, consideration must be given to the manner in
which the marks are likely to be employed as for example, the use of
name marks in conjunction with a generic description of the goods”.
5.9. CORBETT JA : stated further at paragraph 47 in Plascon Evans “…in my
view, a purely verbal comparison is not enough. As I have said, in cases such
as this the Court must transport itself to the marketplace and try to visualize
how customers of the goods, in relation to which the marks are used, would
react “.
6. FINDINGS
6.1. I find that the Applicant has shown good cause to bring this application under
section 160 of the Companies Act.
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6.2. I further find that the First Respondent’s name is so confusingly similar to the
Applicant’s trademark that is falsely implies or suggests that, or reasonably
mislead a person to believe incorrectly, that the Company is part of, or
associated with, the Applicant in contravention of section 11(2)( c) of the
Companies Act.
6.3. Considering the conspectus of the case cited above and the guidance from
the above case, I conclude that the First Respondent’s name runs foul of the
provisions of sections 11(2)(b)(iii) read with section 11(2)(a)(iii) and Section
11(2)(c) (i) of the Companies Act.
7. ORDER
I hereby grant the following relief by default judgement:
7.1. The First Respondent is ordered to change its name to one which does not
consist of, or incorporate, the mark “BRYTE” ( and that Business
Enterprises is purely descriptive) or any other mark which is confusingly
and/or deceptively similar to the Applicant’s “BRYTE” trademark.
7.2. The Second Respondent is directed to change the name of the First
Respondent to its registration number, in the event of the First Respondent
not complying with point 18.1 above within 30 days(1 month) from the date of
this order the second respondent to change the first respondents name to its
registration number being “2025/ 955312/07” as the First Respondents new
company name on the companies register that; and
7.3. The Second Respondent notify the First Respondent within 14 days of this
order.
7.4. No order as to costs.
H K Dlepu Member or the Tribunal