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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
In the matter between:
ANDRIES MARTHINUS
JANSE VAN RENSBURG
JANINE JANSE VAN RENSBURG
And
Not reportable
Case Number: 2026-045637
FIRST APPLICANT
SECOND APPLICANT
AGANG AFRICA HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD FIRST RESPONDENT
MOORS EMPIRE (PTY) LTD SECOND RESPONDENT
Coram: Reddy J
Heard: 8 May 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically, circulated to the
parties' representatives via email, uploaded to CaseLines, and released to
SAFLII. The date and time for the handing down of the judgment are deemed
to be 18 May 2026 at 16h00.
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Summary
Urgent Applications - Rule 6(12) - two distinct and conjunctive
requirements: circumstances rendering matter urgent and reasons why
substantial redress unavailable in ordinary course - applicant must account
for every material period of delay from moment cause of urgency arose -
right to eject crystallised 31 May 2025 - founding affidavit silent on three
discrete periods of delay totalling some nine months - urgency self-created
where applicant voluntarily concludes new sale agreement with 120-day
suspensive condition with full knowledge of prevailing unlawful occupation
- self-imposed deadline cannot found urgency - application fails on
urgency and is struck from roll with costs.
JUDGMENT
REDDYJ
Introduction
[1] Before this court is a semi-urgent application brought by applicants
Andries Marthinus Janse van Rensburg and Janine Janse van Rensburg (the
Van Rensburgs), the registered owners of Portion 138 of the Farm
Buffelsfontein 46, Registration Division JQ, North West Province ("the
property"), for the ejectment of the respondents, Agang Africa Holdings (Pty)
Ltd (Agang) and Moors Empire (Pty) Ltd (Moors Empire), from the property,
together with ancillary relief relating to certain movable assets.
[2] Agang and Moors Empire oppose the relief. Two distinct issues fall for
determination. First, whether the matter is sufficiently urgent to be heard on
the urgent roll under Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court and second, if
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urgency is established, whether the Van Rensburgs have made out a proper
case for ejectment on the papers.
Background facts
[3] The Van Rensburgs are the registered owners of the property. On 24
July 2023, they entered into a written deed of sale with Agang ('the
agreement'). The purchase pnce was R3,800,000.00, compnsmg
R3,480,000.00 for the immovable property and R320,000.00 for identified
movables. A deposit ofR300, 000.00 was payable immediately. Subsequently,
monthly instalments ofR35,000.00 were to be paid commencing 1 December
2023. The full purchase price was to be settled by 30 November 2024.
[4] On 1 September 2023, occupation was granted to Agang. The
agreement provided that the property would be used as a chrome washing
plant. The salient terms of the agreement were as follows. Clause 13 .3
provided that a breach by Agang entitled the Van Rens burgs to cancel upon
ten days' written notice. Clause 13.4.4 provided that, upon cancellation, Agang
was to vacate by a date fixed in the Van Rens burgs' notice. Clause 15 .1
provided that no indulgence would constitute a waiver of any right. Clause
15 .2 provided that no variation would be valid unless reduced to writing and
signed by both parties.
[5] Agang paid the deposit and made monthly instalments for a time. By 30
November 2024, the balance of the purchase price remained unpaid. Around
October 2024 Agang requested that Moors Empire be substituted as purchaser
in its stead. The Van Rensburgs agreed in principle to consider the
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substitution. Draft documents, including a new deed of sale and a tripartite
agreement reflecting Moors Empire as purchaser, were prepared and sent to
Agang and Moors Empire. Notably, Moors Empire did not sign any of those
documents.
[ 6] On 18 March 2025, the Van Rens burgs' attorneys served a breach notice
on Agang, requiring payment of the outstanding balance within ten days.
Agang failed to comply. On 19 May 2025, the Van Rensburgs issued a notice
of cancellation, requiring the property to be vacated by 31 May 2025. The
following day, 20 May 2025, the attorney for Agang and Moors Empire
replied in writing, acknowledging that the Van Rensburgs had elected to
cancel the sale agreement and invoke clause 13.4.1 and 13.4.4 of the sale
agreement'.
[7] Notwithstanding the cancellation, Agang and Moors Empire remained
in occupation. Following the latter, the parties engaged in an attempt, on a
without-prejudice basis, to conclude a new agreement. Fresh draft sale
agreements were circulated in November 2025, with a payment date of 31
December 2025. Agang and Moors Empire did not sign them. The December
2025 deadline passed without payment.
[8] On 10 February 2026, the Van Rensburgs entered into a deed of sale
with Bila Mining (Pty) Ltd ('Bila') for a purchase price ofR2,900,000.00. The
agreement is subject to a suspensive condition that Agang and Moors Empire
vacate the property and deliver vacant possession to Bila within 120 days of
the date of signature, being 10 June 2026. On 3 February 2026, the Van
Rensburgs had already served a further notice on Agang and Moors Empire to
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vacate by 6 February 2026. They did not comply. The Van Rensburgs
launched this application on 26 February 2026.
The Van Rensburgs submissions on urgency
[9] Mr Keeny, contended that the matter is urgent for two primary reasons.
First, the Bila Agreement will lapse if the suspensive condition is not fulfilled
by 10 June 2026, resulting in the loss of a sale in the amount ofR2,900,000.00.
Mr Keeny claimed that the urgency triggered by the imminent loss of a sale to
a new purchaser, caused by an unlawful occupier, is well-established in our
law.
[ 1 0] Second, Mr Keeny opines that Agang and Moors Empire's ongoing
mining operations at the property are causing progressive and irreversible
environmental damage to agricultural land for which the Van Rensburgs , as
owners, bear statutory liability. Towards this end Mr Keeny postulates that the
urgency was not self-created. Simply put, Mr Keeny asserts that the Van
Rensburgs engaged in protracted good-faith negotiations to avoid litigation,
and this application was launched within two weeks of the conclusion of the
Bila Agreement.
The submissions of Agang and Moor Empire on urgency
[11] Advocate Mavimbela contended that the application should be struck
from the roll for lack of urgency. According to Advocate Mavimbela, the
agreement was cancelled on 19 May 2025. He continued that if the matter
was truly urgent, proceedings ought to have been instituted immediately
thereafter. Advocate Mavimbela maintains that the Van Rensburgs engaged
in negotiations for approximate ly eight months and thereafter concluded the
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Bila Agreement on IO February 2026 with full knowledge that Agang and
Moors Empire remained in occupation.
[12] Advocate Mavimbela suggested that the urgency now relied upon is
self-created. Otherwise stated, Advocate Mavimbela contended that a party
cannot manufacture urgency by concluding a further commercial agreement
with a third party while leaving an existing occupation dispute unresolved.
Simply put, Advocate Mavimbela postulated that the Van Rens burgs,
moreover, have adequate redress in the ordinary course by way of a properly
enrolled ejectment application.
The law
[13] Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court imposes two distinct but
conjunctive obligations on an applicant seeking to invoke the urgent roll. First,
the applicant must explicitly set out the circumstances that render the matter
urgent. Second, separately, the applicant must explain why substantial redress
cannot be obtained at a hearing in due course. 1
[14] In East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite
(Pty) Ltd and Others2, where the following was vocalized:
' (5] The issue of whether a matter should be enrolled and heard as an urgent application is
governed by the provisions of 6(12) of the Uniform Rules. The aforesaid sub rule allows
the court or a Judge in urgent applications to dispense with the forms and service provided
1 Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin and Another tla Makin's Furniture
Manufacturers 1977 (4) SA 135 (W) at 136 H
2 East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others
[2011] ZAGPJHC 196 para 5-7.
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for in the rules and dispose of the matter at such time and place in such manner and in
accordance with such procedure as to it seems meet. It fmther provides that in the affidavit
in support of an urgent application the applicant " ... shall set forth explicitly the
circumstances which he avers render the matter urgent and the reasons why he claims that
he could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course."
[6] The import thereof is that the procedure set out in rule 6(12) is not there for taking. An
applicant has to set forth explicitly the circumstances which he avers render the matter
urgent. More importantly, the Applicant must state the reasons why he claims that he
cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. The question of whether
a matter is sufficiently urgent to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application is
underpinned by the issue of absence of substantial redress in an application in due course.
The rules allow the court to come to the assistance of a litigant because if the latter were to
wait for the normal course laid down by the rules it will not obtain substantial redress.
[7] It is important to note that the rules require absence of substantial redress. This is not
equivalent to the irreparable harm that is required before the granting of an interim relief.
It is something less. He may still obtain redress ·in an application in due course but it may
not be substantial. Whether an applicant will not be able obtain substantial redress in an
application in due course will be determined by the facts of each case. An applicant must
make out his cases in that regard.'
Analysis
[15] To my mind, strict acquiescence to Rule 6(12)(b) requires an applicant
to account for every material period of delay in the chronology from the
moment the cause of urgency arose. To juxtapose this principle with the
current matter, this Court is required to determine whether the Van
current matter, this Court is required to determine whether the Van
Rens burgs have discharged this predetermined jurisdictional requirement.
[16] It follows that a detailed examination of the full chronology is
peremptory. The material dates are the following. On 24 July 2023, the
agreement was concluded. On 1 September 2023, occupation was given to
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Agang. The full purchase price was due by 30 November 2024. Agang failed
to pay. On 18 March 2025, a breach notice was issued, affording ten days to
pay. Agang failed to comply. On 19 May 2025, a notice of cancellation was
dispatched, and Agang was required to vacate by 31 May 2025. On 20 May
2025, Agang and Moors Empire's own attorneys acknowledged in writing that
the agreement had been cancelled. They did not vacate.
[17] On 9 June 2025, a settlement conference was held at which the Van
Rensburgs provided Agang with a further extension to pay in two equal
monthly instalments by 30 June and 31 July 2025. No payment was made. On
30 July 2025, a further notice was sent demanding vacation within seven days.
They did not comply. In September 2025 Moors Empire promised payment
by end of September 2025. No payment was made.
[18] On 27 November 2025, new draft agreements were sent to Agang and
Moors Empire requiring payment by 31 December 2025. Follow-up emails
were sent on 1, 3 and 9 December 2025. There was no retort to same. On 10
February 2026, the Bila Agreement was concluded . On 3 February 2026, a
notice to vacate was issued requiring vacation by 6 February 2026. Agang
and Moors Empire did not comply. On 26 February 2026, this application was
launched. The application was enrolled for 8 May 2026.
The three periods for purposes of Rule 6(12)(b)
The first period
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[19] The first period runs from 31 May 2025, being the date on which the
cancellation notice required vacation, to 30 July 2025, when the next demand
was issued. As at 31 May 2025, the Van Rensburgs had a complete and
unimpeachable ejectment claim. The cancellation was acknowledged by
Agang and Moors Empire's own attorney. Agang and Moors Empire's
remained in occupation.
[20] It must be underscored that an urgent application was competent from
that date. No explanation is proffered why proceedings were not launched at
that stage. The founding affidavit does not address this period in the context
of urgency at all. The sole inference from the papers is that the Van Rensburgs
elected to pursue further negotiations. That was a deliberate commercial
choice. It was laudable and commendable, but it was a clear invocation of a
choice. A party that chooses negotiation over litigation cannot later invoke
that choice to explain away a failw·e to act. This is not, as the Van Rensburgs
contend, a case of a party being unable to obtain substantial redress in due
course. It is a case of a party that chose not to seek it.
The second period
[21] The second period runs from 31 July 2025, by which date the extended
payment deadline had again passed without compliance, to 27 November
2025, when the draft new agreements were sent. This period spans some four
months. Again, the founding affidavit proffers no explanation directed at
urgency for this interval. The papers record further promises by Moors Empire
and expressions of willingness to negotiate, but no explanation is given for
why an ordinary ejectment application was not enrolled during this period.
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(22] By this time, the agreement had been cancelled for over two months,
with Agang and Moors Empire having failed to pay by two extended
deadlines, and no new agreement had been concluded. The right to eject was
beyond question. What stands out is that substantial redress in the ordinary
course was clearly available.
The third period
[23] The third period runs from 9 December 2025, being the date of the last
unanswered follow-up email, to 26 February 2026, when the application was
launched. This period spans some eleven weeks. The papers offer no
explanation for eleven of those weeks. The only event that occurs within this
period is the conclusion of the Bila Agreement on 10 February 2026. The
founding affidavit does not explain what the Van Rensburgs were doing
between 9 December 2025 and 3 February 2026 when the next vacate notice
was issued. No affidavit evidence accounts for the sixteen days between 10
February 2026 and 26 February 2026.
[24] The Van Rensburgs' contention that the urgency was triggered by the
conclusion of the Bila Agreement does not avail them. The Bila Agreement
was concluded voluntarily by the Van Rensburgs on 10 February 2026, with
the implicit knowledge that Agang and Moors Empire were in occupation.
Towards this end, the Van Rensburgs were fully aware that Agang and Moors
Empire had been so since September 2023, and had failed to vacate despite
the cancellation of the agreement and numerous notices.
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[25] It is common cause that the one hundred and twenty day suspensive
condition, calculated from 10 February 2026, expires on 10 June 2026. That
window of one hundred and twenty days, to my mind, on any objective
assessment, is precisely the period required for an urgent ejectment
application. The inference is inescapable that the Van Rensburgs structured
both the Bila Agreement and the launch of these proceedings to facilitate
recourse to the urgent roll rather than the ordinary roll. In my view, that is the
paradigmatic case of self-created urgency. An applicant cannot manufacture
urgency by voluntarily assuming an obligation that presupposes a state of
affairs that has not yet been secured.
[26] In my view, the authorities on commercial urgency that the Van
Rensburgs placed much store on do not assist them. The plain distinction in
this matter is that the obligation to deliver vacant possession by 10 June 2026
was self-imposed by the Van Rensburgs. This occurred with full knowledge
of the prevailing occupation, after some nine months of inaction following the
fruition of their ejectment right. These are materially different facts from the
authorities relied on.
[27] I am further not satisfied that the Van Rensburgs have demonstrated, as
required by Rule 6(12)(b ), why substantial redress is unavailable in the
ordinary course independently of the self-imposed Bila deadline. The papers
do not estimate when an ordinary opposed application would be heard in this
division, nor do they demonstrate that such hearing date would necessarily fall
after 10 June 2026. The bare assertion that the Bila Agreement will lapse if an
ordinary application is pursued is not a sufficient discharge of the Rule
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6(12)(b) obligation, because the lapsing of the Bila Agreement is itself the
product of the Van Rens burgs' own commercial election.
[28] Resultantly, I am not satisfied that this application complies with the
requirements of Rule 6(12). The timeline aerates that the Van Rensburgs had
a complete and enforceable ejectment right from 31 May 2025. The urgency
now relied upon flows directly from the Van Rens burgs' voluntary conclusion
of the Bila Agreement with knowledge of the prevailing occupation. In my
view, that urgency is self-created. It follows axiomatically that the application
falls to be struck from the roll.
Costs
[21] The application is struck from the urgent roll Costs follow the result
Agang and Moors Empire have been put to the expense of opposing an urgent
application that ought not to have been brought on the urgent roll. They are
entitled to their costs occasioned by the urgent enrolment on the party-and
party scale.
Order
[22] Resultantly, the following order is made:
1. The application is struck from the urgent roll for non-compliance
with Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
2. The Applicants are ordered to pay the costs of the Respondents,
jointly and severally on the party -and- party scale, the one paying
the other to be absolved.
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REDDY J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Appearances
For Applicants:
Instructed By:
For Respondents:
Instructed by:
Mr. WM Keeny
VVD Attorneys
C/O CJP Oelofse Attorneys
Advocate Ma vim bela
Adonisi Attorneys