SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY)
Case Number: 2026-095198
Reportable: YES / NO
Circulate to Judges: YES / NO
Circulate to Magistrates: YES / NO
Circulate to Regional Magistrates: YES / NO
In the matter between:
R[...] B[...] 1ST APPLICANT
AMANDA STEENKAMP 2ND APPLICANT
and
Y[...] V[...] N[...] 1ST RESPONDENT
LOUW AND DA SILVA ATTORNEYS 2ND RESPONDENT
Heard on : 8 May 2026
Delivered on : 15 May 2026
2
Coram : Olivier AJ
ORDER
In the result, the following order is made:
1. The application is dismissed; and
2. The 1st and 2nd applicants are to pay the costs of this application jointly and
severally the one paying, the other to be absolved.
JUDGMENT
OLIVIER AJ
INTRODUCTION:
1. The 1st and 2nd applicants (“the applicants”) approached this court on an urgent
basis for an order in essentially the following terms:
1.1 That the 1st respondent be interdicted and restrained, pending the final
determination of the divorce proceedings between the 1st applicant and 1st
respondent, alternatively pending the final determination of the parties’
respective proprietary and accrual claims, from receiving, claiming,
withdrawing, transferring, encumbering, dissipating or in any manner
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dealing with the nett proceeds arising from the sale of a property known as
[...] K[...] Street, Kathu, Northern Cape Province (“the property”);
1.2 That the 2nd respondent is directed to retain and preserve the above nett
proceeds in its trust account pending the final determination of the above
divorce proceedings, alternatively pending the final determination of the
parties’ respective proprietary and accrual claims;
1.3 That the 2nd respondent is interdicted and restrained pending the final
determination of the divorce proceedings, alternatively the final
determination of the parties’ respective proprietary and accrual claims from
paying out, transferring, releasing or otherwise dealing with the said nett
proceeds; and
1.4 Costs on a punitive scale in the event of the application being opposed.
2. The application was opposed and both parties had sufficient time prior to the
argument of the matter, to file their respective answering and replying affidavits.
3. The question as to whether the application is in fact urgent was raised on behalf
of the 1st respondent, but seeing that both parties not only had the opportunity
to file their respective affidavits in the matter but also had the opportunity to
provide me with short heads of argument, I deemed it prudent to deal with both
the issue of urgency and the merits of the matter since I am of the view that
practical considerations dictate that the application should be dispensed with at
this time.1
1 See Magricor (Pty) Ltd v Border Seed Distributors CC: In re: Border Seed Distributors CC v Magricor
(Pty) Ltd [2020] ZAECGHC 103 (8 September 2020), par 38 where it was held that, depending on the facts
of each case, circumstances might exist where, even in the case of a material non-compliance with the rules
a matter should be entertained if it is in the interest of expediency. Also see Windsor Hotel (Pty) Ltd v New
Windsor Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] ZAECMHC (7 August 2013), par 10.
4
4. I accordingly allowed counsel for both parties to address me on the issue of
urgency as well as on the merits of the matter and then reserved judgment in
order to properly consider the respective parties’ heads of argument and the
authorities cited therein.
I will herein firstly deal with the merits of the application and thereafter with the
issue of urgency.
AD MERITS:
5. It is not in dispute that the 1st applicant and the 1st respondent is married to
each other out of community of property and that the accrual system is
applicable to their marriage and it is also not in dispute that the property is
registered to the 1st respondent and that same forms part of her estate and will
be considered as such for purposes of the calculation of the accrual of the
respective parties’ estates.
6. It is also not in dispute that the 1st applicant and 1st respondent is in the process
of separating (it appears that a divorce summons has not yet been issued) and
that they are no longer living together.
7. It is further also not in dispute that the property is in the process of being sold by
the 1st respondent, that the offer to purchase was signed during February 2026
and that the registration of the property to the new owner is imminent.
8. The 1st applicant now approaches this court on behalf of himself and the 2nd
applicant for an order essentially “freezing” the proceeds of the sale of the
property until the finalization of the divorce proceedings, alternatively until the
final determination of the parties’ respective accrual claims.
5
9. The 1st applicant alleges, in as far as he himself is concerned, that he harbours
a real concern that the 1st respondent will dissipate the proceeds of the sale of
the property (herein after referred to only as “the proceeds”) which will affect
that calculation of the accrual of the 1st respondent’s estate and might prejudice
him upon the dissolution of the marriage.
10. The 1st applicant bases his above contention on the fact that the 1st respondent
has steadfastly refused to provide him with an undertaking to the effect that the
proceeds will be held in trust pending the calculation of the accrual and the
finalization of the divorce and on the fact that the 1st respondent, on her own
version, intends to utilise the proceeds in order to support herself and the
parties’ children.
11. Mr. Olivier argued on behalf of the applicants that the above shows mala fides
on the part of the 1st respondent which strengthens the applicants’ beliefs that
the 1st respondent intends to dissipate the proceeds.
It should be mentioned that the 1st respondent did in fact state under oath that
she intends to utilise the proceeds, but she also stated that she would do so
responsibly and in order to, inter alia, support the parties’ children.
12. In as far as the 2nd applicant is concerned, it is contended that the 2nd applicant
loaned money to the 1st applicant and the 1st respondent and that the order
sought is warranted by virtue of an alleged verbal agreement between the
parties to the effect that the amount of the loan would be repaid from the
proceeds.
13. It is alleged that the 2nd applicant loaned an amount of R 150 000,00 (one
hundred and fifty thousand rand) to the parties to effect renovations to the
property and an amount of R 450 000,00 (four hundred and fifty thousand rand)
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to the 1st applicant and 1st respondent’s joined business when said business
experienced financial difficulties.
14. The 1st respondent denies any knowledge of the afore-said loans as well as of
the alleged agreement that the proceeds would be utilised to repay the loan
amount of R 600 000,00 (six hundred thousand rand) (“the loan amount”).
15. Mr. Basson argued on behalf of the 1st respondent that the case for the
applicants on the merits stands to fail on essentially two grounds namely:
15.1 That the relief sought does not fall within the recognised scope of anti-
dissipation interdicts; and
15.2 That the applicants have failed to make out a case for the relief sought.
16. Mr. Basson further argued that what the applicants in essence seek to achieve
is pre-judgment security for a contingent and disputed future claim.
17. This argument was obviously rejected by Mr. Olivier who argued on behalf of
the applicants that the applicants only wish to preserve the proceeds of a
specific property where, on the applicants’ version, there was a specific
arrangement to the effect that the loan amount would be repaid from the
proceeds.
18. Mr. Olivier further argued that the 1st respondent’s denial of the agreement and
specifically the terms thereof does not convert the relief into an impermissible
pre-judgment attachment, but that it gives rise to a dispute on the facts that
needs to be determined by another court in future.
19. After the battle lines were drawn, this court now needs to determine:
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19.1 Whether the relief sought by the applicants is legally competent; and
19.2 Whether, if the above is answered in the affirmative, the applicants have
made out a case for the relief that they seek.
Is the relief sought legally competent?
20. It appears to be settled law that a spouse who is married out of community of
property, subject to the accrual, only obtains an accrual claim at the dissolution
of the marriage and that the date upon which the accrual is calculated, is the
date upon which the marriage is finally dissolved.2
21. The implication of the above is therefore that up and until the date of the
dissolution of a marriage subject to the accrual system, neither party has a
vested right to the property of the other and that prior thereto, a party only has a
contingent right.3
22. In Reeder v Softline and Another4 it was held, rather strongly, as follows:
“The parties are not married in community of property. The applicant has no vested
right in the shares of their proceeds, or indeed in any other item in, or portion of, the
second respondent’s estate. Subsection 3(1) of the Act makes it clear that the right of a
spouse to claim half of the nett accrual of the other spouse’s estate is acquired ‘at the
dissolution of the marriage … by divorce or death’ and subsection 3(2) provides that
(subject to the provisions of section 8(1)) ‘a claim in terms of subsection (1) arises at
the dissolution of the marriage’. Pending the dissolution of the marriage … a spouse
who … claims half the difference of the accrual between the two estates, has a
contingent right and not a vested right.”
2 AB v JB 2016 (5) SA 211 (SCA), par 16. Also see section 3(2) of the Matrimonial Property Act, Act 88 of
1984.
3 See inter alia JA v DA 2014 (6) SA 233 (GJ), par 9.
4 [2000] 4 All SA 105 (W) at 110.
8
23. It is trite that section 8(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act, 1984 (“the MPA”),
creates a very specific exception to the above in the sense that this section
provides for a possibility for the division of the accrual at a date or at a time prior
to the dissolution of the marriage, but since the provisions of this section of the
MPA is irrelevant for purposes hereof, further scrutiny of the legal position in
respect of this section is not necessary.
24. What we are dealing with in the present matter is something completely
different in that we are dealing with an application to essentially interdict a party
to a marriage subject to the accrual system, from dealing freely with an asset or
more specifically the proceeds from the sale of an asset which belongs to that
party and the court is asked to do so whilst the marriage still subsists or, as is
the case in the present matter, pending the finalisation of the divorce
proceedings (yet to be instituted) between the parties.
25. Mr. Bosman argued that such an order is not competent in law whilst Mr. Olivier
relied very heavily on the matter of Dikgale v Dikgale5 in his argument that
such an order is in fact a competent order to make and he urged me to properly
consider the judgment in Dikgale when determining the present application.
26. In Dikgale, the applicant approached the court, after having already instituted
divorce proceedings, on an ex parte and urgent basis and obtained interim relief
in terms whereof:
26.1 The respondent was prevented from dissipating various assets pending
the finalisation of the divorce proceedings; and
5 [2020] JOL 49132 (GJ).
9
26.2 The immediate division of the accrual in the parties’ respective estates in
terms of section 8(1) of the MPA was ordered.6
27. The court in Dikgale fully investigated the provisions of section 8(1) of the MPA
and also considered the possibility of interim interdictory relief to preserve the
contingent accrual claim and then held as follows:
“The courts have already found that the contingent accrual claim, if prima facie
established though open to some doubt, is susceptible to preservation by way of an
interim interdict preventing the dissipation of assets pending the vesting and
determination of that claim. This is so irrespective of the contingent nature of the
accrual right but provided that the applicant can demonstrate prima facie, although
open to some doubt that an accrual claim will accrue in his or her favour, once vested,
although the extent thereof need not be determined.”7
28. In Langebrink v Langebrink8 the applicant lodged an application in terms
whereof she sought the respondent being interdicted from transferring certain
assets pending the finalisation of an application for the immediate division of the
accrual in terms of section 8(1) of the MPA.9
The respondent objected to the above and argued that it is an attempt by the
applicant to use application proceedings to achieve an objective that is normally
pursued in terms of section 3 of the MPA and that the applicant would be
entitled to obtain information about the assets of the respondent through the
normal trial process.10
29. The court however disagreed with the respondent’s contentions and held that
there was nothing inappropriate with the applicant’s litigation strategy since she
6 Dikgale, supra, par 5.
7 Supra, par 47.
8 [2019] JOL 46305 (GJ)
9 Langebrink, supra, par 5.
10 Supra, par 22.
10
only attempted to protect the accrual by preserving assets from being
transferred for the sole purpose of frustrating the eventual final relief sought in
terms of section 8(1) of the MPA.11
30. In Reeder12 it was further held:
“A spouse married out of community of property and subject to the accrual system has a
contingent right to share in the accrual of the estate of the other spouse which is
conferred by the Act. It seems to me that that right would be protectable by interdict
pendente lite, whether the lis is a divorce action in which the right is asserted or a claim
in terms of section 8(1) of the Act.”13
31. In JA v DA14 it was held as follows:
“The interdict entertained by Froneman J in Gernetzky v Gernetzky … was interim and
an adjunct to divorce proceedings which in turn were in contemplation of a pending
dissolution that would trigger an accrual calculation…These circumstances, which are
dependent on pending litigation, and the law in regard to the elements of interdictory
relief, place interdictory relief in a sui generis category.”
32. In Dikgale15 it was also held:
“An interim interdict by an applicant to preserve the contingent accrual claim is
capable of being construed as quasi-proprietary. In so finding, this advances the
availability of this remedy to the vulnerable spouse.”
33. If consideration is given to all of the above authorities, it appears that the
granting of interim relief in order to protect the contingent right of a spouse to
11 Supra, par 24.
12 Supra at 112.
13 See in general Gernetzky v Gernetzky 2007 JDR 0247 (E).
14 Supra, par 34.
15 Supra, par 52.
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share in the accrual of the estate of the other spouse, although deemed to be
sui generis, is not incompetent.
I will deal with the question whether this relief is available to the 2nd applicant
herein under.
Did the applicants make out a case for the relief sought?
The 1st applicant:
34. The requisites for the right to claim an interim interdict are well-known and it is
trite that an applicant in an application for an interim interdict needs to show, on
a balance of probabilities:
34.1 A prima facie right, though open to some doubt;
34.2 An injury actually committed or a reasonably apprehension of irreparable
and imminent harm to the right if the interdict is not granted;
34.3 That the balance of convenience favours the granting of the interim
interdict; and
34.4 The absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy.16
35. I hold the view that, apart from the above, due consideration should also be
given to the requirements for anti-dissipation relief as set out in Knox D’Arcy
Ltd and Others v Jamieson and Others17 where the court held that an
16 Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W) at 1192 to 1193; National Treasury and Others v Opposition to
Urban Tolling Alliance and Others [2012] ZACC 18 (20 September 2012), par 41.
17 1996 (4) SA 348 (A).
12
applicant must also show a particular state of mind on the part of the
respondent namely a mala fide intention of defeating the claim of creditors.18
I further hold the view that an applicant in an application such as the present
application, also needs to overcome several other hurdles before the relief may
be granted, but I will deal with same herein below.
36. It has been held that as a result of the draconian nature, invasiveness and
conceivable inequity of the relief sought, such relief should be granted only in
the clearest of cases.19
37. In the present matter Mr. Olivier argued that the fact that the 1st respondent
refused to provide the 1st applicant with an undertaking that the proceeds will be
retained in trust, coupled with the fact that the 1st respondent admitted to the
fact that she will use some of the proceeds in order to provide in the
maintenance of herself and the parties’ children, shows the required mala fides
on the part of the 1st respondent and shows, at least prima facie, an intention on
the part of the 1st respondent to dissipate the proceeds which creates a
reasonable apprehension of harm to the 1st applicant.
38. The 1st respondent has never denied that she planned on utilising the proceeds
when it becoming available and she states in her answering affidavit that she
intends to safeguard the funds and to use it responsibly, including for the benefit
and future tertiary education of the parties’ children.
She further states in her answering affidavit that she has no other meaningful
means of income and that the proceeds represent the only financial security
presently available to her.
18 Knox D’Arcy Ltd, supra at 372. AU v CU 2019 JDR 1987 (GJ), paras 27 to 29.
19 RS v MS and Others 2014 (2) SA 511 (GJ), par 18; AU v CU, supra, par 10.
13
39. The 1st applicant alleges that the 1st respondent and their children are fully
supported by him, but unfortunately provides no proof of this contention.
40. I can unfortunately not agree with the contentions on behalf of the 1st applicant
that it is not necessary to prove that the 1st respondent has the intent to
dissipate and that the 1st applicant only needs to show a reasonable
apprehension to dissipate.
I am of the view that because of the draconian nature, the invasiveness, the
conceivable inequity of the relief sought and also because of the possible abuse
of the process, more should be expected from an applicant under these
circumstances and that an applicant should in fact show an intent to dissipate
as required in Knox D’Arcy.
41. In my view the 1st applicant has failed to establish that he would suffer
irreparable harm if the 1st respondent is allowed to use the proceeds to provide
for her living expenses and the maintenance of the parties’ children and I can
further not find any evidence thereof that the 1st respondent has the intention to
dissipate the proceeds in order to frustrate the 1st applicant’s claim.
42. I am therefore of the view that the balance of convenience favours the 1st
respondent in as far as the 1st applicant’s claim is concerned.
43. Further to the above, it should be stated that in the vast majority of the
authorities that I was referred to and which I read for purposes hereof, it was
evident that an application such as this one was lodged subsequent to either
divorce summons being instituted, or an application being lodged in terms of
section 8(1) of the MPA.
44. I am of the view that an already existing divorce action or an already existing
application in terms of section 8(1) between the parties involved is a necessary
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requirement for the lodging of an application such as this since the lodging of an
application such as the present one, in circumstances where there is no
pending divorce action or application in terms of section 8(1) of the MPA, can
lead to absurdities and abuse.
45. I am further of the view that, specifically in light of the fact that divorce
proceedings have not yet been instituted, the 1st applicant does not have a
prima facie right to the relief that he seeks since the claim for an accrual has not
yet crystallized.
46. The 1st applicant has also failed to show prima facie, as is apparently required
in Dikgale20, that an accrual claim will accrue in his favour.
47. In as far as the question of a suitable alternative remedy is concerned and since
the existence of a pending divorce action is not a prerequisite for the lodging of
an application in terms of section 8(1) of the MPA21, the relief set out in said
section 8(1) provides the 1st applicant with a suitable alternative remedy.
48. In summary therefore, I am of the view that, apart from the normal requirements
for obtaining interim relief, an applicant in an application such as this one,
needs to also meet the requirements as set out in Knox D’Arcy and specifically
the requirement in respect of the intent to dissipate and further has to show:
48.1 That either divorce proceedings or an application in terms of section 8(1)
of the MPA is already pending; and
48.2 That, prima facie, an accrual claim will accrue in favour of such applicant.
20 Supra, paras 47 and 49.
21 Dikgale, supra, par 20.
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49. The 1st applicant, in my view, has failed to meet the above requirements and he
is consequently not entitled to the relief sought.
The 2nd applicant:
50. The case for the 2nd applicant rests solely on the alleged loans made by the 2nd
applicant to the 1st applicant and the 1st respondent and the alleged agreement
that the loan amount will be repaid to the 2nd applicant from the proceeds.
51. The 1st applicant states as follows in his replying affidavit:
“It is an interdict aimed at preventing the dissipation of the only reliable asset linked to
an existing, agreed obligation, namely the repayment of the Second Applicant’s loan of
R 600,000.00 from the net proceeds of the sale of the property.”
As was already mentioned herein above, the existence of the loans as well as
the repayment agreement is denied by the 1st respondent.
52. It is in my view clear that, as far as the 2nd applicant is concerned, we are
dealing with an anti-dissipation interdict in the true sense of the word and it is
therefore incumbent on the 2nd applicant, apart from the normal requirements
for an interim interdict, to also show that the 1st respondent had the intention to
defeat the 2nd applicant’s claim by dissipating the proceeds.22
53. I have to again find that the applicants did not satisfy the above requirement as
there is no evidence provided that the 1st respondent has the intention of
dissipating the proceeds in order to frustrate a claim by the 2nd applicant.
54. The 1st applicant, apart from his say-so and a transcribed voice note that does
not assist the case of the applicants at all, provides no further evidence of the
22 Knox D’Arcy, supra at 373.
16
alleged agreement, the repayment arrangements and of the 1st respondent’s
involvement in the agreement or the repayment agreement.
The 1st applicant also offers no explanation in reply, to an allegation by the 1st
respondent that, as consideration for the alleged loan of R 450 000,00 to the 1st
applicant’s business, the 2nd applicant received shares of equal value.
55. I am consequently of the view that the 2nd applicant has not managed to show
that she has a prima facie right that needs protection by way of the relief
sought.
56. Further to the above it should be mentioned that I do not find the version of the
1st respondent lacking, as suggested on behalf of the applicants or fanciful and
untenable.
The fact of the matter is that she denies the existence of the loans as well as
the agreement in respect of the repayment of same and in view of the lack of
evidence in this regard from the side of the applicants, a mere denial is
sufficient in fact, what more could she have said?
I am therefore of the view that the 1st respondent’s version should be accepted
based on the principles set out in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck
Paints (Pty) Ltd.23
57. Further to the above I am of the view that the 2nd applicant has various
alternative remedies at her disposal in this instance such as a possible claim for
damages and a possible claim based on enrichment.
58. I am therefore of the view that this application, in as far as the 2nd applicant is
concerned, should also fail.
23 [1984] 2 All SA 366 (A).
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59. I can see no reason why the costs should not follow the result herein and why
the applicants should not be ordered to pay the costs of the application.
AD URGENCY:
60. The 1st respondent disputed the applicants’ contention that this application was
in fact urgent and stated that any urgency that might be found to exist, was self-
created.
61. The basis for the alleged urgency of this application according to the applicants
and as is set out in their founding affidavit, is the fact that the registration of the
property is imminent and that, should the property register and should the
proceeds be paid out to the 1st respondent, a real, immediate and substantial
risk exists that the proceeds will be dissipated by the 1st respondent.
The applicants contend that this relief should therefore be granted before this
becomes a reality.
62. It is common cause that it is expected of any applicant to make out the relief
sought by such applicant in his/her founding affidavit24 and that this holds true in
the case of an urgent application in terms of rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of
Court (“the rules”) as well.
63. Rule 6(12)(b) of the rules even clarifies the specific averments that a founding
affidavit in an urgent application should contain where it states as follows:
“In every affidavit filed in support of any application under paragraph (a) of this sub-
rule, the applicant must set forth explicitly the circumstances which is averred render
24 Treasure Karoo Action Group and Another v Department of Mineral Resources and Others [2018] 3 All
SA 896 (GP), par 10; Skjelbreds Rederi A/S and Others v Hartless (Pty) Ltd [1982] 1 All SA 1 (W), p 3.
18
the matter urgent and the reasons why the applicant claims that applicant could not be
afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.”
64. Counsel for both parties referred me to the (by now) well-known matter of East
Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others25
where, in paragraph 6, the court held as follows:
“… the procedure set out in rule 6(12) is not there for the taking. An applicant has to
set forth explicitly the circumstances which he avers render the matter urgent. More
importantly, the applicant must state the reasons why he claims that he cannot be
afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. The question is whether a
matter is sufficiently urgent to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application is
underpinned by the issue of absence of substantial redress in an application in due
course.”
65. It should be stated that it was not in dispute that the signing of the offer to
purchase in respect of the property took place on or about 5 February 2026 and
that the 1st applicant is aware of this fact.
66. The 1st applicant however states that he only became concerned about what
would happen with the proceeds on or about 17 March 2026 when he became
aware of the fact that the 1st respondent was no longer interested in continuing
with the marriage relationship.
67. The 1st applicant states as follows in his founding affidavit:
“Prior to that date, I had no concern regarding the sale itself or the proceeds thereof …
My concern arose only when it became apparent that the marriage would be dissolved
and that the proceeds would be relevant to the calculation of the first respondent’s
accrual.”
25 [2012] JOL 28244 (GSJ).
19
68. The 1st applicant then proceeds in setting out the steps that he took since 17
March 2026 in order to lodge this application which steps include:
68.1 Having to identify and instruct legal representatives in the Johannesburg
area since he was displaced from the Western Cape on or about 20 March
2026; and
68.2 Seeking an undertaking from the 1st respondent that the proceeds may be
kept in trust on or about 10 April 2026.
69. Mr. Olivier argued that urgency was triggered on 17 April 2026 when the
applicants have not received the required undertaking, whilst it was argued by
Mr. Bosman that the trigger for urgency, at the very best for the applicants, was
on 10 April 2026 when the undertaking was sought and not obtained.
70. I hold the view however that, on the 1st applicant’s own version, the so-called
trigger for the application was on 17 March 2026 when he, in his own words,
became concerned with what would happen with the proceeds and I hold the
view further that the 1st applicant’s explanation as to why this application was
not brought much earlier than 25 April 2026, lacks substance.
71. I am consequently of the view that, although one would certainly be able to
argue that this application should be determined expeditiously in light of the fact
that the registration of the property and payment of the proceeds are imminent,
the urgency of this application was in fact self-created and that the application in
fact stood to be removed from the roll on that basis alone.
72. In light of my above findings in respect of the merits of the application, the fact
that the urgency in the application was self-created, holds no further
consequence.
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ORDER:
73. On the above premises, I make the following order:
1. The application is dismissed; and
2. The 1st and 2nd applicants are to pay the costs of this application
jointly and severally the one paying, the other to be absolved.
_________________________
A.D. OLIVIER
ACTING JUDGE
NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION
REPRESENTATIVES OF PARTIES:
For APPLICANTS : Adv. J.L. Olivier
oio Shaheed Dollie Inc.
JOHANNESBURG
c/o Duncan & Rothman Inc.
KIMBERLEY
For 1ST RESPONDENT : Adv. J.F. Bosman
oio Hutten Hefferman Inc. Attorneys
MOSSEL BAY
For 2nd RESPONDENT : No Appearance