IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: ¥-ES-fNO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: ¥-ES/NO
(3) REVISED
DATE: 22 MAY 2026
SIGNATURE:
1
Case No. 2026/008776
In the application for leave to appeal between:
GAUTENG LIQUOR BOARD APPLICANT
And
GOLDEN CANDLE BED & BREAKFAST RESPONDENT
In re:
In the matter between:
GOLDEN CANDLE BED & BREAKFAST APPLICANT
2
And
GAUTENG LIQUOR BOARD RESPONDENT
Coram:
Heard on:
Delivered:
MILLARJ
Millar J
22 May 2026
22 May 2026 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded
to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLII. The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 09H45 on 22 May 2026.
JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal brought by the applicant against a
judgment and order granted by me on 16 February 2026. The order granted by
me was one compelling the issue of a temporary liquor license the Golden Candle
Bed & Breakfast (Golden Candle), pending a review of the decision taken by the
Gauteng Liquor Board (the Board) on 22 December 2025, to refuse the
application.
[2] The Board now applies for leave to appeal that decision. The application was
brought on 24 April 2026 - outside the time period provided for in the rules. There
3
is also an application for condonation for the late filing of the application for leave
to appeal.
[3] I intend to deal first with the application for condonation. The factors to be
considered in an application for condonation are:
[3.1] Firstly, the degree of lateness and the explanation for it.
[3.2] Secondly, the prospects of success on the merits of the appeal.
[3.3] Thirdly, prejudice to the parties.
[3.4] Fourthly, the importance of the finality of judgments.
[4] I intend to deal with the first and second factors. For the reasons that are set out
below, it is not necessary, and I do not intend to deal with the third and fourth
factors.
[5] The application for leave to appeal was brought 35 days late. The explanation
given for the lateness is that on receipt of the judgment on 16 February 2026, a
memorandum dealing with the effect of the court order and the prospects of
success on appeal was sent to the Board.
[6] There is no indication given when this occurred. Apparently due to the
unavailability of the Board members, a consultation could only be held on 30
March 2026 and instructions were given to proceed with the application for leave
to appeal on that day. Thereafter, a draft notice was sent to the Board on 6 April
2026 and thereafter a second draft on 10 April 2026. The application was finally
settled for service on 23 April 2026.
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[7] The high watermark of the explanation
1
for failing to bring the application timeously
was the unavailability of the Board. ,t is self-evident that this explanation is
inadequate. Broad statements about the unavailability of Board members for 1,5
months between 16 February 2026 and 30 March 2026 do not rise to the level of
providing a full explanation of the reason for the delay.
[8] Similarly, the delay between 30 March· 2026 and 24 April 2026 is also not fully
explained and inadequate. There is no explanation as to why the members of
the Board would have been required for consultation or what their contribution to
the notice of application for leave to appeal would have been in the context of
their already having received a written advice from their legal representatives the
day the judgment was handed down. '
[9] The delay and the explanation for it are lacking. However, even with a weak
explanation for delay, condonation may nevertheless be granted if the prospects
for success on appeal are sufficiently strong.
[1 O] Turning now to the grounds upon which the application has been brought. The
Board cited several grounds, some of which are a repetition of what was argued
in the main case. I do not intend to deal with those again and stand by the
judgment in this regard. However, there are two that merit consideration.
[11] The first is in respect of the reasons given for the granting of the interim liquor
license pending the review. It is trite that applications for leave to appeal are not
brought against the reasons for judgment but against the order. In the present
instance, the order that is being appealed is an interim order. Interim orders are
not appealable save in exceptional circumstances.1
1 See South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534
(AD) at 549G and International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012
(4) SA 618 (CC) at 639F-640A.
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[12] The high watermark of the application is the ground that the granting of the
temporary liquor license would "set bad precedent in law, and would in future create
problems." There is simply no basis for this ground given that in this matter, the
Board itself had granted a temporary license to Golden Candle pending its own
review of a prior decision.
[13] The nub of the application is perhaps the second ground:
"1.8.2 Applicants who trade using court orders are outside the enforcement of
the Liquor Act and the board is unable to perform its mandate of collecting
fees as the order does not provide for (if they are special traders who are
above the terms of the Liquor Act).
1.8.2.1 It is submitted that, Inspectors, police and the board cannot
enforce the Act on such traders as provided for in section 105,
106 and 107 can't be applied on the traders as only a court order
can suspend or revoke the right to trade thus hindering
enforcement of the Act.
1.8.3 It is not in the public interest to have this (sic) special type of liquor
traders."
[14] This is no ground of appeal. It is a plea ad miseracordium. The solution for the
Board is to ensure that the review is prosecuted without any undue delay to
ensure that the time period between the granting of the temporary liquor license
and the final determination of the matter is limited.
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[15] The test for the granting of leave to appeal pertinent to the present matter is set
out in section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act2 as follows:
"(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned
are of the opinion that
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should
be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under
consideration"
[16] I have considered the grounds upon which this application has been brought and
the reasons given by me for the judgment. I have also considered the
submissions made by counsel for the granting of leave to appeal on the part of
the Board and those opposing the granting of leave to appeal by Golden Candle.
[17] I am not persuaded that another court· would come to a different conclusion or
that there is some other compelling reason why leave to appeal should be
granted.3
[18] Since the explanation for the delay in bringing the application is wholly inadequate
and there are in my view no prospects of success in the appeal, it follows that
condonation is to be refused.
[19] Costs will follow the result on the same basis as was granted on 16 February
2026.
2 10of2013
3 Caratco (Pty) Ltd v Independent Advisory (Pty) Ltd 2020 (5) SA 35 (SCA).
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(20) In the circumstances, I make the following order:
[20.1) The application for condonation is refused.
[20.2) The application for leave to appeal is refused.
[20.3] The applicant for leave to appeal, the Gauteng Liquor Board, is
ordered to pay the costs of the application for condonation and this
application for leave to appeal, on the scale as between party and
party, scale C.
HEARD ON:
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
IN THE LEAVE TO APPEAL
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
22 MAY 2026
22 MAY 2026
ADV. G RAMARU
THE STATE ATTORNEY PRETORIA
MS. L. TSHIVHASE
ADV. A VAN DER MERWE
MARIUS BLOM INC
MR. R VAN DER MERWE