IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: ¥ES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: v-ESfNO
(3) REVISED
DATE: 18 May 2026
SIGNATURE:.
1
Case No. 2026-089786
In the matter between:
AFRIMAT IRON ORE (PROPRIETARY) LTD
And
MINISTER OF MINERAL AND PETROLEUM
RESOURCES
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
DIRECTOR-GENERAL: DEPARTMENT OF PETROLEUM SECOND RESPONDENT
AND MINERAL RESOURCES
REGIONAL MANAGER: MINERAL REGULATION
(NORTHERN CAPE), DEPARTMENT OF MINERAL AND
PETROLEUM RESOURCES
OCHRE SHIMMER TRADE AND INVEST 78 (PTY) LTD
LUNGILE MLOTSHWA
Coram: Millar J
Heard on: 13 May 2026
2
THIRD RESPONDENT
FOURTH RESPONDENT
FIFTH RESPONDENT
Delivered: 18 May 2026 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded
to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLII. The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 09H00 on 18 May 2026.
JUDGMENT
MILLARJ
[1] The applicant (Afrimat) is a mining company. It contracted with the fourth
respondent (Ochre Shimmer) for the acquisition of a Mining Right which would
enable it to continue its mining operations. The transfer of Mining Rights from
one party to another is governed by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources
3
Development Act1 (MPRD Act). The transfer of a Mining Right from one party to
another is governed specifically by section 11 of the MPRD Act.
[2] This application concerns the interpretation of section 11 (1) of the MPRD Act and
specifically whether the fifth respondent (Ms. Mlotshwa) has any interest in the
Mining Right which requires consideration before any consent to its transfer could
be granted. Ms Mlotshwa applied at the hearing to intervene and be joined as
the fifth respondent. Her application was not opposed.
•• [3] Afrimat presently conducts mining operations in the Northern Cape and operates
inter alia mines at which iron ore is extracted at Demaneng, Jenkins and
Driehoekspan. Besides selling the iron ore locally, Afrimat also exports iron ore
that is mined by it. It is not in issue that the Demaneng Mine is reaching the end
of its productive life and will cease operations by the end of this year or in early
2027.
[4] During its mining operations Afrimat makes use of Transnet Railways. It has an
allocation on the Iron Ore Export Corridor (IOEC). Transnet Railways make
allocations to miners for the allocation of capacity which once allocated is then
utilized by them to move the mined iron ore. The IOEC allocations are made for
10 years, and the latest bids were opened on 1 December 2025. The bid window
in this regard was extended to 30 April 2026 and then again to 29 May 2026.
[5] It is self-evident that for mining production of iron ore on the scale that is being
mined by Afrimat, that the only viable method of transporting the mined iron ore
is by rail. Afrimat currently has an allocation of 870 000 tones which expires at
the end of March 2027. To apply for the same allocation (or an increased
allocation), it is necessary for Afrimat to demonstrate that it can meet that capacity
(or the increased capacity).
1 28 of 2002.
4
(6] The application for the IOEC allocation specifically requires that Afrimat, in
making its application provides:
"a certified copy of a valid and current Mining Right issued by the Department of
Mineral and Petroleum Resources ("DMRE") which Mining Right must relate to Iron
Ore reserves located in the Northern Cape." 2
[7] With the Demaneng Mine reaching the end of its life, the right currently held by
Afrimat in respect of that mine is of no assistance to it in its application for capacity
on the IOEC.
(8] It is not in issue that Afrimat and Ochre Shimmer have concluded an agreement
for the transfer of Ochre Shimmer's mining right (the Mining Right) for iron ore
over the Farm Doornfontein No 446 in the District of Hay which is in the Northern
Cape.
[9] This Mining Right was granted in terms of section 23(1) of the MPRD Act and
commenced on 24 March 2021 and will continue for a period of 11 years ending
on 23 March 2032.
[1 OJ The Mining Right is subject to sections 2(d) and 2(f) of the MPRD Act. These
sections provide that the objects of the Act are inter a/ia to:
"(d) substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for historically
disadvantaged persons, including women and communities, to enter into
and actively participate in the mineral and petroleum industries and to
2 It was asserted by the deponent to Afrimat's founding papers that this condition was imposed in a
confidential invitation to tender. The document did not form part of the papers before the Court but none
of the respondents and in particular the fifth respondent placed the imposition of this as a pre-condition
to the application for IOEC capacity in issue.
And
5
benefit from the exploitation of the nation's mineral and petroleum
resources."
(f) promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all
South Africans."
[11] When the Mining Right was granted to Ochre Shimmer, regarding sections 2(d)
and s 2(f) of the MPRD Act, an agreement entered on 20 May 2013 between TM
Makhato, PL Motsamai and the late BN Mhlanga was considered. In terms of
that agreement, the relative shareholding between the three was 33%, 33% and
34% respectively. It is the 34% held by the late BN Mhlanga which is now in
issue.
[12] The agreement for the sale of the Mining Right between Afrimat and Ochre
Shimmer was concluded on 30 May 2025. For the transfer of the Mining Right
pursuant to that sale to be effected, section 11 (1) of the MPRD Act requires the
consent of the first respondent. The section provides:
"(1) A prospecting right or mining right or an interest in any such right, or a
controlling interest in a company or close corporation, may not be ceded,
transferred, let, sub-let, assigned, alienated or otherwise disposed of
without the written consent of the Minister, except in the case of change
of controlling interest in listed companies."
[13] Additionally, once that consent has been sought, section 11 (2) provides that:
6
"(2) The consent referred to in subsection (1) must be granted if the
cessionary, transferee, lessee, sublessee, assignee or the person to
whom the right will be alienated or disposed of-
(a) is capable of carrying out and complying with the obligations and
the terms and conditions of the right in question; and
(b) satisfies the requirements contemplated in sections 17 or 23 as
the case may be."
[14] It is not in issue in the present proceedings that Afrimat applied to the Minister for
consent for transfer from Ochre Shimmer to itself on 30 June 2025 or that it is
compliant with the provisions of sections 11 (2)(a) and (b).
[15] What is in issue is whether Ms Mlotshwa has any interest in the Mining Right
which prevents the granting of consent in terms of section 11 (1) and transfer in
terms of section 11 (2)?
[16] Nine months have passed since the application was made for consent by Afrimat
and to make its application in terms of the IOEC timeously, consent to and
transfer of the Mining Right must take place befor~ it can submit its application
on 29 May 2026. The urgency in this case is not in issue between the parties.
All those who appeared agree it is urgent - Afrimat because of the time
constraints it faces and inevitable commercial harm if it is unsuccessful and Ms
Mlotshwa because whether her consent is required or. not, may influence whether
the underlying sale of the Mining Right is valid or not.
[17] The circumstances under which Ms Mlotshwa asserts that she does have an
interest arise out of her marriage in community of property to the late Mr. BN
Mhlangu. When Mr. Mhlangu passed away on 7 September 2017, Ms Mlotshwa
7
(by operation of law) held an undivided half share in the community estate.
Accordingly, insofar as his shares in Ochre Shimmer were concerned, on his
death, she acquired 17% of the shares and was entitled to claim transfer of those
into her name directly. She also entered into an agreement with the estate and
acquired the remaining 17% of the shares in Ochre Shimmer totaling the 34%.
[18] Thereafter, Ms Mlotshwa entered into separate agreements with Mr. Makhato and
Mr. Motsamai in terms of which she sold her 34% to them. The agreements for
the sale of the shares were concluded between the period 8 May 2024 and 1 O
October 2024. The closing date for the agreement and thus the effective date for
the transfer of the shares was 31 October 2024.
[19] Nothing further appears to have transpired after 31 October 2024 until 1 O
February 2026 when Mr. Makhato contacted Ms. Mlotshwa to meet. When she
met him on 23 February 2026, he furnished her with a document which he
requested that she sign. The document was dated 20 February 2026 and was
addressed to the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources. It had
already been signed by Mr. Makhato and Mr. Motsamai. Besides setting out the
historical shareholding, it then set out the circumstances under which the shares
of the late BN Mahlangu were acquired and then went on to request that:
"The Company hereby applies for consent from the Minister of Mineral and
Petroleum Resources for the transfer of the 34% of the shares in Ochre Shimmer
Trade and Invest (Pty) Ltd to Mr. Tommy Makhato (25,5%) and Mr. Motsamai
(8, 8%), in terms of Section 11 (1) of the MPRDA."
[20] This approach, piqued Ms Mlotshwa's interest. She refused to sign. This set in
motion the events that have led to the present application. Ms Mlotshwa
subsequently ascertained that on 10 February 2026, 2 weeks before, the third
respondent (The Regional Manager for the Northern Cape) had issued a notice
8
in terms of section 93(1 )(b)(i) of the MPRD Act3 in which a query had been raised
regarding the transfer of shares within Ochre Shimmer. The notice incorrectly
referred to restructuring relating to the "transfer of majority shares" and referred
variously to the transfer of shares from the estate of the late Mr. BN Mhlanga to
Ms Mlotshwa and then from her to Mr. Makhato and Mr. Motsamai. The reason
the notice provoked the response that it did by Mr. Ma~hato was because it
indicated that a failure to comply may result in a suspension of the Right.
[21] Subsequently , upon discovering that Ochre Shimmer had sold the Mining Right ,
to Afrimat on 30 May 2025 (some 7 months later), Ms Mlotshwa objected to the
transfer of the Mining Right from Ochre Shimmer to Afrimat on the basis that since
she had held an interest in the Mining Right and the transfer of her interest had
not been approved by the Minister, the transfer '4'as void ab inito.
[22] The thesis advanced on her behalf was that if the transfer of her interest had not
been approved by the Minister, she still held her interest and was then entitled to
participate (presumably) in the transaction with Afrimat. It was for this reason
that on 6 March 2026, her attorney addressed letters to Mr. Motsamai and Mr.
Makhato purporting to cancel the sale of shares agreement and tendering return
of what had been paid.
[23] The interpretation advanced on behalf of Ms Mlotshwa of section 11 (1) was that
she had a "interest" in the Mining Right. The Mining Rfght was however, held by
Ochre Shimmer and subject to the shareholding of Ochre Shimmer specified in
it. None of the individuals referred to in the Mining Right in respect of Ochre
Shimmer's compliance with sections 2(d) and (f) of the MPRD Act, held any
3 The section permits the issue of orders of rectification in respect of noncompliance with any provision of
the MPRD Act or in respect of any conditions in respect of a mining right is held.
9
interest in the Mining Right itself. Piny interest that they held was qua shareholder
of Ochre Shimmer.
[24] The Mining Right was not held in the name of any private individual and it is for
this reason that the argument advanced on behalf of Ms Mlotshwa must fail. Any
rights that could be exercised could only be exercised qua shareholder.
[25] The Mining Right was an asset in Ochre Shimmer. In terms of section 11 (1 ),
since Ms Mlotshwa did not hold a controlling interest, because Mr. Makhato and
Mr. Motsamai together (even before the transfer of her shares) owned 66% of the
shares and therefore controlled Ochre Shimmer, it cannot be said that any
controlling interest had been disposed of in Ochre Shimmer in respect of the sale
of any of the shares of Ms Mlotshwa. After the sales of the shares, Mr. Makhato
now held 68.5% and Mr. Motsamai 41 .5%. At no time was Ms Mlotshwa's
shareholding a majority that on its own could command control of Ochre
Shimmer.
[26] In Mogale Alloys (Pty) Ltd v Nuco Chrome Bophuthatswana (Pty) Ltd and Others ,4
a case in which the Mining Right was also not registered in the name of private
individuals but in the name of a company, it was held:
"[37] The 'interest' must be one that controls the company (or close
corporation). From a review of the sources referred to above it is apparent
that the term 'controlling interest' cannot be confined to a single
characteristic or criterion. It could mean, in the case of a company, more
than 50% of the issued share capital of the company, or more than half of
the voting rights in respect of the issued shares of the company, or the
power to either directly or indirectly appoint, remove or veto the
appointment of the majority of the directors of the company without the
concurrence of another. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but it
4 2011 (6) SA 96 (GSJ) at paras (37) and (38].
And
10
certainly includes the right of a shareholder (even if notionally) to more
than half of the company's profits or assets. I say this for the following
reasons. The ultimate purpose of s 11 is to regulate the prospecting or
mining right that was granted. Section 11 (2) makes it clear that one of the
main purposes is for vetting the intended acquirer of that right. The
majority shareholder, notionally at least, would be entitled by his majority
shareholding to, inter alia, half the company's assets, which includes the
prospecting right. Thus, the acquirer or intended acquirer, of such a
controlling interest in the company would have to be vetted for regulatory
purposes. [My underlining] .
{38) As I mentioned earlier, disposal of the 'controlling interest' is what is being
regulated. What has to be determined is whether the interest was a
'controlling interest', at least, at the time of the proposed disposal. If a
majority shareholder intends to dispose of his entire shareholding to
another or others, the Minister's consent would clearly be required. If the
majority shareholder, with the controlling interest, intends to dispose only
of a portion of his interest and the disposal will not result in a change of
control, i. e the shareholder will retain the controlling interest, then the
disposal would, in my view, not require the Minister's consent. If,
however, the effect of the disposal would be that the holder of the
controlling interest would Jose such control, then the disposal would
require the Minister's consent, even if no-one else acquires that controlling
interest." [My underlining].
[27) In the present instance, while Ms Mlotshwa may have been the majority
shareholder because she held 1 % more than either Mr. Makhato or Mr.
Motsamai , she did not hold a sufficient shareholding for it to constitute a
"controlling interest". Any two of the three shareholders in Ochre Shimmer acting
in concert at any given time , would constitute a controlling interest. Since two of
in concert at any given time , would constitute a controlling interest. Since two of
the three original shareholders who between them held a "controlling interest "
11
and held control of Ochre Shimmer, it cannot be said that the disposal of Ms
Mlotshwa of her shares, although the shares she held were more than the other
two individually, constituted a "controlling interest".
(28] In Vantage Goldfields SA (Pty) Ltd and Another v Arqomanzi (Pty) Ltd and
Others, 5 the Supreme Court of Appeal endorsed the view expressed in Moga le
Alloys and held:
"Moga le Alloys further held that where the effect of the alienation or disposal would
be that the holder of the controlling interest would lose such control, then the
alienation or disposal would require ministerial consent, even if no-one else
acquires that controlling interest." [My underlining].
(29] Put simply, the Minister's consent was not required for the transfer of the shares
from Ms Mlotshwa to Mr. Makhato and Mr. Motsamai because on her own, Ms
Mlotshwa had no controlling interest. Her 34% could only ever constitute part of
a "controlling interest" when exercised in concert with one or the other of the
shareholders.
(30] Since section 11 (1) does not relate to the acquisition of a controlling interest
(which is what occurred when Mr. Makhato purchased her shares) but rather to
the disposal of a controlling interest, a Ministerial consent was not required for
the transfer of the shares from Ms Mlotshwa to Mr. Makhato or Mr. Motsamai.
(31] The transactions relating to the transfer of those shares are valid inter partes (at
least prima facie) for purposes of these proceedings. In this regard, the notice
issued by the Regional Manager in terms of section 93(1 )(b)(i) also misconstrued
the true position with regards to whether Ministerial consent was required for the
5 2023 JDR 2275 (SCA) at para (49].
12
transfer of the shares from the estate to Ms Mlotshwa or from Ms Mlotshwa to Mr.
Makhato and Mr. Motsamai.
[32] While it may be that the Ministerial consent was not required for the transfer of
Ms Mlotshwa 's shares and the Regional Director was mistaken in addressing the
section 93(1 )(b) notice, the consequences of doing so,_ ultimately brought to the
attention of Ms Mlotshwa, the fact that Ochre Shimmer had disposed of its interest
in the Mining Right to Afrimat. It is not an issue that this Court must decide
whether the transaction was contemplated or for that matter underway at the time
that the sale of Ms Mlotshwa's shares in Ochre Shimmer were negotiated but it
is certainly provides a context for why Ms Mlotshwa has chosen to intervene in
these proceedings .
[33] Having found that no Ministerial consent is required for the transfer of the shares
of Ms Mlotshwa in Ochre Shimmer to Mr. Makhato and Mr. Motsamai, what is left
is the order sought by Afrimat.
[34] The failure of the Minister to take a decision in terms of section 11 (1) and section
11 (2) of the application submitted by Afrimat on 30 June 2025 is reviewable under
section 6(2)(g) read with section 6(3) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act6 (PAJA). It was argued th~t the failure of the Minister to take a decision was
in terms of section 1 (a)(ii)7 of PAJA administrative action. Furthermore , Afrimat
only has recourse in terms of PAJA because the internal remedies provided for
in section 968 of the MPRD Act are only of application when a decision has been
taken . In the present matter, no decision has been taken.
6 3 of 2000.
7 "any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision".
8 "(1) Any person whose rights or legitimate expectations have been materially and adversely affected or
who is aggrieved by any administrative decision in terms of this Act may appeal within 30 days becoming
{sic] aware of such administrative decision in the prescribed manner."
13
[35] In this case, the Minister has failed to take a decision in terms of the MPRD Act.
The failure to take a decision is reviewable in terms of section 6(2)(g), read with
section 6(3), of the PAJA. Section 6(2)(g) provides that:
"6 Judicial review of administrative action
(2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an
administrative action if -
(g) the action concerned consists of a failure to take a decision"
[36] Section 6(3)(a) provides:
"If any person relies on the ground of review referred to in subsection 2(g), he or
she may in respect of a failure to take a decision, where-
(i) an administrator has a duty to take a decision;
(ii) there is no law that prescribes a period within which the administrator is
required to take that decision, and
(iii) the administrator has failed to take that decision,
institute proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review of the failure to take
the decision on the ground that there has been unreasonable delay in taking the
decision."
14
[37) In deciding whether a delay is unreasonable, in Vumazonke v MEG for Social
Development, Eastern Cape, and Three Similar Cases,9 it was held:
"When consideration is given to this fact, the nature of the discretion to be
exercised, the limited amount of information upon which th~. decisions would be .
based and the fact that most of the information is contained in the applications
themselves, any delay beyond three months is unreasonable in the absence of
special circumstances. "
[38] While Ms Mlotshwa (and for that matter the Regional Director) may well have
been mistaken regarding whether Ministerial consent was required for the
transfer of her shares, the failure on the part of the Minister to take a decision,
one way or another, for a period of some 9 months is what precipitated the
present application.
[39] The urgency is self-evident in view of the impending closure of the window within
which Afrimat must make application for its allocation on the IOEC. Having
secured 3 extensions of time, it is unlikely that any further extensions will be
granted given that it is not only ·Afrimat that is bidding for an allocation on the
IOEC but also other parties.
[40] It was argued that Afrimat faces the current situation because of the conduct of
third parties and through no fault of its own. There is no other alternative open to
it other than to seek the orders that it does and an order that this Court order the
Minister to consent to the transfer of the Mining Right together with consequential
relief.
[41] Since time is of the essence, in direct consequence of the failure ·on the part of
the Minister to make a decision, it was argued for Afrimat that it would be just and
9 2005 (6) SA 229 (SE) at para [39].
15
equitable for this Court to order the consent to the transfer of the Mining Right
and the execution of the notarial deed of cession which effects it within truncated
time periods so as to ensure that it is able to meet the time lines for the submission
of its bid for IOEC allocation.
[42] Besides the obvious commercial interest that Afrimat has in the matter, there are ,,
other perhaps equally compelling reasons why it would be just and equitable in
terms of section 8(1 )(g) of PAJA to making such an order. These include the
following facts:
[42.1] Afrimat's iron ore operations currently employ approximately 175
permanent employees and 930 contractors - a total of over 1 100
people. This self-evidently means that at least 1 100 families are
dependent upon Afrimat for their livelihoods. Afrimat is by any
accounts an employer of significance within the Northern Cape. There
are approximately 500 currently employed at Demaneng Mine.
[42.2] Doornfontein, where the Mining Right in issue, is located, is sufficiently
close to Demaneng that it will preserve the employment ·of the 500
employees at Demaneng when it closes and will also then, it is
expected, add approximately 150 new employment opportunities for
contractors and local services providers.
[42.3] Any interruption to or interference with Afrimat's future operations is
likely to have a serious consequence to its continued ability to employ
the employees that it does and for employment in the area generally.
[43] Besides the consequences for those employed by Afrimat should the consent to
the transfer and transfer of the Mining Right not occur timeously, Afrimat stands
to lose a significant capital investment already made into this Mining Right. This
16
includes field exploration and modelling costs as well as a non-refundable deposit
paid to the fourth respondent in anticipation of the commencement of mining
operations.
[44) It is not in dispute in this matter that the only reason consent to the transfer of the
Mining Right was not given was in consequence of a misunderstanding on the
part of the second respondent on whether any consent was required for the
transfer of Ms Mlotshwa's shares to Mr. Makhato and Mr. Motsamai.
[45) While ordinarily it is undesirable for a Court to step into the shoes of the decision
maker, in the circumstances of this case, it is apposite and necessary to avert the
unintended consequences that any further delay may have by preventing Afrimat
from timeously submitting its bid for an IOEC allocation . Any further delays would
leave Afrimat with no remedy. 10
[46) In Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South
Africa Ltd and Another, 11 the Court, in dealing with a just and equitable remedy
in terms of section 8 of PAJA held:
"[90] This applies with equal force to the wide decision-making powers
available to the courts under s 8(1) of PAJA. It is perspicuous that there
are a wide range of options available to a court exercising its discretion
under s 8(1), as it lists a number of just and equitable remedies that a
court may grant. Significantly, it does not seek to confine a court to the
listed remedies. It provides that a court may award any order that is just
and equitable, including, but not limited to the listed remedies. It follows
that any of these remedies is equally permissible .. . "
10 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) at para [47).
11 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC) at para [90].
17
[47] While initially the first, second and third respondents opposed the application,
they subsequently withdrew the opposition and filed a notice that they would
abide the decision of the Court. The order that I intend to make was
foreshadowed in the original notice of motion, save in respect of time periods.
[48] Costs are a matter that are within the discretion of the Court. On consideration
of the matter, I am of the view that while Ms Mlotshwa may well have been
unsuccessful in having the application dismissed as she sought to do, her
intervention given the circumstances was not .unreasonable. This was
occasioned in direct consequence of the section 93(1 )(b) which represented
incorrectly that her consent was required. Insofar as the second respondent may
have played a role in this, once it withdrew its opposition to the application and
abided the decision of the Court, it abandoned that position. Ms Mlotshwa ought
to have taken her <;;ue from this.
[49] Had it not abandoned the incorrect position that it had adopted and abided the . .
decision of the Court, I would have considered ordering it to pay Ms Mlotshwa's
costs as well but in these circumstances, it would be inappropriate to do so.
Accordingly, in respect of Ms Mlotshwa's intervention application and in respect
of her participation, there is no order for costs. She will not obtain any order for
costs in her favour but neither will she be liable for Afrimat's costs.
[50] Afrimat for its part, the entirely innocent party in these proceedings, in any event,
had to approach this Court for the order that it sought and which I intend to make.
The costs will follow the result, and the second respondent is to bear Afrimat's
costs which costs are to include the costs consequent upon the engagement of
two counsel, one of whom is a senior counsel, on Scale C.
[51] In the circumstances, it is ordered:
18
[51.1] The forms and service provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court (Rules)
are dispensed with and the matter is permitted to be heard as one of
urgency in terms of Rule 6(12). The applicant's non-compliance with the
rules is condoned.
[51.2] The intervening appliccmt is wanted leave to intervene and joined in
these proceedings as the fifth respondent.
[51 .3] The failure by the second respondent (being the official with delegated
authority from the first respondent) to take a decision in accordance with
section 11 (2) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act,
2002, (MPRDA), to grant consent for the _t-ransfer of a mining right with
reference number NC30/5/1/2/2/10107 MR. (Mining Right) from the
fourth respondent to the _applicant (Consent), pursuant to the application
in terms of section 11 of the MP RDA lodged by the fourth respondent with
the first to third respondents. under refe·rence number NC-00160-MR/11,
is reviewed in terms of section 6(2)(g) read with section 6(3) of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (PAJA), and set aside in
terms of section 8(1 )(c) of PAJA.
[51.4] The second respondent, alternatively the first respondent, is directed to
grant the Consent in accordance with section 11 (2) of the MPRDA, and
to provide the ~pplicant '«ith written confirmation of that decision by no
later than 20 May 2026. •
[51.5] The second respondent, or a duly authorised official from the second
respondent's office, is directed to appear, to the extent necessary, before
a Notary Public by no later than 22 May 2026 for purposes of the
execution of a Notariai Deed of Cession in respect of the Mining Right.
19
[51.6] The second respondent is directed to pay the applicant's costs of the
application which costs are to include the costs of two counsel (one of
whom is senior counsel), on scale C.
[51. 7] There is no order for costs in respect of the application for intervention or
in respect of the fifth respondent.
HEARD ON:
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
13 MAY 2026
18 MAY 2026
ADV. L SISILANA SC
ADV. LCRO W
DENEYS
MR. A VOS/MR. F LE ROUX
COUNSEL FOR THE FIFTH RESPONDENT: ADV. D MPOFU SC
(INTERVENING PARTY) ADV. T MODISE
INSTRUCTED BY: MABUZA ATTORNEYS
REFERENCE: MR. E MABUZN MS. I MNDEBELE
20
THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD RE~:iPONDENTS FILED A NOTICE TO ABIDE THE
DECISION OF THE COURT. THE FOURTH RESPONDENT DID NOT OPPOSE.