REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA)
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / N.Q
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / WO
(3) REVISED: NO
15 MAY 2026
DATE SIGNATURE
CASE NUMBER: 150090/2025
In the matter between:
LUCILE JANINE ENGELBRECHT Applicant
AND
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MARSELINO JOHN MILLER First Respondent
CAYLIN BENNETT Second Respondent
CASE NUMBER: 088951/2024
In the matter between:
EUPHIN MOHLALA Applicant
AND
CLIVE MOSHIA Respondent
CASE NUMBER: 137348/2025
In the matter between:
ANNA PETRONELLA SUSANNA FOURIE Applicant
AND
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YOLANDA THERESA VILJOEN Respondent
CASE NUMBER: 153692/2025
In the matter between:
ANDRIES GERHARDUS DE BEER Applicant
AND
ABRAHAM JOHANNES MALHERBE Respondent
CASE NUMBER: 132223/2025
In the matter between:
YVONNE BEULAH CRAIG Applicant
AND
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HERMANUS PHILLIPUS DU PLESSIS Respondent
Heard on: 19 February 2026
Delivered on: 15 May 2026
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________
GREYLING AJ
1. These five compulsory sequestration applications were enrolled in the Insolvency
Court during the week 2 to 6 February 2026. The first application (“ Engelbrecht”)
was enrolled as the return day of a rule nisi. The other four applications “Mohlala”,
“Fourie”, “De Beer” and “Craig” were enrolled for provisional sequestration orders.
The court had already prepared all matters allocated before the first motion day
commenced.
2. The Engelbrecht matter was called on Tuesday, 3 February 2026. Since the court
had serious reservations pertaining to the drafting pattern used, the framing of
monies allegedly lent and advanced and the context provided in the founding
affidavit in each of the five applications, the Court enquired from counsel if he also
held instructions in the other four applications which were enrolled for 6 February
2026. Upon confirmation by counsel, Mr W.P. Venter (“Mr Venter”), the court stood
the Engelbrecht applic ation down until 6 February 2026 to be dealt with
simultaneously with the other four applications and requested a supplementary
affidavit from the instructing attorney, Mr Uys of Francois Uys Incorporated (“Mr
Uys”) explaining certain aspects evident from the applications and requested his
personal attendance at court on the Friday.
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3. In the Engelbrecht application the court sought clarity by means of a
supplementary affidavit concerning glaring inconsistencies apparent from the
founding affidavit. Engelbrecht’s own identity number confirmed by her under oath
materially differed from the copy of her identity document annexed; secondly, her
signature to the founding affidavit materially differed from her signature on her
identity document annexed; thirdly, she declared that the Respondent’s letter
acknowledging inability to pay was received during 2024 when the letter is in fact
dated 15 August 2025; fourthly, no factual proof was annexed to the application
that the amount of R54,300.00 was ever paid to the Respondent in terms of the
verbal agreement; fifthly, no allegation appeared in the papers as to whether the
Respondents are married in community of property; lastly, service of the
application on the Respondents was effected in Wynberg East, Cape Town whilst
they reside in Kempton Park, Johannesburg.
4. As this court was not directed to these inconsistencies in the practice note, the
court enquired from counsel whether the court issuing the rule was alerted thereto.
No practice note filed previously mentioned any of these inconsistencies and if
mentioned, no rule would have been issued.
5. On Wednesday, the 4th of February 2026, Mr Uys filed the affidavit as requested.
As to the inconsistencies not brought to the court’s attention, the affidavit merely
states that “as counsel’s fees are too high” the practice notes are drafted by his
offices.
6. As to the court’s concerns mentioned above, the affidavit stated that the identity
number is typographical; secondly, the different signatures explained as “ this is
how the documents were received from client ” and as to proof of signature a
Mandate and Fee Agreement between Engelbrecht and Francois Uys
Incorporated, identity card and confirmation of address were provided; thirdly, the
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difference in date between the Respondent’s letter and that stated under oath is
typographical; fourthly, no objective evidence of payment exists as the payment
was cash; fifthly, no other antenuptial contract could be traced on Windeed or
SearchWorks and Engelbrecht’s ipse dixit was accordingly accepted. ; sixthly,
when the application was issued the Respondents resided in Kempton Park, but
when service had to be effected, they were regularly travelling to the Western Cape
and refused to provide their address in Cape Town, so arrangements were made
telephonically that Respondents would accept service at Wynberg East. These
telephonic communications between Mr Uys and the Respondents were possible
because of previous attempts to recover the debt. I will return to these
explanations.
7. Hershensohn AJ, sitting in this court, handed down judgment on 3 February 2026,
dismissing four compulsory sequestrations based on the same template driven
applications burdening this court and wherein Mr Uys and Mr Venter featured. Mr
Uys therefore stated:
“5. The defects in this matter are admitted, I refer to the judgement of Judge
HERSHENSOHN AJ as mentioned earlier as FU3, the defects in these
applications have been addressed by the court and myself and as such I
have undertaken to rectify these matters.
6. Our instruction to counsel was subsequently to dismiss/remove this matter
in chambers and not for the matter to be heard with the above judgement in
mind. We are now aware of the fact that these discrepancies exist and in
an attempt to rectify them reques ted such dismissal, unfortunately the
matter had already been set down for hearing. It was NOT my intention to
have this matter heard.
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7. I apologize to the Honourable court for any inconvenience caused in light of
the facts mentioned above. I ask that as these matters have been
adjudicated on, that the matter be simply:
• dismissed,
• the Rule Nisi be discharged,
• and that no order be made as to costs.”
8. Supplementary affidavits were filed and uploaded to Caselines in each of the other
four applications during late afternoon of 5 February 2026.
9. In Mohlala, the supplementary affidavit was dated 4 February 2026. Mr Uys stated:
“After a telecom [sic] with the respondent I was able to determine that the
Respondent on his version owns the following movable assets, after negotiation
he was kind enough to email a list to my secretary”; and “here [sic] is undoubtedly
a benefit to cred itors, a dividend can only be calculated after the claims process
has been completed by the Master/Curator, but nonetheless it is evident that a
dividend will exist.”
10. In Fourie, the supplementary affidavit is also dated 4 February 2026. Mr Uys
stated:
“After a detailed search, my offices were able to confirm that the respondent is the
owner of a Toyota Vitz, attached hereto is a valuation of said vehicle. ownership
[sic] was confirmed via telephone with the respondent as well. it [sic] must be
mentioned that the respondent advised that she awaits the sequestration and shall
surrender the car willingly to the estate”; and with the exact same statement that
“There is undoubtedly a benefit to creditors, a dividend can only be calculated after
the claims process has been completed by the Master/Curator, but none the less
[sic] it is evident that a dividend will exist.”
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11. In De Beer, the supplementary affidavit is also dated 4 February 2026. Mr Uys
states that:
“After a telecom [sic] with the respondent I was able to determine that there is an
asset in the Respondent’s possession, a Ford Fiesta. Attached hereto is a
valuation of the car with the information provided to me, a value of R 119 500.00
retail exists”; and he repeated the exact statement as to benefit for creditors.
12. In Craig, the supplementary affidavit is dated 30 January 2026 and uploaded to
CaseLines on 2 February 2026. Mr Uys stated:
“Attached as Annexure "A" is the Automated Valuation of 327 Parsley Street,
Annlin, Pretoria; a property that is owned by the Respondent. There is another
asset in the Respondent's possession, a Volkswagen T-Roc. Further details herein
are unknow [sic]”; a nd he concludes with the exact same statement as to benefit
for creditors.
13. Despite the aforegoing, when the matters were called on Friday, 6 February 2026,
there was no appearance by Mr Venter in any of these matters and Mr Uys was
also not present despite the court’s request. Their absence caused a
postponement and the applicati ons could only be dealt with virtually on 19
February 2026.
14. The virtual court proceeded in the presence of Mr Venter, Mr Uys and Mr Rishay
Badhesi, an assistant of Mr Uys. I informed both Mr Venter and Mr Uys that as
officers of the court they have ample opportunity to make submissions in regards
to the court’s dif ficulties. Mr Venter conveyed that his absence on Friday, 6
February 2026 was as a result of a fall -out he had with Mr Uys the previous day
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and subsequently, on the morning of the 6th at 06:00, he returned all his briefs to
Mr Uys and therefore he did not now hold a brief to appear in any of the five
applications. Mr Uys stated that he had right of appearance and that he, except for
the Engelbrecht matter, would move the provisional sequestration orders in the
remaining four applications.
15. Mr Venter and Mr Uys informed this court that they knew since the previous
Monday before Hershensohn AJ what the outcome of those four applications would
be, as well as the reasons therefore, as in their view my brother took a firm stance
in those matters and also stood the matters down until that Friday to be dealt with.
16. Mr Venter confirmed that he appeared in Engelbrecht matter when the provisional
order was granted, but he could not remember whether he informed the court or
made submissions referencing the shortcomings in the application, but accepted
that he should have filed a practice note bringing same to the courts attention. He
recognised the duty of counsel to do so and admitted his mistake. Even accepting
that the Engelbrecht matter would have been withdrawn on the 3rd, the persistence
with the remaining four iden tical applications the week immediately after
Hershensohn AJ dismissed four identical applications, could not be explained.
17. It was conveyed to Mr Uys that this Court had identified approximately 15 instances
of similarity, which he conceded. These similarities are evident from all five
applications and commence as soon as the alleged debt is dealt with. The
similarities are not confined to broad structure. They extend to recurring words,
phrases, grammatical formulations, spelling errors and capitalisation:
17.1. Engelbrecht states that:
“5.3.1 The Applicant Would [sic] loan an amount of R54 300.00 the 1st
Respondent at his specific request and instance for the purpose of capital
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needed by the Respondent, It is prudent to note that the reason for the
loan was to assist the business but the loan was requested in the
Respondents Personal Capacity.”
17.2. Mohlala states that:
“5.3.1 The Applicant Would [sic] loan an amount of R66,000.00 to the
respondent at his specific request and instance.
5.3.2 The Applicant and Respondent were friends up till the stage when
legal proceedings had to be instituted.”
17.3. Fourie states that:
“5.5.1 The Respondent approached the Applicant on her own free will and
without duress from any other party.
5.5.2 The Respondent requested a personal loan, recorded as such at all
times during the request in the amount of R65,855.70.”
17.4. De Beer states that:
“5.3.2 The Respondent frequented the services of the Applicant to confirm
the above services after telephonic discussions. The Respondent
was quoted a [sic] amount of R60, 000.00 discounted to R52,500.00
at the Respondents request.”
17.5. Craig states that:
“5.3.1 The Applicant Would [sic] loan an amount of R 52 300.00 to the
respondent at his specific request and instance in his personal
capacity, the respondent advanced the reason that his cashflow
was low and he had expenses to pay.
Page 11 of 26
5.3.2 The Respondent frequented the home of the Applicant often and
forged a well-founded [sic] relationship with the Applicant.”
17.6. The repeated phrase “Applicant Would”, with the same unusual
capitalisation, appears in Engelbrecht, Mohlala and Craig. The expression
“specific request and instance” also appears in those three applications.
Engelbrecht and Craig further frame the alleged debt as one incurred in the
respondent’s personal capacity. In Engelbrecht this appears as
“Respondents Personal Capacity”, and in Craig as “in his personal
capacity”.
17.7. A similar type of relationship-based background is also used. Mohlala refers
to the parties being “friends up till the stage when legal proceedings had to
be instituted”, while Craig states that the respondent “frequented the home
of the Applicant often” and “forged a well-founded [sic] relationship with the
Applicant”. De Beer similarly uses the word “frequented”, although in the
context of alleged services.
17.8. Each application then turns to an invoice attached, or purportedly attached,
as Annexure B:
17.8.1. Engelbrecht states:
“5.3.3 The Respondents however made no payments and as such
a meeting to discuss their default was arranged for January
2023, on this date a [sic] invoice for the amount owed was
presented to the 1st Respondent. Attached hereto as
Annexure B is said invoice.”
17.8.2. Mohlala states:
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“5.3.3 Attached hereto as Annexure B is an invoice that my
attorney advised me to have the Respondent sign
confirming the loan amount as there is no written contract
between us ..”
17.8.3. Fourie states:
“5.5.3 on seeking counsel, I reached out to my attorney at the time
who advised that I get a signed acknowledgement of debt
from the Respondent, I was unable to do so as she refused
to sign same. I did manage to have her sign an invoice for
the amount due. Attac hed hereto as Annexure B is the
invoice.”
17.8.4. De Beer states:
“5.3.2 The Respondent frequented the services of the Applicant to
confirm the above services after telephonic discussions.
The Respondent was quoted a [sic] amount of R 60 000.00
discounted to R 52 500.00 at the Respondents request. in
December 2020, the Invoice is attached hereto as
"Annexure B". No deposit was received as work began
immediately and was finalized due to its urgency. Work was
completed on the property and payment was requested as
agreed in January 2021.”
17.8.5. Craig states:
“5.3.3 The Respondent however made no payments and as such
a meeting to discuss his default was arranged for 28
February 2023, on this date a [sic] invoice for the amount
owed was presented to the Respondent. Attached hereto
as Annexure B is said invoice.”
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17.9. Engelbrecht and Craig are particularly striking. Both use the formulation
“made no payments”, followed by “a meeting to discuss” default, followed
by “on this date”, followed by “a invoice”, followed by “for the amount owed”,
and concluding with “Attached hereto as Annexure B is said invoice”. The
wording is materially the same, with only the date and pronouns altered.
17.10. Mohlala and Fourie also follow an invoice -centred structure. Both refer to
advice received from an attorney or counsel, the absence or non -
procurement of a more formal written document, and then rely on an invoice
attached as Annexure B. De Beer, although framed as a services claim, also
relies on the same central device, namely an invoice attached as Annexure
B.
17.11. The applications therefore display similarity at several levels: the amounts
claimed, the sequence in which the alleged debt is pleaded, the use of
personal or relational background, the repeated reliance on an invoice as
Annexure B, and the recurrence of particular expressions and errors,
including “Applicant Would”, “specific request and instance”, “Respondents
Personal Capacity”, “frequented”, “made no payments”, “a invoice”, “said
invoice”, and “Attached hereto as Annexure B”.
18. The claim in each application is therefore pleaded in materially similar language.
All amounts are either approximately R52,500.00 or R66,000.00. The recurring
formulation, the repeated reliance on an invoice attached as Annexure B and the
repeated grammatical and spelling errors are material features of the papers.
19. In each application the act or acts of insolvency relied upon are framed as follows:
19.1. Engelbrecht states:
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“5.6 During 2024, the 1st Respondent sent my attorney of record, a letter
stating that he is unable to make payment towards the amount
indebted to the me. A copy of the letter is attached hereto marked
Annexure "D".”
19.2. Mohlala states:
“5.6 During the course of settlement attempts, the Respondent sent my
attorney of record, a letter stating that he is unable to make payment
towards the amount indebted to the me. A copy of the letter is attached
hereto marked Annexure "D".”
19.3. Fourie states:
“5.7 however despite almost a year of promises to my attorney she never
made any payment to them or me, she called my attorney to say that
she is unable to pay and shockingly that she is selling assets to again
pay creditors, my attorney immediately asked her to put this is writing”.
19.4. De Beer states:
“5.6 During 2025, the Respondent called my attorney of record, stating that
he is unable to make payment towards the amount indebted to the me.
The attorney asked the Respondent to put his pleas in writing so that
instruction may be taken from me, the Respondent replied with a mail
Attached hereto marked Annexure "D".”
19.5. Craig states:
“5.6 During 2023, the Respondent sent my attorney of record, a letter
stating that he is unable to make payment towards the amount
indebted to the me. A copy of the letter is attached hereto marked
Annexure "D".”
Page 15 of 26
20. Advantage to creditors is similarly dealt with in similar template format;
20.1. Engelbrecht states:
“11.1 It is my opinion that the 1st Respondent will sell his (joint) assets in
order to meet benefits [sic] of specific creditors, and this will be to
the detriment of their remaining creditors. It is therefore of the
utmost importance that a Trustee be appointed in order to facilitate
a proper investigation into this as well as other matters relating to
the Respondent's assets and set aside any disposition not made for
value.”
20.2. Mohlala states:
“11.1 It is my opinion that the Respondent will sell his assets in order to
meet benefits [sic] of specific creditors, and this will be to the
detriment of their remaining creditors. It is therefore of the utmost
importance that a Trustee be appointed in order to facilitate a proper
investigation into this as well as other matters relating to the
Respondent's assets and set aside any disposition not made for
value.”
20.3. Fourie states:
“11.1 It is my opinion that the Respondent will sell her assets in order to
meet benefits [sic] of specific creditors, and this will be to the
detriment of her remaining creditors. It is therefore of the utmost
importance that a Trustee be appointed in order to facilitate a proper
investigation into this as well as other matters.”
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20.4. De Beer states:
“10.1 It is my opinion that the Respondent will sell his assets in order to
meet benefits [sic] of specific creditors, and this will be to the
detriment of his remaining creditors. It is therefore of the utmost
importance that a Trustee be appointed in order to facilitate a proper
investigation into this as well as other matters relating to the
Respondent's assets and set aside any disposition not made for
value.”
20.5. Craig states:
“11.1 It is my opinion that the Respondent will sell his assets in order to
meet benefits [sic] of specific creditors, and this will be to the
detriment of their remaining creditors. It is therefore of the utmost
importance that a Trustee be appointed in order to facilitate a proper
investigation into this as well as other matters relating to the
Respondent's assets and set aside any disposition not made for
value.”
21. Reference was made above to the flurry of supplementary affidavits that were
filed in the remaining four applications. Engelbrecht’s supplementary affidavit has
already been dealt with supra. All the supplementary affidavits were filed to
breathe life into the remaining four applications and, on 19 February 2026, Mr
Uys moved the provisional sequestration applications. However, these
supplementary affidavits did not cure the defects. They compounded them.
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22. Mohlala’s supplementary affidavit was filed on Thursday afternoon, as mentioned
supra. It introduces a list of 28 movable household items, ranging from a lamp
worth R80 to a mattress of R4 500, which is, incidentally, the highest value item
on the list. No sworn valuation is attached and no formal dividend calculation was
prepared. This was therefore not an attempt to convert the application into a so -
called “friendly sequestration”. It was rather an ill-conceived attempt to bolster the
requirement of advan tage to creditors where none existed. On a cursory
consideration of the list, it is apparent that the items are, from an advantage -to-
creditors perspective, of negligible realisable value and, in any event, fall squarely
within the class of household items ordinarily retained by an insolvent in terms of
s 82(6) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, which provides:
“From the sale of the movable property shall be excepted the wearing apparel
and bedding of the insolvent and the whole or such part of his household
furniture, and tools and other essential means of subsistence as the creditors,
or if no creditor has prov ed a claim against the estate, as the Master may
determine and the insolvent shall be allowed to retain, for his own use any
property so excepted from the sale.”
23. The list supplied by Mr Uys, extracted from CaseLines, reads: Sofa R3000; Study
Table R650; Chairs R950; Bed Frame R2800; Mattress R4500; Refrigerator
R2300; Microwave R2300; Washing Machine R3000; Television R3600; Lamp
R95; Curtains R1800; Blender R1800; Electric Kettle R950; Toaster R560; Iron
R480; Wardrobe R3000; Fan R300; Heater R350; Dish Rack R650; Cutlery Set
R850; Dinner Set R900; Laundry Basket R80; Mirror R650; Side Table R300; TV
Stand R1800; Wall Clock R360; Garbage Cutter R900.
24. On these figures, and absent any reliable valuation or dividend computation, the
alleged advantage in dividend value for the concursus is not established. The
alleged advantage in dividend value for the concursus is not established. The
supplementary affidavit adds nothing of probative value to the enquiry and serves
only to create a false impression that the statutory requirement of advantage to
creditors has been met.
Page 18 of 26
25. Fourie’s supplementary affidavit by Mr Uys was deposed to on 4 February 2026
stating that “3. After a detailed search, my offices were able to confirm that the
Respondent is the owner of a Toyota Vitz, attached hereto is a valuation of said
vehicle.” Howev er, no valuation is attached and the attached CSI Vehicle
Ownership document clearly indicates that the report was drawn on 05/02/2026
14:58 and printed on the same date at 15:00. It was uploaded onto CaseLines at
15:01. Despite the allegation of confirmat ion of ownership with the Respondent
and a WhatsApp vehicle licence photo, credible evidence is absent. The facts
asserted to under oath by Mr Uys are, objectively considered, circumspect. The
objective timeline indicates that Mr Uys signed the supplementary affidavit before
the discovery of the asset. The WhatsApp photo of the licence disc uploaded onto
CaseLines reflects the date stamp of the photo as 2026 -02-05 at 14:14:48,
cementing the timeline as the supplementary affidavit being first, secondly the
licence disc photo and thirdly the CSI Vehicle Ownership document. On the
objective chronology, the probable inference is that Mr Uys had knowledge of this
asset prior to its declared discovery.
26. De Beer’s supplementary affidavit refers generically to a Ford Fiesta “in the
Respondent’s possession” without any further detail. The valuation also refers to
a Ford Fiesta without any further detail. Mr Uys states that the valuation is
attached of the ca r “with the information provided to me”. Properly considered,
however, the annexed document contains no information beyond a Ford Model
Fiesta with a registration number. The submission that the vehicle will increase
the advantage to creditors has no substance.
27. Craig’s supplementary affidavit is dated 30 January 2026. The valuation is
automated by Windeed, but the search date clearly indicates 2026/02/02 10:05
and the report print date as 2026/02/02 10:11. It was uploaded to CaseLines at
and the report print date as 2026/02/02 10:11. It was uploaded to CaseLines at
12:03 on the same date. O bjectively, the supplementary affidavit predates the
valuation information. Unfortunately for Mr Uys, the affidavit unequivocally states
that ownership of this immovable property falls within his knowledge, without the
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context of sudden discovery as the other supplementary affidavits may have
suggested. The property is declared by the Applicant in the founding affidavit as
the address of the Respondent. Mr Uys states unreservedly that “a property that
is owned by the Res pondent” and further that “there is another asset in the
Respondent’s possession, a Volkswagen T-Roc [sic]. Further details are unknow
[sic].”
28. As a result, as at 19 February 2026, the Respondent owned immovable property
valued between R2 520 000.00 and R2 060 000.00, at the lower end, plus the
value of the T -Roc. Even if the Applicant’s alleged loan is accepted, the
sequestration application was persisted with whilst the Respondent was
commercially and factually solvent.
29. In all four applications dealt with hereinbefore, the evidence placed on record
through Mr Uys’s supplementary affidavits materially undermined the credibility
of each applicant. The statement in every founding affidavit by the applicant that
“the Respondent will sell all his assets in order to meet benefits [sic] of specific
creditors” appears, on the objective material later placed before Court, to be
untruthful.
30. On 19 February 2026 the Court urged Mr Uys to accept the Court’s invitation to
address these aspects fully and indicated that the Court would extend its sitting
hours to allow him time to explain the Court’s difficulties in every matter. Mr Uys
declined an d submitted that he could not take the matters any further. His
unwillingness to address the Court’s concerns did not dispel the concern that
these applications may have been based on fabricated loans for ulterior
purposes, and may constitute an abuse of the Court’s process.
31. As the relief was persisted with, except in the Engelbrecht matter, it is necessary
for this Court to deal with the merits of all five applications. It is trite that the Court
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retains a discretion and must prevent abuse of process. No doubt, a
sequestration order is a drastic remedy. It establishes a concursus creditorum
and, upon sequestration, the trustee administers and distributes the estate in
accordance with the Insolvency Act. The hand of the law is laid upon the estate
so that no single creditor may alter rights to the prejudice of the general body. It
also affects the civil status of an individual and engages matters of public interest.
The Court is accordingly obliged t o satisfy itself independently that the
jurisdictional requirements prescribed by the Insolvency Act are met.
32. Unopposed sequestration applications heighten the Court’s duty to safeguard its
processes and to prevent abuse and misuse for ulterior purposes. The inherent
power to control process is well-established.
33. The concept of advantage to creditors was formulated by the Constitutional Court
in Stratford and Others v Investec Bank Limited and Others1. The Court held that
“advantage” is broad and should not be rigidified. Insisting on a cents-in-the-rand
calculation in hostile sequestration can be unhelpful, but the Court must still
assess whether sequestration will likely produce some benefit for cred itors. The
Court’s discretion must be guided by the classic Friedman approach 2. Roper J
stated that “The classic test is thus whether the facts satisfy the Court that there
is a reasonable prospect — not necessarily a likelihood, but not too remote —
that some pecuniary benefit will result to creditors.” The statutory inquiry powers
are not an advantage in themselves. They are a means to achieve material
benefit.
34. Be that as it may, all five applications fall at the first hurdle. There is no evidence
of any verbal loan agreement between each applicant and each respondent. Had
there been credible evidence substantiating this allegation, it would have found
its way to Court. During the week preceding my sitting, and on the admissions of
its way to Court. During the week preceding my sitting, and on the admissions of
both Mr Venter and Mr Uys, they were well aware that this aspect required
Page 21 of 26
objective, credible substantiating evidence rather than mere clarification that the
alleged loans were paid in cash. The supplementary affidavits filed before this
Court are indicative of the ample opportunity provided to place those facts on
record. None was forthcoming. The final order will therefore reflect that the five
applications are dismissed.
35. However, the conduct of counsel and the attorney of record, Mr Uys, left this Court
with no other choice than to question their ethical conduct.
36. The uberrima fides duty of legal practitioners towards the Court has been
emphasised in ex parte insolvency matters, as has the need for full disclosure.
This duty exists so that creditors and the Court can properly assess whether the
legal requirements are met on supporting evidence deposed to in affidavits.
37. This Court in Ex parte Slabbert3 warned against template insolvency litigation and
evidence suggesting coordinated manipulation of statutory requirements4. As far
back as 2015, this Court noted in Ex parte Reggioro and Others the proliferation
of voluntary surrender applications in standard form and described a “fledgling
cottage industry”. It recorded that many take a standardised cut -and-paste form
drafted by a small set of attorneys specialising in such applications. This authority
is particularly relevant where compulsory sequestration applications display the
same template hallmarks and friendliness-risk indicators.
38. In matters such as Ex parte Du Raan and Another; Ex parte Snyman; and Ex
parte Buys, the abuse shows its ugly face. 5 Daphue J dismissed three near -
identical voluntary surrender applications, criticised the proliferation of carbon -
copy insolvency litigation, found that the insolvency requirements were not
genuinely met, and warned against abuse where practitioners benefi t from
debtors’ predicaments. Significantly, the calculation of advantage to creditors
Page 22 of 26
came under scrutiny with specific reference to an amount of R2 875.00 that was
incorrectly calculated in each matter as trustee fees.
39. As an illustration of how little effect court warnings sometimes have, this Court in
the week of 2 to 6 February 2026 dismissed applications brought by the same
attorney referred by Daphue J to the Legal Practice Council, based on the same
incorrect calculations that Daphue J referenced in his judgment. When requested
to present himself to Court, the attorney informed this Court that the investigation
arising from Daphue J’s referral to the Legal Practice Council had commenced
only during the week prior to this Court’s sitting.
40. When a combination of these factors is apparent from the papers, including
repetition across several applications enrolled by the same firm of attorneys, it
may become concerning if, when considered together, they suggest a purpose
other than the bona fide establishment of a concursus creditorum. The purpose
of sequestration is trite. Where the use of that process appears to be misused, or
invoked for a purpose inconsistent therewith, the matter cannot be approached
as a routine unopposed application. A rep eated lack of evidential substance,
objectively contradictory supplementation, or other features capable of
misleading the Court are matters which require scrutiny and, where appropriate,
investigation. These applications are of that nature.
41. It is against this background that the Court deals with the conduct of Mr Venter
and Mr Uys. Their respective positions are not the same. Mr Venter appeared as
counsel in circumstances dealt with below. Mr Uys, however, was the attorney
responsible for the preparation, issuing, enrolment and supplementation of all five
applications. This Court can also not ignore that similar applications, brought by
the same firm of attorneys, served before Hershensohn AJ during the previous
the same firm of attorneys, served before Hershensohn AJ during the previous
week, and that Mr Uys nevertheless persisted with these applications thereafter.
Page 23 of 26
42. The position of Mr Venter is materially different from that of Mr Uys. Mr Venter
appeared as counsel in the Engelbrecht matter. When the Court raised the
defects in that matter, he did not seek to persist with the application or to defend
what could not properly be defended. He acted in accordance with his instructions
and conveyed the difficulties identified by the Court to Mr Uys. When the Court
resumed on the postponed date, Mr Venter explained that he did not attend Court
on the Friday to which the matt ers had been stood down because he had
surrendered his briefs at 06:00 that morning, after a fallout between himself and
Mr Uys on the previous day. This was confirmed by Mr Uys. Mr Venter tendered
an apology. As far as this Court is concerned, his explana tion was accepted as
sufficient in the circumstances and no further sanction against Mr Venter is
presently justified.
43. The conduct of Mr Uys stands on a different footing. He was the attorney
responsible for the preparation, issuing, enrolment and supplementation of all five
matters. None of the features identified in this judgment, considered in isolation,
would necessarily justify the conclusion that the process was being misused. The
difficulty lies in their cumulative presence across these applications: the repetitive
template structure of the papers, the admitted after-the-fact generation of invoices
at his office to g ive apparent documentary support to alleged oral agreements
and payments for which no objective proof was placed before Court, the
persistence with these matters after Hershensohn AJ’s judgment, his failure to
attend Court when requested to do so and the a bsence of any satisfactory
explanation when the concerns were raised.
44. The supplementary affidavits became the hinge point. They were filed as a last
resort to strengthen the applications. Instead of curing the defects, they revealed
objectively that information presented as newly discovered assets either existed,
objectively that information presented as newly discovered assets either existed,
or was known, before the decision to supplement was taken. The same pattern
Page 24 of 26
emerging across all four remaining applications cannot be treated as mere
coincidence without explanation and, when sought, could not be provided. The
inference that evidence was being introduced incrementally to meet the Court’s
concerns, cannot be escape d and hence this conduct appears to be more
serious, prevalent and widespread than these five applications viewed in
isolation. These concerns are addressed in the order.
45. The Court is mindful that adverse remarks concerning legal practitioners should
not be made lightly. Where the material is inconclusive or where a practitioner
has not had a fair opportunity to deal with the Court’s concerns, restraint is
required. That is not the position here. The concerns were raised in open Court.
The Court explained to Mr Uys the import of the inferences that could be drawn
in the absence of proper explanation and afforded him ample opportunity to
address those concerns fully. He declined the invitation. The findings that follow
are therefore confined to the objective features apparent from the papers and to
the explanation, or absence of explanation, placed before Court.
46. After due consideration of all the facts and circumstances, this Court is satisfied
that the appropriate immediate sanction is a monetary and protective order,
coupled with a referral to the Legal Practice Council for urgent investigation.
ORDER:
In each of the five matters, the following order is made:
1. In case number 150090/2025, Lucile Janine Engelbrecht v Marselino John
Miller and Caylin Bennett , the rule nisi is discharged and the application for
sequestration is dismissed.
2. In case number 088951/2024, Euphin Mohlala v Clive Moshia , the application
for sequestration is dismissed.
Page 25 of 26
3. In case number 137348/2025, Anna Petronella Susanna Fourie v Yolanda
Theresa Viljoen, the application for sequestration is dismissed.
4. In case number 153692/2025, Andries Gerhardus de Beer v Abraham
Johannes Malherbe, the application for sequestration is dismissed.
5. In case number 132223/2025, Yvonne Beulah Craig v Hermanus Phillipus du
Plessis, the application for sequestration is dismissed.
6. No costs order is made in favour of any applicant.
7. Francois Uys Incorporated, as attorney of record for the applicants and as the firm
responsible for preparing and prosecuting these applications, is directed not to
present a bill to, nor to recover any fees or disbursements from any applicant in
relation to these applications.
8. To the extent that any fees or disbursements have already been raised, charged
to, debited to, received from, or paid by any applicant in respect of the work
referred to in paragraph 7 above, Francois Uys Incorporated shall perform a proper
reconciliation and repay any amount so raised, charged, debited, received or paid.
9. Mr Francois Uys is referred to the Legal Practice Council for urgent investigation
into his conduct in relation to the sequestration applications dealt with in this
judgment and such related matters as may appear from the judgment, including
the role of Francois Uys Incorporated insofar as the conduct occurred through that
practice.
10. The Registrar is directed to transmit a copy of this judgment and order to the Legal
Practice Council.
Page 26 of26
PJ GREYLING
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is
electronically circulated to the parties/their legal representatives by e-mail and by
uploading it to the electronic file of these matters on Caselines. The date for hand-down
is deemed to be 15 May 2026.
Appearances:
Counsel For the Plaintiffs:
Advocate Wentze l Venter
Instructed by FRANCOIS UYS INCORPORATED
REFERENCES:
1. Stratford and Others v Investec Bank Limited and Others (CCT 62/14) [2014] ZACC 38; 2015 (3) SA 1
(CC) (19 December 2014).
2. Meskin & Co v Friedman 1948 (2) SA 555 (Y-1).
3. Ex pa1t e Slabbe1t (099263/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 286; [2025] 3 All SA 264 (GP) (20 March 2025).
4. Ex pa1t e Reggioro and Others (66537-14; 21414-15; 23068-15; 23076-15; 25733-15; 25741-15; 39697-
145; 23403-15) [2015] ZAGPPHC 1152 (8 August 2015).
5. Ex pa1t e Du Raan and Another ; Ex pa1te Snyman; and Ex pait e Buys (6165/2024; 29/2025; 645/2025)
[2025] ZAFSHC 284 (Free State Division, Bloemfontein , 9 September 2025).