In the matter between:
DJ M obo RJ M
and
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
1
Reportable
Case no: 2616/2025
PLAINTIFF
DEFENDANT
Neutral citation: DJM obo RJM v RAF (2616/2025) [2026] ZAFSHC 241 (14 April 2026)
Coram: CRONJEAJ
Heard: 10 March 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties'
representatives by email and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is
deemed to be 15h00 on 14 April 2026.
Summary: Claim against the Road Accident Fund - claim form not completed in all material
respects - substantive compliance - court raising failure to sign the claim form mero motu -
court proposing index and pagination of claim documents when submitting them to the Road
Accident Fund - Road Accident Fund to consider whether rejection letters have merit or
whether it is issued by default - each party pays its own costs
1 The special pleas are dismissed.
2 Each party pays its ·own costs.
Cronje AJ
2
ORDER
JUDGMENT
[1] The plaintiff instituted an action against the Road Accident Fund (the Fund)
pursuant to a road accident on 26 September 2024, where the minor child, then merely
two years old, was a passenger on a bicycle. As a result of the accident, it is alleged
that the child suffered a splenic injury, headaches, hearing impairment, and
forgetfulness. The amount, comprising of past hospital and medical expenses, future
loss of income (the largest component), and general damages are substantial.
[2] The Fund raised four special pleas. The first on locus standi was abandoned.
The balance of the special pleas essentially relates to the question whether there was
compliance in submitting the claim in terms of inter alia s 24 of the Act. Section 24(1 )(a)
provides:
'24. Procedure.-(1) A claim for compensation and accompanying medical report
under section 17 (1) shall-
(a) be set out in the prescribed form, which shall be completed in all its particulars;' (Own
emphasis.)
[3] Section 24(4) provides:
'(4) (a) Any form referred to in this section which is not completed in all its particulars shall not
be acceptable as a claim under this Act.
,. (b) A clear reply shall be given to each question contained in the form referred to in subsection
(1), and if a question is not applicable, the words "not applicable" shall be inserted.
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(c) A form on which ticks, dashes, deletions and alterations have been made that are not
confirmed by a signature shall not be regarded as properly completed.
(d) Precise details shall be given in respect of each item under the heading "Compensation
claimed" and shall, where applicable, be accompanied by supporting vouchers.' (Own
emphasis.)
[4] The attorneys for the plaintiff submitted lodgement documents comprising the
mother's certified identification document, the minor's birth certificate, a power of
attorney, a consent form, the South African Police Service accident report, the s 19
affidavit, the RAF 1 form, medical records and a school report (terms 1-3). The plaintiff's
trial bundle consists of 275 pages.
[5] The claim was lodged on 4 December 2024. On 8 February 2025, the Fund
dispatched a letter to the attorneys, noting that the submitted documents did not meet
the requirements for a substantially compliant and valid claim. It lacked any other
documents listed in s 19(fJ(ii) and 19(e)(ii) and (iii), the claim form, hospital and medical
records, the completed statutory medical report, and the amount claimed as
compensation. It stated that it does not accept the documentation presented and returns
the documents with th!:! letter. The claimant was warned that the Fund would raise a
special plea should the summons be issued as regards the objection. There is no
indication in the papers that th~ attorneys replied to the Fund's letter. On 16 October
2025, the trial bundle was sent via e-mail from the plaintiff's attorneys to Ms Banda.
[6] The Fund complains that the plaintiff submitted the incorrect RAF 1 form and that
the medical report section was not completed. Ms Banda, on behalf of the Fund,
submitted that the submitted form lacks substantial compliance. A perusal of the form
indicates the names, identity number and address of the mother and minor, particulars
of the minor's deceased father and the attorney's details, bank account and e-mail
of the minor's deceased father and the attorney's details, bank account and e-mail
address. There is a description of the accident, and the medical form was completed.
[7] She highlighted several deficiencies. From her submissions and my review of the
fo"rm, the following points can be noted. In the section pertaining to the injuries, it is only
stated that the child suffered a grade 4 splenic injury. The rest of the injuries listed in the
particulars of claim are not included. Paragraph 6.1 of the form provides for substantial
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compliance in injury claims. The unabridged birth certificate of the minor was not marked
as presented. No documentation is indicated as available for past medical expenses.
The medical report lists the minor's name and simply refers to a grade 4 splenic injury.
[8] Paragraph 15 provides for a declaration and consent. Only the mother's name is
completed . It is not stated whether she claims in her personal capacity and/or as a
representative, the names of the minor are not inserted, and no signature of the claimant
or a witness is affixed to the document to confirm the accuracy of the information.
[9] The Fund has, over time, in various cases consistently raised special pleas on
the failure of claimants to use the prescribed form. My appreciation of the claim
submitted, whether in the old form or the new disputed form, is that it provides very little
information, and it is evident that the Fund would have difficulty considering it. It should
be appreciated that the form, at least, in respect of the material provisions, is the guiding
document. Even if the documents that were appended to the letter for lodgement of the
claim were submitted, which were, at face value, not indexed and paginated, it would
make it very difficult for the Fund to populate itself. It is not its job.
[1 O] She submits that the accident report form, the case docket, and the sketch of the
scene of the accident were not included when the claim was lodged. It was only when
the trial bundle was submitted that the deficiencies were addressed. The plaintiff should
have refiled the claim. She proposes that either the special pleas be upheld and the
claim be dismissed, or the plaintiff be granted the opportunity to resubmit the claim.
[11] Mr Mohono, appearing for the plaintiff, submitted that the_ new form adopted and
implemented per Board Notice 271 of 2022, dated 6 May 2022,1 and Board Notice 302
of 20222 was declared unlawful and set aside in the case of Legal Practitioners Indemnity
of 20222 was declared unlawful and set aside in the case of Legal Practitioners Indemnity
Insurance Fund NPC and Others v Road Accident Fund and Others3 (LPPF), the Court
ordered:
'(iii) Board Notice 271 of 2022 published in Government Gazette No 46322 of 6 May 2022 ('the
Board Notice') is declared unlawful and is reviewed and set asid~;
1 Board Notice 271 of 2022 of 6 May 2022, published in Government Gazette No 46322 on 6 May 2022.
2 Board Notice 302 of 2022 . published in Government Gazette No 46652 of 4 July 2022.
3 Legal Practitioners Indemnity Insurance Fund NPC and Others v Road Accident Fund and Others [2024)
ZAGPPHC 294; 2024 (4) SA 594 (GP).
5
(iv) Form RAF 1, prescribed by the Minister of Transport ('the Minister') in terms of s 26 of the
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 ('the RAF Act'), and published in Board Notice 302 of 2022
in Government Gazette No 46653 of 4 July 2022 ('the RAF 1 Form') is declared unlawful and is
reviewed and set aside;
(v) It is declared that Claimants whose claims were accepted by the Second Respondent ('the
RAF') to have been lodged in compliance with the Board Notice and/ or the RAF 1 Form are
deemed to have been lodged in terms of the RAF Act, and the RAF will continue to investigate
and process these claims as lodged claims;
(vi) • From 6 May 2022, the prescribed form contemplated in s24 (1)(a) of the RAF Act shall be
deemed to be the RAF 1 third party claim form ('the 2008 RAF 1 Form), forming part of the
Regulations published by the Minister on 7 July 2008 in Government Gazette No 31249, until
such time as the Minister prescribes an amendment to the 2008 RAF 1 Form in terms of s 26 of
the RAF Act;
(vii) Claimants who sought the lodgment of their claims in terms of the Board Notice or the RAF
1 Form, but lodgment was declined by the RAF or was not acknowledged by the RAF , are
afforded a period until 30 September 2024 to resubmit their claims to the RAF in terms of the
2008 RAF 1 Form a1nd those claimants who thereby secure lodgment will enjoy the benefits of
such lodgment as from the date on which lodgment was originally sought by them;'
[12] Bearing in mind the knowledge of the judgment, it is not apparent why the plaintiff
elected to use the new form. My understanding of the judgment is that the court held
that nothing it decided dictates what information or documents the Minister might reflect
in a revised form, nor the regime that is to be applied to the information and documents
so that a claim may be lodged. The court simply indicated the kinds of considerations
relevant to the lawful exercise of the Minister's power. The court held that it is manifestly
relevant to the lawful exercise of the Minister's power. The court held that it is manifestly
in the public interest that the Minister must engage on this matter with some urgency
and undertake what is required to effect procedurally fair administrative action.
[13] Mr Mohono submits that the Fund appealed against the judgment but not the
order declaring the amended form unlawful. The Fund's insistence that parties comply
with the new form has no legal basis. The special plea should be dismissed with costs,
or alternatively, that the court determine the question of compliance with the
requirements of s 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (the Act) in line with
what was required under the 2008 form, which entailed an element of substantial
compliance and had no onerous requirements, as those that the Fund relies on.
6
[14] The test for substantial compliance is objective. The remarks of the court in
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund v Radebe4 (Radebe) is apposite:
'It is true that the object of the Act is to give the widest possible protection to third parties. On the other
hand, the benefit which the claim form is designed to give the fund must be borne in mind and given
effect to. The information contained in the claim form allows for an assessment of its liability including
the possible early investigation of the case. In addition, it also promotes the saving of the costs of
litigation. In particular, the purpose of reg 9(I)(b)(ii) is to facilitate a decision whether, in the case of a
dependent's claim, it was the fatal accident which caused the deceased's death and whether the driver
of the vehicle in question was negligent. Sec 16(2) of the Inquests Act 58 of 1959 enjoins the judicial
officer holding the inquest to record a finding inter alia as to the cause or likely cause of death and
whether it was brought about by any culpable conduct on the part of any person. The fund would be
able to obtain similar though less cogent information from the charge sheet. These various advantages
are important and should not be whittled away. The resources, both in respect of money and
manpower, of agents and particularly of the fund are obviously not unlimited. They are not to be
expected to investigate claims which are inadequately advanced. There is no warrant for casting on
them the additional burden of doing what the regulations require should be done by the claimant.
There can be no {substantial) compliance where the claimant has merely indicated to the fund how it,
through its own efforts, can obtain the necessary information or documents. To sum up so far, I am of
the opinion that the fact that the information supplied by the respondent in her MV3 form would have
enabled the appellant to obtain a copy of the inquest report does not avail the respondent. There was
no duty on the appellant to do this. Reg 9(1)(b)(ii) imposed the obligation on the respondent. She failed
to comply with it. This was therefore not a case of substantial compliance but one of non-compliance
[15] In Pithey v Road Accident Fund5 (Pithey), the court recognised that the Act and its
predecessors constitute social legislation aimed at providing the widest possible
protection and compensation for loss and damage arising from the negligent driving of a
motor vehicle.6 Accordingly, in interpreting the provisions of the Act, courts are enjoined
to bear this factor uppermost in their minds and to give effect to the laudable objectives
of the Act. The Fund relies entirely on the fiscus for its funding and should be protected
against illegitimate and fraudulent claims. It is important to note that the court in Pithey
recognised the judgment in Radebe, stating that although these remarks were made in a .
4 Multilat eral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund v Radebe [1995) ZASCA 80; 1996 (2) SA 145 (SCA).
5 Pithey v Road Accident [2014) ZASCA 55; 2014 (4) SA 112 (SCA); [2014) 3 All SA 324 (SCA).
6 Road Ac_cident Fund v M obo M [2005) 3 All SA 340 (SCA) para 12.
7
different context, they articulate the purpose that the claim form is intended to serve.
[16] Mr Mohono submits that Pithey and Al/pay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Ply)
Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency and
Others7 (Al/pay) provide that the method of measuring compliance with statutory
provisions is merely by investigating whether the language used is peremptory or
directory at the expense of a permissive substantive investigation, it is not an end in itself.
I could not find support for this contention in Al/pay. Al/pay recognised that accountability
is ensured by financial compliance with operative legislation.8
[17] One must be careful not to elevate the findings in another court to a blanket
protection aga.inst non-compliance in a different case. In Pithey, the plaintiff submitted a
factually self-contradictory claim. The court held that when the Fund is in possession of
information which a claimant is statutorily obliged to supply and which reveals that the
claim really relates to an unidentified vehicle, the Fund is not entitled to repudiate the
claim on the basis that no valid claim had been made. Nor ought the Fund to benefit from
its own failure to clarify with minimal time, effort and expense, whatever confusion the
claim form and attached documentation revealed.
[18] Ms Banda stated that the Fund only received all the documents when the trial bundle
was served on the Fund. Although the Fund bears the onus on a special plea, I have
nothing to show regarding her submission that the Fund indicated in February 2025 that
it had not received all the documents, and that a substantive set of documents was only
recently received, is incorrect. As noted, the plaintiffs attorneys did not reply to that letter.
[19] The main argument in Mr Mohono's favour was the judgment in Road Accident
Fund v Busuku9 (Busuku). The court held that the form does not require detailed
Fund v Busuku9 (Busuku). The court held that the form does not require detailed
information. It is not meant, on its own, to allow the Fund to assess the quantum of the
plaintiffs claim. Instead, it aims to enable the Fund to examine the impact of the injuries
7 Al/pay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Ply) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South
African Social Security Agency and Others (No 2) [2014) ZACC 12; 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); 2014 (4) SA
179 (CC).
8 Ibid para 58.
9 Road Accident Fund v Busuku [2020] ZASCA 158; 2023 (4) SA 507 (SCA).
8
sustained. To do this, the RAF 1 form requires the disclosure of information to guide and
support the investigation. In the present matter, the medical report has been completed,
and I accept that the 230 pages of medical records, if supplied, would have enabled the
Fund to investigate the claim.
[20] If Mr. Mohono's submissions are correct and, based on his instructions, all the
medical records were provided when the claim was lodged, and if the Fund's letter of
rejection is a standard letter generated automatically, then the integrity of the Fund's
system would be in question. I do not need to decide on this, but the Fund should
consider this comment. If it is true regarding its system, many special pleas could be
avoided, court time saved, and wasting of taxpayers' money in litigation could be
I
prevented.
[21] As often happens, a judgment may also be a double-edged sword. Busuku also
held:
'[17] It concluded with the declaration signed by Mr Busuku that, to the best of his knowledge,
the information provided in the claim form was true and correct. The blank medical report
followed thereafter.'
[22] This is where the facts differ from the immediate matter. In the matter before me,
there does not appear to be a signature of any person, notably the plaintiff or the
attorney, declaring that to the best of that person's knowledge, the information provided
in the form is true and correct in every respect.
[23] Pretorius v Road Accident Fund1° follows the same facts as many other cases
where the claimants did not either complete the medical section in the claim form or did
not provide all the medical records. A number of decisions in this Division are
distinguishable from the facts of the case before me.
[24] One can only hope that the practice of submitting claims to the Fund, where it is
well-known that it struggles with capacity, will evolve to a point where claims handlers
do not have to wade through hundreds and thousands of pages to determine the exact
do not have to wade through hundreds and thousands of pages to determine the exact
claim, the entitlement to claim, and whether the claim is supported by the documents
10 Pretorius v Road Accident Fund [2019] ZAGPJHC 293.
9
received. It will not place an onerous duty on claimants and will obviate the onerous duty
of courts to wade through the same pages and entertain arguments that probably would
not have arisen when this is effectively addressed.
[25] Submitting a claim that is properly indexed and paginated will help. The claimants
will, in any case, prepare such a bundle for trial. If the documents were not available at
the date of submission; the index can state this.
[26] What may be accepted, for this case only, is that the special power of attorney
that the mother granted to the attorneys on record states that they may, inter alia, sign
on her behalf and determine the amount of compensation claimable for damages (at the
attorney's discretion). Apart from the special power of attorney, the consent to obtain
medical records, copies of relevant documentation, authorising RAF to inspect medical
records and relevant documents, as well as the s19(f) affidavit signed by the mother,
the claim form was neither signed by her nor the attorneys.
[27] The Fund requested a postponement of the proceedings pending the finalisation
of the LPPF appeal. However, regarding this postponement, I have my own views. I can
only note that I separated the adjudication of the claim for past loss covered by the
medical aid from the rest of the claims under rule 33(4) in another case, as it seemed
appropriate because the claims were not paid from the medical aid member's savings
account. The plaintiff would therefore not suffer direct loss until the final adjudication of
the appeal.
[28] I raised the issue of the failure to sign the claim form during the argument. Neither
party referred to it, and I did not have the benefit of an argument on this point. I could
not find any case law on the matter. However, it appears to me to be an important issue.
If it eventually comes to challenging the veracity _of the claim, no person will willingly
stand behind any incorrect facts. This should not happen. I cannot simply dismiss or
stand behind any incorrect facts. This should not happen. I cannot simply dismiss or
grant an order in favour of the Fund on this basis. Nonetheless, it may ultimately become
a relevant consideration.
[29] I dismiss the special pleas. I deem it unfair that the Fund should pay for the
dismissal when the form is not duly completed, and especially not signed. Ordering the
10
Fund to pay the costs of the dismissal will, to some extent, sanction the obvious
deficiencies and fail to send the message that claimants should be more meticulous in
preparing and submitting claims. They should also at least reply to the Fund when it
raises non-compliance and not wait until final preparations for trial when a bundle is
indexed and paginated. They should also not wait for interlocutory proceedings. The
Fund should also consider each case on its facts and bear in mind the long line of
decisions addressing compliance.
Order
(30] In line with practise, the following order is made:
1 The special pleas are dismissed.
2 Each party pays its own costs.
ACTING JUDGE
/ '
PRCRONJE
Appearances
For the plaintiff:
Instructed by:
For the defendant:
KP Mahana
Mavuya Attorneys
Bloemfontein
P Banda
_Office of the State Attorney
Bloemfontein
11