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THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case no: 2023-012939
(1) REPORTABLE: Yes
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes
(3) REVISED: Yes
Date: 12 May 2026
In the matter between:
THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH
AFRICA LIMITED
Applicant
And
EDGAR ADAMS
First Respondent
SHENAZ RENAY ADAMS Second Respondent
Keywords: Summary judgment — mortgage bond — home loan — primary
residence — bona fide defence — Rule 32(3)(b) — organised pseudolegal
commercial arguments (OPCA) — sovereign citizen — strawman theory — ALL
CAPS names — legal personality — natural persons — juristic persons —
jurisdiction — constitutional supremacy — rule of law — Aboriginal or indigenous
rights — Free Prior and Informed Consent — Indigenous Knowledge Act —
securitisation — Rule 46A
2
JUDGMENT
DU PLESSIS J
Introduction
[1] This is an opposed application for summary judgment in respect of a home -
loan agreement secured by a mortgage bond over the respondents’1 residential
immovable property.
[2] The respondents are self -represented. They do not meaningfully dispute that
they concluded the home -loan agreement, that the bond was registered in favour of
the applicant, or that they are in arrears. Their plea, affidavit and oral submissions
rest on what is termed in foreign jurisdictions the “sovereign citizen” or “organised
pseudo legal commercial arguments” (“OPCA”).2
[3] In short, they contend that they are "sovereign Aboriginal living persons", that
the applicant ("the bank") and this Court do not have jurisdiction over them, that the
mortgage is invalid because of alleged indigenous rights, and that, in any event, the
loan has been discharged by their signatures and the securitisation of the debt. They
have also filed a counterclaim.
[4] Under our law, these submissions do not constitute bona fide defences in a
summary judgment application regarding a mortgage debt, for reasons set out after I
the background facts.
Background
[5] In May 2012, the parties concluded a written home -loan agreement under
which the bank advanced approximately R1.26 million to the respondents, with the
usual obligation to repay by way of monthly instalments over a period of 360 months.
1 The parties will be referred to as they are in this application, and not “plaintiff” and “defendants”.
2 Meads v Meads 2012 ABQB 571.
2
The loan was secured by the registration of a mortgage bond over the immovable
property (the respondents’ residence) situated within the jurisdiction of this court.
[6] The respondents fell into arrears in 2021, after which a summons was issued
for payment of the outstanding balance, together with interest, and for an order
declaring the property executable. The respondents entered an appearance to
defend and filed a lengthy plea.
[7] The bank then instituted these summary judgment proceedings, after which
another lengthy opposing affidavit was filed. At the hearing, the first respondent
addressed the Court at length on the themes and points set out in the plea and
affidavit. The main themes concerned whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear the
matter, whether I have the necessary authority to adjudicate the matter, and the
assertion that the bank, as a corporation, could not have contracted with the first
respondent as a “living man”.
The defendants’ contentions
[8] The defendants’ central submissions are:
a. The defendants draw a distinction between themselves as “sovereign
Aboriginal living man/woman” and the versions of their names that
appear in official documents in capital letters, such as “EDGAR
ADAMS” and “SHENAZ ADAMS”. In their view, the ALL CAPS names
denote separate corporate “strawmen” or Cestui Que Vie trusts that
were created without their consent and are being traded or used by the
State and banks. They submit that contracts and court processes
directed at those “strawmen” are invalid, and that they, as living
persons in flesh and blood, cannot be held liable on that basis . They
assert that, as sovereign Aboriginal people and holders of allodial title
within an “Empire” structure, they are not bound by South African
statutes or courts. Instead, they recogni se only "common law”, “natural
law,” and an Aboriginal legal system that they claim . Therefore, they
submit that this Court lacks jurisdiction over them and that its authority
submit that this Court lacks jurisdiction over them and that its authority
exists only if they consent.
3
b. They submit that the mortgaged property forms part of inalienable
Aboriginal or indigenous territory, that the State recognises this through
various instruments (including the Indigenous Knowledge Act 3 and
Free Prior and Informed Consent principles), and that the plaintiff was
required to obtain certificates or authorisations from indigenous ‑rights
bodies (such as NIKSO) before trading on or lending against that land.
In their view, the failure to obtain such approvals renders the mortgage
“fraudulent, null and void”.
c. They also submit that the “banks never lend money”. Instead, when
signing the home loan documents, the plaintiff allegedly generated the
credit “out of thin air” through their signatures, making them the actual
creditors and the bank the debtor. Moreover, they claim that the later
securitisation of the mortgage debt on capital markets discharged the
obligation, thus leaving the plaintiff with no enforceable claim.
d. They purport to bring a counterclaim in the hundreds of millions of US
dollars against the bank, its attorneys and others, based on alleged
identity theft, fraud, trading in their “strawman” estates, and violations
of various foreign statutes, including provisions of the United States
Code.
[9] I deem it necessary, to some extent, to address the main submissions as
grouped together above, to develop an approach that is appropriate in instances
such as these, where litigants purport to deliberately place themselves outside the
rules and the law and rely on pseudolegal arguments to do so. Guidance can be
found in foreign case law.
A comparative perspective
[10] The respondents’ arguments are not unique. Courts in Canada, Australia and
New Zealand have, over the last decade, had to grapple with similar arguments,
often in mortgage and foreclosure cases. These jurisdictions have developed a
helpful vocabulary and analytical framework and deserve mentioning.
3 Act 6 of 2019.
4
[11] In Meads v Meads4, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, in a comprehensive
and lengthy judgment, coined the term “organised pseudolegal commercial
arguments” (OPCA) to describe collections of legal ‑sounding words, documents and
rituals that purport to create immunities from normal legal obligations, but have no
foundation in any recognised legal source. The Court surveyed several cases in
which such arguments were deployed, including mortgage ‑resistance schemes, and
concluded that OPCA strategies are “pseudolaw”: they mimic the form of law but are
substantively empty.
[12] Foreign courts have described the “Strawman Theory”/ALL CAPS argument in
some detail and have uniformly rejected it. After Meads v Meads ,5 Canadian courts
have held that the notion of a separate “strawman” created by the use of capital
letters is “factually false and legally irrelevant”. In Potvin (Re),6 the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench summarised it as the notion that each individual is secretly linked to
a separate “strawman” legal entity through birth registration, which is allegedly tied to
a hidden fund. It is claimed that governments and banks can operate only through
this entity and that, with certain techniques, a person might access the fund or evade
legal responsibilities. The court, following Fiander v Mills ,7 held that the Strawman
Theory is “notoriously” false, has “no basis in the law”, and that its use in court is a
marker of bad faith and vexatious, abusive litigation.
[13] As to the rejection of jurisdiction: In Meads v Meads ,8 the Court held that
OPCA arguments denying the authority of courts unless the litigant “consents” are
“obvious nonsense”: the court’s jurisdiction is prescribed by law and is not contingent
on individual consent. In Kosteska v Magistrate Manthey ,9 the Court likewise held
that courts derive their authority from statute and the constitution, not from an
4 2012 ABQB 571.
5 2012 ABQB 571.
6 2018 ABQB 652.
7 2015 NLCA 31.
8 2012 ABQB 571.
4 2012 ABQB 571.
5 2012 ABQB 571.
6 2018 ABQB 652.
7 2015 NLCA 31.
8 2012 ABQB 571.
9 QCA 105. Queensland Court of Appeal (Australia).
5
individual’s acceptance. New Zealand’s High Court has rejected similar “personal
sovereignty” submissions in cases such as James v District Court at Whanganui.10
[14] In relation to the aboriginal argument, New Zealand courts have held that
assertions of Māori sovereignty or reliance on the Treaty of Waitangi and He
Whakaputanga do not create a personal exemption from the courts’ jurisdiction or
from generally applicable legislation . In Creeks v R HC Auckland 11 the Court
stated:12
"The Court of Appeal has made it clear that the courts are not the forum for a
fundamental challenge to the entire constitutional structure of the country or
for political campaigns of the sort the appellants are waging. Maori
sovereignty can be the subject of debate in Parliament. The Waitangi Tribunal
may be prepared to consider it. It can be debated in public meetings or the
media. It may be the subject of lawful protest. But an assertion of Maori
sovereignty does not raise a justiciable question. It cannot succeed in the
general courts of New Zealand. Accordingly, this point should not be
submitted to the Court of Appeal."
[15] In other words, claims framed as assertions of indigenous sovereignty cannot
be asserted in ordinary courts tasked with enforcing private-law obligations.
[16] As for the arguments relating to banks not lending money, in
Crossroads‑DMD Mortgage Investment Corp v Gauthier ,13 the Alberta court, in a
mortgage foreclosure, expressly rejected arguments that banks “never lend money”,
that mortgage loans are funded by the borrower’s own signature or by “book ‑entry
credit” created from nothing, and that therefore no real debt exists. The Court held
that they are classic OPCA “money ‑for‑nothing” schemes. In Bank of Nova Scotia v
Lee,14 the Ontario Superior Court held that securitisation of a mortgage portfolio is a
10 NZHC 2196.
11 A138/00 [2000] NZHC 1522.
12 Para 7.
13 2015 ABQB 703.
14 2013 ONSC 6698.
6
financing arrangement between a bank and investors; it does not extinguish or
novate the borrower’s obligation, nor deprive the originating lender of standing to
enforce the mortgage. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Bossé v Farm Credit
Canada15 described the contention that the borrower’s signature alone creates the
credit and discharges the debt as something that “defies logic” . In Crossroads‑DMD
and in Potvin (Re), 16 Canadian courts dismissed OPCA defences to mortgage
foreclosure, holding that such submissions do not disclose any triable issue.
[17] While these authorities are not binding on this court, they are instructive on
how to approach the same cluster of submissions in the context of mortgage debts.
With this information, I now turn to the South African legal position.
The law: summary judgment
[18] Rule 32(3)(b) provides that, in order to resist summary judgment, a defendant
must satisfy the court that he or she has a bona fide defence to the action and must
“disclose fully the nature and grounds of the defence and the material facts relied
upon therefor”.17
[19] The purpose of summary judgment was restated by the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture .18
The procedure is intended to prevent sham defences from defeating the rights of
parties by delay and causing prejudice to plaintiffs who are endeavouring to enforce
their rights. Properly applied, summary judgment is “drastic” only for a defendant
who, in truth, has no defence.
[20] In mortgage cases involving a primary residence, the court must also have
regard to sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution, the NCA, and Rule 46A. That
entails careful scrutiny of the loan documentation, the arrears position, the
15 2014 NBCA 34.
16 2018 ABQB 652.
17 Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) at 426A –D and Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk
1976 (2) SA 226 (T) at 228B–E.
18 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA).
7
defendants’ personal circumstances, and the proportionality of execution, supported
by the evidential matrix set out in a Rule 46A.
Do the respondents disclose a bona fide defence?
[21] Do these issues disclose a bona fide defence, supported by material facts,
which, if proved at trial, would constitute an answer to the bank’s claim? The answer
must be no.
[22] Similar to the foreign cases dealt with above, they constitute pseudolaw
arguments as described in Meads v Meads. 19 It uses the same legal terminology,
and the respondents rely on the same statutes and (often foreign and from the
previous century) cases as the litigants in those cases. They lack a foundation in
South African law, and do not constitute a defence in law or otherwise to a valid
mortgage claim.
Strawman
[23] The ALL CAPS/strawman theory is inconsistent with the basic principles of
legal personality under our law. Legal personality is conferred on legal subjects, and
there are two categories : natural persons (all human beings) and juristic or artificial
persons. A juristic person, such as a company or bank , is a legal subject distinct
from its members, often incorporated under general binding legislation. Such a
juristic person has its own rights, duties and capacities to act through its various
functionaries, and those actions of the functionaries bind the juristic person. Nothing
in our law recognises a third category of hidden “strawmen” attached to natural
persons via typography or birth registration, nor does the use of capital letters in a
person’s name create a separate legal subject.20
[24] In other words, a natural person’s name may appear in different typographical
forms in documents and records. This does not create a second legal person or a
19 2012 ABQB 571. In para 44 the Court states: “As I have noted to Mr. Meads, these materials have no force or
meaning in law, other than they indicate an intention on his part to evade his lawful obligations and the authority
of the Court and government. He is an OPCA litigant.“
20 Heaton. The South African Law of Persons 6th Ed. Sixth edition. LexisNexis SA; 2021. Pp 3 – 4. See also
LAWSA, Companies, volume 6(1) para 44.
8
juristic person, nor does it affect their capacity to contract, or their liability should they
fail to honour the contract.
[25] The bank is incorporated as a public company under South African law and is
a recognised juristic person. It is entitled to sue and be sued in its own name, and to
enforce contracts into which it has lawfully entered. Nothing in our law prevents a
bank, as a juristic person, from contracting with natural persons (or from being
represented by attorneys and counsel in enforcing its rights ). The “strawman” / ALL
CAPS theory, therefore, provides no basis in law for the respondents not to be held
to the contract.
Jurisdiction
[26] In its particulars of claim, the bank alleges that this Court has jurisdiction on
two grounds: (1) the defendants reside within this court’s area of jurisdiction; and (2)
the mortgaged property is situated within this area, and the domicilium address
chosen in the mortgage documentation likewise falls here. The bank alleges, and the
respondents do not dispute, that they reside within this court’s area of jurisdiction
and that the mortgaged property and the chosen domicilium are situated here.
Territorial jurisdiction is therefore established on ordinary principles.21
[27] Moreover, the loan agreement , signed by the respondents, provides that it is
governed by South African law. This Court is furthermore obliged to apply the
Constitution, statutes such as the National Credit Act, 22 and the common law as
developed by our courts, not “common law” or “Aboriginal law” as unilaterally defined
by a litigant.
[28] The submission that individuals can refuse to “consent” to the court’s
jurisdiction or legislation is misplaced. In a constitutional democracy, the courts’
authority and the authority of generally applicable laws do not depend on personal
consent. Section 2 of the Constitution explicitly states that “[t]his Constitution is the
supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the
supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the
21 Bonugli v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited [2012] ZASCA 48 paras 19 – 20.
22 34 of 2005.
9
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled." This reflects the core principles of
constitutional supremacy and the rule of law. Additionally, various provisions within
the Bill of Rights clearly establish that rights are granted and obligations are imposed
on both individuals and legal entities .23 Our Constitution thus establishes a public
constitutional order whose rules bind everyone within its jurisdiction. It is not a
contract from which an individual can unilaterally “opt out” by withdrawing consent.
[29] In other words, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution and by legislation .
Individuals cannot unilaterally exempt themselves from the operation of statutes or
from the jurisdiction of courts by declaring themselves “sovereign”. This is a
consequence of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law. This is as true in South
Africa as it is in Canada, 24 Australia25 or New Zealand. 26 This does not constitute a
defence to the claim.
[30] During the hearing , the first defendant alleged that, if this Court proceeded
without first “proving” jurisdiction, the presiding judge would be engaged in “treason”
and that any attorney who failed to report such “treason” would be criminally liable,
relying on provisions of the United States Code. The first respondent further asserted
that the presiding judge and counsel would be personally liable in the amount of 25
million rand for each claim if a “void judgment” were granted. These assertions are
noted for the record, but they have no bearing on the outcome. Section 165(2) of the
Constitution requires courts to apply the law “without fear, favour or prejudice ”, and
the judicial oath in Schedule 2 obliges every judge to uphold and protect the
Constitution and to administer justice to all persons alike, in accordance with the
Constitution and the law. The court’s task is to decide the case in accordance with
South African law, and it has done so.
23 See for instance sections 8(1) and (2) and section 7(1).
23 See for instance sections 8(1) and (2) and section 7(1).
24 Meads v Meads 2012 ABQB 571 (Can).
25 Kosteska v Magistrate Manthey QCA 105 (Aust).
26 James v District Court at Whanganui NZHC 2196 (NZ).
10
Aboriginal claims
[31] The attempt to invoke Aboriginal or Indigenous rights, Free, Prior and
Informed Consent ( “FPIC”) or the Indigenous Knowledge Act 27 as requiring the
plaintiff to obtain authorisation before lending against, or enforcing a bond over, the
mortgaged property is also not available to the respondents. FPIC is a principle of
international indigenous -rights law that requires states and corporations to consult
with indigenous peoples before undertaking activities that affect communal
indigenous land and resources.28 It is a collective community right. It does not confer
on an individual homeowner a way out of private credit agreements voluntarily
entered into over individually owned property. The Indigenous Knowledge Act deals
with the protection and commercialisation of indigenous knowledge systems . It does
not regulate mortgage lending. Neither instrument has the effect of invalidating a
home-loan agreement concluded in 2012. Accordingly, this line of argument does not
constitute a defence to the bank’s claim.
Banks and securitisation
[32] Where a bank advances loan funds to a borrower, whether by paying out
money or by crediting the borrower’s account, a loan agreement comes into being.
Once the borrower has received and use s the money, for example , to acquire a
home, a debt exists on the agreed terms and must be repaid. The mortgage bond
then serves as security for that indebtedness.
[33] The bank’s internal and inter ‑bank funding mechanisms, including any
securitisation of its loan book, do not remove the borrower’s obligation. The
agreement between the bank and the borrower remains; whatever agreement the
bank may have with investors or third parties does not affect the home ‑loan
indebtedness itself.29 This submission does not disclose a bona fide defence that
raises any triable issue and it therefore cannot resist summary judgment.
27 6 of 2019.
raises any triable issue and it therefore cannot resist summary judgment.
27 6 of 2019.
28 See for instance the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 2007, particularly Articles
10, 11, 19, 28 and 32.
29 This was explained in Bank of Nova Scotia v Lee 2013 ONSC 6698.
11
Conclusion on summary judgment
[34] The respondents’ submissions are advanced with conviction, but conviction
does not convert pseudolaw into law . Foreign courts have observed that OPCA
strategies can, in fact, compound the prejudice of indebted homeowners by delaying
resolution and increasing costs. South African courts must, in my view, follow the
same path: treat such arguments as legally ineffective, while ensuring that
defendants are heard and that ordinary defences, where properly raised, are fully
considered.
[35] I therefore find that the defendants have not disclosed a bona fide defence as
required by Rule 32(3)(b). Their affidavit is largely argumentative and ideological, but
does not raise any triable issue on the validity of the loan, the bond, the default, or
the quantum.
The counterclaim
[36] In their papers, the defendants purport to advance an extensive counterclaim
for very substantial unliquidated sums, premised on alleged identity theft, fraud,
“monetisation” and trading of their “strawman” estates, and reliance on various
foreign statutes.
[37] A counterclaim is not inherently a defence to the applicant’s claim, and
specifically not in this instance. The counterclaim does not operate as a defence for
purposes of Rule 32 and cannot prevent summary judgment being granted.
Rule 46A and proportionality
[38] No factual disputes exist regarding the loan and bond, the default, or the
amount shown in the plaintiff’s balance certificate. There are no claims that the
defendants did not receive the funds, failed to make the required payments, that the
interest rate is wrong, or that the certificate inaccurately states the amount owed.
[39] The mortgaged property is the defendants’ primary residence. I am
accordingly required, under Rule 46A and the constitutional jurisprudence flowing
from section 26 of the Constitution, to consider whether execution is just and
equitable.
12
[40] The plaintiff has filed a detailed affidavit pursuant to Chapter 10.17 of the
Practice Manual. It sets out the municipal valuation and independent valuations of
market and forced ‑sale value, the amount of municipal rates and service charges
outstanding, the arrears on the bond and the total indebtedness, and the proposed
reserve price, calculated as the forced ‑sale value less municipal arrears. The
defendants have not meaningfully engaged with these figures or proposed an
alternative plan to cure the arrears
[41] The defendants did not place before the Court any concrete evidence of
personal circumstances, such as income, dependants, or alternative
accommodation, that would justify refusing or postponing execution. Their focus was
almost entirely on jurisdictional and pseudolegal contentions. In the absence of such
evidence, and given the magnitude of the arrears relative to the value of the
property, I am satisfied that it is just and equitable to declare the property specially
executable, with an appropriate reserve price.
[42] I adopt the reserve price proposed in the plaintiff’s Rule 46A affidavit, being
the forced‑sale value less municipal arrears as calculated therein.
Costs
[43] The plaintiff seeks costs on the scale as between attorney and client in terms
of the loan agreement and mortgage bond. Such clauses are generally enforceable,
subject to the court's overriding discretion. I am satisfied that the contractual
entitlement to attorney‑and‑client costs should be enforced in this instance.
Order
[44] The following order is made:
1. Judgment is granted against the respondents jointly and severally, the one
paying the other to be absolved, in the following terms:
1.1. Payment of the amount of R2,062,109.34;
13
1.2. Interest on the aforesaid sum at the rate of 11.090% per annum from 10
February 2026 to date of final payment, both dates inclusive;
1.3. Payment of monthly Insurance Premiums of R1,512.57 from 10 February
2026, both dates inclusive;
1.4. That the immovable property described as:
ERF 1[...] R[...] EXTENSION 5 TOWNSHIP, REGISTRATION DIVISION I.R,
PROVINCE OF GAUTENG (hereinafter referred to as "the Property"), be
declared executable for the aforesaid amounts;
1.5. The Registrar of the above Honourable Court is authorised to issue a warrant
of attachment in respect of the property;
1.6. The Sheriff of the above Honourable Court is authorised to execute the
warrant of attachment herein;
1.7. It is declared that the property is to be sold by the Sheriff at a sale in
execution subject to a reserve price of R1900 000;
1.8. In the event that the reserve price is not attained, and subject to Rule
46A(9)(d) and (e), the applicant may approach this Honourable Court on the
same papers, duly supplemented, to reconsider the reserve price in terms of
Rule 46A(9)(c)
2. The respondents shall pay the costs of this application jointly and severally on an
attorney client scale.
WJ du Plessis
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
Date of hearing:
16 March 2026
Date of judgment:
12 May 2026
For the applicant: PR Long instructed by Van Hulsteyns
Attorneys
For the respondents:
In person