G.G v E.Y.C (2026/071953) [2026] ZAGPJHC 484 (12 May 2026)

55 Reportability

Brief Summary

Children's Rights — Termination of parental rights — Application by de facto guardian to terminate parental rights of biological mother — Biological mother incarcerated and unable to provide informed consent — Need for independent assessment of child's best interests — Appointment of curator ad litem to investigate and report on child's welfare and living arrangements.

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2 Shortly after S was born, she was placed in the care of EYC’s sister, KC. At
the time, KC was in a relationship with GG’s nephew, SV. The couple cared
for S together, but later separated. KC did not believe that she was financially
able to care for S, so SV agreed to take S into his care. SV had a child of his
own. The papers suggest that SV, that child and S thereafter all lived together
in a one-room apartment. A short while later, GG invited SV and the two
children to come and live with GG and his family at their home in a residential
suburb in the southern part of Johannesburg.
3 That arrangement endured for six months, after which SV was offered a job in
Jeffreys Bay. For reasons that are not explained on the papers, SV decided
that he would only take his own child to Jeffreys Bay when he relocated there
to take up his new job. He left S behind in GG’s care. By that time KC was
apparently back on the scene, and, for a very short period, S lived with KC in
Pretoria. KC again decided that she could no longer care for S. She was, I am
told, living with her partner at a motel at the time, and felt that this was not a
suitable environment for S, who was then two years old. KC placed S back in
GG’s care, apparently with a cluster of black plastic bags containing S’s
clothes and other possessions.
4 Since that time – which was what seems like the better part of 3 years ago –
GG has cared for S with his wife, JLP, and his two children, aged 19 and 12.
GG has enrolled S at school. S appears to have been told that GG and JLP
are her parents, but has had what the papers call “brief interactions” with EYC,
during which EYC has been introduced to S as one of GG’s friends. I do not

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know where and how these interactions took place. I have no information
about EYC’s current status or fitness to take on a role in S’s life.
5 Notwithstanding that, GG now applies to me under section 28 of the Children’s
Act to terminate EYC’s parental rights and responsibilities, and to vest those
rights and responsibilities in GG himself. He relies on his role as S’s de facto
guardian, and on an affidavit to which EYC deposed in February 2024, in
which EYC purports to vest what she calls “primary guardianship” in GG and
his wife. The address given in that affidavit suggests that EYC was not
incarcerated at the time she made it, but this application was served
personally on her at a Pretoria prison. I infer from this that, if EYC was released
from prison at any point after she gave birth to S, she is now incarcerated
again. I have no information about why or for how long that incarceration will
continue.
6 I have no reason to doubt GG’s motives or his suitability as a parent. However,
I plainly lack the information necessary to make an informed decision on
whether he should assume full parental rights and responsibilities for S. I have
no idea what EYC’s true attitude to the application is. As she is presently
incarcerated, she faces obvious barriers of access to legal representation,
especially in a civil case. The only material I have on record from her is that
she wishes to vest “guardianship” in GG and JLP. That is a far cry from an
informed decision to relinquish her parental rights.
7 Moreover, I have no independent source of information about S’s well-being
and progress, or about GG’s suitability as a parent. I emphasise that, on the
face of things, GG has acted with the utmost integrity and compassion. But I

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would be failing in my duty if, in a case like this, I were to make an order with
such far-reaching consequences for S merely on GG’s say-so.
8 Accordingly, an independent assessment of the situation is required. Mr.
Bornman, who appeared for GG, resisted a referral of this case to the Office
of the Family Advocate, given what he submitted was the Family Advocate’s
incapacity to deal with the matter anytime soon. While there is no particular
urgency alleged in this case, I agree that the Family Advocate is seldom, at
least in my experience, able to provide matters of this complexity with prompt
attention.
9 It seems to me that the only other realistic alternative is the appointment of a
curator ad litem, to make submissions on behalf of S herself about where her
best interests lie. The curator will have to interview both GG and EYC. They
may also have to source an independent expert assessment of S’s well-being
and current living arrangements. Having made enquiries, I have secured the
consent of Irene de Vos and Khanya Dambuza, of the Johannesburg Bar, to
act as the curatrices in this case. They will investigate and compile a report on
S’s best interests, delivering it to the parties and the court by 28 August 2026.
10 In the meantime, S should obviously remain where she is, under GG’s care. I
will make orders directing that S should not be removed from GG’s care
without my leave, and permitting GG to apply to me, on notice to EYC and to
the curatrices, to provide parental consent in relation to any matter involv ing
S that would ordinarily require it.
11 For all these reasons –