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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2024/000697
In the matter between:
GARY SKINNER NO Plaintiff/Respondent
versus
DEREK ASHLEY HARRISON First Defendant/Applicant
JACQUELINE SYLIVIA SKINNER Second Defendant
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGEMENT IN AN APPLICATION IN TERMS OF RULE 30 (1)
___________________________________________________________________
LIPHOTO AJ
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
11/05/2026
DATE SIGNATURE
LIPHOTO AJ
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7.1. ensure that the assets and affairs of the Skinner Family Trust were
managed for the benefit of the beneficiary;
7.2. observe due care and diligence when managing the affairs of the Skinner
Family Trust;
7.3. exercise their power in good faith, acting independently and objectively;
7.4. avoid a conflict between personal interests and official fiduciary duties;
7.5. act exclusively in the best interests and official fiduciary duties;
7.6. act exclusively in the best interests of the beneficiary; and
7.7. avoid making a profit, either directly or indirectly from the trust
administration.
8. At paragraph 7 of the particulars of claim the Plaintiff alleges that the Deceased
and the First Defendant concluded transactions which were not for the
exclusive benefit of the beneficiary, but rather for their personal interests and/or
profit making from the trust administration and/or with the intention of depleting
the funds of the Skinner Family Trust as follows:
8.1. on the 30/07/2013, the Skinner Family Trust advanc ed a loan to itec
South Africa to the sum of R 1000 000.00 (one million rand);
8.2. on/or about April 20 17, immovable property described as ERF 3454
(held under Deed of title number T40044/2017) was purchased in the
name of the Deceased, in the sum of R 290 000.00 (two hundred and
ninety-thousand rand);
8.3. on the 31/05/2017, immoveable property described as sectional title unit
SS River Drive Mews (Scheme number 108) was purchased in the name
of Limosa Investments 321 (Pty) Ltd (“Limosa”) in the sum of
R 480 000.00 (four hundred and eighty thousand rand);
8.4. during October 2006, property located at 43 Elisabeth Eybers, Randhard
Ext 2 was purchased in the name of Limosa in the sum of
R 1 900 000.00 (one million, nine hundred thousand rand)
8.5. property located at Princestraat, Bloemfontein was purchased in the
name of Limosa, in the sum of R 90 000.00 (ninety thousand rand)
8.6. on/or about 16/02/2016, immoveable property descri bed as ERF 1760,
8.6. on/or about 16/02/2016, immoveable property descri bed as ERF 1760,
Brackenhurst Ex t 2 (held under Title number T17992/2026) was
purchased in the name of the Deceased and the First Defendant, in the
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sum of R 2 835.000.00 (two mi llion, eight hundred and thirty -five
thousand rand)
8.6.1. the above purchases were made using funds belonging to the
Skinner Family Trust.
8.6.2. the purchases above were not made for the exclusive benefit of the
beneficiary, but rather for personal interests and/or personal profit
making from trust administration and/or with the intention of depleting
the funds of the Skinner Family Trust.
9. Under the heading ‘disposal of the assets due to the beneficiary ’ at
paragraph 7.10 of the particulars of claim, it is alleged that , on the 03/07/2015
at Gauteng , one Edward Wallance Skinner and Constance Grace Skinner
(each acting in their respective personal capacities) executed a joint will.
9.1. in terms of the joint will, inter alia, the residue of their estate would be
bequeathed to the Skinner Family Trust No. IT2128/2010, for the
following purposes and subject to the following conditions:
9.1.1. to utilise so much of the income and in need of the capital as the
trustees in their sole discretion consider reasonable for maintenance,
wellbeing and other benefits of the beneficiary who is their daughter.
9.1.2. to terminate the trust on the date of death of the beneficiary and all
trust capital and any undistributed income would be distributed to
their two sons Gary Skinner and Grand Percy Skinner.
9.2. Edward Wallance Skinner and Constance Grace Skinner demised and
their respective estates were wound up.
9.3. on the 24/06/2016, immovable property described as ERF 132
Brakensdowns (held under deed of title number T38433/2016 forming
part of the residue of their estate and which was due to the beneficiary,
was sold for R1 350 000.00 (one million three hundred and fifty thousand
rand).
9.4. the transaction as above was not concluded for the exclusive benefit of
the beneficiary, but rather for personal interests and/or personal profit
making from trust administration and/or with the intention of depleting
the funds of the Skinner Family Trust.
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10. At paragraph 10 under the heading negligent breach of fiduciary duties the
Plaintiff in the alternative claims that, the First Defendant and the Deceased
effected the above purchases of properties and granting of loan amount
negligently and in breach of the fiduciary duties towards the beneficiary.
11. At paragraphs 11 of the particulars of claim, the Plaintiff alleges further that, a
reasonable Trustee in the position of the Deceased and the First D efendant
would have:
11.1. observed a degree of care which a reasonable Trustee would have
observed in the circumstances.
11.2. taken steps to ensure that assets belonging to the Skinner Family Trust
were preserved for the exclusive benefit and utilized for the exclusive
benefit of the beneficiary.
11.3. the Deceased and the First Defendant failed to act in a manner as
aforesaid.
11.4. as a result of the Deceased and the First Defendant negligent breach of
the fiduciary duties, the funds of the Skinner family trust were unlawfully
misappropriated.
12. In consequence of the aforesaid, the beneficiary suffered loss of benefits that
would have been due to her in the sum of R 7 945 000.00 (seven million, nine
hundred and forty-five thousand rand).
13. The Plaintiff then sought for an order in the following terms:
13.1. payment in the sum of R 7 945 000.00 (seven million, nine hundred and
forty-five thousand rand)
13.2. interest on the aforesaid sum at a rate of 11.25% per annum from the
date of service of summons to the date of payment in full.
13.3. the First Defendant is removed from the office as the trustee of the
Skinner family trust.
13.4. the First Defendant is directed to forthwith return his letter of authority to
the Master of the High Court Gauteng.
13.5. costs of suit on an attorney-client scale from the First Defendant, in his
personal capacity, and the late estate of Grand Percy Skinner (estate
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number (071 454/2020) jointly and severally, one paying the other to be
absolved.
14. On the 23/01/2024 the First Defendant filed an appearance to defend the
action.
15. On the same day being the 23/01/2024 the First Defendant filed notice in terms
of Rule 30A to the effect that the Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 17 (4)
of the uniform Rules of Court in that , the Plaintiff has fail ed to set forth in the
summons dated 09/01/2024 the Second Defendant residence or place of
business.
15.1. the Plaintiff was afforded a period of ten days to remove the cause of
complaint failing which the First Defendant intends to apply for an order
that the Plaintiff summons and particulars of claim be truck out.
16. On the 14 /02/2024 the Plaintiff filed the notice of an intention to amend the
particulars of claim in order to remove the complaint raised in the First
Defendant Rule 30A notice.
17. On the 30/04/2024 the Respondent served the Applicant with the amended
summons and particulars of claim dated 18/04/2024.
18. On the 03/05/2024 the First Defendant filed Rule 30 notice against the Plaintiff’s
amended combined summons and particulars of claim, dated 18/04/2024 and
served on the 30/04/2024 that same constituted an irregular step in that:
18.1. on 14/02/2024 the Plaintiff served the notice of intention to amend the
combined summons and the particulars of claim in terms of Rule 28 the
dies for the Defendant to object to the proposed amendment expired on
28/02/2024.
18.2. in terms of Rule 28 (5) of the uniform Rules of Court, the Plaintiff was
required, within 10 days from the expiry of the objection period (which
expired on the 28/02/2024), to serve his amended combined summons
and particulars of claim.
18.3. the Plaintiff served his amended combined summons and particulars of
claim on 30/04/2024, being more than 10 days after the expiration of the
objection period.
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18.4. having regard to the aforesaid, the Plaintiff amended combined
summons and particulars of claim served on the 30/04/2024 constitute
an irregular step.
18.5. the Plaintiff was afforded the 10 days to remove the cause of complaint.
19. On the 28 /05/2024 the Plaintiff served the First Defe ndant with the notice to
withdraw the amended summons and particulars of claim dated 18/04/2024.
20. On the same day being the 28/05/2024 the Plaintiff served the First Defendant
with another notice of an intention to amend the summons and the particulars
of claim.
21. The Plaintiff served the First Defendant with the amended summons and
particulars of claim on the 20/06/2024.
22. The First Defendant filed another Rule 30 notice to the effect that, the Plaintiff’s
amended particulars of claim constituted an irregular step in that, it does not
comply with Rule 18 (4), 18 (6) and 18 (10) for amongst other reasons the
following:
22.1. failure to attach the Deed of Trust for the Skinner Family Trust
22.2. failure to state the nexus between the First Defendant and Limosa
22.3. failure to calculate how an amount of R 7 945 000.00 (seven million nine
hundred and forty-five thousand rand) was computated.
22.4. in the c ircumstances the allegations advanced constitute factual
conclusions, absent the underlying facts upon which the conclusion is
premised.
22.5. in the circumstances the allegations advanced lack the particularity
necessary in order to enable the First Defendant to, inter alia, plead
thereto.
23. The Plaintiff did not remove the cause of complaint, and the First Defendant
filed an application in terms of 30 (1) in which he asked the Court to set aside
the Plaintiff’s amended particulars of claim, as same constituted an irregular
step.
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24. The purported application in terms of Rule 30 (1) only consist s of the notice of
motion without the founding affidavit contrary to the provisions of Rule 6 (1).
25. The grounds for the application in terms of Rule 30 (1) appear on the notice of
motion.
26. The Plaintiff in turn did not file the answering affidavit on the basis that , there
was no founding affidavit.
27. The application in terms of Rule 30 (1) was served on the Plaintiff within the
prescribed time frames , however it was not filed in court and/or uploaded on
caselines timeously.
28. The First Defendant then filed an application for condonation for failure to
timeously file and/or upload on caselines an application in terms of Rule 30 (1).
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
29. There are two issues for determination:
29.1. whether the First Defendant met the requirements for an application for
condonation?
29.2. whether the Plaintiff’s amended particulars of claim constitute an
irregular step and whether same has to be set aside?
THE REQUIREMENTS TO BE SATIESFIED BY THE APPLICANT FOR AN
APPLICATION IN TERMS OF RULE 30 (1) TO SUCCEED
30. In the case of Blom and Another v NWK Limited (750/2021) [2024]
ZANWHC 83 (20 March 2024) in which Peterson J had this to say at
paragraph 9 and 10 of the Judgement:
” The uniform Rules seek to regulate (form) and not substance. Any complaint
raised in terms of Rule 30 therefore speaks to an alleged procedural irregularity
in the conduct of the litigation. It therefore follows axiomatically that if a Court
finds that the procedural steps taken by a party were irregular, a Court is vested
with wide powers to either set aside the proceedings in its entirety or in part or
make any other order the Court may deem fit. The Order which will generally
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follow in applications of this nature, if the Court finds a particular step to be
irregular, it afford s the party against whom the complaint is raised an
opportunity to remove the cause of complaint.
Rule 30 envisages that any irregular step complained of must cause prejudice
to the party seeking to set it aside. It is accepted though, that if a procedural
step may be found to be irregular but it presents no prejudice in the further
conduct of the case to the party complaining thereof, there would be no need
to set it aside. See Trans-African Insurance Co Limited v Maluleke 1956 (2)
SA 273 (A) at 276F-H”.
31. I have perused the First Defendant’s purported application in terms of Rule 30
(1) more than once and I noticed that, there is no paragraph at all dealing with
the issue of prejudice to be suffered by the First Defendant due to an alleged
irregular step and on this ground alone this application must fail.
32. Coming the First Defendant ’s application for condonation, i t is trite that an
Applicant in an application for condonation must satisfy the Court of the three
following requirements:
32.1. good cause for failure,
32.2. prospects of success in the main application , in this case it would be
prospects of success in an application in terms of Rule 30 (1).
32.3. that there is no prejudice to be suffered by the Respondent if the
application for condonation is granted.
33. I have perused the First Defendant application for condonation and I noticed
that, the First Defendant failed to deal with the issue pertaining to his prospects
of success in an application in terms of Rule 30 (1). The First Defendant further
failed to deal with the issue of prejudice likely to be suffered by the Plaintiff if
the condonation application is granted. O n these grounds alone the Plaintiff ’s
application for condonation must fail.
DELAY IN THIS MATTER
34. The First Defendant’s complaints raised in his Rule 30A notice and one raised
34. The First Defendant’s complaints raised in his Rule 30A notice and one raised
in his Rule 30 Notice (irregular step for failure to comply with Rule 18) should
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have been raised simultaneously as such complaints were in the Plaintiff’s initial
particulars of claim.
35. Raising these complaints one after the other has delayed this matter
unnecessarily and also increased costs, such conducts must be avoided by the
litigants at all costs.
36. The First Defendant did not object to the Plaintiff’s intention to amend the
summons and particulars of claim in terms of Rule 28 unti l 10 days’ period for
filing the objection had lapsed, which means in essence the amendment was
effected. I therefore find the First Defendant conduct of filing an irregular step
notice for the Plaintiff’ s failure to file amended summons and amended
particulars of claim untenable, the First Defendant should have just written an
email to the Plaintiff and requested him to file the same, his conduct of filing an
irregular step notice delayed the matter and increased the costs unnecessarily
and such conduct should be discouraged.
37. In the case of Pasiya v standard Bank South Africa Limited (37159/2020)
[2026] ZAGPPHC 182 (04 March 2026), Matlapeng AJ had this to say at
paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Judgement:
“with regard to uniform Rule 30 (1), this R ule allows a party to set -aside an
irregular step which is complimented by uniform Rule 30 (2) (b) which impel an
Applicant to deliver his notice of objection, within 10 days (Ten) days from
becoming aware of the irregularity.
The Rule requires prompt action and no further step to be taken with the
knowledge of the irregularity by the party who must demonstrate prejudice”.
38. At paragraphs 28 to 31 the Learned Judge continued to say: The Applicant
failed to bid the Court to grant him condonation for the Rule 30 application.
Litigation is not a tactical game of delay . The uniform Rules exist to
secure the expeditious and inexpensive resolution of disputes.
It is so that the uniform Rule 30 procedure, is not designed as a shield for
It is so that the uniform Rule 30 procedure, is not designed as a shield for
dilatory litigants. It exists to remove procedural hindrances and not to
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manufacture them.
The Applicant’s conduct, demonstrates an attempt to avoid joining issue in the
merits while exploiting technicalities long af ter the time for raising them has
since expired.
Such conduct, is inconsistent with the duty of litigants to assist the Court
in the proper administration of justice. There is no prejudice that has been
demonstrated by the Applicant on the facts before the Court”.
39. At paragraph 38 of the Judgement Matlapeng AJ continued to say : “in sum,
there is no prejudice demonstrated and the application is fatally defective and
devoid of merit”.
39.1. at paragraph 40.1 the Court dismissed the application with costs.
CONCLUSION
40. I have already indicated that the First Defendant’s application in terms of Rule
30 (1) must fail.
41. I also indicated that the First Defendant’s application for condonation must fail.
42. I further found that the First Defendant delayed this matter as indicated above.
43. I therefore make an order in the following terms:
43.1. the First Defendant’s application in terms of Rule 30 (1) is dismissed.
43.2. the First Defendant’s application for condonation is dismissed.
43.3. the First Defendant is ordered to pay costs on scale B.
_ _______________
L LIPHOTO
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION JOHANNESBURG
On behalf of the First Defendant/Applicant: Adv D L WILLIAMS
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Instructed by: Malherbe Rigg & Ranwell INC
On behalf of Plaintiff/Respondent: Adv N FELGATE
Instructed by: Jailall & Associates
Date of Judgment: 11 MAY 2026
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