IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
( l ) REPORTABLE: ~ /NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: ~ /NO
(3) REVISED.
04MA Y 2026
SIGNATURE DATE
In the matter between:
PETER ANDREW FAUCITT
and
JACQUELINE FAUCITT
DANIEL JAMES FAUCITT
REGIMA WORLDWIDE DISTRIBUTION (PTY) LTD
REGIMA SKIN TREATMENTS CC
VILLA VIA ARCADIA NO. 2 CC
(Registration Number: 1996/004451/23)
STRATEGIC LOGISTICS CC
(Registration Number: 2008/136496/23)
FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED
t/a FIRST NATIONAL BANK
Case No: 2025/137857
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Respondent
Sixth Respondent
Seventh Respondent
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ABSA BANK LIMITED Eighth Respondent
THE COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY COMMISSION Ninth Respondent
LEAVE TO APPEAL: JUDGMENT
LABUSCHAGNE J:
[1] The applicant brought an application based on contempt of clause 2. 5 of a
court order granted by Khumalo J on 19 August 2025 . I dismissed the
application on the grounds that the applicant did not establish a breach of the
court order or a wilful disregard thereof.
[2] Mr Faucitt now applies for leave to appeal. In a lengthy notice of leave to
appeal two themes are pursued.
[3] The first theme is that I erred in my interpretation of clause 2. 5 of the court
order. The order relates to the family business in which Mr and Mrs Faucitt
are office bearers.
[4] Mr Faucitt interprets clause 2. 5 to mean that Mrs Faucitt cannot not be
involved in an executive role in any respect. The clause is expressly aimed at
preventing prejudicial dealings. It is an undefined term and Mr Faucitt has
sought to construe a breach in circumstances where the facts do not support
his contentions. He objects to her presence even at training while , she was
involved in training for a lengthy period.
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[5] Mr Faucitt has placed too stringent an interpretation upon clause 2.5. What is
apparent is that the clause merely prohibits prejudicial conduct. This is
consistent with her role as director . The conduct which, according to Mr
Faucitt, falls within the ambit of clause 2.5 ,was disputed.
[6] What clause 2.5 of the court order does not say is that Mrs Faucitt is precluded
from being involved in the businesses in any manner. There is no prospect of
another court coming to a different conclusion in this regard.
[7] The second theme relates to the application of the Plascon-Evans rule. This
is raised specifically in the context of contempt where the principle is that, once
an applicant has established that a court order exists, which the respondent is
aware of, and that it has been breached, a presumption arises of wilfulness
which needs to be rebutted.
[8] As far as the incidents upon which Mr Faucitt relies is concerned, he cannot
give direct evidence as he was not present. The factual versions as far as the
stock issues are concerned indicate that there is a dispute on what transpired.
However, Mrs Faucitt, corroborated by the company employee responsible for
stock delivery, has confirmed that as far as the stock was concerned,
everything took place as it usually did. There was no prejudicial dealing in
breach of clause 2.5.
[9] So too the training incident relied upon does not demonstrate prejudice to the
business . The version of events put forward by Mrs Faucitt was accepted.
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[10] I decided these facts on the Plascon-Evans basis, namely the version
advanced by the respondent. In doing so, the normal application of Plascon-
Evans took place. The applicant needs to establish a breach of the court order
and, whether the facts are not common cause, the version of the respondent
is accepted, unless it falls to be rejected. No basis for rejecting the
respondent’s version could be advanced.
[11] In light of the aforesaid the applicant has not established the breach of the
court order and the explanation given demonstrates that Mr Faucitt has been
trying to make mountains out of molehills.
[12] There is nothing contentious in applying the Plascon-Evans rule to the
establishment of facts which are disputed in motion proceedings. The
applicant does not establish a breach by his mere say -so, particularly if his
version is disputed. How such a dispute is resolved in motion proceedings, is
trite.
[13] It was also submitted that I did not accord due w eight to affidavits referred to
in November 2025 court proceedings. There is no merit to this position. Those
affidavits were in court proceedings in which the applicant’s application failed.
The applicant relied on subsequent events as basis for enrolling an application
dated 9 February 2026 urgently. Why the November affidavits are relevant in
deciding what the subsequent facts and grounds for urgenc y were, has not
been established.
[14] Having considered all the submissions advanced, I am not persuaded that
there are reasonable prospects of another court coming to a different
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conclusion. I am not persuaded that the re is another compelling reason why
the appeal should be heard.
[15] In the premises the application for leave to appeal must fail.
COSTS
[16] The application for leave to appeal w as scheduled for 16 April 2026. It was
heard virtually. At the hearing new counsel for Mrs Faucitt asked for time as
he had just been briefed and the argument was postponed until 22 April 2026.
As Mr Faucitt had incurred costs in respect of the 16 th of April 2026 hearing,
those costs were reserved. The postponement of the application on 16 April
2026 was brought about by Mrs Faucitt’s late instruction of new legal
representatives, and she therefore needs to pay the wasted costs of that
hearing.
CONCLUSION
[17] In the premises I make the following order:
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs on a party and
party scale, Scale C, subject to paragraph 2 below.
2. Mrs Faucitt is to pay the wasted costs of 16 April 2026 on a party and
party scale, Scale C.
LABUSCHAGNE J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
COUNSEL FOR APPLICANT
ATTORNEY FOR APPLICANT
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
ATTORNEY RESPONDENT
: ADV COETSEE
: ELLIOT ATTORNEYS INC
: ADV NEL
: BURGERS HUYSER ATTORNEYS
BEDFORDVIEW INC
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