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[2026] ZAGPPHC 414
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Preference Capital (Pty) Ltd v Waste Partner Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others (2024/031609) [2026] ZAGPPHC 414 (4 May 2026)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER:
2024/031609
Reportable:
NO
Circulate
to Judges:
NO
Circulate
to Magistrates:
NO
Circulate
to Regional Magistrates
NO
In the matter between:-
PREFERENCE
CAPITAL (PTY) LTD
(REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 2014/093461/07)
Plaintiff
/ Applicant
and
WASTE
PARTNER INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD
1
st
Plaintiff / 1
st
Respondent
THABANG
GLADWIN MOENG
2
nd
Plaintiff / 2
nd
Respondent
THUTO
TSHEGOFATSO MOENG
3
rd
Plaintiff / 3
rd
Respondent
Disclaimer: This
judgment is handed down electronically by uploading it on CaseLines.
The date of the judgment is deemed to
be 4 May 2026.
JUDGMENT
Reid
J
Introduction
[1]
T
his is an application for summary judgment.
The capital amount of R1,545,962.92 has been settled on 6 October
2025.
The remaining dispute is about the amount of interest on
the capital amount, as well as legal fees.
[2]
The defendants claim that the amount includes interest and
costs and
state that the terms of the agreement do not make provision for the
payment of interest.
[3]
The plaintiff argues that the capital amount that was paid,
does not
include
mora
interest in the statement of loan account, due to
its internal processes and loan management system. The
plaintiff argues
that the plaintiff is not pursuing contractual
interest, but
mora
interest which is based on the failure to
comply with the terms of the payments. The plaintiff argues
that
mora
interest is applicable where no interest was agreed
specifically.
Legal
position
[4]
The summary judgment procedure is a
drastic remedy, intended to
enable a plaintiff with an unassailable claim to obtain swift relief.
It was never intended to shut
out a defendant who raises a genuine
dispute of fact or law. Where there is a reasonable possibility that
the defence advanced
may succeed at trial, the court should exercise
its discretion in favour of granting leave to defend.
[5]
In
Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd
1976 (1) SA 418
(A)
the
Court of Appeal (as it was then known) held as follows at 426A-C:
“
Accordingly,
one of the ways in which a defendant may successfully oppose a claim
for summary judgment is by satisfying the
Court by affidavit
that he has a bona fide defence to the claim. Where the
defence is based upon facts, in the sense
that material facts alleged
by the plaintiff in his summons, or combined summons, are disputed or
new facts are alleged constituting
a defence, the Court does not
attempt to decide these issues or to determine whether or not there
is a balance of probabilities
in favour of the one party or the
other. All that the Court enquires into is: (a) whether the
defendant has 'fully' disclosed
the nature and grounds of his defence
and the material facts upon which it is founded, and (b) whether
on the facts so
disclosed the defendant appears to have, as to either
the whole or part of the claim, a defence which is both bona
fide and
good in law.”
[6]
The above principles were confirmed
in the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint
Venture
2009 (5) SA 1
(SCA) as follows:
“
[31] So too in
South Africa, the summary judgment procedure was not intended to
'shut (a defendant) out from defending', unless
it was very clear
indeed that he had no case in the action. It was intended to
prevent sham defences from defeating the rights
of parties by
delay, and at the same time causing great loss to plaintiffs who were
endeavouring to enforce their rights.
[32] The rationale for
summary judgment proceedings is impeccable. The procedure is not
intended to deprive a defendant with a triable
issue or a
sustainable defence of her/his day in court. After almost a century
of successful application in our courts, summary
judgment proceedings
can hardly continue to be described as extraordinary. Our courts,
both of first instance and at appellate
level, have during that time
rightly been trusted to ensure that a defendant with a triable issue
is not shut out. In the Maharaj case
at 425G - 426E,
Corbett JA was keen to ensure, first, an examination of whether there
has been sufficient disclosure by a defendant
of the nature and
grounds of his defence and the facts upon which it is founded. The
second consideration is that the defence so
disclosed must be both
bona fide and good in law. A court which is satisfied that this
threshold has been crossed is then bound
to refuse summary judgment.
Corbett JA also warned against requiring of a defendant the precision
apposite to pleadings. However,
the learned judge was equally astute
to ensure that recalcitrant debtors pay what is due to a creditor.”
[7]
This Court thus has to exercise its judicial discretion in
determining whether the plaintiff has an unassailable claim.
Analysis
[8]
It is common cause that the plaintiff does not seek contractual
interest on the capital amount, but
mora
interest.
[9]
The plaintiff’s entitlement to
mora
interest cannot be
established with an analysis of the documents before this Court.
[10]
The claim is thus not unassailable and as such not suitable for
summary judgment.
The defendant should be granted leave to
enter appearance to defend.
Cost
[11]
The general principle is that the successful party is entitled to its
cost.
[12]
However, the issue of legal fees is also in dispute in
casu.
[13]
On this basis I find it in the interest of justice that the cost of
this summary
judgment be cost in the cause.
Order
[14]
In the premise, the following order is made:
(i)
The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
(ii)
The defendants / respondents are granted leave to defend
the action.
(iii)
The costs of this application shall be costs in the cause.
FMM REID
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
NORTH WEST DIVISION
MAHIKENG
SEATED AT GAUTENG
NORTH, PRETORIA
DATE
RESERVED:
9 FEBRUARY 2026
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
4 MAY 2026
APPEARANCES:
For
plaintiff / applicant:
ADV
SCULLEN
Instructed
by:
BARNARD
INC. ATTORNEYS
REF:
LOTTER/MAT15673/RN
For
defendants / respondents:
ADV
MOHAMMED
Instructed
by:
MUKANSI
ATTORNEYS
REF:
WW MUKANTSI / WPI / MAT30/2023