2
acting in their interest, to obtain interim and final protection orders
accompanied by warrants of arrest that may be executed promptly in the event
that a repetition of violence is threatened or carried out. The Act defines
domestic violence in deliberately broad terms (section 1). The Act also
overrides the common law test for the grant of a final interdict and any
associated remedial discretion that a court would ordinarily enjoy. A court must
issue a final protection order merely upon proof on a balance of probabilities
that an act of domestic violence has been committed (section 6 (4)).
2 However, this generous protective regime is open to inappropriate use. In this
case, the terms of the Domestic Violence Act have been stretched well beyond
their reasonable purposive meaning. The appellant, IKM, is divorced from the
respondent, GRM. Although the applicable matrimonial property regime was
disputed in the divorce proceedings, the Regional Court found, in the course
of granting a decree of divorce, that the parties’ marriage was out of
community of property, but subject to the accrual system. We were informed
at the hearing of this matter that an appeal has been lodged, out of time,
against that conclusion, but we are presently required to deal with the facts as
the Regional Court found them.
3 Before the divorce proceedings were finalised, on 8 November 2024, GRM
laid a complaint of domestic violence in the District Court and obtained an
interim protection order against IKM. He claimed that IKM had caused him
psychological harm when, on 18 October 2024, she went to his place of work
to collect a car she owned, had purchased for his use, on which she was
making all the payments and for which she retained a set of keys. GRM was
3
not present at the time. He had left the car in the company parking lot before
leaving for Cape Town. IKM informed the company security guards that she
was there to collect her car. The security guards were naturally cautious, but
allowed IKM to take the car after they contacted GRM to tell him what was
happening, and after the police reviewed IKM’s ownership documentation and
were satisfied that IKM had the right to take the car. A few of GRM’s personal
items were removed from the car before it was driven away. Those items were
given to the security guards for safe-keeping.
4 GRM expanded his complaint with a further incident that he said took place in
2019, during which IKM was alleged to have thrown an ornament of some sort
at him in the parties’ living room, and with a threat GRM said IKM had uttered
during a joint therapy session, also in 2019. Since the District Court declined
to grant relief in respect of these alleged incidents, and there is no cross-
appeal against that refusal, we need not consider these aspects of the
complaint.
5 The sole question before us in this appeal is whether IKM’s removal of the car
from GRM’s company parking lot on 18 October 2024 constituted an act of
domestic violence under the Act. The District Court found that it did, and it
granted an order restraining IKM from going to GRM’s workplace again without
his consent. The District Court also restrained IKM from entering GRM’s home
until the divorce proceedings then pending between the parties had been
concluded.
6 The District Court’s decision is inadequately reasoned. The Magistrate simply
asserted that what IKM did constituted “emotional and psychological abuse”.
4
That assertion was made without pointing to any relevant evidence, and it
cannot be sustained. While attending at GRM’s workplace without his consent
is conduct that might count as domestic violence, section 1 of the Act makes
clear that such conduct must, in addition, harm GRM, or inspire the reasonable
belief that harm may be caused to him. GRM said that the incident caused him
actual psychological harm. He claimed that the incident had put him in fear of
IKM. He also claimed that he was afraid that IKM would start trying to remove
possessions from his place of residence.
7 As far as I can see, though, GRM did nothing in the proceedings before the
District Court to specify the sense in which IKM’s conduct placed him in fear.
Nor did he lay the factual foundation for any reasonable belief that IKM might
try to take things from his house. It is hard to see how GRM could have feared
for his own safety, since he was not present at the time IKM removed the car.
It is at least possible that the removal of the car might have caused GRM some
sort of psychological anguish, but that was not alleged before the District
Court, and no evidence of that was led. I do not think that the removal of the
car could in itself have inspired any particular fear or anguish, and the District
Court did not conclude that it did.
8 It follows that there was no basis for the District Court’s ultimate decision that
IKM had committed an act of domestic violence. That is not the same as
saying that what IKM did was either appropriate or lawful. It may have been
an act of spoliation (although, given that IKM retained a set of keys, the fact
that the parties were probably joint possessors of the vehicle might have
complicated any such complaint). GRM might also reasonably have felt that
6
This judgment was prepared by Judge Wilson, with whom Judge Wentzel agrees. It is
handed down electronically by circulation to the parties or their legal representatives
by email, by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines, and by
publication of the judgment to the South African Legal Information Institute. The date
for hand-down is deemed to be 7 May 2026.
HEARD ON: 30 April 2026
DECIDED ON: 7 May 2026
For the Appellant: D Boyce
Instructed by Tracy Sischy Attorneys
For the Respondent: No appearance