JUDGMENT
1
SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted
from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case No : 2025- 119922
Date : 04.03.2026
In the matter between
10
BMW FINANCIAL SERVICES Plaintiff / Applicant
(SOUTH AFRICA) PTY LTD
and
SEGOOA, HARRIET BASETSANA Defendant / Respondent
J U D G M E N T
MOU LTRIE J : The applicant seeks summary judgment in
relation to a claim in an action instituted as cedent,
pursuant to the respondent’s breach of an instalment sale 20
agreement in respect of a motor vehicle.
Although the respondent opposes the application,
upon entering the court at 12h 00 today, being the scheduled
time for the hearing, I found only counsel for the applicant
present. I enquired as to whether she had any information
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE : NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES : NO
(3) REVISED
JUDGMENT
2
regarding an appearance on behalf of the respondent . She
informed me that she had telephoned Mr Selebi , the
attorney for the respondent , who had advised her that he
had briefed counsel (as it turned out, this was a reference
to Mr Raulinga, an attorney with rights of appearance) to
represent the respondent , and that the representative was
“just parking” and would be in Court shortly.
I therefore agreed that the matter would stand down
until 12h 20. The respondent’s representative did not arrive
by 12 h20, and I then proceeded with the hearing in the 10
absence of a representative for the respondent . At 12h50
the Court was forced to rise due to an interruption of
electricity .
The hearing then reconvened at 14 h00, whereupon to
my surprise Mr Raulinga introduced himself as the
representative for the respondent . I enquired from him as
to his lateness, for which he apologised, and he indicated
that he had not come to court earlier because he had “been
given the impression that the matter would settle” , but that
when it had not settled by 11 h30 , he had left his office in 20
Rosebank to attend Court. W hile I attempted to obtain from
Mr Raulinga a comprehensi ble explanation as to why he
could still not have been in Court by 12h50 when the C ourt
had risen, especially since he was apparently “just parking”
at 12h20, he was not able to do so. As I have said,
JUDGMENT
3
however, he did apologise, and I allowed him to address
me.
The merits of the matter have effectively been
conceded by the respondent , both in the written heads of
argument and in oral argument before me. It is conceded
that the respondent fell behind on her instalments under the
agreement , and for that reason the applicant was entitled,
as a matter of law , to cancel and to claim repossession of
the vehicle.
The summary judgment that is sought is only in 10
relation to the cancellation and in relation to the
repossession of the vehicle itself, which is an immediate
consequence of the cancellation. In the circumstances, at
least in relation to pray er s one and two (to which the
application is limited ), the applicant is, as a matter of law,
at least prima facie entitled to the summary judgment.
In her affidavit opposing summary judgment, the
respondent raised a whole raft of alleged defences, none of
which appear to me to avail her in any manner whatsoever.
Of those defences, the only ones that Mr Raulinga persisted 20
with were the following.
Firstly, on the question of jurisdiction, Mr Raulinga
attempted to persuade me that the Court had no
geographical jurisdiction over the respondent on the basis
that she is domiciled within the geographical area of the
JUDGMENT
4
Pretoria High Court. I then engaged with Mr Raulinga over
the relevance of the notices that had been published by the
Minister in the Government Gazette in January 2016 and
December 2015 under section 6(3) of the Superior Courts
Act , 10 of 2013 regarding the jurisdiction of the Court.
Although Mr Raulinga accepted and acknowledged the
existence of those notices, he attempted to argue on the
basis of the authority of Standard Bank v Mpongo 2021 (6)
SA 403 (SCA) that they were not of application. The
argument is incorrect, miscon ceived, misguided, and 10
unavailing. T his is well -established in a range of cases (cf.
Isibonelo Property Services (Pty) Ltd v Uchemek World
Cargo Link Freight CC and Others [2023] ZAGPJHC 156 ).
The respondent’s next contention is that the affidavit
in support of summary judgment is invalid because the
attorney who commissioned it was admitted under the Legal
Practice Act 28 of 2014, and not under the Attorneys Act , 53
of 1979 as specified in paragraph 2(b) of the designation
notice ( GN 903 in GG 19033 of 10 July 1998, as most
recently amended in GN 6896 in GG 53767 of 2 December 20
2025) published under the Justices of the Peace and
Commissioners of Oaths Act, 16 of 1963. This contention is
not sustainable in view of s ection 12(1) of the Interpretation
Act , 33 of 1957, which provides that :
“Where a law repeals and re- enacts with
JUDGMENT
5
or without modifications , any provision of
a former law, references in any other law
to the provision so appealed shall, unless
the contrary intention appears, be
construed as references to the provisions
so re -enacted. ”
The next point that Mr Raulinga attempted to advance
was the contention that the applicant had fail ed to engage
in a fair manner with the respondent over proposals that
she had made in seeking to bring her arrears up to date. 10
Mr Raulinga did not suggest to me that any of those
attempts had been undertaken in terms of any particular
section of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005 and sought to
rely solely on section 3 thereof. He was ultimately
constrained to concede that this section affords no person
any right. It simply sets out the purposes of the Act : the
rights of consumers, as well as the obligations and rights of
the various other participants in the credit market are set
out elsewhere in the Act. And as I have said, Mr Raulinga
was not able to identify any particular section giving rise to 20
a defence.
Mr Raulinga did attempt to persist in alleging that
there were various fraudulent misrepresentations made in
various documents. In the first place, it is contended that
in an Affidavit of Service , an employee of the applicant had
JUDGMENT
6
incorrectly stated that the section 129 letter had in fact
been delivered or collected by the respondent or a family
member. It is also contended that it is incorrectly stated
that a N otice of Bar had been delivered. Even if I were to
accept that these affidavits contained inaccuracies (and I
put it no higher than that) or even if I were, for the
purposes of the judgment, to accept that they contained
intentional falsehoods, I do not accept that that would
undermine the right of the applicant to obtain summary
judgment in this matter. The reason for that is , as Mr 10
Raulinga very correctly conceded , those statements would
have no effect whatsoever on the right of the applicant to
relief, because the section 129 letter had, in fact, been
delivered in terms of the requirements under the
Constitutional Court’s judgment in Sebola and Another v
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another [2012] ZACC
11; 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC); 2012 (8) BCLR 785 (CC) . In the
circumstances, I wish to make it clear that I make no finding
as to whether or not , in fact, any perjury or fraud has been
committed, but I do not consider that it would be relevant to 20
reach any conclusion in that regard. As I have said, on the
merits, there is no defence, and in the circumstances, the
applicant is entitled to summary judgment for conformation
of the cancellation of the agreement, as well as an order
requiring the return of the vehicle.
JUDGMENT
7
The question of costs has exercised my mind in this
matter. Before expressing my views in this regard, I wish to
indicate that the submissions advanced by both
representatives before me were equal ly disappointing.
Neither representative appeared to be fully prepared. And
in fact, both representatives appeared to not be aware of
critical and relevant law in relation to the issues that have
been raised. However, their clients should not suffer as a
result of that.
Ultimately, I conclude that the correct approach is 10
simply that the costs should follow the cause and that the
respondent should pay the applicant’s costs. Of course, that
will, without specifying so, constitute a costs order on the
party -and- party scale including include the costs of counsel.
The failure to reference any particular scale will result in
the costs order for counsel being on scale “A”. In the
circumstances, I make the following order.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT is granted in favour of the
plaintiff / applicant against the defendant / respondent as
follows : 20
1. The plaintiff / applicant’s cancellation of the
instalment agreement is confirmed.
2. The Sheriff of the High Court is authorised to
attach, seize and hand over the following motor
vehicle to the plaintiff / applicant: BMW X3 XDrive
JUDGMENT
8
20d (G 01), Engine number 6[ … ], Chassis number
W[… ].
3. The defendant / respondent is ordered to pay the
plaintiff / applicant’s costs.
…………………………..
MOULTRIE J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
10
Hearing and judgment: 4 March 2026
Ex tempore judgment revised: 14 May 2026
For the plaintiff: S Masitenyane instructed by MacRobert Inc.
For the defendant: S Raulinga (attorney) on instruction from Selibi & Co.