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[2026] ZAGPJHC 464
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Hollard Insurance Company Limited v NJR Projects (Pty) Limited and Others (Application for Leave to Appeal) (2023/96485; 2024/8205) [2026] ZAGPJHC 464 (5 May 2026)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 2023/
96485
&
CASE
NUMBER: 2024/8205
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
In
the matter between: -
THE
HOLLARD INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
Applicant
and
NJR
PROJECTS (PTY) LIMITED
First respondent
NHLABANELE
JEOPHREY RAMAHLALEROA
Second respondent
PHEANE
EDWIN SODI
Third respondent
This
Judgment was handed down electronically and by circulation to the
parties’ legal
representatives
by way of email and shall be uploaded on Caselines. The date for hand
down
is deemed to be on 5
May 2026.
JUDGEMENT
ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
MALI
J
[1] The first
respondent under case number 96485/2023 (“Hollard”) seeks
leave to appeal against the applicant
(DBSA) and the third respondent
under case number 8205/2024 (“Mr Sodi”) applies for leave
to appeal against Hollard.
Both cases were argued together, and the
judgment which this leave to appeal is sought was delivered on 15
January 2025.
[2] The application
is brought in terms of
section 17(1)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of
2013
, which provides that leave to appeal may only be granted where
the court is of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable
prospect of success, or that there exists some other compelling
reason for the appeal to be heard, including the existence of
conflicting judgments.
[3]
The threshold imposed by
section 17(1)
is stringent. The use of the
word “only”, read with “would”, underscores
that leave to appeal is not to
be granted lightly. As recognised in
Mont
Chevaux Trust v Goosen
[1]
,
the standard has been raised beyond the mere arguments.
[4]
In
S
v Smith
[2]
,
it was held that reasonable prospects of success require a
dispassionate assessment of the facts and the law to determine
whether
a court of appeal could reasonably arrive at a different
conclusion. There must exist a sound, rational basis for such a
conclusion;
it is insufficient that the case is merely arguable. In
MEC
for Health Eastern Cape v Mkhitha
[3]
it is held that leave to appeal "must not be granted unless
there truly is a reasonable prospect of success" and "that
those prospects are not remote, but have a realistic chance of
succeeding"
[5] Hollard
advances several grounds of appeal. In essence, it contends that this
Court erred in finding that the advance
payment had not been fully
recouped; in its interpretation and application of the APG; in
permitting the correction of a payment
certificate; and in concluding
that any alleged non-compliance with the APG requirements was not
dispositive. It further contends
that the judgment gives rise to
conflicting authority. Mr Sodi aligns himself with these submissions.
[6] The central
premise underlying several of Hollard’s complaints is the
allegation of fraud in relation to the reissue
of the interim payment
certificate. That premise is unsustainable. No factual foundation was
laid to substantiate fraud, nor was
any evidence adduced to support
collusion between DBSA and the contractor. In the absence of proof,
the allegation cannot sustain
a reasonable prospect of success on
appeal.
[7] As to
recoupment, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the contractor
acknowledged an outstanding shortfall and sought
indulgence in
respect of repayment. The APG expressly permitted DBSA to regulate
its financial arrangements with the contractor
as it deemed fit.
There was no dispute between DBSA and the contractor regarding the
outstanding indebtedness.
[8] The complaint
regarding the correction of the payment certificate is similarly
without merit. Properly understood, the
correction occurred within a
context in which fraud was alleged but not proven. In those
circumstances, the finding that the certificate
could be corrected
does not conflict with established authority.
[9] Furthermore
there is no merit in the contention that the judgment is
at odds with prior decisions concerning
strict compliance with
guarantees. On the facts of this matter, the requirements of the APG
were satisfied in substance, and no
genuine conflict of authority
arises that would constitute a compelling reason for an appeal to be
heard.
[10] Viewed
cumulatively, the grounds advanced do not establish reasonable
prospects of success, nor do they disclose any
compelling reason
within the meaning of
section 17(1)(a)(ii).
[11] The
application for leave to appeal cannot succeed.
ORDER
1.
The application for leave to appeal in case
number 96495/2023 is dismissed with costs on Scale C.
2.
The application for leave to appeal in case
number 8205 /2024 is dismissed with costs on Scale C.
N.P
MALI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
REPRESANTATIVES
On behalf of Hollard
Insurance: R
Stockwell SC
And
I Posthumous
Instructed
by:
Moll Quibel & Associates
For the 3
rd
Respondent:
W Pye SC
And
N Loopoo
Instructed
by:
Bower & Turner Inc.
On behalf of
DBSA
Lee Segeels-Ncube
Instructed
by:
Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc.
Hearing Date:
14 April 2026
Delivery
date:
5 May 2026
[1]
2014 JDR 2325 LCC para 6
[2]
2012(1) SACR 567 (SCA) para 7
[3]
2016 JDR 2214 (SCA) Paras 6 to 10.