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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2026-053157
In the matter between:
In the matter between:
M[…] M[…] M[…] OBO S[…] M[…] Execution Creditor/
Applicant
And
FIRSTRAND BANK LTD First Respondent
VILAKAZI MARY Second Respondent
DAVIAS MARKOS GEORGE Third Respondent
BURGER JOHAN PETRUS Fourth Respondent
WINTERBOER THOMAS Fifth Respondent
NAIDOO PREMILLA DEVI Sixth Respondent
VON ZEUNER LOUIS LEON Seventh Respondent
ROSCHERR ZELDA Eight Respondent
SIBISI SIBUSISO PATRICK Ninth Respondent
ISAACS TAMARA CAROL Tenth Respondent
MAKOSHOLO PABALLO JOEL Eleventh Respondent
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED: YES/NO
______________ _________________________
DATE SIGNATURE
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ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Twelfth Respondent
SHERIFF CENTURION EAST Interested Party
JUDGMENT – LEAVE TO APPEAL
STRYDOM, J
[1] This is an application for urgent leave to appeal against my judgment delivered
on 30 March 2026, where I made the following order:
a. The application is struck off the roll for lack of urgency.
b. The applicant to pay the waste costs occasioned by the filing of this
application on scale C.
[2] Leave to appeal may only be given where a Court is of the opinion that—
a. the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
b. there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration.
[3] The applicant brought this application on an urgent basis for an order that the
1st to the 11th respondents and the R oad Accident Fund (‘the RAF’) be
ordered, and or be compelled, to comply with the applicant's writ of execution
obtained pursuant to a court order issued by the Polokwane High Court on 20
January 2026. Further, ancillary orders were sought and obtained, inter alia , to
permit reliance on hearsay evidence and to seek contempt of court orders
against the respondents. Final relief was sought.
[4] The matter was initially set down to be heard on Tuesday, 17 March 2026, but it
was heard on Friday, 20 March 2026. At the hearing, the Court made it clear
that the issue of urgency was to be decided upfront, but it also allowed some
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argument on the merits of the application, as this was the last opportunity to
hear arguments on the merits before the end of the urgent court week.
Moreover, the urgency of the matter could not be determined without proper
insight into the facts . I could not determine the urgency during the hearing, as
affidavits were still being filed during the urgent week. A replying affidavit was,
for instance, uploaded onto Caselines on Thursday evening. I was not informed
about this. By the time I heard the application, I had not had an opportunity to
read this affidavit.
[5] After the argument, I reserved judgment . On 30 March 2026, this Court
delivered a written judgment dealing quite extensively with how this matter was
placed on the urgent court roll . The Court concluded that, although some
urgency was established, the degree of urgency with which this application was
brought was not commensurate with the true urgency of the matter itself. The
matter was prematurely placed on the urgent roll without affording the
respondents sufficient time to file their answering affidavits. This resulted in the
late filing of answering affidavit s, and replying affidavits were filed even later.
For that reason, the Court struck the m atter off the roll for lack of urgency and
made no finding on the merits.
[6] The applicant in this application for leave to appeal argued that the C ourt
should grant leave to appeal because there was a reasonable prospect that
another court would reach a different conclusion. During the argument, the
Court engaged with counsel for the applicant and indicated to him that it had
not decided the merits of the matter. It was argued that the order effectively
amounted to a dismissal of the application. It was argued that the order might
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have been interlocutory , but that it would be in the interests of justice to grant
leave to appeal, as the C ourt was dealing with a minor child and, accordingly,
the best interests of the minor child should have been paramount.
[7] In deciding whether to grant leave to appeal, the first question is whether the
Court decided the merits of the application. If not, whether the decision on the
urgency is nevertheless appealable on the basis that the interest of justice
would permit leave to appeal to be granted.
[8] On behalf of the respondent , it was argued that the matter was not appealable
because the Court had never decided the merits and had struck it from the roll
for lack of urgency . It was further argued that the Court exercised its wide
discretion in this regard and that it is unlikely that a Court of Appeal would
interfere with th is Court’s exercise of this discretion. It was argued that an
appeal would have no practical effect as the grounds for urgency mentioned in
the application papers had come and gone. T he cut -off date for the minor
child’s admission into the care facility has lapsed, rendering this issue moot.
[9] From a reading of my judgment and the order made I made, it is clear that I
never made a decision on the merits of the matter . I did not decide the issue
pertaining to the execution of the writ of attachment or the contempt of court ,
nor have I decided whether the applicant was entitled to obtain the RAF's bank
statements.
[10] I decided the matter after considering only the urgency of this application.
[11] I am satisfied that this decision is not appealable as the ruling did not finally
dispose of the merits of the matter . The finding on the urgency of th e matter
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was interlocutory in nature. After the order was made, the applicant still had the
option available to enroll the matter on the ordinary opposed motion roll for
consideration; alternatively, t he applicant could have set the matter down in
another urgent court if the applicant could again make out a case for urgency.
This could have been achieved by amending the notice of motion and filing
supplementary affidavits if continued urgency could be shown. The applicant
elected not to pursue these avenues but rather applied for leave to appeal.
[12] I decided the matter on the basis that the applicant failed to show the
extremely high degree of urgency with which she approached the urgent court.
This was not a final decision, nor was it a decision that should go on appeal in
the interest of justice.
[13] In my view, my decision on the urgency of the matter was not appealable, and
for this reason alone, the application for leave to appeal should be refused
[14] The order of the C ourt is that the application for leave to appeal is dismissed
with costs on scale A.
___________________________
R. STRYDOM
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Heard on: 29 April 2026
Delivered on: 05 May 2026
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Adv. T. Moloi
Instructed by: Malatji S Attorneys
For the 1st to 11th Respondents: Adv. N. Konstantinides SC
Instructed by: Van Hulsteyns Attorneys
For the 12
th Respondent: Adv. Adv. M. Mogano
Instructed by: State Attorney – Johannesburg